National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Judge and Lord Hope of Craighead

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise for not being present at Second Reading; I was doing other business in the House. I feel particularly humbled, because if my noble friend Lord Carlile thinks that he was the junior to my noble friend Lord Anderson and therefore was short, I have reverted to something I have not been since 1964: a pupil. Pupils are allowed to take notes, but they are not allowed to say anything, and, if they do say anything, that marks the end of their pupillage—they are not wanted any longer. I hope noble Lords will forgive this pupil if I say just a few words in support of my noble friends.

Just look at Clause 28 and what it means. It means that we are creating an immunity from prosecution before any facts are known, before any inquiry has been made and before a crime has been committed. We are, in effect, rubber-stamping the possibility that a crime may be committed with no further investigation in public. We all understand that there must be cases of immunity: sometimes because the facts require it and sometimes because, to get at the facts, people are offered immunity if they tell the truth so that the worst features of a case can be grasped. We also recognise authorisations; that is an ordinary, elementary part of the system.

However, what if we say to a special individual or a special group of individuals, “Ah, you will not be prosecuted, whatever you do in any circumstances, because you are immune”? I hate to keep using this phrase in this Chamber, as I do from time to time, because your Lordships all understand it, but what is left of the rule of law if some of our citizens are entitled to break it with immunity and commit crimes with immunity? There is a perfectly good defence in the current Act, as the law stands, and there may be better defences. Indeed, I agree with and support the amendment proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile. But what does Section 50 provide? It provides that an individual may, in circumstances that would otherwise be an offence, put forward that it was reasonable. That is a very good start. He may want the reasonableness of his behaviour—he will always want the reasonableness of his behaviour, if he really wants to prove that it is reasonable—to require an examination of all the facts. What happened? What was the situation? But that would be a defence, not an immunity, and there is a huge difference.

We all recognise, for example, that if someone is charged with an offence of violence, murder or serious bodily harm, of course he or she may say that they were acting in reasonable self-defence. They may ask for the circumstances to be looked at as they were. “Do not demand perfection”—as we do not—“in the face of an upturned knife or a gun, or a mob coming at me. Make sure that it is reasonable.” If the prosecution fails to demonstrate that it was not reasonable self-defence, there has never been a crime at all. It is decriminalised, but that is not immunity.

When I looked at this, I asked myself whether the House of Commons Library statement on it was correct. It says:

“The provision therefore appears to be intended to extend immunity from criminal prosecution to actions which could not be proved to have been reasonable.”


I agree with that analysis, and I would like the Minister to refute it if he can. But that is rather shocking, is it not? You can argue that maybe the burden of proof in Section 50 should be amended so that the burden is not on the defendant to prove that he acted reasonably, and it is for the prosecution to prove that he acted unreasonably. You might do that—and you might, as I said earlier, create different defences. You might create specific defences for different parts of those covered by Clause 28, such as the Armed Forces and, if I can call it so compendiously, the Secret Service.

Can the Minister then ask himself what the difference is between acting reasonably in Section 50 as it stands and acting in the proper exercise of the particular function, as is proposed here? Are we really going to legislate that an unreasonable exercise of function must always be treated by previous decision as a proper one, for which there can be no consequences? If so, there is no difference. What are we doing? Is it consistent with the rule of law to grant anyone, or any group of people, immunity from prosecution for serious crime before any facts have been examined? While we are about the rule of law, where does that leave the unfortunate victim of the crime? It leaves them with nothing.

If it is felt that we need to amend any part of the law, as is proposed here, we need to amend Section 50 as I have suggested and we need to use the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, proposed. We must create a specific defence that recognises that there are particular circumstances where criminal liability will not follow. We must create a reasonable self-defence issue for those who carry out these duties for us.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I think we need to remind ourselves that the United Kingdom is a party to the torture convention. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, raised a red flag in my mind because, when I saw the word “torture” and the implication in his amendment that Clause 28 as it stands could extend to granting immunity for acts of torture, that seemed to me plainly contrary to our obligations under the torture convention.

It is worth remembering two things about that convention. The first is that all states parties to it are prohibited from authorising torture in any circumstance. It is also an unusual convention because it creates a universal jurisdiction; in other words, any state party which finds somebody who has committed torture within its jurisdiction, wherever he comes from, can prosecute that individual for the act of torture. The idea of granting immunity from acts of torture, which is what this clause seems to do, is a false idea because you certainly cannot do that with regard to other states parties to the torture convention.

It seems to me that Clause 28 is fraught with danger for that reason. Therefore, I very much support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson.

Public Order Bill

Debate between Lord Judge and Lord Hope of Craighead

Committee stage
Wednesday 16th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord because I am coming on to deal with exactly that. Indeed, it leads me into the next paragraph in my notes. I am just making the point that one has to consider the practical consequences for prosecutors and the police of leaving this expression as wide as it is and without qualification of some kind. Of course, I am pointing to a particular qualification that needs to be made.

