Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016 (Consequential Provisions) Order 2017

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Wednesday 10th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Harris of Richmond]

The noble Baroness makes a good point and I concur with what she says. I predict that this will go horribly wrong at some point and that is a real shame. I hope that the noble Lord has listened very carefully to the views that have been clearly expressed around the House, and certainly the resolution that the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, talked about, as that will be extremely important.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, as a fairly frequent traveller on the east coast railway line from Edinburgh to London King’s Cross, I would like to say a word or two about this issue. As the noble Lord, Lord Maxton, pointed out, there is no train station at the border, which you reach a little north of Berwick-upon-Tweed on your way to Dunbar. As I understand the situation, that means that in order to police effectively south of the border, British Transport Police officers will have to get on to the train at Waverley in Edinburgh, so they will travel the whole way down the line, as they do at present. Going north, they cannot get off at Berwick-upon-Tweed, because they still have several miles to run in England before they reach the Scottish border, and they will have to travel all the way to Waverley.

Therefore, the ridiculous situation created by this proposal by the Scottish National Party is that the British Transport Police force will remain on the train, as it does at present. It will cease to provide the kind of security north of the border that the noble Baroness, Lady Liddell, talked about, although to do its job effectively in England, it will have to travel the whole journey. Therefore, members of the Scottish police force will be travelling on the train, getting off at Berwick if they are lucky—but not every train stops there—or going all the way down to Newcastle and then having to travel all the way back again. I cannot speak for the west coast line because I am not so familiar with it, but presumably the same problem applies there, and you have to travel at least to Carlisle before you can get off the train.

[Lord Maxton]

It is even worse on the west coast, because Carlisle is even further south than Berwick-upon-Tweed.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, a curious feature of this measure is that if British Transport Police officers are brave enough to exercise their powers as British Transport Police officers north of the border, they are given the power to do that by paragraph 2 of Schedule 2. In fact, the paragraph is consistent with the idea that we do not go ahead with the merger at all. It is a perfectly sensible method of solving the problem which the Smith commission had to face up to, which was to say that the functions of the British Transport Police in Scotland will be a devolved matter. That is a perfectly sensible proposition. What has gone wrong is the Scottish National Party’s interpretation of it, as the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, said.

For all the reasons that others have given, I am strongly against the merger. However, like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, I cannot see anything wrong with the order we are asked to consider. Therefore, if the Motion were pressed, I regret that I would have to vote with the Government because that is the state of play. However, I entirely sympathise with the plea of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, to the Minister. Given the practical example I have given to the Minister, I hope that he can point out to the Scottish National Party that it is a waste of public money to have two police officers travelling on the train from Newcastle all the way to Edinburgh and back again just to solve the problem of the merger which it is trying to advance.

[Lord Faulkner of Worcester]

My Lords, in opening the debate, the Minister referred to the degree of opposition to this proposal in this House. He was not wrong in that. He could also have mentioned the degree of opposition in the Scottish Parliament, most particularly among his colleagues in the Conservative Party, who are on record as opposing this proposal most vigorously, particularly Ruth Davidson. He could have included the Liberal Democrats and the Labour opposition in the Scottish Parliament as well. But above all, he should have mentioned the opposition of the British Transport Police and the British Transport Police Authority. When it gave evidence to the Scottish Parliament in March, it said that dealing with fatalities, for example, could take 50% longer under the new plans, and that,

“there is well-defined evidence that a non-specialist force is less able to provide the consistent levels of service that a dedicated policing commitment can offer”.

Decades of experience of dealing with IRA threats would be lost, and the work that the BTP undertakes as the lead authority on scrap metal theft across the whole of Great Britain would also be lost if this proposal went through.

Fortunately, there is an opportunity for the Scottish Parliament to think again about the model of devolution which it is putting forward. Indeed, it would have been helpful if this House had passed the amendment which a number of us tabled almost exactly two years ago, which made it clear that, while we were not opposed to devolution of transport policing in Scotland, that devolution should be on the basis that a force linked to the British Transport Police should be the agency that carries it out. I spoke to the chief constable of the British Transport Police, and he is entirely happy with that. Indeed, in its evidence to the Scottish Parliament the BTP said that it is happy to have a direct relationship with Scottish Ministers and with Holyrood. If it is necessary to change the name of the force in Scotland, for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, referred to, that is possible—there is no reason why it should not be called “Transport Police Scotland” or “Scotland Transport Police”. Nobody is hung up on the name of the British Transport Police. What matters is that the job is done properly and in the most effective way.

Brexit: Justice for Families, Individuals and Businesses (EU Committee Report)

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Wednesday 20th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Cashman. If he will forgive me, I am afraid that this is a contribution by another lawyer—although not with anything like the experience and insight into these matters of the noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton of Belgravia. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, on her committee’s excellent report. I extend my compliments to the members of the committee, many of whom are present.

At the risk of some repetition, I shall concentrate on the section of the report which deals with Brussels IIa and the Maintenance Regulation. This is a little technical but these are the measures that are concerned with the rights of adults and children with regard to matrimonial matters; parental responsibility, including rights of custody and access; and the very important issue of child abduction. They supplement the Lugano and Hague conventions on these matters. As I shall mention in a moment, they do so in a way that is crucial to the points to which the report draws attention.

It struck me that there were two words that the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, stressed several times: predictability and certainty. That is what these measures give us, against the rather looser background of the conventions—much to the advantage of everyone involved in these matters, be they commercial entities or families.

At the end of his speech the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, drew attention to the passage in the report which says:

“To walk away from these Regulations without putting alternatives in place would seriously undermine the family law rights of UK citizens”.


I do not think it was an exaggeration for the report to go on to say, as the noble Lord did, that to do that would be,

“an act of self-harm”.

That underlines the crucial nature of the issues we are talking about.

The issue is of concern to UK citizens in all parts of the United Kingdom, not just the jurisdiction in which we are today: England and Wales. It might be worth inviting the Minister to study an article by Janys Scott QC—whose name, I am sure, is familiar to him; she is a senior practitioner in family law in Scotland—in this month’s edition of the Journal of the Law Society of Scotland. She draws attention, as the noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton, did, to the risk of conflicting proceedings if our domestic courts are bound to resort to our own procedures without the benefit of the reciprocity in family matters that the regulations provide. She points out that the withdrawal Bill does not create that reciprocity: in fact, it removes it, and puts nothing in its place. The risk is of conflicting actions in different countries ongoing at the same time, with conflicting decisions and no way of deciding which must prevail. That surely is a recipe for much delay and expense and is quite contrary to the principle that gives priority to the best interests of the child. As I mentioned, there are other international treaties, but they are less clear and less decisive than the Brussels measures.

That point is illustrated very clearly in the European Commission’s guide to the provisions for the return of the child. In the table you find phrases such as “not obliged to” and “may refuse” in the Hague Convention, when for the same stages in the procedure the regulations say “cannot refuse” and “shall ensure”. There you see the certainty and predictability that the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, drew attention to. We cannot rely on the conventions to provide the certainty we need. We need to maintain the same reciprocity, attention to detail and standards of precision that operate across the EU. As Janys Scott says, family law deserves serious attention if Brexit is not to result in confusion and expense for families who find themselves stretched between one or other of the jurisdictions in the UK and other European states when the misfortune of break-up strikes.

This brings me to the Government’s response, bearing in mind the sub-committee’s warning that it was not convinced that the Government had, as yet,

“a coherent or workable plan to address the … problems … if alternative arrangements are not put in place”.

We have now been told in the response that the Government are seeking,

“an agreement with the EU that allows for close and comprehensive cross-border … co-operation”,

in family matters, which would provide a range of reciprocal rules. I am not wholly reassured, so I have two questions for the Minister.

The first is: can he give us an assurance that, when the Government are seeking an agreement with the EU in these matters, the aim will be to achieve the same high degree of reciprocity and predictability that we have now? The response talks about “close” cross-border co-operation, but the words “close” and “closely” are not really good enough. Precision, predictability and certainty are what we are looking for, leaving no room for doubts that could give rise to dispute. Will that be the aim? I very much hope that it will.

The second question is: can he assure us that everything will be done to ensure that there will be no cliff edge on these matters when we leave the EU? If the current arrangements are to continue during the transitional or implementation period after the exit date, can we be assured that they will continue even after the end of that period if an agreement cannot be reached and the replacements put in place by then? The Minister will, I am sure, appreciate how highly charged family disputes can be. We must surely do everything possible to avoid a gap in the cross-border arrangements: a black hole, one might say, which would make their resolution even more difficult than it already is.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That is absolutely correct, but the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, brought this out more fully when he distinguished between cases in the pipeline and those that arise post Brexit. As paragraph 91 of the joint report points out, there will essentially be agreement—or consensus; let me put it that way—on how we deal with existing cases at the point when we leave the European Union. But there is no desire to see us walk away or wind down the existing regulatory regime.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, posed two questions in the context of the Government’s response, where we talk about a “close and comprehensive agreement”. It cannot be a mirror of what is already there, because of the jurisdiction of the CJEU, but “close and comprehensive” is what we seek.

The noble and learned Lord’s first question was whether we could give an assurance that the aim is to achieve the same degree of certainty and predictability. The answer, I would suggest, is yes. The aim is most certainly to achieve that. I assure him that there will be no cliff edge. We have no desire for there to be any cliff edge anywhere, but that will be the subject of negotiation because we are now entering the second phase. Perhaps it is more important to point out that the Government’s aim in this context is to ensure that we have certainty, predictability and continuity.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

What would happen if at the end of the time-limited implementation period it had still not been possible to achieve what the noble and learned Lord said in answer to my first question?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

If at the end of the transition period there had been no agreement, there would be no basis for reciprocal enforcement pursuant to Brussels Ia, Brussels II and those regulations, because we would no longer be a member of the EU for those purposes. That would appear to follow. Nevertheless, there would still be recourse to the Hague convention, although I am the first to accept that the convention provisions do not replicate or achieve the level of predictability and certainty that is in the Brussels regulations.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Does that not just heighten the importance of achieving agreement during the implementation period as a matter of urgency?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I absolutely concur, which is why we and the EU have expressed a desire to move forward to the second phase of negotiations as swiftly as possible. I emphasise that this is about reciprocity. It is about the interest not only of the United Kingdom but of the EU. It appears to me that those interests will eventually prevail.

