Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Monday 15th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I offer Green support for Amendments 212 and 213, with a preference for Amendment 213, which this debate has made clear is the stronger of the two. I return to the Committee after two weeks away from your Lordships’ House at the COP 26 climate talks. There we heard again and again about the need for evidence-based policy-making on the climate. It is very clear from the powerful introductions from the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Dubs, and all of the subsequent debate, that the evidence here is clearly that short prison sentences do not work.

I very much agree with the comment by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that those words are there in the Sentencing Code, but clearly we need to strengthen this prescription. The figures from 2019 show that more than 44,000 prison sentences of less than six months were handed out. That was nearly half of all people sent to prison. Some 68% reoffended within a year of release, and for theft offenders, the rate was 82%. Two-thirds of the women in prison are serving a sentence of less than six months. Like other noble Lords, I go to the excellent group, Revolving Doors, and the experience of one person, Robert, subjected to a whole succession of short sentences. He said:

“Any support with drugs and alcohol I had in community stopped when I went to prison. I didn’t access any support in prison and certainly there was no planning when I was released.”


Very briefly, I turn to the reference to children in Amendment 212. The report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Human Rights and the Government’s Response to COVID-19: Children Whose Mothers are in Prison, indicated that the Government do not have clear figures on the number of women in prison who are separated from dependent children. It recommended that the Government undertake a census and ask all women coming into prison whether they have dependent children and what ages they are, and that those figures be collated and reported regularly. Can the Minister tell me, either now or in the future, whether that recommendation from the Joint Committee on Human Rights has been acted upon?

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I support both these amendments, but I want to add a brief comment on the mechanism which they both have in common: the giving of reasons. I know from my own experience how valuable it is to marshal your thoughts when you are having to give reasons, and sometimes when you write them down you wonder whether your thoughts in the first place were correct, and you may think again as a result. So the mechanism that is being suggested is a good one and, with great respect to my noble friend Lord Pannick, I think Amendment 213 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, does add something to the code.

Of course, the code encourages care in passing custodial sentences and it sets it out very well, but it is this additional element which is of value. One particular word in the amendment adds force to it, and that is “must”. Everybody will have to do this. The noble Lord will know better than I do how often magistrates in particular pass custodial sentences without giving reasons. The point is that this discipline, which both amendments seek to inject into the system, adds value.

That having been said, I hope that these reasons will not just become a rota, because there is some experience in the Supreme Court where we had to give reasons for refusing leave to appeal; we had many of these cases to deal with, and we adopted a mechanism which I think the Minister will know quite well—it was the same reason given every time. That does not really meet what I think the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, is getting at, and I hope the Minister will be able to reassure us that when the word “must” is put there, together with the other matters in his report, it will actually add value and people will really think before they give their reasons, and not simply adopt a formula.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I would like to add a little to the evidence which has already been provided to the Minister, but he must of course know the evidence which has already been made available to him. Just in case it has not, I repeat what the recent sentencing White Paper says: short sentences

“often fail to rehabilitate the offender or stop reoffending.”

It goes on:

“A Ministry of Justice 2019 study”—


an analytical exercise, full of figures—

“found that sentencing offenders to short term custody with supervision on release was associated with higher proven reoffending than if they had instead received community orders and/or suspended sentence orders.”

In other words, the Government’s own evidence points to supporting these amendments—not necessarily in the same words, but certainly the thrust of them. We should remember that, pre-pandemic, nearly half of those people who were sentenced to custody in England and Wales were subject to short sentences of less than, or equal to, six months.

There are many reasons why we must support the change—more effectively reducing reoffending, dealing with issues such as drug use and producing better outcomes for women. Short prison sentences do not provide sufficient time for addressing those issues, such as dealing with substance addiction, or benefiting from any education and training facilities on offer. There may not even be sufficient time for the prison authorities to devise a programme to address the prisoner’s needs on release day. The best we can say about short sentences is summed up by one of the former Conservative Prisons Ministers, of which there have been many in recent years, who said that short prison sentences are

“long enough to damage you but not long enough to heal you.”

Almost two-thirds of prisoners sentenced to these terms of less than 12 months will reoffend within a year. The amazing statistic is that nearly half of adults are convicted of another offence within one year of release, but anyone leaving custody who has served two days or more is now required to serve a minimum of 12 months under supervision in the community. As a result of not fulfilling their supervision orders in some minor way, 8,055 people serving a sentence of 12 months or less, and sometimes of only a few days, were recalled to prison in the year ending December 2020.

What has happened to the Conservative plan to secure a reduction in the use of short sentences? I think I know the answer, but it would be helpful if the Minister could confirm to the House what has happened to this idea. The Bill can address this issue. To finish with the words of a former Conservative Secretary of State:

“For the offenders completing these short sentences whose lives are destabilised, and for society which incurs a heavy financial and social cost, prison simply isn’t working.”


Offenders are less likely to reoffend if they are given a community order. These are much more effective in tackling the root causes behind criminality.

Given the evidence of both Conservative Secretaries of State and the evidence produced in the Government’s own studies, can the Minister explain whether there has been a U-turn or a Z-turn, or whether the course is laid out as described in the evidence that they have received?

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 8th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I want to provide my support for a remark made by the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, in the course of his speech. He said that the emphasis should be more on disqualification than on imprisonment. One can understand that, when a jury or magistrate is considering what to make of the facts of the case, the threat of imprisonment may influence the decision to go for the softer option rather than the harder one, whereas disqualification does not have that connotation at all. There is a lot of force in the noble Lord’s point.

I also support the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. She talked about the patchwork of offences and the need for a much more balanced approach that looks at all the various offences across the board, rather than fitting together one or two things. That is what this enormously long Bill, which, I suggest, is really not suited for this kind of treatment, does.

