Victims and Prisoners Bill

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Hope of Craighead

Tuesday 12th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I would like to add a few words to what has already been said about Amendments 162 and 163 devised by the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett. The really important part of Amendment 162 is in proposed new subsection (2), which would set out in statute the aim of the convenor of these planning meetings. It states that they are taking place

“with a view to ensuring that all possible steps are taken to enable their safe release at the earliest possible time”.

Those words emphasise the purpose of the reviews and therefore enhance the care that would be taken to conduct them by the Secretary of State.

As far as Amendment 163 is concerned, the first part of it is already the existing law. It says that for

“a person serving a sentence of detention for public protection, the Secretary of State must refer his case to the Parole Board … after he has served the relevant part of his sentence”.

That is a tariff and is already standing practice. What is new is the proposal that the Secretary of State must refer a person’s case to the Parole Board,

“where there has been a previous reference of his case to the Board, no later than the period of one year beginning with the disposal of that reference”.

The emphasis in both these amendments is on the regularity of reviews. When I was Lord Justice General, I saw this working well in my visits to the Parole Board. As I mentioned earlier, there are files prepared that have to be examined in detail, but the Parole Board appointed a particular member to take on a particular case, so that each time it came up for review, the member could reinforce what was in the files by explaining his or her own view of what was taking place and, as time went on, reinforce it by previous discussions. In that way, continuity was provided to the whole process.

Each board will have its own method of dealing with it, but the structure of what is provided by these two amendments provides a basis on which the Parole Board can exercise its views with a view to achieving what is set out in proposed new subsection (2) in Amendment 162, ensuring that all possible steps are taken to ensure safe release at the earliest possible time.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 155 in this group. The principles behind and the purposes of the amendments we have been discussing have already been well forked over, so I will cut straight to the chase.

I have intervened in Committee only on one other group of amendments, a few weeks ago on restorative justice. I link the two because they offer the opportunity to break cycles of offending and to give the individuals involved a chance of hope, to avoid the hopelessness that my noble and learned friend the Minister said was so pernicious when he was summing up the first group of amendments; the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley of Knighton, also said it when contributing to a later group. Nowhere can this be more important than when dealing with young offenders. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, the individuals who make up the group covered by these amendments are unlikely, at the time of their initial sentence, to have a great deal of emotional maturity or self-discipline. They are children, as she pointed out. This is unsurprising, given the likelihood of their background and their life chances prior to their sentence. One hopes that the framework provided by the prison regime for young offenders will accelerate that emotional and other development, paving the way for a return to society.

I endorse the remarks of my noble friend Lord Attlee and the noble Baroness that this is not seen as a soft option. We have to make sure that the public are properly protected—otherwise, respect for and confidence in our judicial and penal system are undermined.

This group is going to undergo a further shock. At a meeting of the All-Party Group on prisons, we had evidence from young people—25 year-olds, really—about what it was like to move from a young offender institution to full prison life. The evidence was pretty startling. The guy said that life in a young offender institution was no bed of roses, but when you got into prison it was a whole different world—quite shocking. Clearly, he was very shocked by it. Indeed, Recommendation 24 of the Justice and Home Affairs Committee report addresses the issue of how you transition and what it means to the people who are so caught up in it. He went on to say that, for some people, it hardened them into a life where they would be persistent offenders but, for some others, it was a wake-up call. They saw that it was a chance, if they managed to get their act together, and were encouraged, to be able to break out—and part of that was seeing some light at the end of the tunnel. This is one of the issues that is very important in these amendments: it is about light at the end of the tunnel, and people being able to see that something can happen to them.

I shall end with a different example that is completely outside the matters that we have been discussing but which might give a sense of what it feels like to be given an IPP sentence. My father’s best friend was captured at Dunkirk in June 1940. He was 24 years old, and he was in a prisoner of war camp until May 1945, when the war came to an end—first in Germany, then in Poland. He went in at 24 and came out at nearly 30. He did not talk about it much, but I remember when I was about 20 him being prepared to talk about what the experience was like. So much of it was like having an IPP sentence.