I am afraid that I keep on getting a note saying that I have one minute to go and I keep on stretching that one minute. I have not expressly addressed all points raised by noble Lords, but perhaps I may touch on one or two. I entirely concur with the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, that one cannot negotiate in public. We can express our intentions and our aims, but it is very difficult for us to give a running commentary about where we are on these issues any more than on other issues, but I underline our aims in this context.

The noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, referred to the delay in the Government’s response to the report. I apologise for that. The report was followed by the general election and then by the Summer Recess. The government paper was issued on 22 August, when I believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, was invited to take part in a briefing on the matter, but I accept that it took until the beginning of December for the response to be published.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, asked about progress in “discussions”. These are not discussions; these are negotiations. The noble Lord is a very experienced lawyer and knows perfectly well that one cannot have or maintain a running commentary on such matters when one is hoping to achieve consensus at the end of the day. However, we verily believe that we will achieve certainty and predictability, which, I emphasise again, is our aim.

I again thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, and her sub-committee for the report.

Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2017

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Wednesday 13th September 2017 Lords Chamber

The real problem with the statutory instrument with which we are concerned is the possibility that an application can be made to the court to vary the cost cap, up or down, and that introduces uncertainty, which must affect the minds of the people in communities who wish to challenge a decision of an authority or of government. It is the job of lawyers such as myself to advise people never to go to court if they can possibly help it, but who would want to go to court with the threat that the cost cap which you can judge and expect under the convention might go up or down? That is not supportable, and I hope that all your Lordships will join my noble friend in regretting this statutory instrument.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I had not intended to speak in this debate but I have an interest in it for a variety of reasons. First, I should declare an interest as a member of the RSPB, the Scottish Wildlife Trust and the Scottish Ornithologists’ Club, and as the owner of a cottage, which happens to be called “Craighead”, in an area of east Perthshire which is at risk of being surrounded by wind farms.

I am very conscious of the importance of the right of the public to challenge planning applications without undue cost where the proceedings would be unduly expensive. Therefore, in a sense I am very sympathetic to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, has raised. On the other hand, as my noble and learned friend Lord Brown pointed out, I presided in the case of Edwards. That case raised a particular problem for us because we were sitting in the Supreme Court, where the environmental point was being taken not on the first appeal but the second. One reason that we were particularly anxious to refer the matter to the CJEU was to find out what the position is when cases reach the appellate stage and one has already had two hearings of the issue and is facing the cost of a third. Therefore, at the moment I am undecided as to which way to go.

There is a feature that is worth bearing in mind. It is very easy to take a blanket view about all the people who wish to challenge planning applications or other matters that affect the environment, and assume that they are all taking the proceedings in the most economical and responsible way possible. Judges are aware that human nature varies and applications vary, and that there may be circumstances in which the element of control which comes with the ability to vary the cap up or down, as has been pointed out, may be a useful method of controlling proceedings before they get out of control.

I will be interested to hear from the Minister about the background to this measure, and to understand and know whether it applies to appeals as well as to proceedings of first instance, before I decide whether I can support the Motion to Regret. I am in sympathy with it but not sure that I can carry it the entire way.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak briefly in support of the Motion and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for giving us the opportunity. I refer your Lordships to my entry in the register of interests.

I wish to make a wider point about the consequences of this legislation. I speak as a passionate environmentalist and as someone who has maintained a sceptical eye on the environmental claims of the party opposite because, sadly, time and again the practical realities of its actions have not lived up to its lofty claims about defending the environment.

I was intrigued when I heard Michael Gove’s keynote speech setting out his own agenda to the WWF in July. He went further than the usual ministerial platitudes on these issues. He specifically praised organisations such as the WWF, the RSPB, the Wildlife Trust, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and so on. He said:

“Their campaigning energy and idealism, while occasionally uncomfortable for those of us in power, who have to live in a world of compromise and deal-making, is vital to ensuring we continue to make progress in protecting and enhancing our environment”.


He went on to say:

“On everything from alerting us all to the danger posed by plastics in our oceans and nitrogen oxide in our air, to the threats posed to elephants by poaching and cod by over-fishing, it’s been environmental organisations which have driven Governments to make progress”.


It is therefore ironic that the organisations holding the Government to account—which Michael Gove was keen to praise—are the same organisations which have now written to noble Lords urging us to support this Motion to Regret.

I have a specific question for the Minister, which is: has Michael Gove, the new Secretary of State for Defra, been fully consulted about these changes and is the Minister confident that he supports them? If so, we on these Benches will have to revert to our cynicism about his true intentions about working with those organisations to protect the environment.

It is clear that the proposed changes to the court costs will discourage environmental charities, local groups and individuals from holding the Government to account when they fail to live up to their promises about protecting the environment. I refer noble Lords, for example, to the heroic and dogged legal case of Client Earth on holding the Government to account on the question of clean air, which has wide and enormous public consequences. The case has true public benefits and there are many other cases like it.

Like others, I have read the Explanatory Memorandum, and I share the disbelief of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee that it does not make it clear why these changes are needed. There is no evidence of a flood of unmeritorious claims in court. The figure quoted of 153 cases in a year seems remarkably reasonable. It is also clear that a healthy number of those cases were successful, which rather underscores their validity.

I do not wish to prolong this discussion but the continuity and the streamlined thinking of the Government have been tested by this. I am not sure whether Defra and the justice department are thinking with like minds and I therefore urge the Minister to withdraw the proposals. In doing so, I make it clear that I will support the Motion if it is pressed to a vote.

Air Weapons and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2015 (Consequential Provisions) Order 2017

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Thursday 9th March 2017 Grand Committee

[The Earl of Kinnoull (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his customary logic and clarity in telling us about the proposed statutory instrument. I declare an interest: I have a firearm certificate from Police Scotland and I own an air gun. It is relevant to later in my short remarks that I bought it second-hand for £25. Living as I do in rural Scotland, I can tell the Committee that probably most homes in my area either own an air gun or have done so at some point.

I should make clear that everything I shall say in no way challenges the fact of the devolution of powers, or the fact that the licensing regime has been introduced. However, some people have expressed to me the opinion that the licensing regime is disproportionate, badly cast and impractical, and, having looked into, it I have some concerns.

The British Association for Shooting and Conservation has 144,000 members; I am not one of them. Around 12,000 members are Scottish. The BASC has given a briefing paper to all its members, from which I will read the concluding paragraph. I preface that by saying that at the start of this process there were an estimated 500,000 air guns in Scotland: that puts the figure of 19,000 into context. The report, Air Gun Licensing in Scotland a Costly and Bureaucratic Mistake, states:

“Currently, 60,000 people in Scotland already hold firearms licences. Increasing the licensing requirement to cover hundreds of thousands of people in Scotland plus visitors will place existing Police Scotland licensing staff under a massive administrative burden when offences have fallen significantly and the police are subject to pressure on both budgets and staffing”.


As the Minister pointed out, version 1.0 of the Guide to Air Weapon Licensing in Scotland of June 2016 states that the whole thing will broadly follow the principles and practices of existing firearms legislation. That is pretty onerous. There are seven different forms that you can fill out but the main form is number one; it is 12 pages long and includes lots of questions about health and about security in the home.

There is a warning that if you answer a health question with a problem, your GP will be contacted. The security questions at home are, of course, very similar to those in the firearms questionnaires that I fill out, which result quite rightly in visits to homes. With hundreds of thousands of people needing to apply for these licences, with warnings that GPs may be contacted and security may need to be checked in homes, and with a 12-page form that needs to be processed, my concerns reach not just to the BASC’s worries about the pressure on Police Scotland but to needless pressures on the National Health Service. GPs will not know everything and will have look in their files, as they will—I presume—have to write a report to say that a person is suitable for a licence. The cost of the licence is also quite a lot; it is £72 for someone aged over 18. Admittedly it is only £50 for a 14 year-old, but I put that against my original purchase of a £25 air gun.

The function of this House is scrutiny and the weapon we have is to ask the Government to think again. Of course, in recent days we have seen ourselves do that in a very public way. My question is: where we see something like this in the underlying legislation—something that I feel to be impractical and, in the round, bad news for the people of Scotland and disproportionate—should we just wave through a statutory instrument or should we ask the devolved Administration to think again? I have carefully reviewed the underlying Act—I have it here on my iPad—and I think it would be possible with the Act to have a much simpler system, which would be cheaper and would not use up the resources of Police Scotland or of the National Health Service in Scotland, and yet would give some element of comfort to make sure that the horrible crimes that can occur with these things are lessons. I would be very grateful for the Minister’s comments on this underlying constitutional issue.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I have never owned an air weapon, although when I was younger I did fire one once or twice, but it was a very long time ago. I have come along to welcome this measure—not in any way to take away from the points that the noble Earl has raised—but I do so against a background for which I should declare an interest as a member of the Scottish Ornithologists’ Club.

I have been concerned for many years about the misuse of air weapons by young people, particularly in the countryside, who are tempted when they see, for example, a swan on a pond or a loch to shoot at it. I dare say it is a very tempting target for a young boy with an air gun. Of course, the injury that can be caused to these wild animals can be very disabling—not fatal, but it can considerably disable the individual bird and, if it is nesting, affect the lives of the cygnets or young birds that are being looked after.