The Supreme Court, in a well-known case called Ziegler in 2021, held that protesters had been rightly acquitted of obstructing a highway when protesting about an armament fair. That is not an easy judgment to read or understand, not helped by the fact that there were two dissents in a court of five, but it has been thought to support the view that invoking the public interest defence in that context is acceptable. However, a series of decisions in the Court of Appeal have narrowed the window that Ziegler left open. The point is that we are dealing now, in the offences that we are considering in the Bill, with offences that require proof of serious disruption. The Court of Appeal’s point is that that changes the balance between what is proportionate and what is not, which is at the heart of this issue. The proof of serious disruption was not a necessary element of the offence of obstructing the highway considered in Ziegler, but it is important to notice that in our offences it is a vital and essential element.

The Colston case was the subject of the most recent Court of Appeal decision, which is Attorney-General’s reference no. 1 of 2022. The court was asked to rule on what principles judges should apply when determining whether the convention rights are engaged by a potential conviction for acts of damage during a protest, and when the issue of proportionality should be withdrawn from the jury. The court held that the convention did not provide protection to those who cause criminal damage during a protest that is violent, not peaceful. That was the Colston case.

However, it went on to say that a conviction for causing significant damage to property, even if inflicted in a way that could be called peaceful, could not be held to be disproportionate either. The prosecution in the Colston case was correct, both because the toppling of the statue in that case was violent and, as a separate issue, because the damage to the statue was significant. The words “serious disruption”, which appear in these offences, seem to fall into the same category. In other words, a person who engages in criminal conduct that causes serious disruption cannot take advantage of this defence.

It has been pointed out that a case raising this issue is expected to be heard by the Supreme Court before Christmas. I think there are problems with that. The judgment is not likely to be given until well into next year because the court takes a considerable time to consider all the issues. I think one would be fortunate if the judgment were out before the early summer. This is a problem that needs to be solved now, and I will come back to the question of the magistrates’ court and the problems that could arise there.

I stress again that the offences we are dealing with here all require proof of serious disruption. That is why the reasonable grounds defence should be removed altogether or qualified in the way I am suggesting, to confine it to circumstances that affect the position of the individual on the ground at the time he or she is causing the disruption. That qualification would be welcome, and undoubtedly useful, in many cases. Without it, I suggest that the whole defence be removed.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I am very sorry that I was not able to speak at Second Reading. I shall be very brief. I share the various arguments presented to the Committee about the vagueness of this legislation and the ineptitude of the drafting that leaves so many criminal offences so vaguely described. I support the basic premise of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. We are about to legislate in a situation where there is a decision of the Supreme Court, with two dissenting judgments out of five; further decisions of the Court of Appeal are rowing back from the majority decision in Ziegler; we have the Colston decision, which will have to be reconciled with Ziegler; and we know that the Supreme Court is looking at the issue again.

What on earth are we supposed to do when we have the opportunity to make it clear what the answer is to these problems, revealed by the number of cases to which I have referred? We have the opportunity, and we should take it. We really should not just say, “You carry on sorting it out”. How many more times does the issue have to be examined in higher courts? If the issues are being examined in magistrates’ courts, there will inevitably be references to cases stated and so on. If we do not accept the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, or at least the thrust behind it, we are sending a slightly chaotic situation back to the courts when we could clear it up.

Subsidy Control Bill

Debate between Lord Judge and Lord Hope of Craighead

Committee stage
Wednesday 2nd February 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Judge (CB)]

What is the point of Clause 47(7) if the object is to allow, in appropriate circumstances, a deferral or a delay in the publication of the information?

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

Might I add to my noble and learned friend’s question? To whom is the information to be given? Who needs to know about this direction? It is rather important to understand how the scheme is supposed to work. Presumably, the publication is to serve a purpose; one needs to know to whom it will be disseminated.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Judge and Lord Hope of Craighead

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, we have not had time yet for all of us to read the report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee or, for that matter, that of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, whose paper is entitled Democracy Denied? The Urgent Need to Rebalance Power between Parliament and the Executive. I have read that, but I did not get round to the first.

We have to support our committees—that is why we have them; they are cross party. This is a tiny amendment of significance. The amendment does not propose any interference with the power to address the problem of serious disruption. It is not intended to address that. The submission is that the way in which the legislation is drafted, in Clause 55(4) and Clause 56(6), is completely unnecessary to enable justice to be done in whichever way the Government think it is appropriate for justice to be done.

Secondly—this is a bit naughty of me—I think the provision reflects a growing constitutional wheeze, what I call the “blank cheque wheeze”. It is this: the Executive tell the legislature to please legislate, and the legislature legislates—and, when it legislates, the Executive then tell the legislature what the legislation means. That is a blank cheque that we are being asked to give in these clauses.

As to the words, I know that it is quite late at night and so I shall be short, but do any of us here not understand two simple English words—“severe disruption”? I mean, come on, even the lawyers among us cannot think of a lot of differences. “Severe”, “serious”—get out your thesaurus. They are simple English words, and the two words put together make a perfectly clear picture of what is being addressed and sought to be protected.