It began with a sense of shame: had you done enough? Should you have gone on to the bitter end and had you, by surrendering, let your country down? But that died away. Then it was about hardship, which was quite great in the first winter of the war, 1940-41, until Red Cross parcels and parcels from home began to arrive. But my father’s friend said that none of that in any way matched up to the appalling sense of hopelessness —that month after month and year after year ticked by, and you could feel your life running through your fingers.

My father’s friend could articulate that, but I suspect that that is what quite a lot of the IPP individuals are feeling, to some extent, even if they are not able to put it clearly into words. They are the ones for whom I hope we can find ways to help, so that they get that sense of hope. In the prisoner of war camp—they put it rather more roughly in those days—a lot of people behaved rather oddly. What they were saying, of course, was that they were under extreme mental stress. There were no drugs, of course, because they were not available in those days, but the stress of persistent confinement in very crowded conditions undoubtedly had a huge effect on a number of people in a prisoner of war camp.

That is why we need opportunities for reviews of individual cases to take place as often as is consonant with public safety. That is why I support this group of amendments and why I put my name to Amendment 155 in particular.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Hope of Craighead

Report stage
Monday 4th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, there are four amendments in this group, all of which are in my name and to which the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord German, and the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, very kindly added their names. They are part of a single package designed to address a serious flaw in the working of Clause 1(2)(b), which states:

“this Act gives effect to the judgement of Parliament”—

I emphasise “the judgement of Parliament”—

“that the Republic of Rwanda is a safe country”.

The word I am concerned with is “is”.

As we were reminded on the previous group, the Supreme Court expressed a view about this in November last year. It said that there were substantial grounds for believing that the removal of claimants to Rwanda would expose them to a real risk of ill treatment by reason of refoulement. Your Lordships have been asked to reach a different judgment. In other words, your Lordships are being asked to declare that Rwanda is a country to which persons may be removed from the United Kingdom in compliance with all its obligations under international law, and is a country from which a person will not be removed or sent to another country in contravention of international law.

It is not my purpose, for the purpose of these amendments, to question the right of Parliament to look at the facts again. The facts have changed since November 2022, which was when the facts were found on which the Supreme Court based its view. If Parliament is to make a judgment on a matter of fact of such importance, great care must be taken in the use of language. By its use of the present tense in Clause 1(2)(b), Parliament is asserting that from the date of commencement that is the position now, and it is asserting furthermore that it will be the basis on which every decision-maker will have to act in future. That will be so each and every time a decision has to be taken for ever, whatever happens in Rwanda, so long as the provision remains on the statute book. As the noble Lord, Lord Tugendhat, said, the answer will for ever be the same. That is the point to which I draw your Lordships’ attention in these amendments. Article 23 of the treaty provides that the agreement will last until 13 April 2027 but that it can be renewed by written agreement, so it may well last a good deal longer and there is no sunset clause in the Bill. That is the background against which I say that a great deal hangs on the use of “is”.

The judgment that your Lordships are being asked to make is crucial to the safety and well-being of everyone, wherever they come from, who is at risk of being removed to Rwanda. Given what refoulement would mean if it were to happen to them, this could be for some a life-or-death issue. The question is whether we have enough information to enable us to judge that Rwanda is safe now and that it will be whatever may happen in future. I do not think so. I do not think I can make that judgment. That is why I have introduced this amendment and its counterpart, Amendment 7.

Amendment 4 seeks to remove “is” from that clause and replace it with “will be” and “so long as”—in other words, Rwanda will be a safe country when and so long as the arrangements provided for in the treaty will have been fully implemented and are adhered to in practice. That would be a more accurate way of expressing the judgment that your Lordships are being asked to make. The point it makes is that full implementation of the treaty is a pre-requisite. The treaty itself is not enough; it has to be implemented. That is what I am drawing attention to. Without that—without the implementation that the treaty provides for—Rwanda cannot be considered a safe country; in my submission, the Bill should say so.