Anything that can be done to restrict the availability of air weapons—excepting those such as the noble Earl and his family, who can no doubt be trusted to use them properly—should be done. I must confess that it never occurred to me as a little boy, or even today, to go to a pawnshop to buy one. I am quite interested as to why pawnshops have been singled out, but it may be that an example has been found of a pawnshop that had air weapons available which were of course not subject to the usual scrutiny that one would get from the reputable dealers. Closing off a loophole of that kind is welcome and I therefore applaud the instrument in that respect.

However, one question puzzles me—purely because the Explanatory Memorandum does not explain enough —which is the exclusion from new subsection (1ZB) of an air weapon. This is in the forfeiture clause, which provides for the forfeiture or disposal of any firearm, other than an air weapon, in Section 1 of the Act. I am not quite sure why that should be. If an air weapon is found, for example, in a pawnshop and the owner of the pawnshop is convicted of the offence, I would have thought that the sensible thing would be to take the air weapon into possession because the only person who has a claim to its ownership is the pawnshop owner; it has not yet been disposed of. It may be that I am missing bits of legislation elsewhere which would cover that but it would be helpful if the Minister was able to explain why air weapons are being excluded. I would be comforted if there was some other provision which enabled that forfeiture to be resorted to. But subject to that, and with very grateful thanks to the Minister for his helpful explanation of the tragic background to all these measures, I support the order.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Dunlop]

I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate for their general support for the order. Perhaps I could take some time to address specifically the substantive points that the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, has raised. He essentially raised two main points: the first relates to whether the regime is proportionate and the second to whether the Section 104 process could be used to ask the Scottish Parliament to think again about this or any other measure.

On the first point, we need to accept that responsibility for the regulation of certain air weapons in Scotland is now a matter for the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Ministers. The Scottish Government carried out detailed consultation on the main air weapon licensing proposals before the Air Weapons and Licensing (Scotland) Bill was introduced. The issue of air weapons licensing has been fully debated in the Scottish Parliament, and it is absolutely right that Scottish Ministers are held to account for the decisions they take by the elected representatives in that Parliament. Of course, UK government departments with responsibility for the relevant reserved legislation, notably the Home Office, which this order affects, were consulted during its drafting and it was approved by them.

The appropriateness of the new regime is an important issue. I understand that the Scottish Government worked closely with the Police Service of Scotland and, notwithstanding what the noble Earl said, with representatives of the main shooting organisations to ensure that the new licensing processes are as familiar as possible and appropriate to the lethality of the weapons affected. For example, there are currently more than 51,000 firearm or shotgun certificate holders in Scotland and it is expected that the majority of them, like the noble Earl, will also hold air weapons. So checks on existing firearm or shotgun certificate holders are not duplicated if they also apply for an air weapons certificate. Existing certificate holders can apply for a coterminous air weapons certificate to align with their existing licence.

The noble Earl mentioned the £72 fee for the full five-year air weapons certificate. There is also a reduced fee of £5 for firearm or shotgun holders who want to align their certificates to expire at the same time. Home visits to applicants will be required in only a small number of cases. Similarly, there will not be an automatic requirement for background medical reports on air weapons applicants; these will be required only in a small number of cases. As a result, the impact on NHS resources should be minimal. While the licensing regime is founded on the pre-existing firearms legislation, I hope that the examples I have given demonstrate the efforts that have been made to ensure the provisions are appropriate.

Turning to the noble Earl’s second point, it would not be an appropriate use of the Section 104 process to force the Scottish Parliament to think again about legislation it has passed in an area of its own competence, and which is now in force. We are today merely looking at consequential amendments to reserved legislation and were we to decline to pass this order, it would lead to gaps in the law. It would also set a very unhelpful precedent for managing intergovernmental relations—a subject in which I know the noble Earl takes a close interest—where mutual co-operation is so important, not least when it comes to reserved legislation that impacts on the devolved settlements or the devolved competence of Scottish Ministers.

The issue of pawnshops was raised. The licensing regime regulates trade in air weapons and to trade in those weapons, you must be a registered firearms dealer. Pawnshops are not registered firearms dealers, so this matches the existing Firearms Act 1968 position.

I was interested to hear the history of the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, in relation to pawnshops. Consultation and making pawnshops aware of this legislation and their duties under it are obviously a matter for the Scottish Government. I do not have at my fingertips what work has been done to make them aware of it, but I am happy to follow up on that.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, mentioned an exclusion. I am not sure I have the detail on this, but if I do not have it to hand I will be happy to write to him. I think it mirrors the position of other firearms in the 1968 Act, but I am happy to clarify that further.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

If I may return to the point I raised earlier, if the offence is committed by the owner of the pawnshop, it seems odd that the authorities have no means of taking possession of the weapon. I would have thought it would be very sensible if they could. However, I quite understand that I am asking a question that may not be capable of being answered immediately. If the Minister could write to me later, I would be very happy with that.

[Lord Dunlop]

I think that issue came up when this order was debated in the House of Commons. If I have got this wrong, I will clarify it, but if the courts find that the weapon is wrongly in someone’s possession then clearly it is a matter for them to confiscate that weapon. It would be normal practice for the court to order the forfeiture or confiscation of a weapon, which would be securely destroyed by the authorities in a way that would put the weapon out of use. However, I am not sure that that is the circumstance the noble and learned Lord is referring to, so I will be happy to write to him to clarify the point.

Inquiries into Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths etc. (Scotland) Act 2016 (Consequential Provisions and Modifications) Order 2016

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd November 2016 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office and Scotland Office (Lord Dunlop) (Con)]

My Lords, the purpose of the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths etc. (Scotland) Act 2016 is to modernise the system of fatal accident inquiries—often referred to as FAIs—in Scotland. The Act is in line with the recommendations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Cullen of Whitekirk, following his independent review of FAI legislation in 2009. The Act received Royal Assent on 14 January 2016, and the order before your Lordships is made under Section 104 of the Scotland Act 1998. The Section 104 mechanism allows for necessary or expedient legislative provision to be made by the UK Parliament in consequence of an Act of the Scottish Parliament. Certain provisions in the 2016 Act will be given effect in the rest of the UK where that is required, and will make expedient substantive legislative provision in relation to matters reserved to Westminster.

Noble Lords may be aware that fatal accident inquiries are held to establish the circumstances surrounding certain deaths occurring in Scotland. Mandatory FAIs must be held when someone dies in legal custody, or when someone dies as the result of an accident related to their work. FAIs are broadly equivalent to coroners’ inquests in England and Wales, which are independent judicial inquiries conducted into the facts surrounding a death that is sudden, unexpected or unnatural.

Among the changes brought forward by the 2016 Act is one to extend the categories of death in which it is mandatory to hold a fatal accidents inquiry in Scotland. The categories for which mandatory FAIs will be held have been extended to include deaths of children in secure accommodation and in police custody, irrespective of location. These changes relate to devolved matters and so it is right that the Scottish Parliament has legislated for them. This Section 104 order will enact changes to reserved matters to ensure they are consistent with the new Act of the Scottish Parliament. It also makes some substantive policy changes, including making clear that it will become mandatory for an FAI to be held into deaths of service personnel in the course of active duty in Scotland. Until now, this has been at the discretion of the Lord Advocate.

The order also proposes that a military death in the offshore area of the continental shelf adjacent to Scotland would require a mandatory FAI. This brings legislation in Scotland on investigations into military deaths in line with the rest of the UK to the extent that every military death in Scotland will, in future, be subject to a judicial inquiry. This new category of mandatory FAIs will be treated in similar fashion to others—for example, in relation to the power of the Lord Advocate to decide that an FAI is not required because the circumstances of death have been sufficiently established in other proceedings.

These proposed changes have taken on added significance in recent days following the death of Lance Corporal Joe Spencer of 3rd Battalion The Rifles at RAF Tain. Lance Corporal Spencer tragically died near Inverness, three weeks ago today, on Tuesday 1 November, in what the Ministry of Defence has described as a “live fire accident”. I am sure that I speak for the whole House in offering our condolences to Lance Corporal Spencer’s family, friends and colleagues. In legal terms, the mandatory requirement for a fatal accident inquiry, proposed in this order, is not retrospective. Even if the death is found to have been in the circumstances provided for, it will not apply to the death of Lance Corporal Spencer. Instead, the existing arrangements under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 will apply, and it will be within the discretion of the Lord Advocate to rule on whether an FAI is held.

This sad incident, none the less, highlights the importance of the order and illustrates why the UK and Scottish Governments, Ministers and officials, have worked closely together to bring it about. I hope that your Lordships will agree that this collaboration represents another example of the UK Government’s commitment to work with the Scottish Government to make the devolution settlement work effectively. I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I join the Minister in expressing condolence to Lance Corporal Spencer and his family for that tragic incident.

I welcome what the noble Lord has said about the introduction of a mandatory FAI in the case of servicemen who die in Scotland or outside the mainland in territorial waters. If these deaths occur in England, there is a mandatory inquest. One of the problems has been the imbalance between the mandatory system in England and Wales and the discretionary system in Scotland. It makes good sense that they should be on the same basis.

Another point worth noting is that the FAI system is very well equipped for a thorough investigation as to the reason for the death, which is not always available in inquests because of the way in which they are organised in England and Wales. It has caused problems for the Supreme Court in dealing with cases which arise overseas, such as deaths occurring during the situation in Iraq. The Scottish system is well equipped and there is no question that introducing a mandatory system provides a very sound basis for finding out exactly why these tragic incidents occurred and also making arrangements to avoid, if possible, a repetition of the same event. I welcome very much what the Minister has said.

Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015 (Consequential Provisions and Modifications) Order 2016

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Tuesday 18th October 2016 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office and Scotland Office (Lord Dunlop) (Con)]

My Lords, it is appropriate that we should be considering this order today, as today is Anti-Slavery Day. The order before your Lordships is made under Section 104 of the Scotland Act 1998, which allows for “necessary or expedient” changes to UK legislation in consequence of an Act of the Scottish Parliament. The Act in this case is the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Scotland) Act 2015. To summarise, the objective of the Act is to consolidate and strengthen the existing criminal law in Scotland against human trafficking and exploitation and to enhance the status of and support for the victims of these crimes. After passing through the Scottish Parliament, the Act received Royal Assent on 4 November 2015.

The 2015 Act is in six parts. Part 1 introduces two new offences: a new single offence of human trafficking for all types of exploitation and a new offence of,

“slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour”.

These replace existing offences in Scots law. The maximum penalty for human trafficking has increased from 14 years to life imprisonment. Part 2 includes provision on the support and assistance to which adult and child victims of human trafficking are entitled. The remaining parts deal with, among other things, the confiscation of property and proceeds of crime, in Part 3, and the introduction in Part 4 of two new preventive and risk orders in Scotland. In Part 5 the Act also places a duty on Scottish Ministers to prepare a trafficking and exploitation strategy.

As I said, if passed, this draft order would amend UK legislation as a consequence of the Act. The order updates existing UK legislation to give the 2015 Act full effect: to reflect the new Scottish offences, to ensure that the relevant powers of UK immigration officers are updated in line with the new offences so that they are able to detain vehicles, ships or aircraft where a person has been arrested for the offence of human trafficking, and to reflect new powers conferred on the police under the 2015 Act.

The order will, for example, update references to existing Scottish offences in relevant legislation applying in other parts of the UK. These changes, primarily to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 but also to the Immigration Act 1971 and the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, will refer to the new single offence of “human trafficking” and the new offence of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour in Scottish legislation and the repeal of existing offences.

The order will enable English and Welsh courts to enforce the two new Scottish trafficking and exploitation prevention and risk orders, which will ensure joined-up and robust enforcement. It will also implement the policy intention of some aspects of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 that relate to Scotland by ensuring the scope of the UK’s Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner’s work and the duty of large companies to report on transparency in supply chains are both updated so that, in Scotland, these flow from the new Scottish offences.

The UK and Scottish Government Ministers and officials have worked closely together to ensure that this order makes in an effective manner the necessary amendments to UK legislation in consequence of the Act of the Scottish Parliament. I believe that this order demonstrates the UK Government’s continued commitment to working with the Scottish Government to make the devolution settlement work.

I hope noble Lords will agree that this order is an appropriate use of the powers in the Scotland Act and that the practical result is something to be welcomed. I commend the order to the Committee.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for his careful introduction to this draft order. I should point out at the very outset that it goes without saying that I am entirely in sympathy with the aims of the Act itself and the draft order for the reasons which the noble Lord has given. The reason I have risen to my feet is to draw attention to two problems with the wording of Article 2, which deals with the detention of a “vehicle, ship or aircraft” in circumstances where a person has been arrested and there are “reasonable grounds” for thinking that it might be forfeited. The article itself is very well laid out and extremely clear in its terms, and it is only because of the clarity of the terms and the way it is laid out that two matters have come to my attention which I respectfully suggest may require further thought.

The broad structure is to identify first the power to detain in paragraph (1) of Article 2. The second is paragraph (2) of Article 2, which says that the,

“vehicle, ship or aircraft may be detained”,

until certain things have happened. It is important for the protection of the individual who owns the article in question, be it a vehicle, ship or aircraft, that the date at which the detention comes to an end—if, indeed, it is to be released from detention—is clearly identified. One has in mind, of course, Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights, which gives a right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions, of which one may be deprived only in the public interest and subject to conditions prescribed by law. This is fulfilling the requirement that the conditions should be prescribed by law and it is important that they should be properly set out.

If one works through Article 2(2), one sees that the detention may come to an end when a decision is taken as to whether or not to begin solemn proceedings or, if solemn proceedings are begun against a person arrested for the offence, until certain things happen. I have no complaint about sub-paragraph (a); it is sub-paragraph (b) that begins to open up some possible points of difficulty. Where solemn proceedings are begun, they may result in the acquittal of the individual, which is set out there. That indeed would be a point at which the article would be released from the detention. Heading (ii) refers to conviction and identifies correctly that the question of whether the article is released from detention will depend on whether the High Court or the sheriff, as the case may be,

“decides whether or not to order forfeiture”.

When that decision is taken, if it is not to order forfeiture, it is clear that the detention comes to an end. The problem arises when one looks at heading (iii), which uses the phrase “proceedings are otherwise concluded”. Very properly, the drafter has gone on to seek to identify the stage at which proceedings are otherwise concluded. It begins by saying:

“For the purposes of paragraph (2) … solemn proceedings begin”—

in well-understood circumstances where there is a first appearance or the indictment is served. I have no problem with that part of the article. The problems arise when looking at paragraph (3)(b), which says that,

“proceedings are taken to be otherwise concluded if … the proceedings are deserted simpliciter”.

That is a very clear point of time. When the Crown deserts proceedings simpliciter they are brought absolutely to an end, there are no further proceedings and it is perfectly proper that the article should no longer be detained. It identifies the point of time very accurately.

Under heading (ii), however, we are dealing with a different kind of desertion of proceedings, “pro loco et tempore”, which is a phrase used in the Scottish courts for the situation where the prosecutor decides that the case cannot proceed for the time being because, for example, the witness is seriously ill or absent and the Crown simply cannot lead the evidence needed to enable the proceedings to go on. The judge or the sheriff, as the case may be, has to decide whether it is proper that proceedings should be stayed temporarily for that purpose. He may refuse to do that, in which case it may be that the Crown is driven to deserting the proceedings simpliciter, but we are dealing with a situation where a decision is to accede to the Crown’s request that the proceedings be deserted “pro loco et tempore”, and,

“no further trial diet is appointed”.

The problem with that concluding phrase is that it leaves in the air the date at which one knows for certain that there will be no further trial diet. Under the Scottish system, the prosecution is entirely in the hands of the Lord Advocate. With great respect, I suggest that it might be better to clarify in some way the point of time at which one can be certain that no further trial diet will be appointed. That is frequently done by the Crown Office writing to the accused saying that it has decided to take no further proceedings. If a letter of that kind is written, it binds the Crown not to proceed any further and the date of the letter is be the date on which one knows for certain that the vehicle, ship or whatever it is should no longer be detained. The better way in which to phrase it might be for a certificate by the Lord Advocate himself or herself to be obtained which would identify his or her decision that there should be no further proceedings. That would achieve absolute clarity and ensure that the decision was ultimately taken by the law officer. Given the importance of what we are dealing with, which is really a very serious crime indeed, it would be best to obtain his or her decision that there should be no further proceedings.

The same point arises in paragraph (4), where we are dealing with three things that are added together. First,

“the indictment falls or is for any other reason not brought to trial”.

Secondly,

“the diet is not continued, adjourned or postponed”,

and, thirdly,

“no further proceedings are in contemplation”.

I do not have any problem with the first two, but with the last one, how does one know that,

“no further proceedings are in contemplation”?

Again, the suggestion is that the best way of ensuring certainty about that would be to obtain a certificate from a law officer—preferably the Lord Advocate—which would identify the decision at that level that there should be no further proceedings.

There are some situations in which a statute intervenes to say that if proceedings are not taken within a given period of time the indictment necessarily falls. In summary proceedings there is a cut-off date of, I think, six months—it may be 12 months—but when one is dealing with proceedings on indictment, as we are here, there is generally no absolute cut-off date in Scots law. I am subject to correction but I do not think that the statutes which we are dealing with as background to this order actually lay down a period of time within which the indictment must be brought. One is dealing with this problem in an area where there is no statutory backing to give a certain date at which the detention of the vehicle or whatever it is should be brought to an end, and therefore something has to be written into the order to make this clear.

I emphasise that I am not in any way raising these points to cause problems for the Minister. However, I suggest that in the interests of everybody it is better to be quite sure that one has identified correctly a cut-off date at each of the various stages with which this order is dealing. Article 2 has identified some of them perfectly correctly in accordance with Scots procedure, but in the two paragraphs that I have identified, in Article 2(3)(b)(ii) and Article 2(4)(c), I suggest that there is a lack of clarity and that it would be better for the Minister to take time and advice to see whether that clarity can be provided.

[Lord McAvoy (Lab)]

My Lords, I will take as long as I can so that the Minister can give some attention to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, has said. It sounds fascinatingly complicated to me, but I am sure the Minister’s mind will be applied to it. I thank the Minister for his clear exposition—notwithstanding what the noble and learned Lord said—outlining the procedures, new offences and updating of powers, particularly the co-operation between England and Wales and the fact that the order covers Northern Ireland as well. This is quite sensible co-operation.

As outlined in the Explanatory Notes, the basis of this order, and the basis of the Act passed by the Scottish Parliament, was that the Equal Opportunities Committee of the Scottish Parliament published a report of an inquiry into migration and trafficking in December 2010. That committee heard evidence of problems and issues faced by the diverse migrant communities in Scotland, as well as of the extent of trafficking of persons in Scotland and protection available to victims of trafficking. It also states that the Act makes human trafficking unwelcome—“a more hostile place” is the phrase used. The Scottish Parliament is owed a vote of thanks for turning its attention to this matter, because Scotland has a regular, steady influx of diverse immigrants into the country. I myself am the grandson of immigrants from County Antrim and County Fermanagh in Northern Ireland. This is particularly so in the west of Scotland, but the central belt as a whole has a track record of receiving migrants and assimilating them into the community. The new wave of immigrants, especially from the European Union, the Far East and Asia, may not have precipitated this, but it brings new issues and problems and new standards for assimilating communities in Scotland. The Scottish Parliament has done a terrific job, and I hope it is successful. I thank the Minister again for outlining the issues involved in this order and look forward with interest to his reply to the noble and learned Lord.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Monday 5th September 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, before my noble friend responds, which I think he is about to do, I will take the opportunity to say that the motivation behind my noble friend’s amendment is a very sound one. The fact that you do not know whether you are being wrongly investigated is contributing to a sense of unease about the intelligence provisions in this legislation. This is a problem we have to try to address.

