Lord Jackson of Peterborough
Main Page: Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Jackson of Peterborough's debates with the Home Office
(4 days, 7 hours ago)
Lords ChamberSome things have not changed. Then you had the mechanical engineers, the aircraft fitters, and so on and so forth: several different unions representing different members. I learned as a very young man that some unions are more militant than others and that a very small group of people could bring a whole aircraft plant to a halt.
I recall crossing a picket line. I was not a member of a trade union, but I was a contractor. A small group of trade unionists brought the plant to a halt. I turned up to work and wanted to go through the gates, and I was barred. But I was always taught to stand up to bullies, so I insisted on going through the gates—indeed, I did walk through the gates. I can remember to this day—and it is 45 years ago—the abuse I received as I walked through those gates to work as a young teenager. I still recall it, because every time I go to a Conservative Party conference I get a very similar amount of abuse. So some things have not changed.
The noble Lord, Lord Barber, rightly pointed out that trade unions are a force for good, because they look after their members in so many ways. Nobody across this House would argue with that. But the point of my amendment is that a small group of militant colleagues on the trade union side can bring the whole factory or organisation to a halt. Throughout this debate we have talked about SMEs; in this case I am talking about a very large organisation. It is the intimidation of the minority that affects the majority. Eliminating the 50% turnout threshold for strike ballots would significantly lower the bar for industrial action, allowing strikes to proceed if only a small minority of the workforce participates. This creates unpredictability and challenges for business continuity and planning, as substantial disruptions could occur based on the votes of a very limited number of employees.
In sectors where products are highly perishable, including the distribution of medicines or those with just-in-time supply chains, the ease of initiating industrial action increases the risk of supply chain interruptions. Some medical products have a limited shelf life. Strikes at distribution centres could lead to critical shortages, with direct consequences for public health and patient care. For industries that rely on seasonal production cycles, such as manufacturing and distribution of vaccines, removing the threshold places the delicate timing of mandatory deliveries at risk.
Even short periods of industrial action could jeopardise the ability to meet strict production targets and delivery deadlines, impacting public services and national preparedness. Lowering the requirements for strike action could deter domestic and international investors, who typically are seeking business environments with stable industrial relations frameworks. The potential for frequent or unpredictable strikes may lead to perceptions of elevated operational risk, discouraging long-term commitment across multiple sectors. The absence of a robust threshold may undermine industrial relations by encouraging strike action that lacks clear, broad-based support among employees. This could erode morale, create internal divisions and reduce trust between management and staff, ultimately affecting organisation productivity and the wider economy. I grew up in the 1970s; we do not want to go back to the 1970s.
My Lords, I will speak very briefly to Amendment 149A—and Amendment 149, spoken to very ably by my noble friend Lord Evans of Rainow. He is absolutely right about the qualifying percentage. Not long ago, I was thumbing through my copy of the Labour Party rules, as you do; the template rules of the Labour Party. I noticed that regional executive council meetings of that party have a quorum of 33% in terms of any decisions made in the deliberations of that committee. If the Labour Party is going to impose a less than 50% and certainly less than 33% marker for decisions being made internally, it is odd that it does not take a similarly robust attitude towards important decisions that affect many workers in industrial landscapes and industrial relations.
Amendment 149A addresses a very perverse consequence—the decision, in terms of Clause 72, to remove proper organised supervision of industrial disputes in the industrial landscape that we have at the moment. It is pretty odd that there does not appear to be a rationale for this. It seems sensible and prudent for us to be in a position where trade union officials are responsible for ensuring that there is an orderly management of industrial disputes. No case has been made by Ministers, in Committee or at Second Reading, for why it is necessary, other than demands from the trade unions to remove that part of previous legislation.
My Lords, I oppose the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hendy. In doing so, I accept that he is very sincere in the arguments that he makes. I would not necessarily wish to dispute his interpretation of ILO regulations or policies, but we are nevertheless being asked to accept the central premise of secondary picketing. Although I agree with the noble Lord—any reasonable person would—that the P&O dispute was an egregious example of malfeasance and inappropriate behaviour by the management, it should not be the basis of industrial policy and legislation that governs employment. On that basis, and with all due respect, I do not think that the noble Lord’s argument is very compelling. It is always bad law to work on the basis of unique circumstances, situations and anecdotes, notwithstanding the fact that we disagree with how P&O Ferries handled that situation, which was pretty lamentable.
That said, in the situation that we now have in the economy, where we have pressure on employment, rising inflation, difficulties in recruitment and ossified GDP growth, and where we are not achieving growth levels that we need, the last thing we need is to make the employment market more disputatious and more litigious. That is what this amendment would do, frankly. If one reads it carefully, the term “connected with” in proposed new subsection 4(a) would probably do a lot of heavy lifting in the future and no doubt be the subject of quite a bit of legal action, one would assume, were it to be incorporated into the Bill. In addition, the change in proposed new subsection 4(b) from employed by “that employer” to by “an employer”—that is, all employers—gives carte blanche, frankly, for going back to the bad old days of the 1970s when we saw behaviour that caused huge disputes and very significant dislocation between the workforce and employers across a wide range of industries.
