Scotland Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Tuesday 8th December 2015 Lords Chamber

Of course, that does not exclude the possibility of a consultative or confirmatory referendum. I am glad to see my noble friend Lord Norton, who is such a great constitutional expert in these matters, nod at that point. This Parliament in Scotland is the creation of the Parliament of the United Kingdom and it is the Parliament of the United Kingdom that should make the decision, with proper safeguards, if the prospect of abolition should ever appear. None of us can foresee the circumstances in 10, 20 or 30 years’ time, but we can say that we have a parliamentary duty and if this Scotland Bill is to become a Scotland Act, it should be as good and as protective of the Parliament to which we all belong as we can make it. I know that I cannot move my amendment at this stage. I leave my remarks there and hope that the Minister will deal with this subject adequately in his response. If not, I hope your Lordships’ House will come back to it on Report.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, it is probably right that I should now speak to Amendment 6, as set out on the Marshalled List, which assumes that subsections (1) and (2) in the new clause remain as printed in the Bill, and then seeks to alter the wording—and, I respectfully suggest, improve it—of subsection (3).

I should explain the origin of the wording of the amendment. I have done my best to keep the Minister informed about my thinking on this matter. As with other amendments on the Marshalled List in my name, the source from which I drew is a series of amendments proposed by the Scottish Government in June, in advance of Committee stage in the House of Commons. However, I tabled these amendments entirely on my own initiative. I am not instructed by anybody and did not table them on behalf of anybody other than me—although they have the support of the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, who may say a word on some of them in due course. It simply seemed to me on reading them, without any political background whatever, that they had some merit in view of their wording and therefore should be discussed. Some of those amendments, which I will come to later, were before the other House but were withdrawn or not moved and therefore have never been discussed. That seemed an unfortunate state of affairs if one is seeking to improve the Bill. This amendment was, I think, tabled on the first day of Committee in the other place and was negatived on a Division. Nevertheless, it is open to this House to look at the wording again and that is what I seek to do.

Before I say more about the wording itself, perhaps I can respond to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, about the relationship between the Scottish Parliament and the Parliament of the United Kingdom. The report of the Constitution Committee, chaired expertly by the noble Lord, Lord Lang of Monkton, referred to a passage in a judgment that I wrote in the Supreme Court in a case called AXA General Insurance Ltd v the Lord Advocate in 2011. In the passage referred to, I sought to describe what I understood to be the position between Scotland and the Parliament at Westminster. I made the point that the Scotland Act 1998 provides that the,

“Scottish Parliament takes its place under our constitutional arrangements as a self-standing democratically elected legislature”,

with a,

“democratic mandate to make laws for the people of Scotland”.

I made the point that it does not, and was not intended to, “enjoy the sovereignty” this Parliament has and went on to say that,

“the sovereignty of the Crown in Parliament … is the bedrock of the British constitution”,

and,

“remains with the United Kingdom Parliament”.

Nothing that I may say in the course of the debate is intended to detract in any way from those propositions. I believe absolutely in the crucial position that this Parliament enjoys. It is well understood that the Scottish Parliament does not have sovereignty in that sense, and that is perfectly clear because its legislation can be reviewed by, among others, the Supreme Court to see that it falls within the parameters set for the powers of the legislature under the Scotland Act. That is all by way of background.

In considering the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, one has to recognise that the Smith commission, which discussed the matter in layman’s terms, said that the position of the Scottish Parliament should be recognised by legislation. Given that that proposition was made and accepted by all the parties to the discussions before Smith, it seems difficult to avoid having at least a clause that recognises the permanence of the Scottish Parliament. So it is against that background that I do not quarrel with subsections (1) and (2) but direct my attention to the wording of subsection (3), with the aim of improving it to clarify the position.

The amendment would insert a new subsection, which states:

“Subsection (1) may only be repealed if … the Scottish Parliament has consented to the proposed repeal”.

That is there simply to recognise that the repeal we are talking about is a repeal of the provisions establishing the Scottish Parliament in the Scotland Act. There seems merit in the proposition that, if that Parliament is to be abolished, it should at least be in a position to express a view as to whether that is desirable. I am not seeking to undermine in any way the sovereignty of this Parliament; I am simply looking at the relationship between the Parliament created by the Scotland Act and a measure that would seek to abolish it. Once it has been created and when it is still in existence, it would seem rather odd that it should be unable to express a view on whether that should or should not happen.

