Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Jay of Ewelme Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hay of Ballyore (DUP)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 38A and 38B in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Weir. The amendment before the Committee in my name would require that this Government

“shall seek to permit limited commercial and chartered flights for British Chagossians to and from Diego Garcia, using the existing runway facilities”,

and is of great importance. Like many colleagues have already mentioned, the islanders themselves ought to be at the very heart of this conversation. I was privileged to receive correspondence from many members of the Chagossian community living in the United Kingdom, asking that I reflect their concerns on this issue. I believe this would be a modest but vital step towards addressing the historic injustice inflicted on the Chagossian community.

I shall explain why the Government should accept this amendment and why the Bill in its present form is inadequate without it. Noble Lords will be aware of the history of the British Indian Ocean Territory, and I do not intend to repeat it today. However, we must be continually mindful of what happened to the inhabitants of these islands from 1968 to 1973, then numbering around 2,000: they were removed from their homes so that Diego Garcia could become the site of a UK-US military base.

Since then, the Government have repeatedly recognised that these are British Overseas Territories citizens, some native, but many descendants of deceased islanders who never returned, and the Government have provided certain support measures throughout the years, or so they might contend. Yet, in spite of this, they have failed to take into account the undeniably important right of the Chagossians to have any meaningful access to their former homeland. They have been denied what we consider an expectation to return home at the end of the day.

This amendment is about more than symbolic flights; it addresses infrastructure, reconnection and justice. It taps into the Chagossian people and their campaign for representation throughout this long process, during which His Majesty’s Government have continually left them very much outside in the cold. This amendment would allow limited commercial or charter traffic, especially for the Chagossian community in the United Kingdom. This would not be a wholesale opening of the island, nor would it challenge the base operations; it would simply permit members of the community, many of whom live in the United Kingdom, to visit, reconnect and maintain their culture and family ties to the Chagossian community.

Those opposed to this amendment may argue that additional flights raise security and other major issues. I respectfully suggest that this argument cannot be used to stonewall all access. Instead, this amendment demands a managed, limited and regular scheme—for example, scheduled charters once or twice a year. Under vetting, with government oversight, this is entirely compatible with defence interests. Indeed, recognising the ties of displaced people is part of Britain’s international human rights obligations. The amendment would permit family members to see where their parents were born and to grieve, remember and connect with their roots. That matters more than any of us could ever know. It gives the Chagossian community a tangible and practical link to their homeland. Practically speaking, the Government should include reporting requirements on how many flights, who operates them, capacity and cost. We should ensure a transparent and accountable process. I therefore urge noble Lords to consider this amendment carefully. Without it, the Bill will proceed without a tangible measure of access and leave the Chagossian community with yet another broken promise.

I turn to Amendment 38B in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Weir. In its current form, the Bill fails to provide even the most basic protections for a community whose treatment by successive Governments has been one of the most regrettable chapters in our modern history. The proposal in this amendment is simple. All employment on the Diego Garcia military base must include fair and equal opportunities for the Chagossians as British Indian Ocean Territory citizens, and conditions must be in line with UK labour standards. Those conditions are the bare minimum we should expect for individuals working under the authority of the United Kingdom, particularly in the case of British Chagossians, who have just as much claim to Britishness as we do. Although the Government like to point out that Chagossians can apply for jobs on Diego Garcia, in reality very few have ever had meaningful access to stable, fair and properly regulated employment on the island. Much of the labour force is made up of contracted or sub-contracted workers from elsewhere. Where Chagossians have been employed, concerns have been raised in relation to pay disparity and unclear contractual safeguards. Without explicit protection in legislation, these inequalities will simply continue unchecked. We cannot allow that to happen.

The British Overseas Territories should reflect British values, and those include adherence to UK recognised labour standards. These standards cover fair pay, safe conditions, rest periods, paid leave and protection from discrimination. I completely disagree with the claim that a military base “complicates” and creates a problem for workforce regulations. Civilians work on UK and allied military installations right across the world.

This amendment is about treating the Chagossian community with fairness and basic justice. It is a chance for Parliament to ensure that the community that paid the highest price for Britain’s historical decisions in the British Indian Ocean Territory is no longer marginalised from its own homeland.

This amendment may not ensure self-determination or the maintenance of sovereignty, and nor is it likely to affect the security of the region. But what it does seek to do is to put the Chagossian people first. If the Government are serious about righting the past wrongs, surely, they must begin by guaranteeing equal treatment in employment.

[Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)]

My Lords, I will say at the outset that I do not see the need for the amendments we are discussing. However, I do think that responding to and respecting the wishes and interests of the Chagossians is one of the most important and difficult issues facing the Governments of both the United Kingdom and Mauritius.

There is a lot of history to make good here. It is all the more difficult, in that there is no single Chagossian view. There are Chagossian people in Britain, in Mauritius, in the Seychelles and elsewhere, and there are different views among and indeed within the different communities. It would be unwise to think that there is an immediate or straightforward answer to meeting the wishes and interests of these different communities. My guess is that current and future British and Mauritian Governments will be dealing with these questions for quite some time to come.