This is unnecessary and a wheeze. We really must not allow the Executive to start treating this way of legislating—called in more elegant terms tertiary legislation —by saying, “We’ll tell you what it means when we get around to it”. The Secretary of State has started to tell us what it means. The place where we should be told what it means, if it does not mean what it says—and I think that it does mean what it says—is in a definition clause within the primary legislation.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I put my name to Amendment 308 in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Judge and shall say a few words in support of what he has just said. It was quite clear from the reply by the Minister to the previous group that these words, “serious disruption”, are the key to the proportionality of the clauses that we are considering. They are absolutely central to the whole proportionality of the scheme. Of course, if something does not amount to a serious disruption, the police take no action; if it does amount to that, within the ordinary meaning of the word, the police have authority to do so.

I mention that because, while I support entirely what my noble and learned friend has just said, there is an element of risk here, which I think the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, hinted at in his comments in the last group. It is the risk of lowering the threshold. Why else is the power being taken? If it is not in the present Home Secretary’s mind to lower the threshold, the risk is there. It is for that reason that I suggest there is a risk here that should be avoided.

There is also the point about the clarity of the legislation. One element of the rule of law is that the law should be accessible, and the more you attempt to define words by regulation and not in primary legislation, the more inaccessible the true meaning of the words becomes. It is not a way to go down—it is unnecessary, as my noble and learned friend said—and I hope very much that the Government do not proceed with this scheme.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Judge and Lord Hope of Craighead

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Wednesday 17th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I do not wish to be taken as suggesting that what works well in Scotland should necessarily be applied in England and Wales, but I think I am right in saying that there has been some attempt in Scotland to allow juries to be remote. The problem one has is that a judge cannot be in two places at once. I think it was thought more appropriate that the judge should be close to the place where the evidence was being taken, with the juries remote in some other room because of the need for social distancing and so on. My point is simply this: I suggest once again, with great respect, that the Minister should find out what has been happening in Scotland and what the experience has been. They may have decided, for the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that it should not be continued. I simply do not know, but it is worth exploring to find out exactly what the position is.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, despite Covid—I know it is not over yet, but despite the 18 months we have had—I have not heard it suggested that one solution to the problems that the courts face is that juries should act remotely. We have trial by judge and jury. I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, but I want to be just a bit more down to the realities of it. What happens in court when the jury is unhappy with itself or with some of its members? The judge has a most delicate task to perform. On my old circuit—I am sorry to say that the Midlands circuit has this—one juror smelled; he stank, and the jury were extremely unhappy about it. Can all that be done remotely, when the judge is responsible for looking after the interests and needs of the jury as a whole? Do we send messages down the line? How is it accommodated? It requires huge tact, skill and, I think, the personal touch.

My other concern about this provision was touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—it is the usual one, I am afraid; you have all heard me talk about it. Why should we give these huge powers when we do not need to give them?

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Judge and Lord Hope of Craighead

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 8th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I want to provide my support for a remark made by the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, in the course of his speech. He said that the emphasis should be more on disqualification than on imprisonment. One can understand that, when a jury or magistrate is considering what to make of the facts of the case, the threat of imprisonment may influence the decision to go for the softer option rather than the harder one, whereas disqualification does not have that connotation at all. There is a lot of force in the noble Lord’s point.

I also support the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. She talked about the patchwork of offences and the need for a much more balanced approach that looks at all the various offences across the board, rather than fitting together one or two things. That is what this enormously long Bill, which, I suggest, is really not suited for this kind of treatment, does.

Having made those remarks by way of support, if one examines the wording of the proposed new clause, one can see that it is a little risky to try to find new wording to replace the well-understood, well-trusted and frequently used phraseology that we have at the moment. For example, in the new meaning of dangerous driving, we are told that that would be where somebody

“commits a breach of … the Highway Code in a way that causes inconvenience, intimidation or danger”.

The word “inconvenience”, which is one of the three alternatives, does not seem appropriate for dangerous driving. I suggest that, if this is to go any further, this word should come out because it is not descriptive of the effect of dangerous driving at all. Similarly, the next subsection defines “careless or inconsiderate driving” and includes “intimidation”, which does not really fit with what one is talking about when one talks of careless driving or driving without due consideration for other road users.

I draw these points to the Minister’s attention because they show that it is a quite a delicate matter to alter the existing wording, which I would wish to preserve instead of trying to introduce a fresh definition.

Finally on definitions, in subsection (4), the words “serious injury” are equated with

“causing death by careless driving”

and the proposal is to insert “or serious injury”. What amounts to a serious injury is difficult to define but, if one is moving in that direction, one would have to introduce additional words, such as “serious injury”. One finds an example in Clause 66, where there is a definition by reference to the existing standards in the criminal court.