Of course, there must be means of determining whether full implementation has been achieved and is being maintained. That is provided for in my Amendment 7. I have based that amendment on the method that the treaty itself provides: a monitoring committee, the members of which are independent of either Government. We have been told that that committee already exists and is in action, so what I propose should not delay the Bill, and it is not my purpose to do so. I simply seek the security of the view of the monitoring committee. The treaty tells us:

“The key function of the Monitoring Committee shall be to advise on all steps they consider appropriate to be taken to effectively ensure that the provisions of this Agreement are adhered to in practice”.


The Government’s policy statement in paragraph 102 says of the committee:

“Its role is to provide an independent quality control assessment of conditions against the assurances set out in the treaty”.


The Government themselves, then, accept that entering into the treaty is not in itself enough. That is why they had asked for a monitoring committee to be set up, and precisely why my amendments are so important. The treaty must be fully implemented if Rwanda is to be a safe country. The point is as simple as that.

My Amendment 7 says:

“The Rwanda Treaty will have been fully implemented for the purposes of this Act when the Secretary of State has … laid before Parliament a statement from the … Monitoring Committee … that the objectives … of the Treaty have been secured by the creation of the mechanisms”


that it sets out. If the Ministers say that Rwanda is already a safe country, it should be a formality to obtain the view of the monitoring committee and it should not detain the Government for very long. All I ask is that we should have the security of the view of that Committee to make it absolutely plain before we can make the judgment that Rwanda is, and will continue to be, a safe country. My amendment would then require the Secretary of State to

“consult the Monitoring Committee every three months”

while the treaty remains in force, and to make a statement to Parliament if its advice is

“that the provisions of the Treaty are not being adhered to in practice”.

If that is so, the treaty can no longer be treated as fully implemented for the purposes of the Act until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament subsequent advice that the provisions of the treaty are being adhered to in practice. All that is built around what the Government have provided before in their own treaty: the work of the monitoring committee, on whose judgment I suggest we can properly rely.

Finally, and very briefly, I say that my Amendments 8 and 13 would make the directions to the decision-makers in Clause 2 conditional on full implementation of the treaty.

I should make it clear that I intend to test the opinion of the House on my Amendment 4—and, if necessary, Amendment 7 as well—if I am not given sufficient assurances by the Minister. I will not move my Amendment 8. That is because I do not wish to pre-empt the alternative qualification of Clause 2 proposed by my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich. His Amendment 12, if moved, will in turn pre-empt my Amendment 13. I beg to move.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I add my tribute to those already paid to Lord Cormack. My particular knowledge of him is that, when I was briefly a Member of the other place, my constituency abutted his and we shared an agent, a Mr Clive Hatton. I learned from the assiduousness with which Lord Cormack worked in his constituency and the importance that he ascribed to it. There was no cause too small nor person too irrelevant that Patrick Cormack was not interested in looking after them and considering them. I learned a lot from him.

I turn to the matter at hand. I shall comment on this group of amendments and, in doing so, pick up on some of the remarks I made in our debate on the Motion from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, on 22 January. I have two points. First, I have listened carefully to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, who, as an extremely eminent lawyer, I have to be respectful of. However, I hope he will forgive me if I have the impression that these amendments, taken together, collectively have the aim of rendering the Bill if not unworkable then inoperable. They are like a line of barbed-wire fences: each time you get through one barbed-wire fence, there is another set of obstacles or objectives to be fulfilled.

I recognise that a number of Members of your Lordships’ House do not like the Bill and do not think its approach is appropriate in any way. I think they are wrong, but obviously I respect that view. Why then are greater efforts not being made to kill the Bill? Because they know such an effort would fail. I do not want to get in the middle of the spat between the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, but such efforts would fail because His Majesty’s loyal Opposition would not support such a move. To wound is fine, but to kill would not be acceptable.

Why, in turn, is that? Because away from the Westminster bubble an overwhelming majority of the British people are appalled by the loss of life in the channel and want it stopped—witness the child of 14 drowning last week—are disgusted by the activities of the people smugglers, and are exasperated, furious or both at what are in large measure economic migrants seeking to jump the legitimate queue. The Bill is currently the only game in town, and to do away with it would be immensely unpopular.