It is sensible of the Government to ask the International Relations and Defence Committee to look into the issue, and sensible of them to conduct a survey of Chagossian interests and wishes. This is not an easy task. There will be, and indeed already are, doubts expressed about the time and scope of the IRDC’s work. That, I fear, is inevitable, but I hope that the results of the IRDC’s survey and its report will give the Minister some firm ground on which to make her promised statement in due course.

I know that discussions have been going on between the Mauritian and British Governments about the way forward. I hope that one conclusion of these talks will be that the £40 million trust fund to be administered by Mauritius will be administered in the interests of all Chagossians, and in a way that reassures Chagossians, wherever they are now, that their views are properly heard and represented. There is understandable scepticism about this, and it needs to be addressed.

I hope too that the Government will recognise and indeed facilitate the right of return to and resettlement on the Chagos outer islands, and that here too, there will be close and constructive co-operation between the British and Mauritian Governments.

There is a lot of history to put right as far as the Chagossian community is concerned, in Britain and elsewhere. The Government are, I know, fully conscious of that, and I am sure that future Governments will be too. Meanwhile, I hope that this Bill will soon be approved, passed and implemented.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

My Lords, I would certainly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Jay, when he says that the Chagossian people, in the disparate parts of the world in which they live, are not united on many issues. However, one thing on which they are united is their desire for employment opportunities on Diego Garcia, so I very much support the words of my noble friend Lord Callanan.

When I looked at this as a Foreign Office Minister, one of the things that staggered me was the number of people employed on that base from Sri Lanka, India and many other countries. There were occasionally some Chagossians, but there was no comprehensive, well-thought-out framework for Chagossians, be they in Crawley, Mauritius or the Seychelles, to find opportunities for employment in Diego Garcia. It was almost as though there was an underlying desire on the part of both the MoD and the Americans not to employ them on the basis, probably, that they might well go on to claim other rights. There was a lot of concern about whether there would be an issue of self-determination if they went there and settled there. I think my noble friend Lord Callanan’s amendment makes a great deal of sense. This is one issue that the Chagossian people are fully agreed on, and we should absolutely support it.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Jay of Ewelme Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

My Lord, I beg leave to propose my Amendments 20L, 20N and 20P. In the interests of brevity and immediacy, I will speak only on Amendment 20L, because I have covered the others in previous groups. This is the amendment that requires the Secretary of State to look at the impact of this treaty on other British Overseas Territories and the implications for their sovereignty.

Of course, we are always told in these situations by whoever is in government, “Oh, it’s a unique situation, you can’t compare”. On one level, that is a truism. Of course, all these situations are unique, yet I think it would be extremely naive not to consider the possibility that they will be fallen upon hungrily by people who want a change to the status quo. The idea that even now there are not politicians and lawyers in Buenos Aires or Madrid looking at the implications of this deal and saying, “How can we press this into the parallel arguments that we have for claims over British Overseas Territories?” is utterly fanciful.

They may already be putting out feelers to British lawyers, who seem very happy to work against the interests of the Crown on these questions. The representative of Mauritius in this case gave an interview in which he gloried in the fact that he lived in a country where you could humiliate the Government. If he is not available, perhaps by then the Attorney-General will no longer be in politics, or indeed perhaps the Prime Minister. They also both have long records of working on cases of this kind.

I suspect that the briefs that will be put in front of them will make the claim that Britain has now, in practice, for all that there was no jurisdiction, for all that it was an advisory ruling, for all that Commonwealth disputes were excluded, conceded this extraordinary and perilous precedent that, if a territory was at one time or another ruled from somewhere else, that establishes the basis of a sovereignty claim. I do not think it is completely fanciful for these elements in foreign countries to feel that they will be dealing with sympathetic elements within the United Kingdom.

Indeed, they have had experience of that. If we think of the experience of our relations with Argentina prior to the war in 1982, we can understand why the Argentines felt that Britain was going to move on the subject. We had the 1968 Anglo-Argentine memorandum, which expressly talked about sovereignty being on the agenda. We then had the persistent proposals throughout the 1970s for the leaseback arrangement, and then the withdrawal of HMS “Endurance”. Argentina is a country I know well, and indeed I have had the privilege of visiting the Falkland Islands as well. To this day, I am often told by Argentine politicians that Margaret Thatcher led them on to the punch—that Britain deliberately looked as though it was preparing to withdraw from the islands in order to provoke this conflict. I think that is nonsense. None the less, you can understand why they think that there are sympathetic elements here.

Similarly, if we look at relations between Britain and Madrid in the run-up to the Córdoba agreement over Gibraltar, the 1990s were a time of constant proposals from this side for some kind of joint sovereignty. It was only a referendum of the Gibraltarian people that put a stop to that process. By the way, it was a referendum that official Britain detested and for a long time did not reconcile itself to and ignored, until it became politically impossible and a new dispensation was reached. So, yes, this will be looked at in Buenos Aires and Madrid.