The other part of the amendment simply looks at the proposition that there should be a referendum, which the Government have accepted should be part of the package to support the remaining provisions in Clause 1. The amendment would clarify what the subject matter of the referendum is to be and state in terms that there would have to be,

“a majority of those voting at the referendum”,

before it had the effect suggested by the clause. The condition is that a referendum has been held in Scotland on the proposed repeal, and that a majority of those voting in the referendum have consented to it. It may be that that is implied by the wording, but it seemed to me that in the interests of clarity, it would be better to make the matter express, because what we are contemplating is such a major political event that the exact condition that would give rise to authorising the proposed repeal needs to be put beyond doubt.

I shall make submissions later in support of other amendments, but those are the reasons behind this amendment and the background to why I tabled it.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Con)]

My Lords, I do not often disagree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, but I think he was walking something of a tightrope there, for obvious reasons.

What is wrong with this first clause is the whole approach to the Bill. The Government, in advance of even knowing what the conclusions of the Smith commission would be, undertook to implement them and expected both Houses of this Parliament to ratify them. In speaking in support of the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Norton, I draw the attention of the House to page 7 of our Constitution Committee’s sixth report of Session 2015-16 on the Scotland Bill. Paragraph 8 states:

“The Bill contains a number of provisions of the highest constitutional importance. In affirming the permanence of the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government and declaring that they are not to be abolished except following a referendum in Scotland, and in giving statutory recognition to the Sewel convention, the Bill carries potential implications for Parliament’s own sovereignty”.

Too right it does.

Paragraph 9 states:

“In our report on the Draft Clauses”—

which were contained in the document which was ironically entitled Scotland in the United Kingdom: An Enduring Settlement—

“we expressed concern at ‘the failure of the UK Government directly to address the implications of these proposals for the United Kingdom as a whole.’ We questioned how any process that did not consider the future of the Union ‘could provide for an “enduring” settlement’, and recommended that ‘the Government give urgent consideration to the consequences of the Draft Clauses for the constitution of the United Kingdom as a whole. This should happen before they are passed into law.’ There is little evidence that such consideration has been given to date”.

That conclusion is something of an understatement, to put it mildly.

If we look at the Smith commission proposals in respect of these amendments and the clause which we are discussing—a point I made at Second Reading—we see that under the heading, “A More Autonomous Parliament”, the Smith commission report stated:

“The Scottish Parliament will be made permanent in UK legislation and given powers over how it is elected and run. The Scottish Government will similarly be made permanent”.

It does not say, “We recommend that Parliament considers how it could be made permanent”, but that it will be made permanent.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I draw the noble Lord’s attention to the fact that the heads of agreement built on what he said by stating:

“UK legislation will state that the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government are permanent institutions”.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

Indeed. Perhaps I have missed out on this modernisation process that is going ahead, but I understood that laws are made by Parliament and receive the assent of the Crown. I did not think that they were made up by subcommittees of appointed party politicians meeting in secret and then getting together with the leaders of the parties, who did not in any way consult their parties, with Parliament then being expected to rubber-stamp them. This takes us back to the time of Henry VIII. We could save a great deal of money by getting rid of this whole apparatus of Parliament and leaving it to the leaders of the parties to get together, decide things and agree that they will be passed into law and leave the monarch with the dubious task of having to give Royal Assent to such matters.

A colleague I was speaking to earlier said, “I’m not coming in for the Scotland Bill. I’ve really had enough of Scotland”. I said, “But it’s not about Scotland; it’s about the United Kingdom”. He said, “Oh, I didn’t realise that”. It would appear that the Government do not realise that, either, judging by the nature of this clause.

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[The Marquess of Lothian (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 1. We have heard a lot of intricate and technical arguments and I do not intend to get involved in them.

I listened to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness. He mentioned Section 1 of the Scotland Act. I remember that Act well because I was leading for the Opposition in the other place at that time. I think we all accepted that the Scottish people had asked for devolution, that there would be a Scottish Parliament and that, for all we knew, it would be there for a long time if not for ever. But the word “permanent” was never introduced into the legislation, partly, I suspect, because, as my noble friend Lord Forsyth has said, the draftsmen would not have allowed it, but also because we all accepted that to enter it into the legislation would set a whole lot of other constitutional hares running. That is really my purpose in rising to talk merely about Amendment 1.

