Victims and Prisoners Bill

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Hope of Craighead

Tuesday 12th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I would like to add a few words to what has already been said about Amendments 162 and 163 devised by the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett. The really important part of Amendment 162 is in proposed new subsection (2), which would set out in statute the aim of the convenor of these planning meetings. It states that they are taking place

“with a view to ensuring that all possible steps are taken to enable their safe release at the earliest possible time”.

Those words emphasise the purpose of the reviews and therefore enhance the care that would be taken to conduct them by the Secretary of State.

As far as Amendment 163 is concerned, the first part of it is already the existing law. It says that for

“a person serving a sentence of detention for public protection, the Secretary of State must refer his case to the Parole Board … after he has served the relevant part of his sentence”.

That is a tariff and is already standing practice. What is new is the proposal that the Secretary of State must refer a person’s case to the Parole Board,

“where there has been a previous reference of his case to the Board, no later than the period of one year beginning with the disposal of that reference”.

The emphasis in both these amendments is on the regularity of reviews. When I was Lord Justice General, I saw this working well in my visits to the Parole Board. As I mentioned earlier, there are files prepared that have to be examined in detail, but the Parole Board appointed a particular member to take on a particular case, so that each time it came up for review, the member could reinforce what was in the files by explaining his or her own view of what was taking place and, as time went on, reinforce it by previous discussions. In that way, continuity was provided to the whole process.

Each board will have its own method of dealing with it, but the structure of what is provided by these two amendments provides a basis on which the Parole Board can exercise its views with a view to achieving what is set out in proposed new subsection (2) in Amendment 162, ensuring that all possible steps are taken to ensure safe release at the earliest possible time.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 155 in this group. The principles behind and the purposes of the amendments we have been discussing have already been well forked over, so I will cut straight to the chase.

I have intervened in Committee only on one other group of amendments, a few weeks ago on restorative justice. I link the two because they offer the opportunity to break cycles of offending and to give the individuals involved a chance of hope, to avoid the hopelessness that my noble and learned friend the Minister said was so pernicious when he was summing up the first group of amendments; the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley of Knighton, also said it when contributing to a later group. Nowhere can this be more important than when dealing with young offenders. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, the individuals who make up the group covered by these amendments are unlikely, at the time of their initial sentence, to have a great deal of emotional maturity or self-discipline. They are children, as she pointed out. This is unsurprising, given the likelihood of their background and their life chances prior to their sentence. One hopes that the framework provided by the prison regime for young offenders will accelerate that emotional and other development, paving the way for a return to society.

I endorse the remarks of my noble friend Lord Attlee and the noble Baroness that this is not seen as a soft option. We have to make sure that the public are properly protected—otherwise, respect for and confidence in our judicial and penal system are undermined.

This group is going to undergo a further shock. At a meeting of the All-Party Group on prisons, we had evidence from young people—25 year-olds, really—about what it was like to move from a young offender institution to full prison life. The evidence was pretty startling. The guy said that life in a young offender institution was no bed of roses, but when you got into prison it was a whole different world—quite shocking. Clearly, he was very shocked by it. Indeed, Recommendation 24 of the Justice and Home Affairs Committee report addresses the issue of how you transition and what it means to the people who are so caught up in it. He went on to say that, for some people, it hardened them into a life where they would be persistent offenders but, for some others, it was a wake-up call. They saw that it was a chance, if they managed to get their act together, and were encouraged, to be able to break out—and part of that was seeing some light at the end of the tunnel. This is one of the issues that is very important in these amendments: it is about light at the end of the tunnel, and people being able to see that something can happen to them.

I shall end with a different example that is completely outside the matters that we have been discussing but which might give a sense of what it feels like to be given an IPP sentence. My father’s best friend was captured at Dunkirk in June 1940. He was 24 years old, and he was in a prisoner of war camp until May 1945, when the war came to an end—first in Germany, then in Poland. He went in at 24 and came out at nearly 30. He did not talk about it much, but I remember when I was about 20 him being prepared to talk about what the experience was like. So much of it was like having an IPP sentence.

It began with a sense of shame: had you done enough? Should you have gone on to the bitter end and had you, by surrendering, let your country down? But that died away. Then it was about hardship, which was quite great in the first winter of the war, 1940-41, until Red Cross parcels and parcels from home began to arrive. But my father’s friend said that none of that in any way matched up to the appalling sense of hopelessness —that month after month and year after year ticked by, and you could feel your life running through your fingers.