Having made those remarks by way of support, if one examines the wording of the proposed new clause, one can see that it is a little risky to try to find new wording to replace the well-understood, well-trusted and frequently used phraseology that we have at the moment. For example, in the new meaning of dangerous driving, we are told that that would be where somebody

“commits a breach of … the Highway Code in a way that causes inconvenience, intimidation or danger”.

The word “inconvenience”, which is one of the three alternatives, does not seem appropriate for dangerous driving. I suggest that, if this is to go any further, this word should come out because it is not descriptive of the effect of dangerous driving at all. Similarly, the next subsection defines “careless or inconsiderate driving” and includes “intimidation”, which does not really fit with what one is talking about when one talks of careless driving or driving without due consideration for other road users.

I draw these points to the Minister’s attention because they show that it is a quite a delicate matter to alter the existing wording, which I would wish to preserve instead of trying to introduce a fresh definition.

Finally on definitions, in subsection (4), the words “serious injury” are equated with

“causing death by careless driving”

and the proposal is to insert “or serious injury”. What amounts to a serious injury is difficult to define but, if one is moving in that direction, one would have to introduce additional words, such as “serious injury”. One finds an example in Clause 66, where there is a definition by reference to the existing standards in the criminal court.

I am not sure that that goes far enough when one considers the consequences of some of these offences and the threat of imprisonment, but one has to give very careful thought to what is really meant by “serious injury”. Is somebody breaking their wrist due to falling on the ground enough? Is something that requires them to go to hospital enough? Or is one looking at something much graver? That brings it closer to the idea that one is trying to bridge what might seem to be a gap, where somebody is injured so seriously that it is only by the skill of a surgeon that death is avoided—I can quite see that there is something that needs to be addressed there—but just using the words “serious injury” may mean walking into a trap that it would be better to avoid.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly. The Road Traffic Act and all its many successors have left us with a law in which a simple textbook, Wilkinson’s Road Traffic Offences, is about as fat as a successful marrow. It is absurd that our law is so complicated on something that everybody, or nearly all of us, does every day. Our children will learn it; the day they get to the age of 17, they will want to drive, and so on and so forth.

I entirely agree that this is a patched-up proposal. Personally, I strongly support the idea that we should get this review conducted and analyse exactly what it is that we want to achieve with a modern law relating to road traffic. That law should address not merely the conduct of a person at the wheel of a car but the conduct of a person on an e-scooter or a person riding a bicycle, some of whom are appalling in the way they ride. It should also include pedestrians who step out into a path and make a driver pull away, causing them to knock somebody else over. We need synchronisation of our laws on these issues, which is why I support the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley.

That said, I want to make a different point and indicate how strongly opposed I am to a proposal that would enable a prison sentence to be imposed on a motorist who was not driving dangerously or taking deliberate risks, and was not under the influence of drink or drugs, but simply made a mistake while at the wheel. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that “road traffic accident” is not the right phrase to use. It is a road traffic incident, which must be examined, as the evidence shows.

You can, perfectly reasonably, accuse someone who drives without due care and attention of being negligent, but criminal culpability is inevitably low because it is negligent. Driving without due care and attention is an offence; it is negligence. However, we do not send people to prison for negligent mistakes causing serious injury in the context of, for example, the medical profession. A mistake is made. It is negligent. There is an action. Various steps are taken in respect of the doctor, the nurse, or whoever it might be. The result to the victim is very serious. So, when we examine whether a doctor or a nurse may be prosecuted, we look not for evidence of negligence, a lack of due care or a mistake, but for something demonstrating that he or she fell far below the standards required by that profession of that individual in that job at that time. We must be careful not to introduce a different standard of approach to motoring offences. We must remember that this offence is also committed by the young mum whose children in the back of the car start howling because there is a wasp in the car, in the way that children do. Is she momentarily distracted? Yes. Should she have stayed rigidly looking to the front? I suppose so. Is it realistic to think that she, or most mums, would stay that way when her child is screaming in the back? No. Let us keep it realistic.

I am also troubled by the way we approach consequences in the whole of this road traffic law. We have situations where identical culpability can lead to completely different sentences because there has been a death. Of course a death is dreadful, but does the offence become more serious because there are two or three deaths? Personally, I think it does, but there is a question that needs to be answered: how far are we addressing the culpability of the driving as against the consequences? Death by dangerous driving is no trouble; after all, you are driving dangerously. Drink driving is no trouble; you choose to have a drink. Driving to take risks and show off to your friends is no trouble; you are driving dangerously. However, we need to be cautious about the introduction of prison sentences for people whose standard of driving amounts to negligence, not gross negligence.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

155: Clause 66, page 63, line 28, at end insert—
“(3) A person is to be regarded as having caused a serious injury to the other person using the road or place only if it would have been obvious to a careful and competent driver that the way the person was driving at the time of the accident was likely to cause serious injury to that other person.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would introduce a test for the words “causing serious injury”, which is needed as a conviction for this offence would attract a sentence of imprisonment.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

In moving this amendment, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, has put her name, I will speak also to my opposition that Clause 66 stand part of the Bill, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, and the noble Lords, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames and Lord Pannick, have added their names.

The essence of the point I wish to raise, which is about imposing sentences of imprisonment for the consequences of an act of careless driving, was put across with great clarity by my noble and learned friend Lord Judge, in his contribution to the previous debate. But if your Lordships will forgive me, I would like to take some time to explain my position on Clause 66, as it raises important issues that affect every driver, however careful and considerate they almost always are.

Clause 66 seeks to introduce a new offence of causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving. As the law stands, causing death by careless driving is a separate, distinct offence but causing serious injury by careless driving is not. That might suggest there is a gap in our law that needs to be filled. Indeed, at one time, it was thought that the fact that a serious injury had resulted from careless driving was not to be taken into account at all when the motorist was being sentenced for careless driving, but that is no longer the case. Under the current sentencing guidelines, that harm has been caused to others is now a relevant factor when a court is sentencing for careless driving, so there is, in practice, now no such gap. It seems that the issue at the heart of this debate is whether the current sentencing approach goes far enough, whether it needs to be changed, and if so, how far, and in what respects.