What we are looking at here is part of the problem that we have suffered from constitutionally in the country over the past 20 years: we keep on amending the constitution piecemeal, unintentionally, and without regard to the possible consequences in other areas. When I look at this word “permanent”, I see an attempt to say that this Parliament can bind other parliaments by saying that the Scottish Parliament is there for ever.

I said in my speech at Second Reading that, as a young law student in Scotland in the 1960s, I was for ever being taught by various professors about the entrenchment of the Act of Union. Section 1 of the Union with England Act states:

“That the Two Kingdoms of Scotland and England shall … hereof and forever after be United into One Kingdom by the Name of Great Britain”.

I was told that that was entrenched and, parliamentary sovereignty aside, we could accept that would never change. But we went into the Scottish referendum last year on the understanding that, if there had been a yes vote, that Act of Union would have been changed. It would not have been for ever because the Scottish people had decided unilaterally that they did not want it to be for ever. What we are looking at here is very important.

The same applies to this clause. If we believe that permanence is permanence, we should say that it is part of our constitution. Or, we should say that the sovereignty of Parliament is supreme, which is what I have always believed, and that one Parliament cannot bind another. If that is the case, we should not indulge in language that dishonestly suggests that we do not believe that to be true. I am not just talking about this Scotland Bill. If we go down the road of saying that whenever we introduce the word “permanent” into legislation, it will bind subsequent Parliaments for ever, we have substantially changed the constitution of this country, and we would have done that without thought, debate or proper consideration. I do not believe that the clause is necessary.

I did not like devolution. I did not like Section 1 of the Scotland Act. I opposed it, but once it was passed I accepted that it was there and that it would always be there. However, I would not have accepted the word “permanent” being introduced if it suggested that the United Kingdom Parliament was anything less than sovereign. We must think very carefully about this when we look at the Bill. The right reverend Prelate said that we should not get rid of this clause because that would have all sorts of other consequences. But if we leave this clause in, we are giving permission for future Parliaments to create permanence in other areas. I may be too old, possibly, to suffer the consequences of that, but I hope my children and grandchildren will not find that we have abandoned the sovereignty of Parliament just in the cause of getting this Bill through.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I want to put to the noble Marquess a point that I mentioned to the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth. The problem is created by paragraph 21 of the heads of agreement, which states in terms:

“UK legislation will state that the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government are permanent institutions”.

There may be an answer to the point that he raises. The word “permanent” is lay man’s language. After all, this was drafted by people sitting around without consulting lawyers at the time. It could be regarded as lay man’s language and there may be some other way of taking away the word “permanent” but nevertheless fitting it into the UK context. The previous paragraph, paragraph 20, says,

“in the context of Scotland remaining within the UK”.

I am not suggesting a form of words, but I wonder whether the noble Marquess would accept that the Government have a problem in having to give effect to paragraph 21. Maybe there is a way of softening the word “permanent” to fit it in with the United Kingdom and the well-understood constitutional principles. Perhaps we are being too attached to the word “permanent”, which lay men use and was perhaps not very cleverly chosen.

[The Marquess of Lothian]

I accept the noble and learned Lord’s suggestion. The word “permanent” is the one that concerns me. I do not think heads of agreement can change the British constitution—only Parliaments can change the British constitution. We could say something along the lines that we envisage that this will last for a long time or for ever, but we cannot say that it will because that is what transgresses against the sovereignty of Parliament.

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[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

I do not think the noble Lord has quite understood my proposal. My proposal is that the language in the amendment in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the noble Lord, Lord Norton, should be preceded by the words: “The provisions of the Scotland Act establishing the Scottish Parliament may not be repealed unless”—and then the two conditions laid out in the amendment. It follows that I mean there would need to be a vote of this Parliament as well as of the Scottish Parliament, and the referendum that the noble Lord, Lord Lang, would not want but I think is necessary.

