(10 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberWell, I will develop my argument about the tension between domestic legislation, parliamentary sovereignty and the rights and privileges of Parliament, and the international obligations and a universalist human rights regime which many noble Lords seem very content to support in preference to the former.
I apologise for interrupting the noble Lord, whose complaint appears to be about supranational bodies. I do not know if he is aware—I am sure he is—that his own amendment disapplies
“any provision made by or under the Immigration Acts,”—
that is domestic law—
“the Human Rights Act 1998”—
that is domestic law—and
“any other provision or rule of domestic law (including any common law)”.
Why is he complaining only about supranational bodies when his amendment seeks to disapply great tranches of domestic law?
Well, the noble and learned Lord will be well aware that the Human Rights Act 1998, for instance, arose from the European Convention on Human Rights and the obligations in domestic legislation to that particular convention. I am sure there are other examples—
The hour is late, so if the noble and learned Lord will permit me—
I would be grateful for an answer to the question of what the noble Lord says about
“any other provision or rule of domestic law (including any common law)”.
Nobody could suggest that was derived from abroad.
As the noble and learned Lord will know, the amendment is worded such that it is declaratory and unambiguous. I am glad he has allowed me to make the point that the amendment my noble friend Lady Lawlor and I put down is explicit and unambiguous, so that it cannot be misinterpreted further down the line, outside this Chamber in the judicial setting. That is why it is copper-bottomed. It may not be quite to his liking, but it is there for a reason and the wording serves a specific purpose.
I will continue, as the hour is late. As I have explained, the amendment aims to disapply, for the purposes of this Act, the relevant international arrangements and other laws which prevent the UK controlling its borders, as the people of this country have elected their Government and their Members of Parliament to do. To that end, the laws we pass in this Parliament must be clear and unambiguous. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, the President of the Supreme Court, in dismissing one claim in a judgment on 15 November—that of ASM, an Iraqi—said that a court may not
“disregard an unambiguous expression of Parliament’s intention”.
I agree with what my noble friend Lady Lawlor said about the narrowness of contemporary theory and the universalist view, a logical corollary of which leads to a belief in open borders. It is practically impossible, in the current regime, for us to control our borders while we remain encumbered by international obligations which seek to subvert and undermine the sovereignty of this Parliament.
I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, that we do indeed need to address the immigration problem, but surely it would be better to address it in accordance with the law than in breach of the law.
I hope to address the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. Yesterday, I was in Huntingdon town hall watching a play recreating the trial of Charles I, which took place from 20 to 30 January 1649. Obviously, it did not end well for Charles I, who was arraigned on a charge of treason for making war against his own people. What he really did, of course, was that he usurped Parliament. He grabbed for himself the age-old privileges, that Parliament then said it bestowed upon itself, of a sovereign Parliament. It was the ultimate demonstration of the rights and privileges of that Parliament to put to death for the first time in history its own King. The point is that the sovereignty of this place is a precious thing, and I think that the amendment put forward by my noble friend Lord Hailsham unbalances the three-legged stool that the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, who is no longer in his place, referred to in his earlier comments.
I draw attention specifically on that issue to—noble and learned Lords will no doubt be aware of this reference—AV Dicey’s doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament. The eighth edition of the textbook, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, was published in 1915. It outlines the concepts of parliamentary sovereignty and the supremacy of Parliament. The three key points of parliamentary supremacy were that: Parliament can make any laws, it cannot be overridden by any body and cannot bind its successors nor can it be bound by its predecessors. The wider point is that we are a dualist Parliament. We do not cut and paste international treaties into law without proper scrutiny and oversight. Obviously, that involves primary and secondary legislation going through the proper procedures in this Parliament. That has been upheld by the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords in its time and of course by the Supreme Court. Treaty obligations have effect in domestic law only so far as they are expressly incorporated into domestic law. The sovereignty of Parliament is fundamental to our rule of law and cannot be circumscribed by international law, opinions or even conventions.
In the case of R v Lyons in 2002—it is a very important point, so I hope noble Lords will forgive me if I read it in full— Lord Hoffmann, stated that
“it is firmly established that international treaties do not form part of English law and that English courts have no jurisdiction to interpret or apply them... It is not the treaty but the statute which forms part of English law. And English courts will not (unless the statute expressly so provides) be bound to give effect to interpretations of the treaty by an international court, even though the United Kingdom is bound by international law to do so. ... The sovereign legislator in the United Kingdom is Parliament. If Parliament has plainly laid down the law, it is the duty of the courts to apply it, whether that would involve the Crown in breach of an international treaty or not”.
In Bradley and Ewing’s authoritative book Constitutional and Administrative Law, it is clearly stated that the legislative supremacy of Parliament is not limited by international law:
“the courts may not hold an Act void on the ground that it contravenes general principles of international law”.
Indeed—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, will be aware—the Labour Government in 1998 specifically reaffirmed the sovereignty of Parliament in relation to the Human Rights Act.
The amendment that we put down specifically makes that point. As I draw to a finish, I want to say to noble Lords that convention and international treaty obligations can be circumscribed and undermined to an extent by government. I draw noble Lords’ attention, for instance, to the prisoner vote issue of 2005. When I served in the other place, it was very much the settled view across the parties, including the Labour Government and the leader of the Opposition, that we would not accept prisoners who had been incarcerated with custodial sentences over a certain period receiving the vote. That was anathema to David Cameron, the case being Hirst v UK (No. 2) ECHR 681 [2005]. There was no outcry or uproar then; there was a settled consensus in this sovereign Parliament that the British people were not prepared to subsume their views, attitudes and opinions on prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment having the vote, having those civil and human rights that other people did. This issue will come up again when we debate later in this Committee the issue of marriage of whole life-tariff prisoners. One other example of course is that Madam Merkel disregarded the Dublin convention in 2015, allowing over a million Syrian refugees to come to the country in breach of Germany’s obligations under various treaties.
In conclusion, this Bill is of course imperfect; it is flawed. I may not even have voted for it when I was still in the other place, but that is another issue. Some noble Lords clearly want to hobble the Bill, make it inoperable and kill it with multiple amendments. We know that; it is only honest to say so. But the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Hailsham moves the dial far too much towards judicial activism and away from parliamentary sovereignty. For that reason, I must ask noble Lords to resist it.
Finally, to those potentially assuming a ministerial responsibility later this year on the other side of this Chamber, I say, “Be careful what you wish for”. If Labour is elected to government, it will have to put into place an election manifesto; the people will have given it the faith and trust so to do. To undermine that by subjugating parliamentary sovereignty to international treaty obligations, which may change against the interests of a Labour Government and the British people, is a hostage to fortune. Undermining parliamentary sovereignty may seem a prudent thing to do in Opposition, but the burdens of higher office mean that, one day, the boot may well be on the other foot. For those reasons, I very strongly support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Lawlor and resist the amendments moved by my noble friend Lord Hailsham and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.