The Minister in a contribution to the previous debate referred to the need for balance in sentencing. Under the current sentencing guidelines, one finds a balance. Cases are to be assessed in three categories according to the degree of culpability and the extent of the harm. A case where serious injury has been caused will be in the top category where the culpability is higher or the middle one if the culpability is lower. The maximum fine in both cases is I think £5,000. The appropriate fine level is higher for the top category, for which disqualification is possible but not mandatory, and it permits the imposition of seven to nine penalty points. Cases involving serious injury with lesser culpability, which are in the middle of the category, will attract five to six penalty points but no disqualification.

Clause 66 seeks to provide that disqualification is to be obligatory in all cases of causing serious injury by careless driving, that the upper range of penalty points be extended and that there be no limit on the fines that may be imposed. However, it also proposes that a conviction for this offence may result in imprisonment of up to 12 months if prosecuted summarily or two years if on indictment. The contrast between what the penalties are now and what they would be if this clause were to be enacted in its present form, given that serious harm is already a relevant factor under the current guidelines, is astonishing. That is why I thought it right to draw attention to the issue and to the need for the proposal to be explained and fully justified.

Careless driving is something that every competent motorist will seek to avoid but, human nature being what it is, they will not always be able to do so. Lord Diplock explained the difference between dangerous or reckless driving and careless driving in Regina v Lawrence in 1982—Appeal Cases 510. As he put it, driving is dangerous or reckless where it creates an

“obvious and serious risk of causing … injury … or … damage”.

However, he went on to explain that it is not necessary to show that a driver was conscious of the possible consequences of what he was doing for him to be guilty of driving without due care and attention. Section 3, he said,

“takes care of the kind of inattention or misjudgment to which the ordinarily careful motorist is occasionally subject without its necessarily involving any moral turpitude, although it causes inconvenience and annoyance to other users of the road.”

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, gave striking examples of situations that may arise that caused that kind of situation to occur—the wasp in the car with children, for example. Lord Diplock did not mention causing injury, but I suggest that the fact that a serious injury has resulted from that kind of driving does not alter his assessment of the culpability of the offence—the nature of the offence itself. Of course, the circumstances will vary from case to case, but the offence does not necessarily involve any moral turpitude, criminal mind or wicked behaviour at all. A moment’s inattention may be enough.

The fact that the punishments now being proposed for this offence include imprisonment of up to one year if the offence is charged summarily and up to two years if it is brought under indictment is particularly striking. That is a massive increase in the available penalties. Prisons, after all, are nasty, brutal and dangerous places. Quite rightly, imprisonment is reserved under our road traffic law for only the most serious cases where there has been a deliberate breach of the law of some gravity. This prompts me to ask a number of questions to the noble Lord. Why is such a severe penalty now being proposed for something that does not involve a deliberate breach of the road traffic law but which is mere negligence or inattention? What is the reason for this? What research has been carried out into the need for it, and what thought has been given to the consequences of imposing such a penalty for acts of mere carelessness, albeit that a serious injury has been caused?

One may take the example of the mother in the car with the wasp; something has happened because the children were alarmed and she had a moment’s inattention, and a serious injury resulted. Does a person in that situation really deserve a sentence of imprisonment, or even the severe worry of being faced with the possibility of imprisonment? After all, the imprisonment is one thing, but the fact that you are charged with an offence with a penalty of imprisonment is itself a very serious matter indeed, which is not to be taken at all lightly. I suggest that imprisonment as a punishment for such an offence on its own that is being posed here—of course, I leave aside situations where drink or drugs have been taken, which is a different situation altogether—is grossly excessive and wholly inappropriate.

The risk I fear most when I venture out on to the roads is that of accidentally hitting a cyclist. That risk increases as the days grow shorter, we have increasing hours of darkness and, let us face it, not all cyclists are very visible to people driving motor cars along the road, however careful they may be. They do not always wear Lycra and bright colours and it is sometimes extremely difficult to see them and indeed to be sure which direction they will take their cycle in as you approach them. I fear these cyclists when I see them. There are so many situations where it is not possible, despite one’s best efforts, to create the space that is needed when overtaking. You may have a bus coming towards you on the other side of the road. Of course you can slow down, as I often do, and wait for the cyclist to get to a broader place in the road, but it is not always possible to do that. One has to exercise judgment and take as much care as possible.

However, what if the worst was to happen? The cyclist has fallen off the bicycle and breaks a wrist, possibly an arm or a leg. Of course you stop, because there has been an accident resulting in injury. The police have to be called and, no doubt, an ambulance too. There is then the real possibility of a charge of causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving. In a situation of that kind, almost always the driver will be blamed as the person who caused the accident—that is the way things turn out. Then there is this real prospect of a prison sentence. There is nothing in Clause 66 to tell the magistrates when that would or would not be appropriate. Is that really acceptable? Another question for the Minister: has any thought been given to what the Sentencing Council’s guidelines might be if this offence were to be introduced?