I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, that I think the idea of a supermajority in this Parliament is a very bad one. I think supermajorities in general are a bad idea. Just as we should not add to the statute book provisions which add nothing, so we should not complicate our procedures by inventing a supermajority.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Does the noble Lord accept that he has very cleverly been answering the conundrum that I put to the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, of trying to translate “permanent” into some other language that fits constitutionally with our established principles? I was suggesting that one should not be too tied by the word “permanent”, which is used by lay men, and the noble Lord has perhaps cleverly expressed a way of doing that.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord but I refuse to be drawn into a debate among lawyers about how clever I am.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

Clearly it is not, because, notwithstanding the outcome of any such referendum, this place might decide not to legislate in accordance with the outcome of the referendum. One cannot use these arguments to undermine the ultimate sovereignty and supremacy of Parliament.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I shall take up the point that the Minister made about Clause 1 as a whole—I think he was referring to the whole clause as it now stands, with all three new subsections—that it was simply a political statement. New Section 63A(3) is not just a political statement; it lays down a condition. If that is the right reading of the new subsection, does the Minister not recognise that it might be better to address some of the possible imperfections in new Section 63A(3) as it stands? The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, among others, made the point that the phrase “the people of Scotland” is a little ambiguous, and it might be better to say “a referendum held in Scotland” to tell you where the referendum is going to be.

It is quite commonplace in Committee debates for Ministers to say, “We’ll take this away and look at it and perhaps reconsider whether the wording we have in the Bill is the best that could be used”. I wonder whether the Minister would be prepared at least to look at proposed new paragraph (b) in Amendment 6; leaving aside the mention of the Scottish Parliament in its proposed new paragraph (a), it suggests a rewording of new Section 63A(3) to see if it is the best wording that could be adopted. I absolutely accept that it deals with a hypothetical situation but, if one is laying down a condition, would it not be better to use the best possible terms in doing so?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord for reminding me of the observations made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, in that context. At this time the Government consider that we have achieved the best possible wording for the purposes of new Section 63A(3) in Clause 1. I compliment the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, on his eyesight and his ability to read my notes at such a considerable distance. However, the position of the Government remains that we are satisfied that a relatively open provision in this context with regard to the people of Scotland voting in a referendum is the appropriate way forward.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to my noble and learned friend. It seems to me that we make no further progress on this point, notwithstanding the further observations of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. I simply underline the sovereignty of this Parliament, and nothing in Clause 1 derogates or takes away from that. That is the bottom line. It is necessary to make progress with this Committee debate rather than to stay in still waters on one sterile point. Therefore, at this point I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Perhaps I may return to new subsection (3), which relates to a separate point from the one that the Minister has been emphasising concerning the sovereignty of Parliament and so on. If we look ahead to the day some time next year when this Bill comes back on Report, it is quite likely that there will be an amendment seeking to reword new subsection (3), perhaps along the lines that have already been discussed. I respectfully suggest to the Minister that he would carry a little more credibility if he were to depart just a fraction from the briefing that he is reading from and were prepared to say that he would look again at this. He does not have to commit himself to any rewording, but sometimes when we have these debates in Committee it softens the atmosphere a lot if one is prepared to say simply, “Well, some interesting points have been made. We’ll have another look and perhaps come back with something on Report, or perhaps not”. It would ease the atmosphere a little on this point and avoid repetitive interruptions.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I notice what the noble and learned Lord says with regard to new subsection (3) in Clause 1.

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Tabled by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

6: Clause 1, page 1, leave out lines 15 to 17 and insert—
“( ) Subsection (1) may only be repealed if—
(a) the Scottish Parliament has consented to the proposed repeal; and (b) a referendum has been held in Scotland on the proposed repeal and a majority of those voting at the referendum have consented to it.”

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

In the light of what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said, I understand that he will at least reflect a bit on what was said earlier. We may return to this on Report, but for the time being I will not move the amendment.

Amendment 6 not moved.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

I apologise to my noble friend Lord Forsyth. I must confess that I was unclear who was intervening on whom. I add to the point made by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. As I understand the point he was making—it was one that I had endeavoured to make before, but obviously had not made clearly—it is simply that Clause 1 is amending and introducing Section 28(8) of the Scotland Act 1998. It is necessary to read that in conjunction with Section 28(7) of the Scotland Act 1998, which refers to the ability of this Parliament to legislate in respect of Scotland on all matters. That is a matter to which the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, alluded earlier as well. That is why the issue of sovereignty—the supremacy of this Parliament—is already contained in the relevant section of the Scotland Act, as it will be amended by this clause of the Bill.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way, but Clause 2 amends Section 28. We are still talking about Clause 1, which amends a different part of the Scotland Act, so there is a separation there. However, I very much endorse what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, said—namely, that any reader of the Scotland Act knows perfectly well that you have to look at Section 28 to understand the competence of the Parliament and the relationship between the two Parliaments. The point is simply that Clause 1 does not deal with Section 28.