The Minister has put forward some genuine, practical considerations which would make it difficult to implement a clause such as my noble friend’s. This is not a new problem: throughout the history of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, we have had the problem that the only answer that could be given is that no unlawful activity has been carried out, which does not tell you whether any activity has been carried out. If it was carried out, it was lawful, but maybe it was not carried out at all. It was an infuriating answer for people who suspected that they might have been subject to investigatory powers but had no way of knowing or being certain.

It is a problem which even existing procedures sidestep. The Minister referred to ways in which notification may take place in cases where a mistake has been made. Included in the category of people to whom that might apply would be the very people he said he did not want to assist by bringing to their attention that on this occasion, they had been unsuccessfully investigated but there might well be reason to investigate them in the future. The Minister was wrong to say that the people to whom we would be imparting this information were criminals or people threatening the security of the state. If an investigation has not been successful in identifying who is involved in a radicalisation ring or in planning a kidnapping, that may well be because some of those people genuinely were not involved in any way, and some other factor—a mistaken number, for example—had drawn them into the net of the inquiry. Maybe they were known to others involved but genuinely played no part in it, and that emerges from the intelligence.

We should recognise, in considering this suggestion, that strong fears arise from uncertainty and from an inability to establish whether you have been the subject of investigation or not, when there is no reason for you to have been so subject. That of course places a very heavy burden on the commissioners, because rather like special advocates, they have to represent the concerns of people with whom they cannot check—they cannot ask, “How do you feel about this?”. At the very least, it is a salutary reminder of the importance of the processes which this Bill will introduce and of the involvement of judicial commissioners, and we may need to revisit this issue in the future.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I absolutely understand the motivation behind the amendment, but I wonder whether the Minister might consider another objection. He referred to the risk of the person who was notified changing his practices in the knowledge that what he was doing was being observed by one or other of these various methods. The problem may be not the individual himself but the people with whom he is in contact. One does not know how wide the web is of the group to which he belongs, and it would be so easy for that message to be passed around to people to warn them that there is a particular mechanism in play which is tapping into what he does and that those who operate in the same way as he does will be subjected to the same kind of scrutiny. I rather suggest that the problem is more wide-ranging than the Minister was telling us in his very careful reply to the amendment.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (LD)]

My Lords, with great respect to my noble friends Lord Paddick and Lord Beith, I am with the Minister and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, on this one. What my noble friends may have overlooked is the strength, distinction and effectiveness of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. If there was any evidence to indicate that the commissioner, whether the present one or a future one, was likely to behave in a malign way and not reveal where improper action had taken place, then my noble friends’ concerns might have some validity. As has been said, though, the Bill is a world leader, not least in the protections that it contains. I commend to the House the provisions that have been placed in the Bill without these unnecessary amendments.

Scotland Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Monday 21st March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, both noble and learned Lords have made powerful points. I do not wish to make anything other than a very brief intervention, but I have amendments, strongly supported both in Committee and on Report, concerning the word “normally”. I am extremely sorry that the Minister has not really met that point. It has been made with great eloquence by noble Lords learned in the law, and it was made by those of us throughout the United Kingdom who share the concern of the two noble and learned Lords who have just spoken. I am sorry that their amendments have not been deemed admissible. Of course they have done entirely properly in not seeking to move them, but this is an unsatisfactory Bill and we are in an unsatisfactory situation.

I put it on record that I remain extremely concerned about the use of this very loose word “normally”. I believe as a layman that it is clearly something that could be justiciable. I know not what will happen, but I fear that we are not putting on the statute book something that recognises what noble Lords in all parts of this House have recognised. In my opinion this is a flaw in the Bill, and it has been demonstrated as such by many people. I am sorry that the Minister has not felt able to move on this issue.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, when I spoke on this matter on Report, having tabled an amendment which dealt with the issue in slightly different terms from those proposed by Amendments 1 and 2 on the Marshalled List, I said that I would come back to the issue at Third Reading. But, on consideration of the various rules and practices, I decided not to renew my amendment in recognition of the fact that it would not be proper to bring it forward in those terms.

I am grateful to the Minister for the statement he has made, which goes a little way to addressing the problem. But I feel very strongly that this is an example of a missed opportunity, which could have been taken to clarify exactly what the Sewel convention is, to remove some of the problems to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, referred, and to deal with the complications raised by the use of the word “normally”.

As I stressed on Report, my concern was to preserve the sovereignty of Parliament, which the Minister mentioned in his brief address. The problem with the method he has chosen is that it opens up the possibility of a challenge to the sovereignty of Parliament, which is the greatest danger of all, because it puts at risk the enforceability of legislation where the spectre, if I should put it this way, of the Sewel convention may be hanging over it. I understand that the Minister has gone as far as he believes he can—but, like others, I regret that he was not able to go further.

[Lord Stephen (LD)]

My Lords, it seems that the Government had an important decision to make on this issue. Did they want the Sewel convention, or the legislative consent convention as it has now become known, at least in the Scottish Parliament, to continue as a convention or did they want to convert it into statute? In truth, the answer is that they are making a mess of that decision. In a sense they are trying to do both, and in doing so they are creating bad legislation. They are continuing the convention—we have been told that and I certainly hope that that is the case. I hope that all legs and all elements of the convention will continue to be operated between the Scottish Parliament and the UK Parliament, the Scottish Government and the UK Government. But the Government have decided to take one rather limited and narrow—although, I accept, important—part of the convention into statute, and to do so in as limited and as loosely worded a way as possible, with words such as “normally” and with new expressions such as “devolved matters” that have not previously been used or defined in statute.

I now believe that the use of these words and the introduction of this vagueness has been quite deliberate on the part of the Government, to make it as ill-defined and declaratory as they possibly can. Why are they doing that? They are doing it to technically comply with the Smith commission’s recommendations, but this is not in the spirit of the Smith commission and it is not being done in a clear, sensible or coherent way. In summary, it is not a good way to legislate. If the Government’s excuse is that this is what the Smith commission told them to do, frankly, that is not a good enough excuse, because they can depart from the Smith commission—they have done so on the issue of abortion, for example—and the Smith commission was not perfect in every respect. On this issue it referred to only part of the Sewel convention—a mistake that I think the commission would readily admit to.

Scotland Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Monday 29th February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I noted earlier, with regard to paragraph 103, that it surely cannot be conceivable that the funding would dry up. The House is therefore owed an explanation as to precisely what lies behind paragraphs 52 and 103 of this agreement.

The proposal that my noble friend and I have tabled is that there should be a review, which should be informed by a commission. The commission should be three persons from the Office for Budget Responsibility advisory panel, to be appointed by the OBR’s chairman, therefore taking it even more than arm’s length away from the Government, and there also should be membership of a Scottish professional body—it could be the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland or CIPFA—to be agreed by Her Majesty’s Treasury and Scottish Ministers, whose members should be appointed by the senior office-bearer of that body. Again, that is an attempt to put it at one remove from the Scottish Government. It would be a genuinely independent body that would inform the review about how the fiscal framework had worked.

We go further than that by saying that no person appointed to the commission should have been a member of any political party for five years prior to accepting membership. Consistent with the fiscal framework, the report should be laid no later than 30 November 2021 and submitted to both Houses of this Parliament, the Scottish Parliament, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Scottish Ministers.

All that we find out in the fiscal framework agreement is that the arrangements for review, including how independent they will be, should be left to the Joint Exchequer Committee. We may feel that in order to be reassured, it is not unreasonable for Parliament to set some parameters for how the independence of that review body will be established. The amendment is therefore intended to probe just what Ministers have in mind with regard to the working out of that review, and indeed to answer some of the questions about what happens in the event of a failure to reach agreement on the review. There are important questions to be answered, and I look forward to the response of the Minister.

I am sorry, is the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, waiting to intervene or to ask a question?

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I was hoping to follow the noble and learned Lord.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

That is fine. I hope that the Minister will be able to fill in the gaps when he comes to reply to this important debate.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I would like to pursue the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, about dispute resolution. As a lawyer, one tends to look to the dispute resolution bits, because they are the things that matter to us, to see that there is actually an effective mechanism for that, rather than at the fiscal parts, which I am content to leave to others.

Would the Minister care to look at paragraph 46, which the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, identified? It contains the definition of “policy spillover effects”, which is where either Government make a policy decision that affects the tax receipts or expenditure of the other. If that happens then there is a spillover and a spillover effect. In paragraph 98 we enter the dispute resolution system, which applies to, among other things,

“All disputes arising from the consideration of direct and behavioural spillover effects, including both gains and losses”.

So this particular group of paragraphs deals with the resolution of the dispute. We can see how it works: first, if it cannot be settled at working level then it becomes a disagreement and is referred to senior officers at director level or above, including consideration at Joint Exchequer Committee official level too. If that does not work, the matter becomes not a disagreement but a formal dispute. It is then referred to Ministers to be raised and discussed at a meeting of the JEC.

We then move to paragraph 100, and so far we are working down the line of complete impasse:

“If … there is a dispute that cannot be resolved between Ministers, there is an automatic pause placed on the disputed finances, i.e. no decisions … can be taken by either government in relation to the disputed amount until the dispute is resolved”.

That seems a strange system, given that revenues either way are crucial to the running of the country. To have a dispute simply frozen in that way is very strange. The formula goes on a little further, because if that happens then the Governments are to draw up a statement of fact on the dispute, and technical input may be sought to ensure that the facts are correctly stated. It will then be considered by both Governments, who commit to using their best endeavours to resolve the dispute.