I am not sure that that goes far enough when one considers the consequences of some of these offences and the threat of imprisonment, but one has to give very careful thought to what is really meant by “serious injury”. Is somebody breaking their wrist due to falling on the ground enough? Is something that requires them to go to hospital enough? Or is one looking at something much graver? That brings it closer to the idea that one is trying to bridge what might seem to be a gap, where somebody is injured so seriously that it is only by the skill of a surgeon that death is avoided—I can quite see that there is something that needs to be addressed there—but just using the words “serious injury” may mean walking into a trap that it would be better to avoid.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly. The Road Traffic Act and all its many successors have left us with a law in which a simple textbook, Wilkinson’s Road Traffic Offences, is about as fat as a successful marrow. It is absurd that our law is so complicated on something that everybody, or nearly all of us, does every day. Our children will learn it; the day they get to the age of 17, they will want to drive, and so on and so forth.

I entirely agree that this is a patched-up proposal. Personally, I strongly support the idea that we should get this review conducted and analyse exactly what it is that we want to achieve with a modern law relating to road traffic. That law should address not merely the conduct of a person at the wheel of a car but the conduct of a person on an e-scooter or a person riding a bicycle, some of whom are appalling in the way they ride. It should also include pedestrians who step out into a path and make a driver pull away, causing them to knock somebody else over. We need synchronisation of our laws on these issues, which is why I support the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley.

That said, I want to make a different point and indicate how strongly opposed I am to a proposal that would enable a prison sentence to be imposed on a motorist who was not driving dangerously or taking deliberate risks, and was not under the influence of drink or drugs, but simply made a mistake while at the wheel. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that “road traffic accident” is not the right phrase to use. It is a road traffic incident, which must be examined, as the evidence shows.

You can, perfectly reasonably, accuse someone who drives without due care and attention of being negligent, but criminal culpability is inevitably low because it is negligent. Driving without due care and attention is an offence; it is negligence. However, we do not send people to prison for negligent mistakes causing serious injury in the context of, for example, the medical profession. A mistake is made. It is negligent. There is an action. Various steps are taken in respect of the doctor, the nurse, or whoever it might be. The result to the victim is very serious. So, when we examine whether a doctor or a nurse may be prosecuted, we look not for evidence of negligence, a lack of due care or a mistake, but for something demonstrating that he or she fell far below the standards required by that profession of that individual in that job at that time. We must be careful not to introduce a different standard of approach to motoring offences. We must remember that this offence is also committed by the young mum whose children in the back of the car start howling because there is a wasp in the car, in the way that children do. Is she momentarily distracted? Yes. Should she have stayed rigidly looking to the front? I suppose so. Is it realistic to think that she, or most mums, would stay that way when her child is screaming in the back? No. Let us keep it realistic.

I am also troubled by the way we approach consequences in the whole of this road traffic law. We have situations where identical culpability can lead to completely different sentences because there has been a death. Of course a death is dreadful, but does the offence become more serious because there are two or three deaths? Personally, I think it does, but there is a question that needs to be answered: how far are we addressing the culpability of the driving as against the consequences? Death by dangerous driving is no trouble; after all, you are driving dangerously. Drink driving is no trouble; you choose to have a drink. Driving to take risks and show off to your friends is no trouble; you are driving dangerously. However, we need to be cautious about the introduction of prison sentences for people whose standard of driving amounts to negligence, not gross negligence.

Extradition (Provisional Arrest) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Judge and Lord Hope of Craighead

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 5th March 2020 Grand Committee

[Lord Judge]

My Lords, I support Amendment 9. As I indicated at Second Reading, I support the Bill. There is a great deal to be said for the proposition that there should be reciprocity between countries that respect the rule of law on the administration of criminal justice. However, I strongly support this amendment; I see absolutely no inconsistency between the two propositions.

The reasons why are very simple. We all know that there are countries in the world that do not respect the rule of law. I will not set about trying to give your Lordships a list because the list itself changes. Countries that respected the rule of law no longer do. Weimar Germany did; Hitler’s Germany did not. This is a moveable feast.

My concern is that we are giving the Secretary of State wide powers to add different nations to the list by regulations. At Second Reading I went through the possible reasons, and they are still there: political motivation, getting a good deal on a treaty, the fact that we need a bit of support on this or that, so we put a country on the list. There is a whole series of reasons why, in years to come, since this Act will be in force for many years, Ministers—not, I hasten to assert, either of these Ministers—will think it appropriate to add to the list countries that this House and the other place together think are inappropriate to be added.

We are doing this by way of regulation, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, pointed out. The consequence is that the Prime Minister of the day or his acolyte—and we are talking about a Prime Minister who would not perhaps respect the rule of law himself, but who knows what could happen—would insist on having a country that we in both Houses would regard as totally inappropriate to be a brother or sister nation on such a list and with whom we would think it quite inappropriate to have any sort of arrangement of this kind simply because it does not respect the rule of law. I have been through that.