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[Lord Stephen]

I agree that there is an issue there. I wonder whether the discussions that will take place in coming weeks, and perhaps even months, behind closed doors between the Scottish Government and the UK Government would be greatly assisted if there was a clear statement on the record from the Scottish Parliament that it supported this legislation. While I believe that both Houses will eventually indicate their support for this legislation, it would be helpful to have that clear support on the record now.

A lot has been said today about the monolithic, unassailable sovereignty of the UK Parliament but I ask the Committee to consider this point: the UK Government have introduced a concept called English votes for English laws. Perhaps the Minister would care to comment on this: the Government are pursuing a course whereby legislation passed by the House of Lords and the House of Commons can be vetoed by a subset of the House of Commons, so this Government have already conceded the point of a limitation on the sovereignty of the UK Parliament. If it is sauce for the English goose for elected English MPs to veto legislation for England on devolved matters, it must be sauce for the Scottish gander for properly and democratically elected Members of the Scottish Parliament to be able to veto Westminster legislation affecting Scotland on devolved matters.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, perhaps it would be helpful for me to speak to my Amendment 12, which in effect restates in combination the points just made in support of Amendments 11, 15 and 16. I will also refer to Amendment 20, which deals with a related issue.

I think I saw that the noble Lord, Lord Lang, was about to rise to his feet and the background to my Amendment 12 is paragraph 38 of the Constitution Committee’s report, which draws attention to problems with the Sewel convention as his committee saw them. One problem was the use of “normally”, which gives rise to doubt as to what exactly that means. There was also the need to clarify the reach of the convention, which was the point just made in support of Amendment 11 and its related amendments. My Amendment 12 puts together in a package the same point that was referred to on those other amendments.

Amendment 20, however, deals with an issue which is closely related to existing practice. It refers to a:

“Duty to consult the Scottish Government on Bills applying to Scotland”.

It says, shortly, that:

“A Minister of the Crown must not introduce a Bill into the Parliament of the United Kingdom … that would make provision applying to Scotland unless a Minister of the Crown has consulted the Scottish Ministers”.

It is intended to reflect what I understand to be the existing practice and to follow on the points made in relation to restating Clause 2 in appropriate statutory language.

I should make it clear, as I did earlier on this afternoon, that the amendments to which I am speaking are in words that were in effect provided for me by the Scottish Government because they were tabled in June this year, in advance of Committee in the House of Commons. But I restate that I do not speak to these amendments on behalf of anybody other than myself; I simply see them as sensible amendments which have merit on their own wording. It is with that in mind that I speak to these two amendments.

[Lord Davidson of Glen Clova]

Could the noble and learned Lord indicate what the Scottish Government see as particularly virtuous about the formula that he suggests in this amendment?

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[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord. There are really two points. First, Clause 2 as worded uses “normally”; secondly, it does not set out in full the way that the convention is applied in practice. These points were made very effectively by the noble Lord, Lord Stephen, a moment ago in moving Amendment 11, which is read together with Amendments 15 and 16. There are two points which needed to be added to Clause 2, one being to alter the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament and the other being to alter the executive competence of the Scottish Government. These matters are in practice the subject of a consent resolution or a Sewel convention Motion and should be referred to expressly in the clause to cover the reach of the convention. That is the point which the committee of the noble Lord, Lord Lang, was talking about.

[Lord Lang of Monkton]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for his comments about the word “normally”. It is not a word that alarmed me particularly, as a non-lawyer, but the clause as a whole certainly alarmed and concerned the Constitution Committee. I shall say something about that in a moment but “normally” in its location there seemed to strike the balance between permitting the Scottish Parliament to legislate on devolved matters without intervention from the United Kingdom Government while, at the same time, giving the Government of the United Kingdom the clear right and entitlement in special circumstances to intervene. I will be interested to hear what my noble and learned friend at the Dispatch Box will have to say about it.

My own Amendment 13 simply seeks to strengthen new subsection (8) of Section 28 of the 1998 Act by reasserting the supremacy of the United Kingdom Parliament to reinforce the terms of subsection (7), which subsection (8) might otherwise seem to contradict. Having heard the treatment given by the Front Bench to my noble friend Lord Forsyth’s amendments, I suspect that I may not be on an ideal wicket. But I want to say a word or two about this clause because the Sewel convention is a dangerous situation in which to legislate.

