Defence Capabilities: EUC Report Debate

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Department: Ministry of Defence
Wednesday 24th October 2012

(12 years, 1 month ago)

Grand Committee
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Lord Jay of Ewelme Portrait Lord Jay of Ewelme
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My Lords, I, too, welcome this debate for a number of reasons, not least for the chance it has given us to listen to the excellent speech by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson. It is not all that long ago that it used to be argued that to develop European defence was dangerous because it would duplicate NATO and cause the Americans to weaken their commitment to Europe. That is very clearly yesterday’s argument. NATO has changed greatly and so has America’s perception of its self-interest, which is focusing increasingly on the Asia-Pacific region and, as the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, said, it sometimes prefers to follow not lead where its own interests are not perceived to be directly engaged, as we saw in Libya.

The EU has changed too. It is larger, more diverse and more variegated, due in good part to the policies of successive British Governments over the past 20 years or so. There is now an acceptance that inner groups sometimes need to act together, even if not all the others join in. We see that in the common foreign and security policy and most notably in Iran where Britain, France, Germany and the EU High Representative in effect represent the EU in the negotiations. We saw it in Libya, where the UK, France, Italy and, importantly, some smaller EU states, although not Germany, worked with the US and under a UN Security Council resolution to prevent a pretty devastating civil war.

So the question is not whether there should be more effective European defence arrangements but how they should best be organised. Importantly, they must be consistent with NATO but recognise that there are tensions and conflicts in the world that will not attract US or NATO intervention. As the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said, they must also recognise that the EU’s ability to combine diplomacy, economic aid and different degrees of military involvement—from training, as in Somalia; to intervention, as in Libya; or in combating piracy, as in the Indian Ocean—gives the EU a role distinct from that of NATO. There is no question of the one diminishing or replacing the other. The question is how they can reinforce each other to the advantage of both, and very much to the advantage of Britain’s interest.

I do not want to cover all the ground in the report this afternoon. I support the concept of pooling and sharing. I hope that we do not let the issue of an operational headquarters distract us from the real need for effective defence co-operation. The arrangements to support the Atalanta operation in Somalia are a good model that could be built on.

However, I want to mention two issues. The first, which some others have mentioned already, is Franco-British co-operation, which must be at the heart of any effective European defence co-operation. France and Britain share a tradition of global reach. We are both permanent members of the UN Security Council. We both face acute budgetary pressures, and France is of course back in the integrated military structure. So the logic of working more closely together seems to be unanswerable, with the aim, as the report says, of improving interoperability between Europe’s two most capable military nations.

I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, will forgive me if I do not follow her down the nuclear road, except to agree entirely with her that the chances of France giving up its nuclear deterrent are zero at best. None the less, there will be a French tendency to work more closely with Germany. If one effect of that is to prevent another division, as there was over Libya, so much the better. However, I do not see that closer Franco-German defence co-operation should in any way affect the case for strong, continuing and developing Franco-British co-operation.

At the risk of repeating what I have said in other debates in your Lordships’ House, one of the clearest examples of the need for strong Franco-British co-operation is over Mali. There may be a tendency— I have heard it said from time to time—to ask what our interest is in a part of Africa which the French know a great deal better than we do. However, the establishment in northern Mali of an al-Qaeda/Boko Haram/radical Tuareg state can have or will have a direct and destabilising effect on our interests in the region, in north Africa and, through support for terrorism, much closer to home. Perhaps the Minister can assure us that we indeed see this as a potential threat to our interests and will work with the French to try to resolve it and participate actively in an EU mission, if there is to be one.

I should say a word about defence procurement and industrial collaboration. I have to say that I regret the breakdown of negotiations between EADS and BAE Systems on a merger. This seems to be a case where the commercial logic for a merger was compelling, but the political difficulty is great and the issue, I fear, became public—for whatever reason—before the political issues had been sorted out. I do not at present clearly see BAE’s alternative strategy. I hope that the Minister was right in saying yesterday that it would continue to thrive on its own. Does he think that that is really the only option now before British Aerospace?

Finally, on defence procurement, I believe, as others have said, that the European Defence Agency has a role to play, as the report argues, in greater co-ordination and the development of capability, particularly at a time of budgetary constraint. I know that the Government are considering their position in the EDA, and I noted carefully what the Minister said yesterday. Still, towards the end of a—how shall I put it?—characteristically thoughtful speech on the European Union yesterday, the Foreign Secretary said that the British felt that,

“in too many ways the EU is something that is done to them, not something over which they have a say”.

However, it is very difficult to have a say and to make your voice heard if you are not in the room. That is an important point to bear in mind when reflecting on our role in the EDA and indeed on broader European Union issues.