However, the agreement says in paragraph 103:

“If no agreement can be reached then the dispute”,

fails—or rather “falls”—and, as the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, pointed out,

“there would be no specific outcome from the dispute and so no fiscal transfer between the Governments”.

What puzzles me further is paragraph 104, and maybe the Minister can help here:

“If either Government wishes to pursue the dispute further”—

let us imagine that the UK Government are anxious to do that—

“it can be referred to the ‘Protocol on the Resolution and Avoidance of Disputes’ attached to the Memorandum of Understanding between the UK government and the devolved administrations”.

I do not know where the memorandum is—it is not in the Printed Paper Office, as far as I know—and it is also said to be subject to review. So there is a cloud of uncertainty over exactly what paragraph 104 means and how fixed it is as a system for resolving these disputes.

If one is entering an area like this where it is plain that there will be political arguments on either side that may lead to a complete impasse, it is crucial that there should be a system for the resolution of disputes; otherwise one is left with a situation where no transfer takes place although one side is calling for it and the other is not. How can the system be left in that situation, hanging in the air without anyone to decide it? Can the Minister inform the House about that? It has a direct bearing on the amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth.

[Lord Lang of Monkton (Con)]

My Lords, we all slightly feeling our way in the dark in this debate, and that is very unfortunate because the fiscal framework is crucial to the future not just of the Government of Scotland but of the Government of the United Kingdom, and indeed to the stability of the UK and holding it together in the face of the assault coming from the Scottish nationalist Government in Scotland.

One would not have thought that we were feeling our way in the dark, though, from the absolutely masterly exposition by my noble friend Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, who laid out the issues with great clarity and considerable force and raised a number of very important points to which we have not yet had an answer. I share his view on almost everything that he said, and he has helped me to share it more clearly than I did before.

I shall focus on one fairly simple issue as I understand it—although here, too, we are in the dark—namely, the way in which the implementation of the financial assistance that is to be given to the Scottish Government over the next five years on the population issue will be put into force. I should start by saying that, yes, I welcome the fact that a deal has been done because it is a political situation that we also have to consider, as well as the proprieties, the economics and the constitutionality. Having a deal done means that the Bill can come into force and the Scottish Government can be put in the position of becoming accountable to a greater degree for their actions, possibly exposing themselves to the shortcomings of their policies and attitudes.

As I look at it, in the context of the Scottish block and the Barnett formula, there seems to have been a finesse of a somewhat insidious nature and we need to try to get to the bottom of it. I am perhaps thought pedantic because I do not like to hear the whole financial settlement in Scotland referred to as “Barnett”. Barnett is a very small part of it which simply deals with the annual increases that are added to the very substantial Scottish block, and the effect it has on those increases is, by an infinitesimal and unreliable amount, to reduce what comes to Scotland from what it otherwise would have been under the old Goschen formula, when the Barnett formula did not exist. I will not bore the House with the reasons why; I could do so but it has never had much impact on people before so I will ask your Lordships to take my word for it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, in view of the difficulties to which the noble and learned Lord has drawn our attention, does he agree that clarity and dispute resolution is absolutely crucial? This issue is ripe with areas that will give rise to dispute of various kinds and it cannot be left in a position where there is no mechanism for deciding them.

[Lord McCluskey]

My Lords, that was my 14th point. My notes state that the arrangements for resolution of these disputes read like the draft of a script for a BBC drama that would put “War and Peace” to shame.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Kirkwood of Kirkhope (LD)]

My Lords, I have three amendments in my name in this group. I am pleased to follow the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy. Social security is a very important subject and Part 3 is a very important part of the Bill.

I can dispose of my amendments briefly. At one point during Committee, I considered running a series of amendments that would have sought to take on employability. That is an important part within social protection but separate from social security. I welcome the fact that Clause 29 devolves a certain amount of power in terms of the Work Programme and related contractor-driven service provisions north of the border to Scotland. That is entirely sensible.

My original idea, which I think there is still a case for, is that employability as a subject could have been taken much further than the Smith commission suggested. I have for some time come to the conclusion that the whole of Jobcentre Plus services could be more efficiently and better served from a Scottish base run by the Scottish Government through the Scottish skills department, in a way that could improve on what we have at the moment. I decided against doing that because it was not in the Smith commission. There is a stateable case for doing it but I do not think that this Bill is the right way.

Instead, I decided to try to encourage Ministers to look more flexibly at the powers within Clause 29. Amendment 58 looks at some of the restrictions in claiming reserve benefits. Amendment 59 would try to give more flexibility and power to the Scottish devolved powers in Clause 29 to make them easier to tailor to individual Scottish circumstances.

I should declare an interest. Colleagues probably know that I am a non-executive, non-remunerated director of the Wise Group in Glasgow. I have been in that position for a while. As a result of that experience, I am pretty persuaded that the Scottish conditions, the shorter lines of communications and the set-up north of the border are of a different order to what happens throughout the rest of the United Kingdom and could be better developed in a way that would provide a better service if a maximum amount of flexibility was given. The providers who run the programmes already have a lot of discretion about the services that they deploy. It is all done on the basis of payment by results and the outcomes are all very carefully monitored, so I do not think that we would be giving very much away by encouraging the Clause 29 powers to be developed in as flexible a way as possible.

I suspect that the Minister will be advised that Amendments 58 and 59 would run counter to some of the legislative provisions that set up the Work Programme. I am prepared to accept that, if that is the case, but I think there is at least a series of questions to be asked about what are very important programmes delivering services to low-income households and jobseekers in Scotland in a way that I think could be improved. In parenthesis, I think that worklessness will be less of a problem in Scotland in the future and that low-income working households will have difficulties with poverty which will need to be addressed in a different way, because work incentives are not just about getting people into work but about getting them to progress through work. That is important, too. If the Minister does not mind, it is worth spending just a moment trying to give me a rationale on why we should not increase the flexibility available to work providers north of the border once Clause 29 powers are delivered to Scotland.

I do not think there are as many lawyers present in the House now as there were earlier this evening; otherwise, I might be tempted to press Amendment 60 to a Division because any self-respecting lawyer who looked at the complexity that now exists within this Bill compared with the parent Act of 1998—we are dealing with exceptions, reservations and exempted, as well as accepted, powers—would consider that a consolidation measure was easily justified. I hope that the Minister will note that I have made it easy for him in the amendment by saying that I would settle even for a draft, because trying to do what that amendment seeks to do in six months would be quite a tall order. However, it is a serious point. It would be of considerable assistance to all of us to have such a measure as this body of law develops. I hope rather than fear that it will develop; that is, I am fearful of that from a complexity point of view but hope for it from a political point of view.

On the previous group of amendments, the Minister rightly said that it was important to try to keep the template of the various sister Acts in some kind of cohesive shape. But in order to do that and to assist that process, a draft consolidation measure would be much appreciated by everybody in future. As I say, if there were enough lawyers in the House, I might even think about pressing this to a Division. I make the point facetiously but I hope that the Minister takes it seriously and gives us some comfort that he will go back to the department and explain how difficult it is for us—never mind members of the public—to understand the complexities of the interrelationships of the Acts that flow as a sequence from the parent 1998 Scotland Act.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I support what the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, has said. Even with the advantage of the websites, it is very difficult to get an accurate and up-to-date version of amended legislation. If you go to the official website, you usually find that mention is made of amendments which have not yet been incorporated into the legislation as shown on the website. That time lag makes it very difficult for ordinary people to see exactly what the content of the legislation is. I think I am right in saying that when the Law Commissions were set up they had a function to keep an eye on the need for consolidation. If the Minister is not inclined to accept the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood, perhaps he might, through his offices, encourage the Scottish Law Commission to get to work on consolidating these measures in a way that would be useful for anybody working in the Scottish Parliament or who was trying to understand what the current legislation really is.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendment 60, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood of Kirkhope. I am sure the Minister will be advised that it is not necessary to include this in the Bill but it would be excellent if he were to give an undertaking at least to produce a draft Bill. I am not a lawyer, but I have certainly found it extremely difficult to cope with the piecemeal changes that have been made over the years and to follow the cross-references back to the 1998 Act. The noble Lord has made probably the most sensible suggestion of the evening.

I presume the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, will not press his amendment to a Division or anything of that kind. The Labour Party is in its debating society mode at present. When the Minister responds to the amendment, which is about setting up this welfare monitoring joint committee, will he answer a question I asked earlier, arising from the fiscal framework? Paragraphs 16 and 17 appear to contradict each other. Paragraph 16 says:

“For welfare, and all other spending unless stated otherwise in this agreement, the chosen method will be the Barnett formula”.

However, paragraph 17 says that,

“whilst achieving the outcome delivered by the Indexed Per Capita (IPC) method for tax and welfare”.

This is very important, because it makes a considerable difference to the amount of money that is available for welfare purposes in Scotland. Will the Minister indicate which I am to believe: paragraph 16, which would involve a substantial cut in the current budget, or paragraph 17, which appears to contradict it?

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Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

61: Clause 68, page 74, line 32, leave out “1, 3, 4, 5 or 6” and insert “3”

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I have Amendments 61, 62, 63, 64 and 65 in this group. I tabled these amendments in Committee and renewed them for Report just to preserve my position in case amendments were not forthcoming from the Government. Clause 68 deals with the, “Power to make consequential, transitional and saving provision” and is of the type commonly referred a Henry VIII clause.

I made a number of criticisms of this clause in Committee, which I do not need to repeat. Having now studied the amendments which the Government have brought forward in this group, I am satisfied that the majority of the points that I raised have been met. I do not therefore propose to insist on any of the amendments which are in my name in this group. I wait to hear the explanation from the Government for the amendments they are putting forward, but my impression is that they are a commendable reaction to the points made by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee.