What are our processes? They are that such a country could be included in a list of perfectly acceptable countries—the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said the Netherlands and Turkey—but can we just cut down a little further into that? It means that when the House considers the regulation, it will have to decide whether to exclude Turkey—to use the country that the noble Baroness used—because it is really rather important and because we greatly respect the Netherlands, or whether to reject Turkey and the Netherlands. Or, to go the other way, we must have the Netherlands, so we must therefore have Turkey. If one or other of these courses is taken—whichever way round it is—if there is any amendment, the whole thing falls to the ground. We will not want the Netherlands to fall to the ground, nor Denmark, France or Germany. There are many countries that we would want to espouse as colleagues in respect for the rule of law.

What is proposed in this amendment is utterly simple. What is the difficulty in doing it one country by another? It might take a little longer; there might a little more typing, a little more printing—we could even have all the countries, except the ones objected to, come through as a job lot. I gave a little cricketing analogy earlier and I am sorry that I bowled bouncers not googlies at the Minister. One of the most famous things ever said at a cricket match was when, in 1902, Hirst came out to bat against the Australians with 15 runs to get on a difficult wicket in the dark; the story goes that Rhodes met Hirst and exchanged the words, “We’ll get them in singles”. Let us get this done in singles.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I cannot match the noble and learned Lord’s eloquence, except I remember that Lord Bingham used to use that phrase to describe how judges should nudge the law forward gently, step by step, rather than sit hitting sixes and fours.

I support this amendment for the reasons that have been explained. There are two features of the issue that are worth bearing in mind. First, the standard that the Government have set, which was described by the Minister, is a relatively high standard and, therefore, we are not talking about large numbers. Indeed, the Schedule itself demonstrates that we are not expected to have a great list, they will come in twos or threes at the worst, preferably ones, as the amendment seeks. Secondly, the issue of a standard is something that we would wish to debate, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, demonstrated in his contribution. It is a great shame if we are masked, as it were, by having one good country on the list that we would not object to but which is in the kind of pairing that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, mentioned, so that we cannot really grapple with the one to which we are objecting because the instrument is not amendable.

With great respect, this seems a very sensible amendment that meets the problem of the non-amendable instrument without at the same time creating an insuperable difficulty for the Government. It enables a debate to take place that would have a real point to it instead of one that really does not have a point because one part of the list—if it is a list—is unobjectionable. I very much support the amendment.

Healthcare (International Arrangements) Bill

Debate between Lord Judge and Lord Hope of Craighead

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 12th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge]

My Lords, I have already spoken warmly about the efforts by the noble Baroness, Lady Blackwood, and referred to us having a little touch of Blackwood in this House. Let it continue. I should like what has happened today to be habit-forming.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Perhaps I may add a few words to those of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. I was particularly concerned by Clause 5(3), as the noble Baroness may remember, and am delighted to see it removed because, as worded, it gave rise to a lot of problems. Together with the other amendments proposed, there is considerable improvement and I am most grateful.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Judge and Lord Hope of Craighead

Report stage (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Tuesday 12th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I have tabled Amendment 69 relating to the conduct of the review that we have been discussing, in particular in relation to Schedule A1. I wish to add one definite article and three words to this part of the Bill. That definite article and those three words are already part of the Bill in two places, and this afternoon the Minister indicated that there would be a third occasion when the words “the Lord Chief Justice” would appear.

This is a very dry debate, and therefore I remind the House that we are dealing with catastrophic cases, with injuries that are life-changing not only for the unfortunate man, woman or child who has suffered them but—let us not overlook it—his or her family: the wife, husband, parents or child. We are reflecting on family disaster.

Judges have to observe, day by day, year by year, the practical realities of the impact of the discount rate on claimants, defendants and, in particular, settlement proposals. I remind your Lordships that, in the case of children and those who need a guardian for the purposes of the conduct of litigation, a settlement can be acceptable only if it is presented to a judge, usually a High Court judge, to see whether he or she approves it and its satisfied by its reasonableness. In other words, there is a fund of experience constantly being refreshed by the litigation process. If the practical impact, the glitches and the nuances are not fully appreciated, the Lord Chancellor will be deprived of information that is vital to any decision relating to the review. The only way to make it fair and balanced is for there to be judicial input to it as a consultee, and therefore I invite the Minister to agree, as he did this morning in relation to Amendment 12, that the Lord Chief Justice should be made a consultee to this part of the Bill.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I added my name to Amendment 69 and I support everything that my noble and learned friend has said. There is just one point that I would like to add. I draw attention to subsection (4) of the new Section A1, which is printed at page 7, lines 37 to the foot of the page. It refers to the content of the original order that the Lord Chancellor will have made, which is the background to the review process. The order not only talks about the rate but has to contemplate the possibility of descriptions of pecuniary loss, the length of the period during which pecuniary loss is expected to occur and the time when the pecuniary loss is expected to occur.