It will be looked at, I am sure, by those in Nicosia. They will think that there is an extremely close parallel there, in the sense that this is a military installation rather than an ethnically separate population. Again, they will say “This was ruled from somewhere else and we have a claim”. When I was a Member of the European Parliament, I would often get petitions and resolutions from Greek Cypriot MEPs raising the issue of the base.

What all these claims have in common is that final resolutions are never treated as final by the other party, any more than the final and binding resolution was with Mauritius in 1965. I do not want to bore noble Lords on this, but I feel it bears repetition. Mauritius trousered a large sum of money in exchange for perpetually renouncing any claim over the Chagos Islands.

In fact, there are very few British Overseas Territories that have not at some point been ruled from somewhere else. In addition to the ones I have mentioned, I was listing just now which ones have at some point had some other seat of government. Cayman, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Turks and Caicos, St Helena and Montserrat were all, at some point or another, ruled by someone else. All of them will be looking at this as a precedent and a claim.

What all our overseas territories have in common is that they are all content with their present status. The British Empire was unusual in the peaceful and voluntary nature of the way it was relinquished: not completely, not universally—there were tragic exceptions in Cyprus, India and Kenya—but they were the exceptions. They were not the rule. Decolonisation in Malaysia was a perfectly peaceful process, for example. The only argument was about whether the British should stay longer to defeat the Communist insurgents. It was a generally peaceful process in the Caribbean and in most of Africa, so the places that have stayed are the places that wanted to stay, and they made that very clear, in the cases of the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar in quite recent memory, with overwhelming referendums. It seems to me that they will now be looking to those referendums as their one shield: the only thing that potentially distinguishes them. But of course they will be vulnerable to the argument that, if we are treating Mauritius rather than the Chagos Islands as the unit, why should we not treat all of Cyprus as the unit, since that was once partitioned in a similar way at the time of independence? They will all be extremely alarmed by that precedent.

It seems to me there is only one way of reassuring these countries, which is to allow a referendum of the Chagossians, dispersed and scattered as they may be. Then, if the Chagossians vote in favour, it does not matter. We would not be setting any precedent. We would be following the principle of self-determination. If the Chagossians vote to be Mauritian, that is of no concern to Gibraltarians or Falkland Islanders or anyone else, because the principle of self-determination would be upheld. But at least let us give them the vote.

We are privileged in this country to be custodians, stewards, of a largely maritime sovereign area. If we put together the oceans around our overseas territories, they are about the same size as India. We are in charge of some of the richest and most important marine environments, and that is our real string of pearls. The pearls are there because in every case they want to be on the string. Let us not set the precedent of tearing one of those pearls off and hurling it away in defiance of the wishes of the people most involved. I beg to move.

[Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)]

My Lords, in his remarks, the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, has tried to pre-empt the comments that I was about to make. I remember well the Falklands War in 1982. I remember many negotiations with Spain about Gibraltar. I remember the struggles with China over Hong Kong. I remember discussions about the future of the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands—both of which I have visited—as well as discussions about the future of St Helena, Ascension, Tristan da Cunha, Anguilla and the sovereign territories in Cyprus. In each case, the discussions took place on the basis of the interests of each sovereign territory concerned and I believe that that will remain the case. I cannot see why this treaty over the British Indian Ocean islands and the Chagos Islands will affect the discussions that we will have with our other overseas territories about their futures. I think that the situation will remain as it has been in the past, so I do not feel that I can support this amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Hannan.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

My Lords, I certainly do support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan. I will be very brief. The amendment on which I want to focus is not one regarding referenda and consulting the Chagossian people, even though that is very important. Amendment 20L simply states—and I would be surprised if the Government could not accept this—that the Secretary of State needs to come up with a report

“assessing the potential implications for other British Overseas Territories that would arise from this Act and the Treaty”.

What is wrong with that amendment? Nothing. It would cost the Foreign Office a certain amount of time and effort to put together a report but, in the context of what has been said—at Second Reading, in the debate that we had on the treaty, on the first and second day in Committee—it is not asking a lot.

The noble Lord, Lord Jay, was looking specifically at the interests of the citizens in those different territories. He has a huge amount of knowledge, wisdom and experience, and what he said made a huge amount of sense. What he perhaps did not address is the signals that this Bill, if it becomes an Act, and the treaty, will send to other countries. The noble Lord, Lord Hannan, made some specific points about Argentina—where we know that the dispute will not go anywhere; it will go on and on—as well as Gibraltar. I will also mention one other territory that could well—

Relations with Europe

Lord Jay of Ewelme Excerpts

Thursday 10th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)]

My Lords, it is an excellent subject for debate today, chosen by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham. We have heard what I know will be the first of many excellent speeches by the noble Baroness, Lady Hodge.