Many of your Lordships will have received an email from Cycling UK with recommendations as to how our current road traffic law should be reformed. The noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, with his amendments in an earlier group, has drawn attention to a number of its recommendations. Its interest in promoting these reforms is very obvious in view of the very real risks that cyclists undertake every day. However, I was particularly interested in its comment on Clause 66, and I hope that I have understood it correctly when I say that it suggests that there should be a greater focus on disqualification and less on imprisonment. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, made that very point in his speech in an earlier group. Cycling UK suggests that the maximum sentence on summary prosecution should be reduced to six months—of course, I would say that it should not be there at all—and that account should be taken of other circumstances not mentioned here that would increase culpability. I would regard that as an improvement if one is to introduce this offence at all; you look for something else, such as taking drugs or driving without insurance or when disqualified. I do not support all that Cycling UK proposes, but there is an indication in what it is saying, which I endorse, that the Government need to think again, and much more carefully, about what needs to be done to alter the current approach to sentencing, which, as I have suggested, strikes a balance as to what is appropriate between the various degrees which may fall within the ambit of this offence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I accept that it may be a severe penalty. It depends who you are dealing with, and the circumstances. There are other factors which the courts have to bear in mind when considering the particular effects of disqualification on a particular driver.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I hope the Minister has sat down, because I thought it was time for me to wind up. I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate.

I hope the Minister will appreciate—I think he does—that my Amendment 155 is simply an attempt. I said that it was not cleverly drafted, and he has made it clear that it has problems attached to it. The essence of my intervention is on Clause 66 and imprisonment. Disqualification is fair enough. I can see that taking people off the road meets almost every situation. The same is true with fines. It is quite remarkable that there are no other non-custodial penalties. What about other orders, such as retraining, community service, or something of that kind? They are not mentioned here. As the noble Lord, Lord Beith, pointed out, the emphasis on imprisonment as the alternative is endemic in the Government’s approach. It is seriously wrong in this situation.

Two phrases came up in the course of the discussion. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said that only in an “exceptional case” would a custodial sentence be thought appropriate; I understand that and entirely follow it, of course. The Minister said that he contemplated a “serious, life-changing injury” where he might find it difficult to look into the eye of the victim and say, “We cannot equate it to the sort of sentence that involves imprisonment. We cannot provide a custodial sentence to make up for the devastating consequences of the injury.”

The problem is that, as it stands, the clause is completely open-ended. There is absolutely no qualification to narrow down the situation described by both noble Lords. That is what I was trying to do with my Amendment 155, and is part of my complaint. If you introduce sentences of imprisonment, you really have to think about whether the nature of the offence or the circumstances that give rise to that kind of penalty should be more carefully defined. Otherwise, we are at the mercy of magistrates, who vary and may misunderstand the situation.

Of course, as I mentioned in my earlier speech, the mere threat of imprisonment is a devastating situation. I go back to example given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, of the mother in the car. Her children will ask, “Mummy, does that mean you’ll have to go to prison?” The family must live with the possibility of imprisonment and all its consequences until, eventually, the moment arises when the sentence is pronounced. Even when there is no imprisonment, the fact that this hovers over a family in that situation is devastating enough.

I hope that the Minister will think more carefully. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, will also think more carefully about his party’s approach to this problem, because there is more to it than was thought at first sight. I welcome the suggestion of ongoing discussions; I hope that, with the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, we will be able to have a discussion with the Minister to see whether some attempt can be made to qualify the open-ended nature of this offence to make it a little less devastating.

For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 155 withdrawn.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I rise briefly to support both amendments. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, looks at this from the position of the victim. It is, of course, right to acknowledge the huge progress that has been made over the last 20 or so years in improving the position of the victim—but we have not got to the end of the road. The important point of his amendment is that it gives further protection to the victim at two important stages: first, where things have gone wrong and there is an inquiry, and secondly and much more importantly, in the victim exercising the right of review where there has been a failure to prosecute. It seems to me, therefore, that the duty of candour is yet another step in putting the victim—as is so often said by politicians on both sides—at the heart of the criminal justice system.

The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, looks at this from a broader perspective, which encompasses the position of the defendant and the greater public interest. We should think of experiences over the years. One can go back, for example, to a problem that arose in Tiger Bay in Cardiff over 30 years ago, where the inquiry into the Lynette White murder investigation went on and on. One cannot help feeling that, if there had been a duty of candour, it would have brought that very damaging case to an end.

I say nothing about the undercover policing inquiry as it is still ongoing, but it seems that there is ample evidence that we need to enshrine this duty of candour to protect the position of the defendant and the wider public interest by making it absolutely clear that the police owe that duty—and they should be grateful to have that duty imposed on them, because we need to restore, above all, confidence in our constabularies.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I support these amendments as well. I look at the situation from an unusual perspective and with the unusual experience of sitting as the senior judge in Scotland in a criminal appeal. It was a case of murder, and I was not able—because I was sitting in a court where all the evidence was already out—to develop what was at the back of my mind, which was that the police had identified the wrong individual, who was then accused and convicted. I will not go into the facts of the case for obvious reasons, but it struck me that the court at that late stage was powerless to deal with what I thought had not been a frank and fair police investigation. I make that point simply because stages are reached where the situation is beyond recall, but I was deeply disturbed by what had happened in that case and could not do anything about it. So I welcome the steps that are being taken to improve the standard of candour among the police at all stages in the investigation of crime and its aftermath.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I commend the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for once again sharing his experiences with the Committee in moving his amendment and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for tabling his. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, summed it up very well: we have not got to the end of the road. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, also challenged me about what the Government are going to do. I hope I can explain to both noble Lords how we are going to get to the end of the road and what we are going to do.

Noble Lords have rightly highlighted the very important fact of transparency within police forces and prosecuting authorities when dealing with victims of crime and their families. I totally agree with noble Lords about the importance of placing this at the heart of engaging and supporting victims and their families and, as we have talked about so much over the last week or so, the importance of regaining trust in the system.

There are a number of areas where the Government have already made progress and where work is ongoing to improve integrity and transparency in policing. In relation to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, it is worth highlighting the introduction of the College of Policing’s statutory code of ethics in 2014, which makes clear the requirement on all officers to act within their powers and with integrity.