My father’s friend could articulate that, but I suspect that that is what quite a lot of the IPP individuals are feeling, to some extent, even if they are not able to put it clearly into words. They are the ones for whom I hope we can find ways to help, so that they get that sense of hope. In the prisoner of war camp—they put it rather more roughly in those days—a lot of people behaved rather oddly. What they were saying, of course, was that they were under extreme mental stress. There were no drugs, of course, because they were not available in those days, but the stress of persistent confinement in very crowded conditions undoubtedly had a huge effect on a number of people in a prisoner of war camp.

That is why we need opportunities for reviews of individual cases to take place as often as is consonant with public safety. That is why I support this group of amendments and why I put my name to Amendment 155 in particular.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Hope of Craighead

Report stage
Monday 4th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, there are four amendments in this group, all of which are in my name and to which the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord German, and the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, very kindly added their names. They are part of a single package designed to address a serious flaw in the working of Clause 1(2)(b), which states:

“this Act gives effect to the judgement of Parliament”—

I emphasise “the judgement of Parliament”—

“that the Republic of Rwanda is a safe country”.

The word I am concerned with is “is”.

As we were reminded on the previous group, the Supreme Court expressed a view about this in November last year. It said that there were substantial grounds for believing that the removal of claimants to Rwanda would expose them to a real risk of ill treatment by reason of refoulement. Your Lordships have been asked to reach a different judgment. In other words, your Lordships are being asked to declare that Rwanda is a country to which persons may be removed from the United Kingdom in compliance with all its obligations under international law, and is a country from which a person will not be removed or sent to another country in contravention of international law.

It is not my purpose, for the purpose of these amendments, to question the right of Parliament to look at the facts again. The facts have changed since November 2022, which was when the facts were found on which the Supreme Court based its view. If Parliament is to make a judgment on a matter of fact of such importance, great care must be taken in the use of language. By its use of the present tense in Clause 1(2)(b), Parliament is asserting that from the date of commencement that is the position now, and it is asserting furthermore that it will be the basis on which every decision-maker will have to act in future. That will be so each and every time a decision has to be taken for ever, whatever happens in Rwanda, so long as the provision remains on the statute book. As the noble Lord, Lord Tugendhat, said, the answer will for ever be the same. That is the point to which I draw your Lordships’ attention in these amendments. Article 23 of the treaty provides that the agreement will last until 13 April 2027 but that it can be renewed by written agreement, so it may well last a good deal longer and there is no sunset clause in the Bill. That is the background against which I say that a great deal hangs on the use of “is”.

The judgment that your Lordships are being asked to make is crucial to the safety and well-being of everyone, wherever they come from, who is at risk of being removed to Rwanda. Given what refoulement would mean if it were to happen to them, this could be for some a life-or-death issue. The question is whether we have enough information to enable us to judge that Rwanda is safe now and that it will be whatever may happen in future. I do not think so. I do not think I can make that judgment. That is why I have introduced this amendment and its counterpart, Amendment 7.

Amendment 4 seeks to remove “is” from that clause and replace it with “will be” and “so long as”—in other words, Rwanda will be a safe country when and so long as the arrangements provided for in the treaty will have been fully implemented and are adhered to in practice. That would be a more accurate way of expressing the judgment that your Lordships are being asked to make. The point it makes is that full implementation of the treaty is a pre-requisite. The treaty itself is not enough; it has to be implemented. That is what I am drawing attention to. Without that—without the implementation that the treaty provides for—Rwanda cannot be considered a safe country; in my submission, the Bill should say so.

Of course, there must be means of determining whether full implementation has been achieved and is being maintained. That is provided for in my Amendment 7. I have based that amendment on the method that the treaty itself provides: a monitoring committee, the members of which are independent of either Government. We have been told that that committee already exists and is in action, so what I propose should not delay the Bill, and it is not my purpose to do so. I simply seek the security of the view of the monitoring committee. The treaty tells us:

“The key function of the Monitoring Committee shall be to advise on all steps they consider appropriate to be taken to effectively ensure that the provisions of this Agreement are adhered to in practice”.


The Government’s policy statement in paragraph 102 says of the committee:

“Its role is to provide an independent quality control assessment of conditions against the assurances set out in the treaty”.


The Government themselves, then, accept that entering into the treaty is not in itself enough. That is why they had asked for a monitoring committee to be set up, and precisely why my amendments are so important. The treaty must be fully implemented if Rwanda is to be a safe country. The point is as simple as that.