So one is not simply talking about the calculation of a rate of return in the abstract. It would be open to the reviewer to examine whether there should be some fresh approach to the matters that are contemplated in that subsection. It underlines the important point that my noble and learned friend has been making about the need for judicial input against the background of experience which everybody in the courts has drawn out of cases involving these very serious injuries. I support the amendment for that reason.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Judge and Lord Hope of Craighead

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 15th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I want to draw attention to one or two other passages in the Government’s response, to which the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, referred in his excellent introduction. Two features caught my eye. One is in paragraph 45. The Justice Select Committee had drawn attention to quite strong representation for the Civil Procedure Rules to make it a requirement that PPOs be offered; its advice was against that, because it was reasonably clear that not every case made a PPO appropriate—one has to be selective; some cases are better suited than others. The point of mentioning that is that one could adopt the approach of amending Section 100 of the 2003 Act, which is the basis for the award of PPOs, to toughen up the requirement that they be offered in every case, but that is not what is being suggested and, I think, rightly so.

The other question is whether rules of court are best equipped to deal with the problem. That is why I draw attention to what is said in paragraphs 50 and 51 of the Government’s response. In passages that are written out in heavy print and underlined, they undertake to,

“investigate the quality and effectiveness of the advice currently available”,

with a view to endorsing,

“guidance on standard practice to ensure that claimants are properly informed”.

Will the Minister expand a little on what the Government had in mind in that passage? Was it guidance rather than amendments to the Civil Procedure Rules, guidance to lie alongside the Civil Procedure Rules or guidance which will inform the committees responsible for the revision of those rules?

What comes through from that and the following paragraph is that further investigation is in the mind of the Government. A little more information may be needed before the rules are revised in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, has in mind. If the Minister could expand a bit on that, it would be very helpful.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise to the Committee that I was not here for the first 90 seconds of what the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, had to say, but I came puffing in as quickly as I could.

In our discussions so far, which I entirely understand and support, one feature has not yet been mentioned: the advantage of the PPO in the process from the point of view of the unfortunate man or woman who has suffered serious or catastrophic injuries. Both at the Bar and as a judge, one thing that you have to look at is how long the unfortunate individual concerned will actually live. I am sorry to say so, but when you talk to your client and say, “We have to discuss how long you will live”, or to the parents of a child who has suffered catastrophic injuries, “We are discussing how long your little boy or your little girl will live”, you are treading on what is obviously deeply sensitive ground. The answer is that it has to be discussed if you are proceeding by way of lump sum, because the calculation of damages depends significantly on whatever the medical experts say the life expectation of the man, the woman, the little boy or the little girl is likely to be.

The medical experts I dealt with were men and women of the utmost integrity. They would do their best. They would say, “Well, the best I can do is X”, or Y or Z. What you discovered after a little while doing these sorts of cases was that, actually, what they were doing—and who can blame them?—was taking an average: “We have had so many patients aged between 21 and 25 who have suffered these sorts of injuries, and they have lived for so long and then they have died”. So in addition to the sensitivities that go into a discussion of how long will the victim—the plaintiff, as they used to be in those days—suffer, be alive, and how long will the damages have to cater for his or her interests, there is also the uncertainty of the medical evidence, because no doctor can tell you.

I still remember a very distinguished surgeon from Stoke Mandeville, who, when I asked him this question in a conference just before I became a judge, said, “Well, we are asked the most ridiculous questions. We do our best. We offer you the best. The truth is that we do not know when this man or this woman’s will to live will go. When the will to live goes, that is when they will die. Some will wish to live and will have the will to live for longer than others, so what we are offering you is the best we can do”. He did not say, and it would not be fair to say, that it is speculative: it is the best they can do but, inevitably, it is almost certainly not going to be right. The end result is that the damages will be too much or too little. The great advantage of the PPO system is that it caters for however long this unfortunate injured person actually lives. I support the idea behind this amendment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Judge and Lord Hope of Craighead

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord and I apologise for not having paid due regard to that formula because the wording is exactly what I am looking for, but I am trying to fit it into the opening words of Clause 6(2). However, it is certainly right; I respectfully suggest that “may” is the right word to use. It is better to add in the bit about,

“where it considers it relevant”,

which is what comes from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. So one is putting together bits and pieces of thought from various attempts to produce a formula.

Perhaps I may read out again for Hansard’s benefit how I suggest the provision might run: “A court or tribunal need not have regard to a judgment or decision given by the European Court on or after exit day, but it may have regard to it where it considers this relevant for the proper interpretation of retained EU law”. If “may” is used—although the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will correct me—proposed new subsection (2C) in Amendment 56 will no longer be relevant. I say nothing about subsection (2B) which may have force and value if the court requires guidance as to what to do with the agreement between the United Kingdom and the EU.

I hope that that contribution will give the Minister something else to think about. I think that we all hope that on Report he may be able to come back with a formula which we can all endorse.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, perhaps I may add a few words, simply because of the devoted affection in the Bill for the word “appropriate”. It is larded through the document. Its inappropriateness in this particular context needs to be underlined—I shall come back to it at a later stage under different clauses. It is terribly simple: if something is relevant to a court’s decision, it is likely to be appropriate that the court should look at it. If something is irrelevant to the court’s decision, it cannot possibly be appropriate for the court to look at it. So the term “appropriate” should go.