In February last year, we amended the policing standards of professional behaviour to make it clear that failing to co-operate as witnesses in investigations and inquiries can be a disciplinary matter. This means that there is now a clear framework in place to hold officers to account where they fail to reach the high standards the public expect of them. Ultimately, a significant breach can mean that an officer is dismissed and placed on the barred list. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, rightly asked me why no officer had been disciplined following the Daniel Morgan independent panel. The IOPC is still considering that, so we could still get a call-in referral. On the failure to co-operate, those regulations have been in force since February 2020, so anything before that would be difficult to enforce.

I turn to the concept of a duty of candour. Like the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, I pay tribute to the bereaved families and survivors of the Hillsborough disaster, who have campaigned for a statutory requirement for candour in public life. This idea, as noble Lords have said, was also endorsed by the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel as a means of ensuring that law enforcement agencies are fully transparent with the public.

It is absolutely right that the Government carefully consider the arguments made around the duty of candour. This is not the first discussion we have had about it in this Chamber. There is ongoing work across government, and we continue to work closely with our partners to carefully consider all the points of learning in Bishop James Jones’s report concerning the bereaved Hillsborough families’ experiences and from the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel report. Before we respond to Bishop James Jones’s report, we believe it is important that the families have an opportunity to share their views, as it is critical that the lessons that can be learned from their experiences are not lost. We hope to do that as soon as is practicable. The Home Secretary has committed to updating Parliament in due course on the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel report.

I fully understand and empathise with the interest in the introduction of the duty of candour. The Government have already made significant changes to ensure that officers can be disciplined if they mislead the public, and we are committed to properly consider and respond to the recommendations for a duty of candour, as highlighted in Bishop James Jones’s report.

I hope that, having had the opportunity to debate this and given the work that is ongoing, the noble Lord will be happy to withdraw his amendment.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Tuesday 18th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]]

My Lords, there are two sentences in the gracious Speech on which I should like to comment. The first is:

“Legislation will be introduced to … restore the balance of power between the executive, legislature and the courts.”


The second is:

“Measures will be brought forward to establish a fairer immigration system.”


The first I understand to be a reference to proposals in the Government’s response to the Independent Review of Administrative Law under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. The second is a reference to the proposals in the Government’s New Plan for Immigration.

Both of these documents were issued by the Government in March. They were both put out for consultation, but the consultation period in each case was only six weeks. Given that this period included the Easter bank holiday weekend, this surely was far too short to allow sufficient time for all those affected or interested to comment in detail on these far-reaching proposals—and, of course, the time allowed today is far too short, too. I do hope that time will be found for this House to debate them fully before the legislation is introduced. In the meantime, I will make the following points.

First, with regard to any reform of judicial review, it is important to note that most of these proposals can apply to England and Wales only. I leave it to others more familiar with that system than I am to comment, but Scotland has its own system of judicial review, which is devolved. On the whole, Scotland has been able to align itself fairly closely with the system in England, but it may not be willing to do that if the reforms are pressed too far. That could lead to forum shopping, as I was able to do under the then current rules when I was still in practice to successfully challenge the Government’s policy on aviation in Scotland. It should also be noted that the justification for the abolition of the so-called Cart reviews, which is questionable in England and Wales, is even more so on the figures that relate to Scotland.

Secondly, on the New Plan for Immigration, there is much to be concerned about. The new two-tier system that is proposed appears to be based on discriminating against asylum seekers depending on how they arrived in the UK. Those who use irregular routes of entry, involving passage through a third country, will be considered to be inadmissible. This seems to run counter to the overriding objective of the reforms, which we are told is fairness and access to asylum based on need. For most asylum seekers, unauthorised entry is the only means they have of entering the UK, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed out. Further, the fact that no successor agreement to the Dublin III regulation has been developed means that there are currently no safe and legal routes for unaccompanied asylum-seeking children to enter the UK from the EU—so they too will be discriminated against under the proposed two-tier system. I find myself in full agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, that a more sophisticated approach is needed to deal with these problems.

There is also an absence of detail in the plan about how the Government would secure a returns agreement with the safe country through which those who have used an irregular route will have passed, or how they will be protected when they get there. The proposal to remove support from those who arrived by an irregular route but cannot be returned is also very worrying. For them, that would mean destitution. Are we turning our back on our treaty obligations once again?

Whiplash Injury Regulations 2021

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Monday 26th April 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I spoke in favour of what is now Section 3 of the Civil Liability Act 2018 when it was before the House three years ago—and I have not changed my mind. It seemed to me that the case for the whiplash injury regulations that we now have was compelling. It was far too easy for claims to be made that would not survive scrutiny if they were to be adjudicated on by a court. They would be accepted by insurers because it was so much cheaper for them simply to pay up. Human nature being what it is, not everyone abides by the rules. There was an abuse here that needed to be dealt with. A decision to proceed in this way was taken then, and what we are concerned with now is the content of these regulations.

There is no getting away from the fact that the figures listed in each of the columns in Regulation 2 are quite modest. Indeed, some people have described them as “derisory”. We have them, however, in the columns before us, and I welcome very much the Minister’s assurance that he accepts the Lord Chief Justice’s recommendation that a review in the light of experience be undertaken in relatively early course, after one year’s experience.

We note, of course, the opportunity for the court to increase the amounts payable by up to 20% in exceptional cases, and we should also note that Section 3(8) of the Act rightly provides that nothing in that section prevents a court awarding an appropriate amount for any other injuries the person may have sustained, which may well be the case in the ordinary road accident section. There is a risk, of course, that other kinds of minor injury will now take the place of whiplash claims. That will need to be carefully watched. For now, however, modest though the figures are, these regulations have my support.

Independent Review of Administrative Law Update

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Monday 22nd March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]]

My Lords, of course Parliament has the power to legislate to limit or exclude judicial review. The question is how far it should go. I was a member of the panel of the Supreme Court in the Cart case. We set the bar as high as we could when we were defining the test that should be applied, but experience has shown that our decision has not worked so I agree that it is time to end that type of review.