I should perhaps declare an interest, as I was ambassador in Paris in October 1997, the last time a Labour Government were working hard to establish themselves—but things were not, of course, quite the same then. With Britain inside the European Union, other EU member states were beating a path to our door, wanting to know and understand the British Government’s view on EU and other matters. Now, with Britain outside the European Union, we are knocking on its door, when much of its attention is understandably elsewhere; but, of course, it is the right thing to do.

The EU and its member states remain an important trading partner, and we have huge and urgent foreign policy issues in common. Uncertainty over the future direction of US foreign policy strengthens the case for European co-operation, so I welcome the Prime Minister’s and Foreign Secretary’s recent visits to EU capitals and the Prime Minister’s recent meeting with Ursula von der Leyen. A closer and more constructive relationship is needed with the EU and its member states, although there will be difficult and no doubt fraught moments along the route. With EU negotiations, that is always the case.

I have two specific points to make. The first—and I am not the first to say this—is on youth mobility and student exchanges. Understanding others’ cultures and, indeed, speaking their languages is, or certainly should be, a key part of our culture. However, the Government seem to have turned their face against the Erasmus scheme. The Turing arrangements are a lot better than nothing, but a lot less good than Erasmus. I know that money is scarce, but can the Minister assure us that the Government recognise the value of student exchanges and that rejoining is not off the table?

The second subject is security and defence co-operation. The bedrock of our security is of course NATO, but EU security and defence co-operation is strengthening. Our interests and those of most—alas, not all—EU countries are similar, in particular over Ukraine and the threat from Russia. We need a close relationship on defence and security with the EU and its member states. The EU being the EU, there are various security and defence structures that we can aspire to join. My only advice is that it is the substance not the form of that relationship that matters, and that it is urgent.

King’s Speech

Lord Jay of Ewelme Excerpts

Thursday 25th July 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure as always to follow the noble Lord, Lord Empey. I join others first of all in congratulating the noble Baroness, Lady Anderson, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on their appointments.

As others have said, and it is a view I share, the world is more uncertain and dangerous now certainly than at any time I can remember: the war in Ukraine, the war in Gaza, the simmering tension in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah as a proxy for Iran, the appalling conflict in Sudan—alas, often almost ignored—and the constant and at times resurgent struggle between democracy and, in Russia and China, autocracy.

Other contributors to this debate have spoken and will speak about those dangers. I will concentrate on the role the United Kingdom can play, with others, in responding to and confronting them. We have, in our Armed Forces, our Diplomatic Service, our experience and our global vision, huge assets, but there is little we can do on our own. We need to exert and increase our influence and effect by working with and through others. That is easy to say, but much harder to do.

We have a close but sometimes tense relationship with the United States. Any attempt to foretell what might happen in November is unwise, but if next January we have another Trump presidency, the tensions will almost certainly increase, as will the unpredictability. At the least, we may see a return to that streak of isolationism that has characterised American policy at times in the past. The implications are hard to predict, but they may well be serious for the war in Ukraine, and indeed for NATO and the European Union. In these circumstances, I hope the Government will argue powerfully for the United States to remain a key NATO partner, and urge other NATO partners to reach or exceed the 2% spending target. By all means, let us consider exactly what 2% or 2.5% means, but let us increase rather than decrease it. The planned defence review is sensible, and I wish the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, well, but it is the results that stem from it that really matter.

Global uncertainty today, and uncertainty in the United States, shows clearly the need to rebuild our relationship with the European Union—not inside it, but alongside it. Again, that is easier said than done. There are, not for the first time, strains within the EU, and they will not give us something for nothing. But it is strongly in our own interests to work with the EU on foreign and security policy, perhaps through a more structured relationship—provided, of course, that it is not too bureaucratic and is consistent with NATO. I hope that will lead to a more constructive relationship with the EU on other issues too.

I hope too that the Government will contribute all they can to the United Nations, not only in New York but through other UN organisations, including on development aid and humanitarian assistance. It is easy to deride the UN, but without it the world would be even more dangerous.

Finally, I turn to climate change. CHOGM takes place in October this year in Samoa. For many Commonwealth island nations, climate change is not theoretical; it is a matter of survival. COP 29 takes place in Azerbaijan in November this year—not just the latest in a seemingly endless series of meetings, but a chance to show, as at CHOGM, that we really do take climate change seriously, as we must, and will encourage others to do so too. Indeed, as the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, said in her remarks, the Government have said that they plan to initiate an international “clean power alliance” to accelerate the global energy transition. Perhaps the Minister can say more about this.

Taking an active, positive and sustained role in international affairs, working with others, is wholly in line with Britain’s traditions. I wish the Government well.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Jay of Ewelme Excerpts

Tuesday 7th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)]

My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. I join others in congratulating the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, on her maiden speech. I much look forward to further contributions from her—and that is not just politeness.

