Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Lord Jackson of Peterborough and Lord Hoffmann

Committee stage
Monday 19th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I say, gently, to the noble Baroness that this issue with unrestricted, unprecedented levels of geopolitical change and immigration is sui generis. Therefore, one has to see it through that prism. Yes, broadly and in principle, it is better to negotiate than to withdraw from a convention or another legal regime. But you cannot always use the case that, because Putin has been beastly, we self-evidently and axiomatically have to deal with his breach of international law. After all, invading a sovereign country such as Ukraine is a bit different from some of the other cases the noble Baroness used. It does not mean that you cannot be critical of the overall application of the legal regime we are discussing.

In fairness, my noble friend Lord Hailsham’s amendment is very fair-minded, enabling the Government potentially to present the evidence that, hitherto, they were not able to do in the 2022 case. Indeed, the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coker, is eminently sensible—actually, it is rather otiose, because one would always assume that the Home Secretary would seek the advice of the Attorney-General in proceeding in these small number of cases.

Two of the amendments the noble Baroness put forward are clearly wrecking amendments. The amendment that would disapply Section 55 of the Illegal Migration Act would specifically remove the express parliamentary sanction and authorisation of non-compliance with the interim measure, which, in itself, is a draconian move. Amendments 58 and 60 go to the heart of what we assume to be international law, in terms of what is justiciable in domestic law.

Let us be honest and put our cards on the table. This is about tying up the Bill in endless judicial reviews to stop any people being removed and to stop us tackling one of the biggest, endemic, troubling issues in politics. It is about bringing this back under the purview of domestic legislation in order to establish a roadblock via judicial review.

My final point is about the Human Rights Act 1998. It does not give legal effect in domestic legislation to the Strasbourg court’s Rule 39 practice, which is grounded in Article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights and is not one of the Commission rights set out in Schedule 1 to the 1998 Act. For those reasons, therefore, there is a very big question mark over the use of Rule 39 interim measures. Are they really international law as we would define it? Noble Lords would be wise to consider that when they come to vote for these amendments.

[Lord Hoffmann (CB)]

The noble Lord, Lord Howard, did me the honour of quoting a passage which I had written in a foreword to the paper by Professor Ekins of St John’s College, Oxford, on the jurisdiction to grant interim injunctions. I adhere to what I said in that foreword, but I ought to go a bit further. I will not go into the reasons Professor Ekins gave. He looked into the terms of the treaty, the travaux préparatoires and what the court had been saying until relatively recently, and he came to the conclusion that it had simply invented the power to grant interim injunctions. Indeed, the court in Strasbourg does not even have the power to grant final injunctions. If it is determined that there has been a breach of the treaty, what is to be done about it is a matter for the Committee of Ministers and not for the court itself.

However, the power to grant an interim injunction is an important part of the armoury of any court. Anyone who has held judicial office will know that it usually involves not so much any question of law but a practical question of deciding what lawyers perhaps rather frivolously call the balance of convenience between facts, which means the power to balance the possibility of injustice in one direction or the other. That is to say, you say to yourself, “Well, what is the position? Assuming that he turns out to be right but I don’t stop this going ahead, what injustice will he have suffered; and likewise, if I do stop it, what injustice will have been suffered by the person who has been stopped?” You weigh these things against each other and come to a practical conclusion.

It seems to me that it was sensible for the original treaty not to have included a power to grant interim injunctions, because this is essentially a practical and local matter which ought to be considered by English courts—by the courts of this country—and particularly not by a court in Strasbourg, whose sole function is to say what the terms of the convention mean. What the convention means is what it says it means, and that is perfectly well understood. However, the power to grant injunctions seems really to be a question for local courts.

If we go ahead with Clause 5, we have the bizarre situation in which the courts are, by virtue of the other clauses we discussed earlier, prevented from themselves granting interim injunctions. For the reasons I have given, I wholly supported the amendments proposed earlier today by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and my noble and learned friend Lady Hale. They seem absolutely essential to enable our courts to give justice.

On the other hand, however, what we have is a provision by which the orders of a court which, in my view, does not have jurisdiction can nevertheless be enforced, provided that the Minister—like the Emperor at the Colosseum—puts his thumb up rather than his thumb down in relation to those particular orders. That seems an extremely strange situation. For that reason, I am unwilling to support the amendment that gives effect to the interim injunctions in our report, but I certainly supported the amendments that were moved earlier.