Space Industry Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Judge and Lord Hope of Craighead

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 23rd October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge]

My Lords, I apologise to the Committee that when I spoke a few minutes ago I did not indicate that I was a member of the Constitution Committee. I indicate it now. I do not want to repeat everything that the Constitution Committee said—but, with respect, although I do not speak for the Constitution Committee, there is an awful lot of constitutional sense in that paper.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I support the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Steel, in relation to this amendment, looking particularly at the devolution settlement which was the subject of the Scotland Act 1998. I think it is also relevant to mention Section 2 of the Scotland Act 2016, which put the Sewel convention into statute and expressed a principle in relation to primary legislation that would apply with equal force to the issue we are considering today.

The area of devolved competence that is most at issue here can be seen if the Minister looks at Clause 46, which refers to:

“Compensation in respect of planning decisions”.


There are two phrases there: “compensation in respect of”—so compensation is something that is devolved, in this field at least—and “planning decisions” are also a devolved competence in respect of the devolved legislatures. Planning is absolutely at the root of the enterprise that one is contemplating in setting out the locations through which spaceflights and other activities might take place.

The Scottish Parliament, for whom I speak, as best I can, because I understand the Scottish position better than the Welsh or Northern Irish one, will take a very close interest in the way in which this Act is put into force—and, indeed, in framing its own legislation for the future. One has to bear in mind that Clause 66 deals not just with the past, and with what is listed in Schedule 12, but with what the Parliament may do in future in this area. One cannot predict exactly what it will provide for but it is very likely that planning and compensation will be a matter of anxious debate in the Scottish Parliament.

None of the provisions listed in Schedule 12 are, I think, devolved measures; they are not measures passed by the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly or the Northern Ireland Assembly. So we are looking into the future and at how Clause 66(2) will operate, bearing in mind the way in which the devolved legislatures will look at these crucial issues, especially planning. So these are some words of general support for the point that the noble Baroness is making; I stress the areas of compensation and planning because of how crucial and central they are to how the Bill is likely to operate in future.

Children and Families Bill

Debate between Lord Judge and Lord Hope of Craighead

Tuesday 17th December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, to add to a maelstrom of lawyers is not a particularly bright idea at this time in the afternoon, but I declare an interest as I was a member of the Court of Appeal that decided, when we decided it, the case of J. The case was brought to us so that the threshold test could be clarified: that was the only purpose of it. It was brought by a local authority, deliberately focusing on the single fact of possible perpetration and omitting any other consideration, so that the issue could go to the Supreme Court and that five previous decisions of the House of Lords could be analysed once more. We followed the previous decisions of the House of Lords and immediately gave leave for appeal to the Supreme Court—a very unusual step for the Court of Appeal to take—because it had to be addressed in that court.

Once it is established that an individual living in a household in which a child or children have been killed or seriously injured was one of the possible perpetrators of the injuries, but the evidence is not sufficiently clear for the court to identify who is actually responsible, where does that leave us? It leaves us with the possibility that the individual was, indeed, responsible for the death or those injuries or some of them. That seems to me to be a stark fact, but there is a further consideration. Often the ill treatment has been repeated; these awful occasions are not, generally speaking, a one-off. Generally, what you have is a series of repeated assaults on the child that culminate in an attack in which the child sustains fatal injuries. J was such a case. What that little baby had gone through in three weeks is beyond description.

Therefore, in many of these cases, although not all of them, the person who has not actually caused any injury has undoubtedly been aware of the fact that the child has been suffering. It is not just that the child cries—we all know that babies whinge and cry, some more than others—but this was a child with evidence on its little body of injury. Indeed, although these cases are largely confined to the family court, one needs to stand back and wonder why on earth criminal prosecutions under the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act are not undertaken—not simply to establish who is guilty of the murder or manslaughter, but, where the evidence is uncertain, to demonstrate that both, on any view, are culpable in the sense that they have allowed the child to be bullied and abused in the way that has culminated in its death. If there had been a criminal prosecution and a conviction, it would not have occurred to anyone to say, “Oh well, that conviction is irrelevant to the threshold test that the family court has to ask in relation to another case”.

If there are combinations of events like those that have happened, it seems to me that they raise issues of great relevance to the threshold test in family proceedings. It is not a question of removing a child from a family on the basis of suspicion alone; it is that the threshold test should be allowed to be tested by reference to all the relevant evidence. If all the relevant evidence reveals that the threshold test should be passed, then you move on to care proceedings. For me, the idea that we should exclude from the threshold test possible relevant material is not how justice is done.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I hope that I may be forgiven for adding one more lawyer’s speech to those which have already been given, and particularly that the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, will forgive me for doing this. My reason for wanting to speak is that I presided over the case of In re J in the Supreme Court. I think that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, expressed great concern that the issue was being brought before the courts on a hypothesis; I think I am right in saying that he said that it is not the business of the court to judge hypothetical cases. We took the view that we should decide the case on the material that we were given, but it is right to stress, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, stressed, that the situation we were presented with was highly artificial in order to test one particular point: whether the “sole fact”, as it is put in the noble and learned Lord’s amendment, was enough to cross the threshold.