As for suspending quashing orders, in HM Treasury v Ahmed in 2010 I found myself, to my dismay, in a minority of one against six in holding that our order setting aside an Order in Council freezing a terrorist’s assets before they were dissipated should be suspended to give it time for it to be corrected. I agree too with the proposal to consult on prospective-only remedies as I gave a judgment some years ago in favour of those.

So far, so good, but I hope that the indication that the Government are proposing to go further is not meant to be a suggestion that a more wholesale reform is proposed. That would be a cause for concern. Can the Minister reassure me on that point?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the noble and learned Lord’s comments. On prospective remedies, I mentioned the decision in Ahmed in my opening remarks. I hope I am not rubbing salt into the noble and learned Lord’s wounds when I mention that decision, and I am grateful for his comments on it.

On his last point, I shall put it this way: this Government are committed to the rule of law. Judicial review is an essential part of the rule of law—see paragraph 18 of the Government’s response. I hope that gives the noble and learned Lord the reassurance that he was looking for.

Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Regulations 2016

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd March 2016 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

My Lords, the draft regulations extend the range of people who are potentially within the scope of the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010. Subject to the prior approval of both Houses of Parliament, the draft regulations are to be made by the Secretary of State under the power in Section 19 of the 2010 Act. Section 19, in its present form, was inserted into the 2010 Act by Section 19 of the Insurance Act 2015. The purpose of the power is to make provision for adding or removing circumstances in which a person is potentially within the scope of the 2010 Act. The present circumstances within that scope are currently set out in Sections 4 to 7 of and paragraph 1A of Schedule 3 to the 2010 Act.

The draft regulations make a series of textual amendments to the 2010 Act, as amended by the Insurance Act 2015. The effect of the amendments in general terms will be to include corporate and other bodies that are subject to certain sectoral insolvency regimes or, within limited exceptions, have been dissolved within the scope of the 2010 Act. The purpose of making these amendments is to correct omissions from the 2010 Act so that it can be brought into force without adversely affecting people who are currently within the scope of the 1930s legislation that is to be replaced by the 2010 Act.

It may be helpful at this point if I explain the principles that underlie the third parties legislation in a little more detail. It has existed since the 1930s and is so called because the claimant is a third party in relation to the contract of insurance. The current legislation is the 1930 Act, which applies to England, Wales and Scotland, and the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1930. The purpose of the 1930 Acts, and indeed of the 2010 Act, is to protect the interests of claimants against insured persons who have a liability to the claimant but who no longer have effective control of their assets, typically because they are insolvent. The basic effect of the third parties legislation is to transfer to a third party to whom the insured has incurred a liability the contractual rights of the insured against the insurer as regards that liability. This means that the proceeds of the insurance policy are paid to the claimant, not to the creditors of the insolvent insured generally.

The 2010 Act is intended to extend and improve the protection conferred by the 1930 Acts. To trigger the application of the 2010 Act, an insured must both incur a liability to a third party against which it is insured and undergo an insolvency or analogous event specified in the 2010 Act. Unfortunately, following the enactment of the 2010 Act it was found, in some respects, to have a narrower scope than the 1930s Acts. This was partly as a result of the terms used in the drafting of the 2010 Act and partly because of developments in insolvency law following the financial crisis in 2008.

Had the 2010 Act been commenced immediately after its enactment, the effect would have been to deny insurance proceeds to claimants and to pass them to be shared out among the insured’s creditors. This would have frustrated the very purpose of the 2010 Act and had the effect of undermining the purpose of compulsory insurance, such as that which employers are required to maintain. The operative provisions of the 2010 Act have therefore not yet been brought into force and will not be so until these defects have been remedied. The remedial process is therefore essential to realising the benefits of the 2010 Act. Part of the remedial process was effected by the amendments to the 2010 Act made by the Insurance Act 2015. The draft regulations will complete the process.

I will now describe the working of the amendments to be effected by those draft regulations. First, they would extend the list of such insolvency or analogous events by adding the sectoral insolvency or administration procedures listed or referred to in the provisions to be inserted in the 2010 Act by Regulation 3 of the draft regulations. These additions cover the possibility of insolvency or administration under special legislative regimes that generally follow, but are distinct from, the Insolvency Act 1986 in a wide range of important business sectors where company failure has the potential to damage public interest or cause market contagion—for example, financial services and postal or energy companies.

Secondly, Regulation 4 of the draft regulations extends the scope of the 2010 Act to dissolved bodies, other than unincorporated partnerships and bodies that are no longer treated as dissolved by reason of subsequent events. The 2010 Act currently applies to dissolutions under Sections 1001, 1002 or 1003 of the Companies Act 2006 but not to other dissolutions, even though dissolution, after which a body will certainly not have effective control over its rights and assets, would appear to be the paradigm case in which a transfer of rights should occur. Regulation 4 therefore broadens the scope of the application of the 2010 Act to these other dissolutions.

The one exception to the proposed coverage of dissolutions generally is the dissolution of unincorporated partnerships. This exception is sensible, as technically a partnership dissolves each time a new partner leaves or is added. This would extend the scope of the legislation too widely, as many such partnerships would be going concerns. In the case of a partnership which is no longer trading, the insured would need to proceed against the individual partners.

The remainder of the draft regulations deal with ancillary matters. Regulations 5 and 6 amend Section 9 and paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 to the 2010 Act respectively. Section 9(3) and (7) of the 2010 Act provide that a third-party claimant does not have to satisfy a condition of the insurance policy regarding provision of information or assistance to the insurer by the insured if it cannot be fulfilled because the insured has died or is a body corporate which has been dissolved. Paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 to the 2010 Act gives a claimant the right to request information from officers, employees, insolvency practitioners or official receivers of a defunct body corporate, other than when the dissolved body has been restored or ordered to be restored to the register of companies. The draft regulations extend these two provisions to all dissolutions, other than those of unincorporated partnerships, irrespective of whether subsequent events result in the body in question being treated as if it is no longer dissolved or as if it had never been dissolved.