I shall assume that we leave the European Union on 31 January and that—no doubt with a bit of turbulence towards the end of the year—we end the transition period more or less on time. The question is what Britain’s role in the world will be beyond that and how, to quote the previous gracious Speech, the UK is to

“play a leading role in global affairs … alongside international partners to solve the most pressing global challenges.”

The aim is admirable; achieving it is far more difficult, especially in a world increasingly dominated by an oscillating relationship between the US and China and by an irascible and unpredictable US President capable of taking unilateral and dangerous decisions, as with the assassination in Baghdad of Qasem Suleimani.

There are two precepts that we need to follow. The first is that we need a clear sense of our own interests and values. We should not associate ourselves with the United States if it is wrong and we should not distance ourselves from other Europeans if they are right. For example, the Government have been absolutely right not to condone the US action in assassinating Qasem Suleimani and to work with the French and Germans to try to defuse tension now. The Government have also been absolutely right to oppose any attacks on cultural sites.

The second precept, difficult though it may be now, is to work with others to strengthen the multilateral system and the role of international organisations. That will be tough for two reasons: first, because the tendency at the moment is away from multilateralism and away from respect and support for international organisations—and I greatly regret that—and, secondly, because it is not cost-free. Playing the active and leading role in global affairs envisaged in the gracious Speech will require, as well as active diplomacy and a properly funded Diplomatic Service, on which I greatly welcomed the remarks made by the Minister in his opening speech, maintaining or exceeding the 2% of GDP contributed to NATO, maintaining or exceeding the 0.7% of GDP allocated to international development, and—for which all these are necessary preconditions—playing an active and effective role in the UN Security Council and in equally important but often neglected other aspects of the UN’s work, particularly in the developing world.

Finally, and closer to home, I would be grateful for the Minister’s assurance that the integrity of DfID will be preserved. It makes sense, as others have said, to look at how foreign policy, defence policy and aid policy can be better integrated, complementing and not conflicting with one another, through a stronger role for the National Security Council or closer links between DfID and the FCO, or both. However, the FCO, despite its many strengths, is not good at managing very large sums of money, and foreign policy often has short-term objectives, while effective aid requires a long-term perspective. Whatever new foreign policy governance arrangements emerge from the review, DfID needs to remain responsible for managing its own budget. I hope, as others have asked, too, that the Minister will assure us that that will be the case.

Reconciliation: Role of British Foreign, Defence and International Development Policy

Lord Jay of Ewelme Excerpts

Friday 14th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Fall, with whose speech I agree and with whose father, whom she mentioned, I worked for many years. It is a great pleasure, too, to take part in this debate, which gives us an opportunity to consider some of the more difficult issues that face Governments and our societies. I want to focus mainly on conflict, in particular the need to think carefully about the prospect of peace and reconciliation after conflict before entering into it in the first place.

I do not want to get into the long-standing debate about what constitutes a just war, which goes back at least until ancient Egypt and later exercised the minds of some of Christianity’s greatest theologians. However, I agree that war can in certain circumstances be justified. The UN’s endorsement in 2005 of the principle of the responsibility to protect recognised this. Military intervention, as a last resort, can be the only way to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. But saying that is the easy bit; the hard bit for Ministers, the military and civil servants, as I know only too well, is how to be as satisfied as one can before intervening—one can never be certain—that the planned intervention is likely to make things better, not worse, and that the prospects for peace and reconciliation after conflict will be advanced and not put back.

If we look at recent conflicts in which this country has been involved, I think we will conclude that this was the case in Sierra Leone, mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and just in Kosovo. With hindsight, the case for intervention in Rwanda looks strong. Well-planned military intervention could have prevented genocide and the international community was wrong not to intervene in Rwanda. The intervention in Iraq was by common consent a mistake. The atrocities committed by Saddam Hussein were appalling and should not be airbrushed out of history, as now sometimes seems to happen, but there was no hard-headed analysis of whether getting rid of him was going to make things better or of whether reconciliation within a divided community was likely to succeed.

Then there is Syria. I argued in this House against intervention in Syria in 2013, despite the use of chemical weapons by Assad, because I could not see how intervention would help resolve the conflict or advance the cause of reconciliation that would, and indeed will, be necessary after the conflict. None of this is easy, but the conclusion I reach is that before any military intervention there needs to be a hard-headed analysis about whether the chance that there will be genuine reconciliation afterwards will be enhanced. That requires, among other things, real Whitehall togetherness and a readiness to listen to others, not least the faith communities. The creation of the National Security Council—it has been mentioned a number of times in this debate—with representatives of all Whitehall departments, including DfID, is a positive development, but it needs to listen to those outside the Government, as the most reverend Primate said. Perhaps the Minister can confirm when summing up this debate that that is the case and that the National Security Council listens to those outside government as well as to those within it, and that there is—if I may quote the most reverend Primate—what management consultants might call a supervariable crunchy bucket at work here.

