Judicial Appointments Commission Regulations 2013

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Monday 22nd July 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I wish to make a brief general point about judicial diversity in connection with these regulations. The Committee knows that my noble friend is a forceful advocate of judicial diversity. The Government’s commitment was apparent during the passage of what is now the Crime and Courts Act, and in particular in their promotion of the provisions which find expression in Schedule 13 to that Act. While not wishing to make any judgment about the recent appointment to the position of Lord Chief Justice it is, from the diversity point of view, a shame that the extremely highly thought-of female candidate was not selected. That would have been real and very public progress.

These regulations implement the new systems in ways that are both detailed and welcome, but the imperative is to ensure that we move towards a much more representative judiciary with more women, more ethnic minority judges and judges from a far broader range of social background. These regulations can be no more than a step on the way to achieving that. While they are detailed and welcome provisions, to achieve real change we need a deep and continuing change of culture. That was highlighted in the report of the Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger and mentioned by my noble friend. I look forward in the future to Government and the judiciary working together to achieve that change.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I shall make a short point relating to the Supreme Court (Judicial Appointments) Regulations. Before I explain my point, I should declare an interest. I recently retired as deputy president of the Supreme Court. For the past four years I have been a member of the ad hoc commission and thus responsible, along with the president, for a number of appointments, which have included something like a third of the court now sitting as the Supreme Court across the square.

My point relates to diversity in a rather unusual way. As the Minister has explained, one of the aims of redesigning the composition of the selection commission described in Part 3 of these regulations is to meet the recommendation that the commission should no longer be seen to be appointing or selecting for appointment people in their own image. It may be that that was a fair criticism at the time when I was sitting as one of the two judicial members of the panel since the president and I were both men, but I have just retired and I have been succeeded by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale of Richmond. In a way, this follows on from a point just made by the noble Lord that one may regret for diversity reasons the choice of Lord Chief Justice. I make no comment on that, but one great advance that has been made in the Supreme Court is that we now have the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, who is a very vigorous proponent of diversity and is probably best suited of anyone to sit on such a commission.

It is a great misfortune of timing. If she had been in my position when the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, came with her members to visit us and to discuss the change, I am sure that the noble Baroness would have seen—it would have been perfectly obvious—that the noble and learned Baroness was there and that we had on our team every component for diversity one could possibly have wished for. As the noble Lord rightly explained, when the draft regulations were discussed with us, it was impossible to make the point that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, might be my successor because I had not yet resigned and the selection process for my successor had not yet taken place. Therefore, we were very cautious not to make any prediction about who would succeed me. The succession process produced this result only about four weeks ago.

It is a great misfortune of timing has led us to the position where the noble and learned Baroness will now be excluded from participation in the selection process. The regulations are very carefully drafted because the composition of the selection commission in Regulation 11 provides for a senior UK judge to be nominated to take the position which I previously occupied. It is quite clear, if you read Regulation 11(1)(e) with Regulation 14 and Regulation 2, that the senior UK judge can be any senior UK judge other than a judge of the Supreme Court. So it is quite clear it can only be the president who would be the Supreme Court member, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, has no prospect of playing any part in the work of the commission.

The way that the appointments have gone in the Supreme Court in recent years means that there will be no fresh vacancy, I think I am right in saying, for two or three years. Now that I have gone, the way is clear for the court to settle down without any real change. However, in two or three, or possibly three or four years’ time, a significant number will retire and fall to be replaced, and the noble and learned Baroness will still be there. The composition of what one might call the next but one Supreme Court will be greatly influenced by the work of this commission. It is a great pity that the reform has taken this form. As I said earlier, I doubt very much whether it would have done before, but I must concede that the Minister is absolutely right to say that the regulations were shown to us. We did the best we could in our discussions to make this point without naming names.

The purpose of my intervention is to express regret at this turn of events and hope that perhaps one day it may be possible to recognise the enormous qualities of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, and the major contribution she would be able to make to increasing diversity in a way which concerns us all.