The reason for the wider application of these provisions as against the provisions relating to dissolved bodies inserted into the 2010 Act by Regulation 4 is that most such situations reversing a dissolution—for example, restoration to the register of companies—are temporary and unlikely to result in there being a person who is responsible and able, on behalf of the body in question, to assist the claimant by being able to fulfil the condition or to supply the information in relation to the liability.

Before I conclude, I should like to express my department’s thanks to all those who have contributed to the preparation of the draft regulations. It is not a simple matter, as I suspect noble Lords will concede. Insolvency law is fast moving and complicated. The Insolvency Service, the Accountant in Bankruptcy in Scotland and the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment in Northern Ireland have all made significant contributions to what has been a very difficult technical exercise. I am very grateful to them. I am also very grateful to the Commercial and Common Law Team at the Law Commission, which for most of the period in question was led by David Hertzell and Tammy Goriely, without whose expert knowledge and legal skills the draft regulations could not easily have been prepared. Finally, in a more general sense, I thank the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission for their continuing support for the reform of third parties legislation generally. I hope that in the not too distant future we shall be able to make that reform a reality.

In conclusion, the reforms to be introduced by the 2010 Act are supported by insurers and claimants alike. They apply to insurance of all kinds and will be particularly beneficial in cases of long-tail industrial diseases, such as mesothelioma. The approval of the draft regulations by your Lordships’ House will be widely welcomed and will be a key step on the way to the commencement of the 2010 Act.

I am afraid that I am not yet in a position to state when the Act will be brought fully into force, as the draft regulations remain subject to your Lordships’ approval and to approval in the other place. Nevertheless, I can say that, subject to allowing all parties affected no less than three months from the making of the regulations in which to prepare for commencement, the Government’s intention is to bring the 2010 Act, as amended by the 2015 Act and by what will then be the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Regulations 2016, into force as soon as reasonably practicable. I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation and also for bringing this set of regulations forward for our consideration and for the House’s approval in due course. It is an extremely important area which I think anybody practising in the common-law field values very much. I have only one question and that is to ask for reassurance in relation to part of Regulation 3, which deals with the relevant bodies in insolvency or administration under sectoral legislation. This is an extremely sophisticated area of law and I join in the Minister’s congratulations to all those who have played a part in putting all this together.

A feature of the list of enactments set out in Schedule A1 is that all except the last deal with areas of regulation which are common to the United Kingdom, with the special provisions made in the case of Northern Ireland which are set out in the schedule. Aviation, energy, financial services, postal services and railways apply equally to Scotland as they do to England and Wales. But the question of water and sewerage has occurred to me, because Scotland, I believe, has its own legislation relating to sewers and water: there is the Water (Scotland) Act, the date of which escapes me, and I believe that there is a sewerage Act for Scotland as well.

I fear that without detailed research, which is beyond my resources at the moment, I am not sure whether the Scottish legislation provides for administration under a legislative scheme. I am fairly confident that the Water Industry Act 1991, referred to here, does not extend to Scotland. It may well be that those who have been looking at this in detail have reassured themselves that there is no need for a mention of the Scottish legislation, perhaps because it does not actually provide for this kind of administration. If that is right, of course I understand why there is no mention of those statutes, but it might be as well to be absolutely sure that there is not a gap here that ought to be plugged before the regulations are brought into force.

That aside, I regard this as a very fine piece of fine-tuning which I am sure will be greatly welcomed in order to avoid any further gaps in the valuable legislation.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for his explanation of this statutory instrument. I confirm that it is not controversial in the slightest. We are happy to support it, as we supported, of course, the 2010 Bill as it went through Parliament. Indeed, I hope I may be forgiven for reminding the Grand Committee—it was some time ago now—that I was the Minister who took that Law Commission Bill through this House, using the special procedure. I was assisted then by an excellent team from the Ministry of Justice and I suspect—indeed, I am sure—that the Minister has been so assisted today.

The Minister will know that we on this side have many criticisms of much that the Ministry of Justice does these days, but in this area of complex but important law-making and law revision, we have nothing but praise. I have a couple of questions and comments for the Minister’s consideration, but they are brief.

The first point is about paragraph 8 of the Explanatory Memorandum, which deals with the consultation outcome. It says that the APIL and the ABI—the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers and the Association of British Insurers—have been consulted and are broadly content. The memorandum states:

“Both organisations expressed general approval of the Regulations”.

Is there a particular meaning to the word “general” in that particular context? I am pretty reassured that there is not, because I have a letter here from APIL itself, which suggests that it is happy with the regulations, but I wonder what the expression means in that context—probably nothing.

Prison Service: Trans Prisoners

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Tuesday 24th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

The important thing is that there is no generalisation here. It is important to assess each individual prisoner according to the stage they are at and their particular case. It might be a diagnosis or they may have fully realised their gender transformation. That individual assessment is carried out by the Prison Service, involving the assistance of psychological services and healthcare experts. It is after that assessment that they should be assigned an appropriate part of a prison.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, can the Minister assure the House that the policies he just outlined apply in young offender institutions? I believe that Miss Thompson was 21 when she died and assume that she was in an adult prison, but I think it is common knowledge that people tend to become aware of their transgender nature when puberty emerges. Therefore, young offenders are particularly vulnerable and require particular care.

British Bill of Rights

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Wednesday 28th October 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

There are no plans to leave the European Convention on Human Rights. My noble friend is correct to say that Conservatives had a significant role in drafting the convention. There are considerably more difficulties with the Strasbourg jurisprudence, rather than the convention itself.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, can the Minister tell us whether it is proposed to consult the devolved institutions, and if so, when that consultation will take place?