It is a pity that the clause was drafted in the very loose form in which it was. Perhaps there is a lesson here that, in future, such clauses should be more precisely related to the requirements of the particular Bill, not put forward in the general form in which they were when this Bill was introduced. Having said that, I do not propose to insist on the amendment, or the other amendments in my name in this group.

Scotland Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Wednesday 24th February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Con)]

My Lords, we had quite a good discussion about this in Committee. This amendment, together with Amendments 4 and 5 in my name, is centred on the question of the extent to which we wish to maintain the sovereignty of this United Kingdom Parliament and the extent to which we wish to litter our legislation with declaratory statements that have no meaning whatever in order to make political capital on the part of the Government or someone else.

Regarding the Statement delivered a few moments ago, at first I thought that my noble friend had misread it when he referred to “Scotland’s two Governments”. Scotland has a United Kingdom Government and a devolved Scottish Government, but this use of language, which is designed to appease the separatists, is now being included in our legislation. Amendment 1 would simply put back into the Bill the original drafting that the Government presented to the House of Commons. The wording proposed in my amendment was perfectly satisfactory to the Government because it reflected the Government’s position, but the wording was changed to meet an amendment put forward by, I think, the Scottish nationalists.

There is a great irony here. My amendment is about the authority and nature of the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements. I—perhaps rather naively—thought that the Scottish nationalists were in favour of breaking up those arrangements, and I did not really understand why a Conservative and unionist Government would wish to help them in that process. At present, line 9 on page 1 of the Bill reads:

“The Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are a permanent part of the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements”.

My amendment would simply put back the words “recognised as” so that the Bill read, “The Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are recognised as a permanent part of the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements”. If the words “recognised as” are included, that implies that there is another body that recognises that—that body being the United Kingdom Parliament. However, the statement currently in the Bill as amended by the nationalists in the other place flies in the face of our constitutional tradition that no Parliament can bind its successors. It also flies in the face of the Government’s own rule that legislation should not be used for declaratory purposes.

We had indeed a very long debate about this in Committee, but I have looked in vain for any amendments from the Government to address any of the arguments that were put forward. The Constitution Committee produced a very serious report. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, spoke at great length. There were a number of contributions, but all of them have been ignored. They have all been ignored because the Government’s mantra is, “We have to implement what the Smith commission report indicated and there can be no departure from it”. But, of course, this clause is a departure from the commission’s proposals.

My Amendment 4 provides that, on page 1, line 17, we should leave out “Scotland” and insert “the United Kingdom”. As currently drafted, the Bill provides:

“In view of that commitment it is declared that the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are not to be abolished except on the basis of a decision of the people of Scotland voting in a referendum”.

My amendment would make it a decision of the people of the United Kingdom voting in a referendum, because we are still a United Kingdom and, indeed, the Scottish people have only very recently voted overwhelmingly to achieve that.

I thought that my noble friend would accept my amendment in Committee—I realised that he would have to go away and think about it—but perhaps he will now accept my Amendment 5, which provides:

“Nothing in this section alters the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament”.

What has become of us that a Conservative and unionist Government are making declaratory legislation on the face of a Bill but are not prepared to accept as an amendment the words:

“Nothing in this section alters the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament”?

No doubt there will be an opportunity for us to discuss the fiscal framework when we get the fiscal framework, but, looking at the Statement that has been made, where we have given the Scottish Parliament a veto on the terms by which it is financed—we have given that away—I have to say to my noble friend that we appear to be engaged in a long-term process of appeasement which undermines the authority of the United Kingdom Parliament. These amendments are an attempt, in at least a declaratory form, to set the record straight. I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I am as disappointed as the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, that some of the points that were raised—indeed, all the points that were raised—in Committee on Clause 1 have met with no response from the Government by way of amendment. My amendment in this group is Amendment 2, which is directed to the wording of the new Section 63A(3). I am repeating points that I made in Committee which were designed to achieve greater clarity. In some respects, the need for greater clarity is revealed by the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, has tabled and, indeed, by the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, just a moment ago.

There were two particular points in new subsection (3) to which I drew attention last time and to which I draw attention yet again. The first is the phrase,

“a decision of the people of Scotland”.

The first question is: what kind of decision? What majority, if any? Is it to be by simple majority or something else? Merely to use the phrase “a decision” does not tell us what the mechanism is to be to record that decision in a way that would have effect. The second is the phrase, “the people of Scotland”. Is the referendum to be confined to people who are in Scotland, or are any people who can claim they are of Scotland to be allowed to participate in the referendum?

My amendment seeks to clarify those matters by saying that the,

“referendum has been held in Scotland”;

and, secondly, that the decision is to be that of,

“a majority of those voting”—

in other words, a simple majority only.

Unless those points are tidied up and greater clarity is achieved, the uncertainty which I suggested lurked within the current wording of the subsection will remain. I hope very much that the Minister will feel able to reflect yet again on the need for clarity. It is a feature in various parts of the Bill that a great deal of clarity has been achieved. It is disappointing that, in the constitutional part of the Bill—Part 1, which has very great significance—the clarity which is present in other parts of the Bill is not being achieved. It is for that reason that I have come back yet again on Report with the points that I made earlier, in the hope that they will still receive attention.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 3 is in my name. I moved a similar amendment in Committee and expressed the hope, as did the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and my noble friend Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, that there would be some response from the Government. I do not think any one of us is suggesting that our individual solutions are perfect, but clarity is certainly needed. We need to reflect, particularly this afternoon, having heard a Statement, to which we will doubtless return on Monday, that is fraught with danger for the future of the United Kingdom. It is tremendously important in that context that the supremacy of the United Kingdom Parliament should be specifically acknowledged in one way or another.

Where I differ from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is that I do not want the ultimate decision to be made in a referendum, if it comes—I hope it will not, but it might—to the abolition of the Scottish Parliament. The Scottish Parliament was the creation of the United Kingdom Parliament. If it is to be abolished at any time—I reiterate my hope and belief that it will not be—it is crucial that the final word should be with the United Kingdom Parliament.

It may well be that part of such a process would be a referendum. I do not particularly like referenda, but they are now part of our constitutional system and, like them or not, we all have to accept that. But I believe fundamentally in parliamentary democracy. Therefore, it is crucial that the ultimate decision should be made in Parliament and should be made in the elected House. Of course your Lordships’ House should have a constructive part to play. Of course it should scrutinise any legislation that is placed before Parliament. But ultimately, this should be the decision of the elected House.

I am conscious that small majorities can sometimes provoke great wrath and dissension, so I have made a suggestion in my amendment and it is here for noble Lords to see. There would have to be,

“a two-thirds majority in a vote of the House of Commons in which 75 per cent of the members elected by Scottish constituencies voted for abolition”.

I do not put that before noble Lords as the ultimate panacea, but something along those lines would go a long way to reassure those of us who are concerned for the long-term future of the United Kingdom. I am sure that everyone in your Lordships’ House at least shares that concern. I made similar points in Committee and expressed the hope that the Minister would reflect and that we would see the results of his reflection when we came to Report, but there is no sign of that. It is a great pity, because if we truly believe in the United Kingdom, it follows, as night follows day, that we believe in the supremacy of the United Kingdom Parliament. There has to be something in this Bill, either along the lines of the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Forsyth or of mine, as well as taking up some of the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. It is just not good enough to leave the Bill as it is.

In all that has been going on over the past few months, there is an element of the paying of Danegeld. Those who pay Danegeld rarely get value for money, and I think we should bear that carefully in mind.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

As I indicated, we are dealing with an entirely hypothetical situation. Should that situation ever materialise, the terms of the referendum to be held would be determined according to the circumstances in place at that time. It would not be appropriate to anticipate the circumstances of such a referendum, which might be many millennia in the future. It is therefore left open in these terms.

I turn to the amendments moved by my noble friend Lord Forsyth of Drumlean. The points he has raised in them are those he made in Committee in December, and I assure him that we have continued to reflect carefully on the points made at that time. My noble friend has focused on whether Clause 1 impinges on the sovereignty of this Parliament. I thank him for his consideration of this point but must respectfully disagree that there is any question that it does. Constitutionally, the United Kingdom Parliament cannot bind a successor Parliament: the sovereignty of Parliament remains. The purpose of paragraph 21 of the Smith commission agreement, and of Clause 1 in the Bill, is not to change the constitutional position but to reflect in legislation the political understanding that already exists. The clause thus delivers the Smith commission agreement while respecting the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements.

Amendment 1 would reinsert the words “recognised as”, which were removed from Clause 1 by government amendment on Report in the other place. The Government have been quite clear throughout that there has never been any question that the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government are anything other than permanent. However, we have listened to feedback on the clause, and it was felt appropriate to amend the clause to take account of the observations made. The criticism levelled at the clause was that the provision was weak. The Government have strengthened the provision to demonstrate the commitment of the United Kingdom Parliament and Government to the Scottish Parliament and to the Scottish Government.

Amendment 4, tabled by my noble friend, provides that the abolition of the Scottish Parliament and Government would have to be agreed by United Kingdom-wide referendum. The referendum provision in Clause 1 rightly reflects the importance of the people of Scotland in determining the existence of the Scottish Parliament. It is important to be clear that there are no circumstances under which the abolition of the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government is envisaged. However, in responding to the points raised by my noble friend, I state that, in that entirely hypothetical circumstance, this Parliament would of course play its full and proper role, as I mentioned previously.