My Amendment 7 says:

“The Rwanda Treaty will have been fully implemented for the purposes of this Act when the Secretary of State has … laid before Parliament a statement from the … Monitoring Committee … that the objectives … of the Treaty have been secured by the creation of the mechanisms”


that it sets out. If the Ministers say that Rwanda is already a safe country, it should be a formality to obtain the view of the monitoring committee and it should not detain the Government for very long. All I ask is that we should have the security of the view of that Committee to make it absolutely plain before we can make the judgment that Rwanda is, and will continue to be, a safe country. My amendment would then require the Secretary of State to

“consult the Monitoring Committee every three months”

while the treaty remains in force, and to make a statement to Parliament if its advice is

“that the provisions of the Treaty are not being adhered to in practice”.

If that is so, the treaty can no longer be treated as fully implemented for the purposes of the Act until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament subsequent advice that the provisions of the treaty are being adhered to in practice. All that is built around what the Government have provided before in their own treaty: the work of the monitoring committee, on whose judgment I suggest we can properly rely.

Finally, and very briefly, I say that my Amendments 8 and 13 would make the directions to the decision-makers in Clause 2 conditional on full implementation of the treaty.

I should make it clear that I intend to test the opinion of the House on my Amendment 4—and, if necessary, Amendment 7 as well—if I am not given sufficient assurances by the Minister. I will not move my Amendment 8. That is because I do not wish to pre-empt the alternative qualification of Clause 2 proposed by my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich. His Amendment 12, if moved, will in turn pre-empt my Amendment 13. I beg to move.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I add my tribute to those already paid to Lord Cormack. My particular knowledge of him is that, when I was briefly a Member of the other place, my constituency abutted his and we shared an agent, a Mr Clive Hatton. I learned from the assiduousness with which Lord Cormack worked in his constituency and the importance that he ascribed to it. There was no cause too small nor person too irrelevant that Patrick Cormack was not interested in looking after them and considering them. I learned a lot from him.

I turn to the matter at hand. I shall comment on this group of amendments and, in doing so, pick up on some of the remarks I made in our debate on the Motion from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, on 22 January. I have two points. First, I have listened carefully to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, who, as an extremely eminent lawyer, I have to be respectful of. However, I hope he will forgive me if I have the impression that these amendments, taken together, collectively have the aim of rendering the Bill if not unworkable then inoperable. They are like a line of barbed-wire fences: each time you get through one barbed-wire fence, there is another set of obstacles or objectives to be fulfilled.

I recognise that a number of Members of your Lordships’ House do not like the Bill and do not think its approach is appropriate in any way. I think they are wrong, but obviously I respect that view. Why then are greater efforts not being made to kill the Bill? Because they know such an effort would fail. I do not want to get in the middle of the spat between the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, but such efforts would fail because His Majesty’s loyal Opposition would not support such a move. To wound is fine, but to kill would not be acceptable.

Why, in turn, is that? Because away from the Westminster bubble an overwhelming majority of the British people are appalled by the loss of life in the channel and want it stopped—witness the child of 14 drowning last week—are disgusted by the activities of the people smugglers, and are exasperated, furious or both at what are in large measure economic migrants seeking to jump the legitimate queue. The Bill is currently the only game in town, and to do away with it would be immensely unpopular.

Secondly, I disagree with the continued assertion underlying this group of amendments that somehow Rwanda as a country is untrustworthy unless every single “t” is crossed and every “i” is dotted. In this connection, noble Lords might like to read paragraphs 54 and 57 of the Government’s report on Rwanda dated 12 December 2023. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance, an independent organisation, rates Rwanda 12th out of 54 African countries. The World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report makes Rwanda 12th—the UK, by the way, is 19th. The World Bank scored Rwanda at 16 out of a maximum score of 18 on the quality of its judicial processes. Lastly, the World Justice Project index on the rule of law ranked Rwanda first out of 34 sub-Saharan African countries. Those are points that tend to get overlooked in the debate that we are having, which tends to focus on our domestic arrangements.

That takes me to my conclusion. The concept of the rule of law has featured prominently in our debate on the Bill and no doubt will do so in future. I am not a lawyer, as many Members of the House know, but nevertheless I strongly support the concept as an essential part of the freedoms that we take for granted. As I have said in the past, the rule of law depends on the informed consent of the British people. Without that informed consent, the concept of the rule of law becomes devalued. So if the House divides at the end of this debate, I respectfully say to Members that we need to be careful not to conflate the fundamental importance of the rule of law with what I fear I see in these amendments, which is largely a measure of shadow-boxing.

Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Hope of Craighead

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 20th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, Motion B1, in my name, raises an issue that has been of great concern to many in this House from the outset in our examination of the Bill: parliamentary sovereignty. The clause that causes particular concern, and to which my Motion is addressed, is Clause 15, headed “Powers to revoke or replace”. All the powers that it contains are exercisable by statutory instrument alone, with no provision for active or meaningful scrutiny by either House. That amounts to what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, described when the issue was before us two weeks ago—without any exaggeration, I think—as a delegated superpower.