The Sewel convention is as slippery as a fish. It has changed throughout the years since it came into being quite considerably and may yet change again. When I was first asked about it, I was told informally by my late lamented noble friend Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, who was at that time our Front-Bench spokesman on the Bill, that it was really just a courtesy to the Scottish Parliament for the United Kingdom Parliament to offer to legislate on its behalf, if it was an issue devolved to it on which it would plan to legislate. It would thus save time, expense and duplication. I do not think it was ever quite thus but that was the flavour of how I first understood it. It has now turned into something quite different and I see it as a weapon that seems to allow the Scottish Parliament to intrude into United Kingdom legislation to an unsafe extent, possibly even to the extent of a veto.

What is clear is that the Sewel convention is still so fluid and unsettled as not to deserve the name of convention. I do not think, in its present form, it is fit to be converted into law. It may be that those who have drafted the Bill have found, in the form of words they have used, a more stable and secure base for the long term, but the convention has changed a lot over the years and may again. Initially, the United Kingdom Government seemed to maintain that it applied only to powers already devolved or to restricting or diminishing such a power. That was certainly the original intention as I understood it, but in 2005, Devolution Guidance Note 10 was published, which suggested:

“The convention applies when legislation makes provisions specifically for a devolved purpose”.

I see that as something much broader.

Since then, the Scottish Parliament has claimed it applies to devolved areas rather than devolved matters, so that it also applies to legislation increasing devolved powers, which the UK Government seem at times to have accepted. The Scotland Act 2012 bore this out, as it was almost entirely an empowering measure and was taken to require legislative consent Motions. Astonishingly to me, the Labour Opposition supported an SNP amendment in the Commons and tried to enshrine devolved areas into the legislation. That could have given the Scottish Government a veto on UK legislation, which is what prompted my question to my noble friend on the Front Bench at Second Reading. This one-way degeneration of the original purpose of the convention is potentially damaging to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament, and we have to exercise great care in handling this.

The Smith commission asked only that it be put on a statutory footing. Even if we can be confident of a clear, unambiguous wording, the potential troubles do not end there. My noble and learned friend Lord Hope indicated at Second Reading, as he will recall, that it could become challengeable in the courts. My noble friend Lord Norton had serious concerns also, pointing out:

“Clause 2 does not transpose the Sewel convention into statute. It simply states the convention”.—[Official Report, 24/11/15; col. 639.]

I am completely out of my depth in reacting to that and I look forward to his speech a little later in the debate.

My amendment echoes the concerns of others to counter the uncertainties generated by the present wording of the clause. We have all felt the need to reiterate, in every possible way, the need to reassert the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament. My amendment is the simplest and shortest—it may not be the best but at least it has a different wording from that rejected by my noble friend on the Front Bench. We must have a wording that is clear and unambiguous and able to withstand challenge in the courts, where I suspect it will probably end up.

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[Lord Davidson of Glen Clova]

The noble Lord will of course be aware that I have seen those statements and have been interested in what they in fact mean. But he will also recollect that we say, from this side of the House, that given the discussion about the fiscal framework and possible use of legislative consent Motions in that regard, we see the co-operation that has taken place between the Scottish Government and Her Majesty's Government in the past as something in which we can repose a good deal of trust that it will continue in relation to this process with the fiscal framework. Our trust may be misplaced, but we conceive otherwise. The noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, cannot see any more than I can into the future, but we are in a position where we repose trust in the process, at least from this side.

In relation to the various amendments before the House, we accept that a number of them are useful. None the less, we oppose Amendments 13 and 18.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I hoped that the noble and learned Lord might say something about Amendment 20. Perhaps I was not sufficiently clear when I introduced these amendments, but Amendment 12 deals with the stage of passing a Bill and says that,

“the Parliament of the United Kingdom may not pass Acts … without the consent of the Scottish Parliament”.

Amendment 20 intercepts the matter at the earlier stage. It says:

“A Minister of the Crown must not introduce a Bill into the Parliament of the United Kingdom … that would make provision applying to Scotland unless a Minister of the Crown has consulted the Scottish Ministers”.

That amendment, as in the case of Amendment 12, was drafted in Edinburgh by people who know how the system is working. In giving his support to Amendment 12, I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord meant to give his support also to Amendment 20.