I do not want to add anything to the clear description which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, gave us as to what the case of In re J was all about, but I should like to say briefly why I join with the noble and learned Baroness in resisting the amendment. In my case, it is particularly on account of its wording, given the use of “sole fact” and the reference to “real possibility”. My objections can be summarised on three simple grounds: first, the amendment as it stands is wrong in principle; secondly, when you look at the structure of the statute it is unnecessary; and, thirdly, from the point of view of family life in circumstances that are quite likely to occur, it could indeed be damaging.

First, on the principle, I respectfully suggest that the golden rule is that a prediction of future harm has to be based on facts which have been proved on a balance of probabilities. It is only then that the state would be justified in removing a child from the family; in our democratic society, it is not enough that there should be suspicion. It has to be based on proof, so the state should be required to demonstrate that it has real and current concerns about the child’s safety before the child is taken into care. I appreciate that I am moving through all sorts of stages in making that proposition, but that is the background to the point I wish to make. I stress that if we look at the wording of Section 31(2) of the Children Act, which we do not have on the paper before us, when it states that a child may be taken into care only if,

“the child … is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm”,

it is using the language of proof, not of possibility. That was a point made by Lord Nicholls some 18 years ago in the case of In re H.

As I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, accepted, the amendment has the effect of lowering the threshold to some degree. It assumes that the state cannot prove that the carer in question was the perpetrator—that all it can prove is that she was a possible perpetrator—and that that bald fact is all that can be done. Even allowing for the point at the end of the proposed amendment, that this is a “real possibility” and something that cannot sensibly be ignored, I suggest that we are still below the threshold which Section 31(2) sets.

Secondly, on necessity, it is important to appreciate that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, was not saying that the problem which the amendment is addressing is rare in itself. She was not saying, I think, that it is rare for two people in the situation in which the carer in this case was placed to blame each other, so that the court is unable to decide between the two. What she was saying was extremely rare was the situation which the court was being presented with: that this was the sole fact. As she put it in her judgment, the issue hardly ever comes before the court at the threshold stage packaged in that way. The point which she was making, and which one can see by studying the structure of the Children Act, is that in Part V, and in particular in Section 47, powers are available to the local authority to make inquiries and, if it is thwarted, to take further steps which may ultimately lead to an emergency protection order being applied for and so on, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, explained to us.

In the case of In re J, there was a difference of view as to whether the sole fact which has been referred to was relevant at all. In my judgment, I used the words “relevant” and “sufficient” to try to explain the difference of view. Lord Wilson and Lord Sumption said that it was not relevant at all; the rest of us said that the fact of the possible perpetration was relevant and could not be ignored, but it is not enough and is not sufficient to cross the threshold and therefore something more must be found.

The problem with the amendment is that it has absolutely no context attached to it. The sole possibilities are stated in the amendment in the starkest possible terms. However, as soon as you start to examine a particular case—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, did when he talked about the number of injuries inflicted in that tragic period of three weeks—you are adding something that is not in the amendment. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, said that the amendment is dealing with the situation of two possible perpetrators only, but it does not actually say that. It just says “a possible perpetrator”. As soon as you begin to make inquiries and search around, you are going to add things in which begin to build up a context which the social worker will be able to put together before the threshold stage has to be crossed when the case is brought into court. My objection to the amendment is really that: that it does not give you any context at all. Surely, that is taking the matter too far.

The third and final point is the risk of damage. Let us contemplate a situation which is not far removed from the situation of In re J, where the woman—and let us take the woman because it was the woman in In re J—is living in an abusive relationship. That was indeed the case here because she had separated from the previous partner because he was violent to her repeatedly and eventually she left him. All sorts of reasons can be imagined why she did not blame him. She may have been under pressure from him. She decides to create a new life for herself, as indeed she was doing in In re J, making a relationship with somebody who is absolutely blameless, who has children of his own already. There she is, now in family with him with a further child of their own.

My concern is that, if the amendment is passed in its stark form, it holds a threat over that relationship from the very beginning. There must be a question about, “Is it wise for me to enter into this relationship? Am I always going to be at risk of being before the court for a full threshold inquiry, simply because of what happened in the past?” The amendment pays no regard to the length of time that may have elapsed between the incident when the perpetration occurred and the moment at which the inquiry is being initiated. Without elaborating further, it is the starkness of the amendment, which lowers the threshold, that is a cause for real concern.

I wrote to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, with a suggestion about how one might approach the problem—because I do appreciate that there is a problem—by suggesting that, without using the word “sole”, one might be able to reassure social workers that this factor is relevant, which I believe firmly would be the case. If an amendment were to be framed which made that point and put it beyond doubt, then I would be entirely happy and I hope very much that it would reassure social workers. However, the amendment as phrased goes far too far and is too stark and for that reason I support the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, in resisting the amendment.