Secondly, I disagree with the continued assertion underlying this group of amendments that somehow Rwanda as a country is untrustworthy unless every single “t” is crossed and every “i” is dotted. In this connection, noble Lords might like to read paragraphs 54 and 57 of the Government’s report on Rwanda dated 12 December 2023. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance, an independent organisation, rates Rwanda 12th out of 54 African countries. The World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report makes Rwanda 12th—the UK, by the way, is 19th. The World Bank scored Rwanda at 16 out of a maximum score of 18 on the quality of its judicial processes. Lastly, the World Justice Project index on the rule of law ranked Rwanda first out of 34 sub-Saharan African countries. Those are points that tend to get overlooked in the debate that we are having, which tends to focus on our domestic arrangements.

That takes me to my conclusion. The concept of the rule of law has featured prominently in our debate on the Bill and no doubt will do so in future. I am not a lawyer, as many Members of the House know, but nevertheless I strongly support the concept as an essential part of the freedoms that we take for granted. As I have said in the past, the rule of law depends on the informed consent of the British people. Without that informed consent, the concept of the rule of law becomes devalued. So if the House divides at the end of this debate, I respectfully say to Members that we need to be careful not to conflate the fundamental importance of the rule of law with what I fear I see in these amendments, which is largely a measure of shadow-boxing.

Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Hope of Craighead

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 20th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, Motion B1, in my name, raises an issue that has been of great concern to many in this House from the outset in our examination of the Bill: parliamentary sovereignty. The clause that causes particular concern, and to which my Motion is addressed, is Clause 15, headed “Powers to revoke or replace”. All the powers that it contains are exercisable by statutory instrument alone, with no provision for active or meaningful scrutiny by either House. That amounts to what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, described when the issue was before us two weeks ago—without any exaggeration, I think—as a delegated superpower.

It is worth taking a moment to think about the key words that are used to describe the extent of the powers conferred on a relevant authority by this clause. For our purposes, the relevant authority is a Minister of the Crown. Clause 15(2) states that the Minister

“may by regulations revoke any secondary retained EU law and replace it with such provision as the relevant national authority considers to be appropriate and to achieve the same or similar objectives”.

Clause 15(3) states that the Minister

“may by regulations revoke any secondary retained EU law and make such alternative provision as the relevant national authority considers appropriate”.

The subsection (2) power extends not just to achieving the same objectives but to achieving objectives that the Minister considers to be similar. The decision as to whether they are similar or appropriate, about which there may reasonably be more than one view, is left entirely to the Minister.

Subsection (3) goes even further: it extends to the making of such alternative provision as the Minister considers appropriate. There is no limit here to the objectives that are to be achieved. They do not need to be similar—there is no limit to that extent—so they could be different from those of the secondary retained EU law that is being revoked. Again, there could reasonably be more than one view as to whether the alternative provision, whatever it may happen to be, was appropriate.

It is worth reflecting for a moment on the subject matter of what is open to revocation and replacement in the exercise of these powers. This is not simple, routine stuff for which delegated legislation is unquestionably appropriate. It extends to, among other things, major instruments of policy. It extends to fundamental rules relating to public health, trade and the environment, which were handed down to us by the EU and with which we have lived for several decades. It includes, for example, agricultural support, blood safety, fisheries management, food composition standards, nutrition, resources and waste, and the control of ozone-depleting and radioactive substances. Those are just some examples.

Your Lordships might consider it rather strange, given the nature and extent of what is involved, that neither House of Parliament can play any kind of active role in the scrutiny of these regulations. It really is a take-it-or-leave-it system dictated to Parliament by the Executive. The objections to this, which I need not repeat, have been set out many times, and that is what my amendment seeks to address.

I recognise that the previous amendments, which were moved first by me and later by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, proposed a system that the Minister was right to describe as novel and untested. What I am now proposing is based on a system, as the Minister has pointed out, known as the super-affirmative procedure, which was enacted by Section 18 of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006. I shall explain briefly what this involves.