Legal Aid

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Thursday 11th July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, for initiating this very important debate. It is with some regret that, so recently having returned to the House after the lifting of the disqualification that attached to me as a Justice of the Supreme Court, I find myself speaking for the first time on such an occasion as this. It is a sad occasion because one cannot help feeling that the need for this debate ought not to have arisen at all. I find it hard to believe that a Government who truly understood and respected the rule of law, who had taken the trouble to appreciate what that phrase really means and assess the consequences of what they had in mind, would have even contemplated introducing some of the proposals that have attracted so much criticism this afternoon.

Let me emphasise at the outset that I have no personal interest of any kind in the outcome of these proposals. I left legal practice long ago and have now reached the age when I am no longer allowed to sit as a judge. I can claim, however, to be an informed observer. My experience as an appellate judge during the past 24 years has been very wide. Judicial review has been a significant part of my work, as has dealing with cases supported by legal aid. I am also well aware of the pressure on public funds and of the need to make savings, and to continue to make savings year after year wherever possible. I had to face up to that problem time and time again when I was the Senior Presiding Judge in Edinburgh and, more recently, as the Minister will know, as the Deputy President of the Supreme Court. I have done my best to promote efficiency and the saving of costs wherever possible. I have supported the Government and will continue to support them in their search for further savings, including in the administration of legal aid. Of course there is no bottomless pit.

The Government are right to seek to target their limited resources on those cases which really do justify legal aid and on those people who need it, but that requires the exercise of judgment based on sound research and open-minded consultation. There is one cardinal principle which until now has always been respected. It is set out in Section 1 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, referred: the constitutional principle of the rule of law and the Lord Chancellor’s role in relation to that principle. It is worth recalling that the clause was not in the Bill as originally drafted. It did not appear until Third Reading in this House following a recommendation by the Select Committee on the Bill. Perhaps it was thought to be so obvious that it was not necessary to state it at all, but that was not the view of the Select Committee, which thought that it should be there and could not be dismissed as unimportant. It is indeed fundamental to the continued existence of our democracy, but the important point I would emphasise is that the rule of law exists for the benefit of everyone and it is for everyone to respect it. There can be no exceptions at whatever level of government. What this means is that all persons and every public authority must regard themselves as bound by, and entitled to the benefit of, laws that are openly and publicly administered in our courts.

Time is very short and I have only a few points that I can make, particularly in relation to judicial review and the tests—the permission test, the borderline test and the residence test. I would invite the Minister to have regard to a paper circulated on 25 June by Dr Nick Armstrong of Matrix Chambers in which he analyses the costings of these various proposals. For example, with prison law he draws attention to the fact that of the overall savings in the proposals that the Government have in mind, which are assessed to be £6 million, £4 million of those are said to come from prison law. Dr Armstrong, however, has indicated—his work has been seen and approved by the Parole Board—that the additional costs that result from these savings may come to as much as £10 million as a result of the continued detention of people who have no access to prison law. That is quite apart from the constitutional implications.

The truth, if one has regard to the consequences of these proposals and burrows underneath what is being proposed, is that the efficient functioning of the rule of law will no longer be there for everyone. As so often one finds on further examination, it is the weakest, the most vulnerable and, let us face it, the most unpopular who are at risk of being unprotected. For them, the rights that are at issue here are the most basic rights of all, and the savings are at risk of being overtaken many times over by increased costs.

On the permission test, to which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred, why not fund the early stages of seeking permission before it is sought? At present, 60% of cases are resolved at that stage, especially social welfare cases, so it seems odd that the work done by the firms that provide these services should not be paid for so that they can meet the costs of running their businesses.

Time is too short for me to go further. However, I respectfully ask the Minister to do two things. First, I ask him for an assurance that the Government’s mind is still open on all these issues and that they will look at the costings in the paper to which I have referred. Could he say how it is proposed to bring these proposals into force, given that they raise fundamental constitutional issues? I endorse what has been said by the noble Baronesses, Lady Deech and Lady Kennedy, that detailed parliamentary scrutiny, line by line, is required. This is a matter that requires primary legislation. I hope that we will not have to face up to a succession of regret Motions on delegated legislation, which would be wholly unsatisfactory.