Amendment 5 would state in the Bill that Clause 1 does not limit the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament. Again, I hope I have already sufficiently addressed that point. Clearly, the sovereignty of this Parliament remains, and is unhindered by the provisions. I therefore urge noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Before the Minister sits down, I wonder whether he can help me on one point. I made it clear in Committee that the amendments I proposed to this part of the Bill were based on recommendations of the Scottish Government, which were made plain in June last year. The wording of the amendments is not my creation; it comes from Edinburgh, from people who were studying the Bill and trying as best they could to clarify the points they thought needed clarification.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, has drawn attention yet again to the obscurity of the phrase, “the people of Scotland”. One of the virtues—it may be small, but it is there—of my amendment is that it makes clear that it is a referendum of the people in Scotland. I simply cannot understand why the Minister is not prepared to make some concession to clarify that matter. To go back to what the noble Lord, Lord Empey, said, I should have thought that the Government would take on board collaboration between the two Governments to try to improve the Bill and achieve as much clarity as possible. I really am mystified why the Minister is so stubborn and will not accept the need for some further clarity.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. It determines clearly and unambiguously that there can be no question of any unseen, secret understanding between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government when his proposals in the amendments have their source in Scotland, with the Scottish Government. That perhaps puts that in its place.

On the question of the referendum, I reiterate the point that I made earlier: this is a wholly hypothetical situation.

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Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

7: Clause 2, page 2, leave out lines 5 to 7 and insert—
“(8) But the Parliament of the United Kingdom may not pass any measure applying to Scotland that makes provision about a devolved matter without the consent of the Scottish Parliament.
(9) A provision is about a devolved matter if the provision—
(a) applies to Scotland and does not relate to reserved matters,(b) modifies the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament, or(c) modifies the functions of any member of the Scottish Government.(10) In subsection (8), “measure” includes any Act, whether a public general Act, a local and personal Act or a private Act, and any statutory or other instrument made under an enactment.”

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

We return to Clause 2, and to a problem that cannot be dismissed as purely hypothetical. We are dealing with something of day-to-day significance—the Sewel convention, and what should be done about it, in view of what was said about it by the Smith commission. The amendment that I propose is virtually the same as that which I proposed in Committee, though somewhat simplified. As I said a moment or two ago, its source is a paper provided by the Scottish Government last June. Therefore, it is something that I would have thought that the Minister would wish to take seriously.

I go back to what the noble Lord, Lord Lang of Monkton, described as a sacred text. What one finds as a source for this discussion is in the heading to Pillar 1 in the Smith commission report:

“Providing for a durable but responsive constitutional settlement for the governance of Scotland”.

Paragraph 22, as I think we all know, says:

“The Sewel Convention will be put on a statutory footing”.

The adjective “statutory” is the foundation for the point that I made last time and seek to make again.

I reiterate the point that I made in Committee about the dangers of lack of clarity and certainty in responding to the recommendation of the Smith commission. We are talking about legislation—not hypothetical legislation but something that may occur in reality, relatively early, in the near future. One problem with legislation that may be open to scrutiny or criticism on its failure to be compatible with some standard or another is that, so long as that argument hangs in the air, it gives rise to uncertainty. It is right to remind the noble and learned Lord that, when the Scotland Act 1998 was being framed, it made special provision for what was to be done in the event of a challenge being made on the possible incompatibility of the legislation with convention rights. The mechanism was to allow these matters to be referred to the Privy Council for scrutiny before the measure became an enactment. I do not think that we have ever seen that happen with regard to Scots legislation, but there have been two or possibly three cases from the National Assembly for Wales, where challenges have been made, and been referred to the Privy Council for resolution. That has the great advantage of putting beyond doubt the uncertainty that was created by the challenge, because one then has a decision of the Supreme Court to resolve the issue.

The problem with the Sewel convention, if it is put into statute at all, is that it raises the question of what it is—how far it reaches and what it covers—and, of course, there is the question of whether it will always apply or, as we find in the clause as it is at the moment, will apply “normally”, which begs the question of what is or is not normal. The virtue of the wording that the Scottish Government put forward is that it attempted to put the Smith commission recommendation into the form of a statutory provision that could then stand on its own feet and, it was hoped, resolve these issues. The formula that we see in Amendment 7 does not include the word “normally”; it also attempts to explain the reach of the Sewel convention as it is now, which is no doubt wider than Lord Sewel thought it was when he devised the reach of it in 1998. As it has grown, it now covers the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament and the functions of members of the Scottish Government, as Amendment 10, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, appears to recognise as well.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

I do not regard them as alternatives; rather that Amendment 12 tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, is absolutely essential. The other form of wording, that it,

“shall not be questioned in any court of law”,

comes from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, and the noble Lord, Lord Stephen, would be a possible alternative. But something of this kind is in my view absolutely essential if we are setting out in statute a restriction on the power of the United Kingdom Parliament to legislate.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, the problem with the term “Sewel convention” itself seems to beg a question as to exactly what it covers. The word “normally” is not the only problem in that respect.

[The Duke of Montrose (Con)]

My Lords, I should say that if we get to the stage of putting this to a vote, I would like to support the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. In Committee, I drew out the question about the progression from the wording that Lord Sewel set out at that stage of the 1998 Bill and what it had become. It seems to me that the beauty of creating the legislation in statute rather than in a convention is that we know exactly what we have got. It may be that the Government are arguing that we never want to pin things down and that they should be free to do whatever they like at all times, but I think we in this House prefer to have things clearly stated so that people know where they are. Of course, my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth has also made this point —that you cannot have a convention and a statute—so the Government have to make a choice as to which road they will go down. At the moment there seems to be a lack of clarity on many levels, so to have an amendment which has been drafted by the Scottish Parliament and recommended by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, is not a bad beginning.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I note the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, but I can observe only that it is not appropriate to layer legislation with unnecessary detail and that if the matter is to be regarded as implicit in the present clause, it would be inappropriate to add a further clause. I cannot elaborate upon the point at this stage.

The concluded position of the Government is that Clause 2 as drafted delivers what was required by the Smith commission agreement by placing the Sewel convention, as it is properly understood, on a statutory footing. It is in these circumstances that I invite your Lordships to withdraw or not move their amendments.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful to all those noble and learned and noble Lords who have supported my Amendment 7. I am also extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lords, Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord McCluskey, for the points they made in support of Amendment 12, which in a way hangs together with it, because they have identified a crucial issue before us.

With all due respect to the Minister, he cannot get away with simply declaring that the “issue” is not justiciable. He has chosen the word “issue” as meaning something different, but the same point arises. The noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, identified the point precisely: there is a crucial difference between the position of Parliament legislating—and Ministers declaring what words mean when they legislate—and the position of the courts. The courts will assert their right to interpret legislation according to the meaning of the words as they judge them to be. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, has said, the courts cannot close their door to arguments. People will bring arguments before the court, and when an argument is before the court it has to decide on it. The Minister simply cannot get away with the idea that we can be assured that this issue will never be before the courts and require determination.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I shall first address Amendments 15 to 21. Under the Bill, and in line with the Smith commission agreement, the timing of Scottish parliamentary elections is devolved to the Scottish Parliament, subject to the provision in the Bill that Scottish parliamentary ordinary general elections may not be held on the same day as UK parliamentary general elections, European parliamentary general elections or local government elections in Scotland.

Following a request from the Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament, the UK Government agreed to bring forward an order under Section 30 of the Scotland Act, rather than use the Bill, to give the current Scottish Parliament the power to determine the length of the next Scottish Parliament following the poll in 2016. The order devolved to the Scottish Parliament power to legislate on the date of the first Scottish parliamentary ordinary general election after the 2016 poll. Following approval in the Westminster Parliament and the Scottish Parliament, the order was made by Her Majesty in Council on 8 October and came into force the following day. The Scottish Elections (Dates) Bill, currently before the Scottish Parliament, provides for the Scottish Parliament ordinary general election scheduled for 7 May 2020 to be moved to 6 May 2021.

We have tabled a number of technical amendments to make changes to a number of clauses in the Bill that are required as a result of the Section 30 order. Essentially, these amendments revoke the Section 30 order and remove provisions from the Scotland Act inserted by the order, which will be unnecessary as they overlap with provision made by the Bill. The area of legislative competence being devolved to the Scottish Parliament by the Bill is such that the Scottish Elections (Dates) Bill will still be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament following the revocation of the Section 30 order. Additionally, we have tabled an amendment to Clause 5(2) to improve the drafting of this provision in order to ensure that it operates as intended.

We have also tabled an amendment that removes a reference in Clause 10 to a provision of the Scottish Parliament (Elections etc.) Order 2010 which is now unnecessary as this instrument has been revoked by the Scottish Parliament (Elections etc.) Order 2015 that was made by Scottish Ministers and which came into force in December 2015.

In addition, I wish to give notice that the Government consider that drafting improvements are required to the reservation of the timing of ordinary local government elections in Scotland where the poll would otherwise be held on the same day as an ordinary general election for the Scottish Parliament, and to some provisions in Clause 5 relating to this reservation, to provide clarification and ensure that the drafting of these provisions operates as intended. As a result, the Government intend to table amendments to clarify and improve the drafting of these provisions at Third Reading.

Amendments 15 to 21 are technical amendments which will ensure that the clauses in the Bill relating to elections operate as intended.

I now to turn to Clause 11, which contains the supermajority requirements and acknowledge the input and assistance of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, on this matter. I thank him for his willingness to discuss this matter and to propose improvements to the provisions, which are reflected in government Amendments 23 to 26.

Clause 11 requires that the Scottish Parliament must pass certain legislation by a two-thirds majority. Government Amendments 23 to 26 to this clause will enable a Bill in the Scottish Parliament to pass to Royal Assent if the Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament decides that a simple majority is required, the Bill is passed with a simple majority but is referred to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court agrees that only a simple majority was required. The measure currently provides that in those circumstances, the Bill must be reconsidered by the Scottish Parliament before it can be passed for Royal Assent. We have taken account of the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in order to make a little more sense —if I can put it that way—of the provisions of Clause 11 on the application of the supermajority. I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I think I should thank the noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General for Scotland for his kind words. The amendments improve the intelligibility of these provisions. It is important that the system work as smoothly as possible, so I am extremely grateful.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, I am glad that these amendments have been made. Of course, I understand that they will require approval by the House of Commons in due course.