It is worth taking a moment to think about the key words that are used to describe the extent of the powers conferred on a relevant authority by this clause. For our purposes, the relevant authority is a Minister of the Crown. Clause 15(2) states that the Minister

“may by regulations revoke any secondary retained EU law and replace it with such provision as the relevant national authority considers to be appropriate and to achieve the same or similar objectives”.

Clause 15(3) states that the Minister

“may by regulations revoke any secondary retained EU law and make such alternative provision as the relevant national authority considers appropriate”.

The subsection (2) power extends not just to achieving the same objectives but to achieving objectives that the Minister considers to be similar. The decision as to whether they are similar or appropriate, about which there may reasonably be more than one view, is left entirely to the Minister.

Subsection (3) goes even further: it extends to the making of such alternative provision as the Minister considers appropriate. There is no limit here to the objectives that are to be achieved. They do not need to be similar—there is no limit to that extent—so they could be different from those of the secondary retained EU law that is being revoked. Again, there could reasonably be more than one view as to whether the alternative provision, whatever it may happen to be, was appropriate.

It is worth reflecting for a moment on the subject matter of what is open to revocation and replacement in the exercise of these powers. This is not simple, routine stuff for which delegated legislation is unquestionably appropriate. It extends to, among other things, major instruments of policy. It extends to fundamental rules relating to public health, trade and the environment, which were handed down to us by the EU and with which we have lived for several decades. It includes, for example, agricultural support, blood safety, fisheries management, food composition standards, nutrition, resources and waste, and the control of ozone-depleting and radioactive substances. Those are just some examples.

Your Lordships might consider it rather strange, given the nature and extent of what is involved, that neither House of Parliament can play any kind of active role in the scrutiny of these regulations. It really is a take-it-or-leave-it system dictated to Parliament by the Executive. The objections to this, which I need not repeat, have been set out many times, and that is what my amendment seeks to address.

I recognise that the previous amendments, which were moved first by me and later by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, proposed a system that the Minister was right to describe as novel and untested. What I am now proposing is based on a system, as the Minister has pointed out, known as the super-affirmative procedure, which was enacted by Section 18 of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006. I shall explain briefly what this involves.

It applies only to regulations made under Clause 15. It proposes a Commons committee—not a Joint Committee, as previously suggested—to sift regulations made under the clause in the light of an explanation by the Minister as to why the regulation is considered appropriate. If, but only if, the committee reports that there are any regulations to which special attention should be drawn, the Minister must arrange for them to be debated on the Floor of each House. The Minister must then have regard to any resolution of either House and may, but is not required to, propose a revised proposal in the light of what has been resolved. The procedure for approval in both Houses thereafter is the affirmative procedure. Finally, the committee may recommend that the Minister’s proposal should not be proceeded with, but the House of Commons has the last word, as it can reject that recommendation. If it does that, the regulations may be laid.

This is a relatively light-touch procedure, which gives Parliament some measure of oversight of what has been proposed. I offer it as a compromise, in the hope that the Minister, despite the remarks he made at the outset of this debate, will feel able to give it serious consideration. At the heart of it all is an issue of principle, which is of basic concern to this House and the other on their entitlement to take an active part in the major exercise proposed. It is in that spirit that I propose to test the opinion of the House, if necessary, when the time comes.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I would like to detain the House for no more than a minute on this issue. I have spoken about it many times in the past.

I support what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has said on the principle of what we are looking at. It is very important we remember that my noble friend the Minister said, as a defence of the government position, that the House would have a chance to look at these instruments by means of the affirmative procedure —unamendable, as we know—and that it would have the appropriate back-up information. One of the things that has moved on from the days of just framework Bills is the increasing reluctance of the Government to produce the back-up information—impact assessments and Explanatory Memoranda—in time for the House to do its job properly. The spat we had last week about the Public Order Act regulations was the result of this very question of overcasual behaviour.

My noble friend will say that of course we will have absolutely similar treatment—this is the Government’s argument—for affirmative resolutions as we do for primary legislation. I have the greatest respect for my noble friend on the Front Bench—for his patience, courtesy and diligence—but how he can say that with a straight face absolutely beats me. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has done a very important service for Parliament—this House and the other House—in bringing back this issue for us to consider today.