As others touched on in Committee, and notwithstanding what the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, said about the ILO, this is almost from a different era. We are no longer in the era, or we are less so than we were, of heavily mechanised, heavily unionised manufacturing, where that central argument for having collective action between different groups of workers at different locations—I could mention Saltley coke works and Orgreave, which is very topical—was a pertinent issue. We are no longer in that situation, because of technical change, communication change and the way that people work now. Many more people work from home and many more work on a self-employed basis. They are not accessing unions as members and it is not necessary for them to have that physical collective action.
There are, very briefly, other big philosophical and ideological reasons why it would be bad news were this amendment to be appended to the Bill. There would be a disproportionate impact of secondary picketing, which would undermine the confidence of employers, customers and suppliers in businesses that are not directly involved in the dispute. It would create economic damage that extends far beyond the scope of the actual workforce disagreement. It would unfairly target neutral parties. Secondary picketing affects businesses and workers in the supply chain who have no direct involvement in the original dispute. These neutral employers face disruption to their operations, despite having no control over, or responsibility for resolving, the underlying conflict. There would obviously be a multiplier effect in the economy of such disruption. There are also legal and fairness arguments and contractual rights. Secondary picketing can interfere with existing contractual relationships between neutral businesses and their customers, suppliers or employees, which undermines the security of commercial contracts and business relationships.
There is also the right to work. Workers at secondary sites who are not party to the original dispute have their own right to work without interference; secondary picketing would, of course, impinge on that right. Secondary picketing can effectively coerce those workers into supporting a cause that they may not agree with or have a stake in. In terms of property rights, secondary picketing often takes place on or near the property of businesses uninvolved in the dispute, potentially interfering with property owners’ rights to conduct their business freely.
The rule of law is important as well. There is a reason why there was consensus among the voting public at the 1979 election and onwards, with the continuing legislation brought forward by the Conservative Government, that secondary picketing was essentially retrograde, a bad thing and not good for jobs, prosperity and business.
There is a final point to be made about democratic legitimacy. Secondary picketing can give unions power to disrupt parts of the economy where they lack a democratic mandate from the affected workers, as those workers have not chosen to join the industrial action. The point is that if you wish to go on strike, having gone through the democratic processes of a union workplace ballot at your place of work, that must be respected and it must be proper and within the rule of law. However, imposing that particular dispute on other people through secondary picketing undermines democratic legitimacy.
I say finally that the Blair Government were not perfect, but they looked at this situation, as did the Brown Government, when Labour was in power from 1997 to 2010 and did not essentially resile from a settled position and a consensus on secondary picketing. For that reason, notwithstanding that I respect the great expertise of the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, I think that this is an unfortunate amendment and I oppose it.
My Lords, I shall speak briefly to Amendment 150 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hendy, because I think that it is worth taking just a moment to consider the impact of the reduction in union bargaining power that we have seen on ordinary working people in this country. That will not take long, because it is plain to see, in stagnating living standards and the drag on fair growth, but it is also worth considering how the position of the party opposite on industrial action has evolved over time.
In April 1980, the then Secretary of State for Employment, Jim Prior, introduced an Employment Bill which restricted secondary action, but he certainly did not advocate that it should be banned altogether. The then Conservative Government’s position was that secondary action should in fact remain lawful if it related to a first customer and/or supplier that was of direct importance to the original dispute. Jim Prior said that
“the only other position that we could take would be to say that there will be no immunity for anything other than primary action. I do not believe … that that is either a practical or a reasonable position to take”.
He also said that, by protecting the right to take secondary action in relation to a customer or supplier,
“We are seeking to reach a position which we believe is fair and which recognises the traditional rights of the trade union movement”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/4/1980; col. 1490.]
Back then, a Conservative Minister could acknowledge that the relationship between an employer, on one hand, and workers and their unions, on the other, is an inherently unequal one. But, of course, Jim Prior did not last long in that role and, under successive Conservative Governments, the inequality of power between workers and employers was deliberately and repeatedly reinforced.
Secondary action, or solidarity action as it is commonly called, was effectively outlawed in 1990, but here is the problem that I invite noble Lords to reflect on when considering the arguments of my noble friend Lord Hendy. Business was handed a unilateral power to define what secondary action is and, unfortunately, that is an invitation to an abuse of power. This is not an academic point. It was only after a six-week strike in 1984 that Ford sewing machinists finally secured full equal pay, but the victory was short-lived. Ultimately, the company took the decision to outsource those jobs and so avoid any need for pay parity, secure in the knowledge that solidarity action from workers in the customer company would become unlawful. Today, some companies continue to use long supply chains and complex outsourcing arrangements to effectively balkanise workers’ bargaining power. For example, take a company that decides to boost profit margins by targeting one part of the work- force for wage cuts. To prevent fellow workers from participating in industrial action to resist those pay cuts, a company can simply divide itself in two. To paraphrase Jim Prior, is that fair?