[Lord Davidson of Glen Clova]

I apologise for not confirming that we support Amendment 20. I took that as being the overall approach—this smorgasbord—between the approach of the noble Lord, Lord Stephen, and the approach of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. I hope that clarifies the point.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

The point is that in terms of Section 28(7) we in this Parliament could, on the face of it, intervene in such a matter. That was the whole point of the convention: to make it clear that normally we would not do so. I may have misunderstood the intervention of my noble friend Lord Forsyth but, with respect, it seems to me that that is precisely why the Sewel convention was expressed in the terms in which we find it—so that if educational attainment in Scotland was failing we would not be faced with the criticism that the United Kingdom Parliament had done nothing about it because conventionally we would not normally intervene in a devolved matter, but we retain sovereignty and we have the right to do so. That is why the Sewel convention is expressed in the manner in which it is. The intention is not that Clause 2 should give rise to any justiciable issue. It is a political expression of the convention in statutory form. That is why the term “normally” appears within Clause 2. It makes it clear that this is not a justiciable issue. It is quite clear that in terms of the Smith commission agreement the Sewel convention will be expressed in statutory terms. It is there, but whether this Parliament would consider it appropriate to legislate for Scotland in a devolved area, which it can do pursuant to Section 28(7) of the Scotland Act 1998, is a political issue. It would not be for a court to decide what “normally” meant in that context. It would be a political issue. If it could be litigated in court and made justiciable, the question would be: what possible remedy could the court provide other than a political one? That is why it takes us back to the simple proposition that Clause 2, as set out, would not give rise to a justiciable issue. I give way to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

The problem is that paragraph 22 of the Smith commission report states that the Sewel convention will be put on a statutory footing. Rather like the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, I wondered what “statutory footing” meant, and I went to various sources to find out. A translation of it is fairly obvious: it means being put on a firm footing by being written into statute. That raises the question of what the effect is of writing something into statute.

The problem is that, whatever the Minister may say, someone seeing it written into statute is going to say, “Here is something which I can use to challenge a piece of legislation that is apparently being passed without the Sewel convention being observed according to its current usage”. With great respect, it does not do for a Minister to say to the court, “This is just a political matter”, because the judges will say, “It’s a matter for us”. The judge may look at the normal rules to see what the legislation was designed to do, and with a bit of research they will find that it was designed to give effect to the Sewel convention to put it on a statutory footing. The judge will then say, “Well, it’s a matter for me to construe what this means”. I am not at all impressed by the Minister saying that it is all a political matter, because it is now in the hands of the court to adjudicate upon.

The Minister asks, “What remedy does that give rise to?”. It creates uncertainty about the effectiveness of legislation. One of the things that we have to be very careful about is that the legislative process is well founded and not open to challenges, except those that are already subject to legislation in the Scotland Act. So, with great respect, it is necessary to warn the Minister that he cannot get away with assuming that the judges will accept that it is simply a political issue; it is not that at all, once it is written into statute.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The noble and learned Lord acknowledges that there would be no remedy other than a political remedy in that context, or appears to do so. He shakes his head; nevertheless, there is no remedy except a political remedy. This underlines the importance of the words “recognised as” and “normally” where they appear in Clause 2.

However, the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, spoke to his Amendment 19, a proposal that it should be expressly stated that the clause is not justiciable and does not give rise to justiciable rights. That is a matter that I would be pleased to discuss with him, albeit that the Government’s position at present is that there is no requirement to expressly state that in the context of a clause that, on the face of it, is implicitly not justiciable. That would be my position on Amendment 19.

--- Later in debate ---

Tabled by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

12: Clause 2, page 2, leave out lines 5 to 7 and insert—
“(8) But the Parliament of the United Kingdom may not pass Acts applying to Scotland that make provision about a devolved matter without the consent of the Scottish Parliament.
(9) A provision is about a devolved matter if the provision—
(a) applies to Scotland and does not relate to reserved matters, (b) modifies the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament, or(c) modifies the functions of any member of the Scottish Government.(10) In subsection (8), “Acts” includes any Act, whether a public general Act, a local and personal Act or a private Act.”

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am bound to say that I am very troubled by this whole matter and we will have to return to it on Report. Leaving the clause in its present form is bound to create instability—for reasons that I need not expand on further. Having given notice that I will come back to this on Report, I do not intend to move the amendment.

Amendment 12 not moved.