My final point is closer to home. It is of course possible to conduct a foreign policy purely on the grounds of perceived self-interest without any moral imperative behind it—at the moment, look at Russia in Syria or China’s detention of Canadian citizens—but if, as I think we should, we seek to incorporate moral values into our foreign and security policy, we need to follow, and be seen to follow, those values at home. That is especially challenging just now, but we need to remember that our authority and our influence abroad would be weakened by, for example, reports of anti-Semitism, Islamophobia and lack of tolerance and generosity. The role of the faith communities will be crucial in showing that we are at least striving for real tolerance in our own society, which is why I welcome this debate.

Iraq Inquiry

Lord Jay of Ewelme Excerpts

Tuesday 12th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)]

My Lords, it is always a challenge to follow the trenchant words of the noble Lord, Lord Jopling.

I strongly supported the setting up of the inquiry into Iraq, as I thought it important to learn the lessons for British involvement in future conflicts. I said in the past in your Lordships’ House that I regretted that the report had not been published much earlier. Having now read it—or much of it—and seen the responses to it, I think it was right for the inquiry to take the time needed for a full and proper investigation.

I want to focus on three issues. First, the inquiry is critical of the Government and, among others, of the Foreign Office, for the degree of preparation for the aftermath of conflict. As Permanent Secretary to the Foreign Office at the time, I accept that criticism. As I said when I gave evidence to the inquiry, we could and should have carried out a more thorough assessment ourselves of the possible consequences of the invasion than we did. We should not have relied as heavily as we did on our ability to persuade the Americans, as leaders of the coalition, to do the preparation themselves.

But we must be realistic about this. The Chilcot report itself says that,

“better planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq would not necessarily have prevented the events that unfolded in Iraq between 2003 and 2009”.

As the Prime Minister said in the Commons last week:

“We should not be naive to think that just because we have the best prepared plans, in the real world things cannot go wrong”.—[Official Report, Commons, 6/7/16; col. 888.]

In the real world, things do go wrong—as they did in Iraq and as they did in Libya.

That leads on to my second point. Many have said in this debate that it would be wrong to conclude from the conflict in Iraq that Britain should never again get involved in conflicts abroad. Of course this is right. We can all think of successful British involvement in conflicts—in Sierra Leone and in Kosovo. There are conflicts in which we should have intervened but did not, such as Rwanda or Bosnia. But there are also conflicts in which, with hindsight, British intervention looks either wrong, such as Iraq, or at least questionable, such as Libya and, perhaps, Afghanistan.

The difficult question is: when is intervention justified? In my view, there needs to be, first, agreement that all diplomatic avenues are effectively closed—although, as the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, said, that may be a matter of judgment. Secondly, there needs to be a convincing argument that intervention will leave things better than if there is no intervention: that intervention will succeed—which, as I said, was not the case in Iraq nor, as I argued at the time, when the Government sought authority for a bombing campaign in Syria in 2013. Thirdly, there needs to be unambiguous UN Security Council authority: or, if that is impossible—I accept what the noble Lord, Lord Soley, said about the difficulties of getting it—there needs to be a powerful humanitarian justification, as in Kosovo. Finally, Britain needs to be acting as part of a strong international coalition, such as a NATO intervention—again, as in Kosovo.

Decisions to intervene are never easy, but I believe that criteria such as these can provide a necessary and coherent justification for intervention and avoid the easy but naive conclusion that intervention that succeeds is always right and intervention that fails is always wrong.

My last point is in some ways the most important, at least for me. Much has rightly been said about the bravery of our soldiers in Iraq. Less has been said about the courage and professionalism of the many members of the civil and diplomatic services, men and women from many departments, who volunteered for service in Iraq out of a commitment to help rebuild the country. In early 2004, I visited them in Basra and Baghdad, where many British civil servants lived in containers on the ground floor of a concrete multi-storey car park. I witnessed the good humour, professionalism and bravery with which they worked every day in the most difficult and often dangerous circumstances. They, too, deserve our gratitude.

UK Armed Forces in Iraq

Lord Jay of Ewelme Excerpts

Monday 15th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for repeating the Statement made in the other place. Could he say something about the effect of the assistance given so far to the Iraqi Government in deterring or curbing the activities of ISIS?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, we are confident that it is working. We have a very active training programme, which I can tell the noble Lord about. We are carrying out training on heavy machine-guns and combat infantry training. We feel that any training of this sort will help the Iraqi security forces to train up to combat ISIL.

Somalia: Piracy (EUC Report)

Lord Jay of Ewelme Excerpts

Monday 11th March 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Jay of Ewelme]

My Lords, I, too, greatly welcome the opportunity to discuss this report by Sub-Committee C. As I am about to be rotated—perhaps in this context I should say helicoptered—off the committee, perhaps I may also pay tribute to the stewardship of the committee by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson. I say “stewardship” because I am not sure that Liberal Democrats accept the concept of chairmanship. I also welcome the chance to comment—as did the noble Lord, Lord Davies—on a European Union activity that is working well, and to which the UK has made an important and perhaps even determining contribution. I will come back to that general point at the end of my speech.

