Public Order Bill

Debate between Lord Jackson of Peterborough and Lord Weir of Ballyholme

Report stage
Monday 30th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

Well, it is good to see, in relation to that, the idea that we need to defend opinions and the rights to protest and free speech, even if we fundamentally disagree with the opinion that is put within that.

As has been indicated already, and as we have seen with PSPOs, the problem is that, in terms of interpreting the law, there is a level of mission creep that goes well beyond simply the issue of threatening or intimidation. For example, with PSPOs, we have seen people prosecuted for simply taking part in prayer.

As I said, if we are going to defend the right of people to freedom of speech and freedom to protest—and, yes, that always has to be done in a peaceful manner—let us do that not simply for things we agree with, or even things we disagree with, but even things that we find repugnant. As such, I believe that what is in Clause 9 is totally unacceptable. As I said, it mixes in things that all of us would find perfectly reasonable with things that go well beyond that. Seeking to criminalise an interpretation simply of influencing someone similarly takes this beyond what the bounds should be.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 45, tabled by my noble friend Lady Sugg, and to strongly and emphatically support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Farmer. I am unconvinced as to whether, at the present time, Amendment 45 actually ameliorates the concern about incompatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights. I will be interested to hear the Minister’s specific answer to my noble friend Lady Sugg’s question. I do believe, however, that this amendment is still disproportionate and is a significant attack on freedom of speech and thought.

First, the amendment seeks to criminalise those who are

“influencing any person’s decision to access, provide or facilitate the provision of abortion services”.

When compared with Clause 9, this is still extraordinarily broad and could potentially cover a whole range of innocuous activities. I know that there is a value judgment to be made about handing a leaflet to a vulnerable woman offering financial or housing support, but what about silent prayer, as we have seen examples of more recently?

This amendment does not actually exclude the outside of private property, so anyone who is in their private garden or their own car expressing their conscience could be criminalised. For a law which specifically proposes to limit fundamental freedoms of speech, expression and even thought, should we not be very specific about which behaviours are being disapproved of and where?

Yet, this amendment is indiscriminately applied to every clinic in the nation. As noted, the prohibited behaviours are far too broad. For example, in Clause 9 the 150-metre arbitrary curtilage limit refers to the abortion clinic at Mattock Lane, Ealing, west London. Behaviours, such as standing silently as if praying, which are found to have influenced someone, are included. Quite how this applies is a moot point.