[Lord Faulks]

We will consult the devolved assemblies, because we are conscious of the intricate treaty arrangements that exist. We will do so thoroughly, and keep them well aware of all our plans.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Monday 1st June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Dunlop, on his appointment to the House and on his speech, which I welcome. Perhaps I may say before he departs for a moment that I look forward very much to his contribution to our debates on the devolution issues that will be coming before the House in the next few months, especially those affecting Scotland. The reason for that is quite simple. The noble Lord’s expertise in this field will be greatly valued. The task of securing,

“a strong and lasting constitutional settlement”,

in the interests of the whole of the United Kingdom, to which the gracious Speech refers, will be a formidable one. It will not be easy to reconcile it with the restless demands for more powers to be devolved to Scotland which have been voiced by the third largest party in the other place. Only someone whose roots are as deep-seated in Scotland as his so obviously are can really appreciate the difficulties that a Government in Westminster will face in getting their message across to a suspicious public in Scotland. One cannot ignore the fact that so many voted in favour of a party whose ultimate aim is diametrically opposed to the lasting settlement that the Government seek to achieve.

There are of course many people in Scotland—the majority, indeed, as the result of the referendum showed—who support the one-nation approach. They very much wish to see the bringing together of the different parts of our country in the way the gracious Speech refers to, not just by promoting economic stability in the interests of all sections of society but by achieving a constitutional settlement which will be as strong and lasting as such a thing can ever be in a modern, socially aware democracy. But a very large question mark hangs over this declaration of the Government’s policy. How is this to be done? How are the people of Scotland, on whose views the holding together of the union will ultimately depend, to be persuaded that the Government’s policy is the right one? How are they to be persuaded that the recommendations of the Smith commission are being honoured in full when the Scottish National Party continues to assert that they are not? For my part, I do not think that legislation alone is the answer. Something more needs to be done, and I look forward very much to the efforts that the noble Lord will undoubtedly make in getting the message across.

Of course, this is not the time to look in detail at the Scotland Bill which has just been introduced in the House of Commons. At first glance, it is an impressive piece of work, extending to 64 clauses and two schedules. It will require a great deal of detailed scrutiny if everyone is to be satisfied that it gives full effect to the agreement set out in the Smith commission’s report. Of course, much of that scrutiny will take place in this House, as that is the way this Parliament works. I cannot help thinking therefore—the noble Lord touched on this point in his speech—that it is a pity that the SNP has set its face against nominating members of the party to sit here in this House. As the noble Lord knows only too well in view of the criticisms that were made of his appointment—I am not referring to the matter than the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, referred to, but to a quite different point—opposition to the House of Lords is one of the SNP’s great remaining totems, as one commentator put it in a Sunday newspaper a few days ago. Reports by the House’s Constitution Committee, so ably chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Lang of Monkton, are routinely rubbished by the party’s propaganda machine, simply on the ground that this House is made up of Peers who are not elected. The simple fact is that they see this House as an affront to democracy. However, the fact is that this House exists and it does much valuable work. If the SNP wishes to make a serious contribution to what is being done in this Parliament as a whole, and to the scrutiny of this Bill in particular, has the time not come for it to think again—to follow the words of the famous song which is sung at rugby matches? Has the time not come for it to study what the House really does and to appreciate that the party needs to contribute to what goes on here if the arguments that it wishes to put forward are to be considered in detail, as they no doubt deserve to be?

That brings me to the other point, the proposal for a British Bill of Rights. There are many reasons for expressing concern about this idea, as well as grounds for relief that the Government have decided to refrain from legislating until further work has been done. I would simply make two points. The first is how one is to address the question of whether the enactment of a British Bill of Rights would be compatible with the devolution settlements with Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. I took part in a debate on the devolution statutes, a couple of decades ago I think. When legislative and executive power was being devolved, I recall that great care was taken to prohibit the devolved institutions from legislating or exercising functions in a way that was incompatible with the convention rights or with Community law. As I understood it, the reason was that it was thought necessary that this country should adhere to the treaty obligations in these two respects. Those obligations include, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern mentioned, the obligation under Article 46 of the European convention to abide by the final judgment of the European Court in any case to which this country is a party. It was thought, quite simply, that it was the responsibility of this Parliament to ensure that these obligations were respected in full when devolving legislative and executive power to others. One cannot be surprised about the opposition that is being voiced by the party in Scotland to the idea that the Human Rights Act should be departed from.

There is a real question here which I would like to draw attention to. It is being suggested in some quarters that the Scottish Parliament will have a veto on any alteration of the Human Rights Act as it affects Scotland under the Sewel convention, which is to be made formally part of legislation by the Scotland Bill. For my part, I rather doubt whether that argument is sound because the two crucial sections—Sections 29 and 57—which contain the prohibitions are not devolved. There is nothing, I think, in the Scotland Bill that is to come before us which will devolve those crucial sections either. As I understand the structure of the Act, those sections are deliberately reserved matters that are in the hands of this Parliament. I think that the argument that there is a veto in the hands of the Scottish Parliament is misconceived but that is merely my opinion and I ask the Minister to pay careful attention to this because there will certainly be a challenge when the point comes, if it is to come.

The other point is that I suggest that the Government need to recognise the extent to which the convention rights are so deeply embedded in our law as a result of decisions taken both by this House in its judicial capacity and by the United Kingdom Supreme Court since those days. Respect for those rights is firmly established in our jurisprudence and all the comparative work that has gone into it. To get rid of all of that is rather like trying to get rid of Japanese knotweed, which we hear about at Question Time. It will be as difficult and therefore one does wonder whether all the effort that is going into this is really worth it. I rather support the point made by the noble Lord, Lord McNally, that once one recognises the reality and also respects the convention, which I understand the Prime Minister now to favour, the problems are more imaginary than real, and one should be real about it and address the issue in that way.