But then we get to the politics—and politics does come into this. The reality is that the reforms that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, many other Members of your Lordships’ House and I would like to see come about will take place only if they are led by the House of Commons. If that does not happen, the Government will immediately say that this is the unelected House trying to tell the elected House how to do its job. That, I am afraid, will be game over. That is why I voted against the fatal amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. The House would be unwise, within one day of the Commons having passed a resolution, to immediately pass a fatal amendment.

The brutal truth is that we have been unable to get Members of Parliament in the House of Commons in sufficient numbers to understand what we are driving at: that it is not to do with EU law but is about parliamentary sovereignty, as the noble and learned Lord has said. There are stirrings there but they are only stirrings.

The case before us is further complicated by the fact that this is all going into the Brexit meat-grinder. In the debate in the House of Commons on 12 June, Sir William Cash MP said:

“The way the House of Lords has dealt with these amendments demonstrates that the Lords are determined to try, by hook or by crook, to obstruct the House of Commons, which is the democratic Chamber in these matters as far as the electorate is concerned”.


Later in the same speech he said:

“We know from everything that we have heard over the last few weeks on the Bill that there is an intransigence—a stubbornness, if I may say so politely—from our noble Friends in the House of Lords in the face of any attempt to get rid of retained EU law in the way in which we are proposing”.—[Official Report, Commons, 12/6/23; col. 34.]

Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Hope of Craighead

Report stage
Monday 15th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord for his explanation. I think the noble Viscount will appreciate that we have to deal with this very carefully. On the other hand, I think he will agree that, given the nature of the task being carried out, it would be extremely unfortunate if a flaw were spotted and nothing could be done about it. We are trying to suggest a mechanism by which something that is agreed by the Joint Committee, and indeed by both Houses as necessary, should be capable of being done. I hope I may leave it at that. This is a carefully drafted amendment that is doing its best to address an extremely important and, in some respects, quite delicate task.

When the time comes, if necessary, I shall seek the opinion of the House on Amendment 76. For the time being, because we have before us Amendment 15, that will be my position too, if necessary, when Amendment 15 is called.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, we have had two significant amendments proposed by the noble and learned Lord. I have Amendments 73 and 74 in this group, which are small and technical but significant in the way in which they try to enhance the scrutiny provisions that underlie the noble and learned Lord’s two amendments, which I entirely support. I will not repeat my reasons because I would be largely rehearsing the arguments that I made an hour and a half ago.

It is generally anticipated, though not certain, that the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee will be one of the bodies appointed to carry out some scrutiny of the regulations, as and when this particular part of the Bill comes into force. The Bill as drafted envisages a period of 10 working days for a report to be produced by the SLSC that would then come before the House, and the House would make its mind up about its view of that report on the instrument. The Government use the example—the dreaded precedent—of the 10-day period provided under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. In the SLSC report that I referred to earlier, we proposed that the period should be extended from 10 days to 15. We said in paragraph 58:

“We know from our own experience in scrutinising proposed negatives under the 2018 Act that, depending on the day of the week on which a proposed negative has been laid, meeting that 10-day deadline could be challenging”.


Under the Bill, the regulations to be scrutinised are of an entirely different level of policy implication, importance and significance. This view and the proposal for a five-day extension—by no means a huge length of time—have been endorsed by the Hansard Society, which Members of the House will be aware is an academic expert in matters of parliamentary procedure.

In Committee on this Bill on 8 March, at col. 876, my noble friend, having heard the debate on these amendments, was kind enough to offer to go away and reflect. I have no doubt that he did his level best, but I fear that he was rebuffed because the Government said in their response to the SLSC report of 10 May:

“Having considered this carefully and in particular how the existing 10 day sifting practice works, the Government remains of the view that a 10 day sifting period is sufficient for SIs laid using the powers in the Retained EU Law Bill … The retained EU Law programme is a similar challenge”—


to 2018—

“but it is no more complex or demanding”.

I have just two points on that. First, to describe this Bill as no more complex and demanding, compared to that of 2018, is, I am afraid, plain wrong. It is a much more significant piece of legislation than the 2018 Act. Secondly, the members of the SLSC do not come to this view ex cathedra. We think about it, but we also talk and take into account the views of the highly experienced and dedicated staff, who produce excellent reports which come before your Lordships’ House every week.

To conclude, I suppose I could just about have got my mind around my noble friend’s view that it should be 10 days after all when we were under the cosh of the 31 December drop-dead end date. We do not have that now, so the time pressure that was otherwise going to be imposed has now been released and reviewed. I urge my noble friend to go back to the chateau behind the lines and ask the general commanding to think again. If the Government do not think again, it will be yet another example of how they appear intent on marginalising Parliament at every single opportunity.