I welcome, too, the way in which the effectiveness of Operation Atalanta today draws on the lessons from its own operations at the start. I think that there is a lesson here perhaps for other European Union operations and policies too—that there needs to be a constant rethinking in the light of experience. The first example which strikes me in particular is the stronger co-operation between Atalanta and NATO and others including India and China. I think that the way in which this has become a much more international anti-piracy operation is very impressive. The second example is the inclusion of security teams on board ships. The committee did indeed have reservations about this at first but, in the light of experience, it, too, changed its mind. It is clear that having security operations on board has proved itself in the past couple of years or so. Finally, as the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, pointed out, persuading the World Food Programme to provide larger and quicker ships to reduce their vulnerability to piracy, which has had a very marked effect on the ability of the programme to deliver food to populations in Somalia and elsewhere who really need it, is something which I greatly welcome, too. However, I welcome in particular the realisation that piracy is largely the result of chaos and instability within Somalia, which has effectively for the past 20 years or so, with a slight improvement recently, been a failed state.

We need to see Atalanta as part of a broader EU approach to the Horn of Africa, not just an operation in its own right. The Horn of Africa strategy adopted at the end of 2011, including the training mission in Uganda for Somali security sector training and the mission to strengthen coastal defence capabilities through the region—the horribly named EUCAP NESTOR—have not only been very worth while but add up to an overall approach by the EU to the Horn of Africa that is admirable. At the same time, it is encouraging that some economic and political stability is emerging at least in and around Mogadishu and that the influence of al-Shabaab is at least for now—and let us hope for longer than now—on the decline. Ensuring that that continues must be the main aim of EU and our own policy from now on. This should largely be an African task, not just an EU or western task, although it is very hard to see how EU and western help will not be necessary in the foreseeable future.

It seems to me that the African Union will have a key role to play here. It has huge challenges at present, and it has weaknesses, but it is far more effective than it has been in the past. I hope that the European Union and the UK will continue to do what they can to strengthen it. It would be very helpful if the Minister could say something about that.

At the same time the EU must focus its development on capacity building in Somalia. I declare an interest here as the chair of a medical aid charity, Merlin, which operates in Somaliland, Puntland and Somalia itself. Britain, like the EU, has an important role to play in helping with education and medical aid both through its own funds and through the help that it gives to non-governmental organisations.

I should like to branch out just slightly from Somalia and look at two other African issues that have arisen since our report was produced—as the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, said—some months ago. The first is Mali and the second is piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Sub-Committee C has expressed great concern about the destabilisation of Mali and the impact that that could have on Britain and on wider European interests since the break-up of the country two years ago. The attack on the oil refinery in southern Algeria and the recently—alas—proven murder of hostages, including a British hostage in northern Nigeria, show only too clearly how developments apparently remote from us can affect us and damage us directly.

I would not accept the argument that these attacks are the result of western action. We have a role to play in supporting west African countries in countering al-Qaeda, Boko Haram and other terrorist groups, but I do not underestimate the difficulties in doing it. I greatly welcome the help that we are giving the French in what could still be a long and unpredictable campaign in Mali. I believe that our contribution there really matters and is important.

More related perhaps to the debate on Somali piracy is the growth of piracy in west Africa, in the Gulf of Guinea. In some ways this seems to be of a different kind of piracy from that in Somalia, including attacks in port—for example, in Abidjan in the Ivory Coast—and it is centred more on stealing cargo for money than on kidnapping ships and crews for ransom. The effect of piracy in west Africa can be particularly dramatic on fragile economies, increasing insurance rates but, much more than that, reducing revenue—by up to 70% in the case of Cotonou, the only port in Benin. That has had a pretty dramatic impact on the state of a fragile economy.

From the recent Parliamentary Statement in another place by the Foreign Office Minister, Alistair Burt, I am glad to see that the Government are taking the growth of west African piracy seriously. I am also glad that the Royal Navy is deploying at least one ship in the Gulf of Guinea and is working closely there with the French. When the Minister responds could he say whether that deployment has been stepped up in the light of the growth of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea?

I would make one final point in drawing some of these threads together. We see a mixture of piracy, conflict and terrorism in Somalia, Mali and the Gulf of Guinea—all of these seem a long way off but this can affect our interests directly. As a nation with global interests and, as a member of the UN Security Council, of NATO and of the European Union, with global responsibilities too, we cannot stand aside from nor ignore instability of this sort. Nor, given budgetary pressures of which I am sure the Minister is only too aware, can we respond to them on our own. We also need to recognise that political influence, development and military intervention where necessary need to be looked at together—as has been the case in Somalia—and not as separate activities. As we have seen in Somalia, the European Union is uniquely able to do this, by bringing together actions through its defence policy and its common foreign and security policy. All those are important for the African countries themselves, for the EU and, I would argue, for Britain as well. None of those policies is perfect; all would be better with the full engagement of the United Kingdom, and British interests would be well served too. In the context of common foreign and security policy and of bringing together policies in Somalia, that argument is relevant to our policy towards the European Union in a wider sense where critical, constructive engagement can be in our interests and can make a real difference to the policies of the European Union itself.

