Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lord Howarth of Newport Excerpts

Tuesday 7th February 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, both these amendments are concerned to ensure that the court knows all that it needs to know before sentencing. In my experience as a recorder, the court would be acting very negligently indeed if it were to sentence a woman, or even a man, without knowing the effect of that on the dependants. That is the fundamental point usually made in mitigation. It is very much part of the picture that any sentencing tribunal would have to take into account. If for some reason an advocate or the probation service was not giving sufficient information about this, the court would ensure—by adjourning if necessary—that that information was available. Therefore, although I accept the points made about the necessity to take all these facts into account, these amendments are designed to tell the courts what to do. I respectfully submit that the courts know what to do.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, I fully support the intentions of these amendments. I admired the speech by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, but seek clarification from him. I have a question about feasibility and practicality. I am not sure whether it is intended that the requirements in these amendments should extend to magistrates’ courts as well as to the other courts. However, if one considers the circumstances in which the magistrates’ courts were operating last summer, following the riots, when they transacted an extraordinary volume of cases, worked under extreme pressure and sat until late at night, I wonder how realistic it is to lay upon those courts the requirements that these amendments would lay. I had misgivings about the magistrates’ courts working in that fashion but I recognise that what they did at that time was seen by the public as entirely appropriate in a situation of exceptional crisis. Perhaps what I am really saying is that there is no substitute for having enough courts that are sufficiently resourced and a probation service that is well enough resourced, and for the courts to do their work as far as possible screened from the pressures of the media and politics. However, that is a rather fanciful state of affairs to desire.

I therefore simply ask the noble Lord, whose purposes I thoroughly endorse, to explain, if he will, how he envisages these requirements actually working in practice when the courts are under severe pressure.

[Lord Judd]

My Lords, I must apologise for not having been in my place when the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, was moving his amendment; however, as I have put my name to the amendment, I hope that with the leave of the House I might make just two observations.

First, it has been said that it is not appropriate to tell the courts what to do because they know what to do. That is a fine sentiment in some ways, and I pay due respect to the sincere professionals who make the courts system work. The issue is whether the court has enough information in front of it to make a proper decision in view of the circumstances and consequences of what it may decide. The amendments are therefore dealing with a rather different point.

I also want to make this observation: of course, when the court has before it someone who is about to be sentenced, I am sure that there is a punishment to be made; but if we are sensible and rational beings, and the courts are working well, it is also essential right from that moment to be thinking about the rehabilitation of the individual so that they can become a positive citizen. That is why the quality and depth of the probation service’s report is crucial; otherwise, we slip into a sort of factory system of justice whereby there is an automatic response to a case. One has to try all the time to look at the individual and at how the sentence can be tailored to enable that citizen not only to be punished but to start the process of rehabilitation and join society as a responsible citizen.

If we are concerned about future crime, there is nothing more absurd and wasteful than not to take fully into account the implications for the dependants, because we may otherwise find that the court, by not having paid sufficient attention to the needs of the dependants, has inadvertently contributed to the next generation of offenders in that family.