Defence Capabilities: EUC Report

Lord Jay of Ewelme Excerpts

Wednesday 24th October 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Jay of Ewelme]

My Lords, I, too, welcome this debate for a number of reasons, not least for the chance it has given us to listen to the excellent speech by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson. It is not all that long ago that it used to be argued that to develop European defence was dangerous because it would duplicate NATO and cause the Americans to weaken their commitment to Europe. That is very clearly yesterday’s argument. NATO has changed greatly and so has America’s perception of its self-interest, which is focusing increasingly on the Asia-Pacific region and, as the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, said, it sometimes prefers to follow not lead where its own interests are not perceived to be directly engaged, as we saw in Libya.

The EU has changed too. It is larger, more diverse and more variegated, due in good part to the policies of successive British Governments over the past 20 years or so. There is now an acceptance that inner groups sometimes need to act together, even if not all the others join in. We see that in the common foreign and security policy and most notably in Iran where Britain, France, Germany and the EU High Representative in effect represent the EU in the negotiations. We saw it in Libya, where the UK, France, Italy and, importantly, some smaller EU states, although not Germany, worked with the US and under a UN Security Council resolution to prevent a pretty devastating civil war.

So the question is not whether there should be more effective European defence arrangements but how they should best be organised. Importantly, they must be consistent with NATO but recognise that there are tensions and conflicts in the world that will not attract US or NATO intervention. As the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said, they must also recognise that the EU’s ability to combine diplomacy, economic aid and different degrees of military involvement—from training, as in Somalia; to intervention, as in Libya; or in combating piracy, as in the Indian Ocean—gives the EU a role distinct from that of NATO. There is no question of the one diminishing or replacing the other. The question is how they can reinforce each other to the advantage of both, and very much to the advantage of Britain’s interest.

I do not want to cover all the ground in the report this afternoon. I support the concept of pooling and sharing. I hope that we do not let the issue of an operational headquarters distract us from the real need for effective defence co-operation. The arrangements to support the Atalanta operation in Somalia are a good model that could be built on.

However, I want to mention two issues. The first, which some others have mentioned already, is Franco-British co-operation, which must be at the heart of any effective European defence co-operation. France and Britain share a tradition of global reach. We are both permanent members of the UN Security Council. We both face acute budgetary pressures, and France is of course back in the integrated military structure. So the logic of working more closely together seems to be unanswerable, with the aim, as the report says, of improving interoperability between Europe’s two most capable military nations.

I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, will forgive me if I do not follow her down the nuclear road, except to agree entirely with her that the chances of France giving up its nuclear deterrent are zero at best. None the less, there will be a French tendency to work more closely with Germany. If one effect of that is to prevent another division, as there was over Libya, so much the better. However, I do not see that closer Franco-German defence co-operation should in any way affect the case for strong, continuing and developing Franco-British co-operation.

At the risk of repeating what I have said in other debates in your Lordships’ House, one of the clearest examples of the need for strong Franco-British co-operation is over Mali. There may be a tendency— I have heard it said from time to time—to ask what our interest is in a part of Africa which the French know a great deal better than we do. However, the establishment in northern Mali of an al-Qaeda/Boko Haram/radical Tuareg state can have or will have a direct and destabilising effect on our interests in the region, in north Africa and, through support for terrorism, much closer to home. Perhaps the Minister can assure us that we indeed see this as a potential threat to our interests and will work with the French to try to resolve it and participate actively in an EU mission, if there is to be one.

I should say a word about defence procurement and industrial collaboration. I have to say that I regret the breakdown of negotiations between EADS and BAE Systems on a merger. This seems to be a case where the commercial logic for a merger was compelling, but the political difficulty is great and the issue, I fear, became public—for whatever reason—before the political issues had been sorted out. I do not at present clearly see BAE’s alternative strategy. I hope that the Minister was right in saying yesterday that it would continue to thrive on its own. Does he think that that is really the only option now before British Aerospace?

Finally, on defence procurement, I believe, as others have said, that the European Defence Agency has a role to play, as the report argues, in greater co-ordination and the development of capability, particularly at a time of budgetary constraint. I know that the Government are considering their position in the EDA, and I noted carefully what the Minister said yesterday. Still, towards the end of a—how shall I put it?—characteristically thoughtful speech on the European Union yesterday, the Foreign Secretary said that the British felt that,

“in too many ways the EU is something that is done to them, not something over which they have a say”.

However, it is very difficult to have a say and to make your voice heard if you are not in the room. That is an important point to bear in mind when reflecting on our role in the EDA and indeed on broader European Union issues.