It applies only to regulations made under Clause 15. It proposes a Commons committee—not a Joint Committee, as previously suggested—to sift regulations made under the clause in the light of an explanation by the Minister as to why the regulation is considered appropriate. If, but only if, the committee reports that there are any regulations to which special attention should be drawn, the Minister must arrange for them to be debated on the Floor of each House. The Minister must then have regard to any resolution of either House and may, but is not required to, propose a revised proposal in the light of what has been resolved. The procedure for approval in both Houses thereafter is the affirmative procedure. Finally, the committee may recommend that the Minister’s proposal should not be proceeded with, but the House of Commons has the last word, as it can reject that recommendation. If it does that, the regulations may be laid.

This is a relatively light-touch procedure, which gives Parliament some measure of oversight of what has been proposed. I offer it as a compromise, in the hope that the Minister, despite the remarks he made at the outset of this debate, will feel able to give it serious consideration. At the heart of it all is an issue of principle, which is of basic concern to this House and the other on their entitlement to take an active part in the major exercise proposed. It is in that spirit that I propose to test the opinion of the House, if necessary, when the time comes.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I would like to detain the House for no more than a minute on this issue. I have spoken about it many times in the past.

I support what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has said on the principle of what we are looking at. It is very important we remember that my noble friend the Minister said, as a defence of the government position, that the House would have a chance to look at these instruments by means of the affirmative procedure —unamendable, as we know—and that it would have the appropriate back-up information. One of the things that has moved on from the days of just framework Bills is the increasing reluctance of the Government to produce the back-up information—impact assessments and Explanatory Memoranda—in time for the House to do its job properly. The spat we had last week about the Public Order Act regulations was the result of this very question of overcasual behaviour.

My noble friend will say that of course we will have absolutely similar treatment—this is the Government’s argument—for affirmative resolutions as we do for primary legislation. I have the greatest respect for my noble friend on the Front Bench—for his patience, courtesy and diligence—but how he can say that with a straight face absolutely beats me. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has done a very important service for Parliament—this House and the other House—in bringing back this issue for us to consider today.

But then we get to the politics—and politics does come into this. The reality is that the reforms that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, many other Members of your Lordships’ House and I would like to see come about will take place only if they are led by the House of Commons. If that does not happen, the Government will immediately say that this is the unelected House trying to tell the elected House how to do its job. That, I am afraid, will be game over. That is why I voted against the fatal amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. The House would be unwise, within one day of the Commons having passed a resolution, to immediately pass a fatal amendment.

The brutal truth is that we have been unable to get Members of Parliament in the House of Commons in sufficient numbers to understand what we are driving at: that it is not to do with EU law but is about parliamentary sovereignty, as the noble and learned Lord has said. There are stirrings there but they are only stirrings.

The case before us is further complicated by the fact that this is all going into the Brexit meat-grinder. In the debate in the House of Commons on 12 June, Sir William Cash MP said:

“The way the House of Lords has dealt with these amendments demonstrates that the Lords are determined to try, by hook or by crook, to obstruct the House of Commons, which is the democratic Chamber in these matters as far as the electorate is concerned”.


Later in the same speech he said:

“We know from everything that we have heard over the last few weeks on the Bill that there is an intransigence—a stubbornness, if I may say so politely—from our noble Friends in the House of Lords in the face of any attempt to get rid of retained EU law in the way in which we are proposing”.—[Official Report, Commons, 12/6/23; col. 34.]

Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Hope of Craighead

Report stage
Monday 15th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord for his explanation. I think the noble Viscount will appreciate that we have to deal with this very carefully. On the other hand, I think he will agree that, given the nature of the task being carried out, it would be extremely unfortunate if a flaw were spotted and nothing could be done about it. We are trying to suggest a mechanism by which something that is agreed by the Joint Committee, and indeed by both Houses as necessary, should be capable of being done. I hope I may leave it at that. This is a carefully drafted amendment that is doing its best to address an extremely important and, in some respects, quite delicate task.

When the time comes, if necessary, I shall seek the opinion of the House on Amendment 76. For the time being, because we have before us Amendment 15, that will be my position too, if necessary, when Amendment 15 is called.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, we have had two significant amendments proposed by the noble and learned Lord. I have Amendments 73 and 74 in this group, which are small and technical but significant in the way in which they try to enhance the scrutiny provisions that underlie the noble and learned Lord’s two amendments, which I entirely support. I will not repeat my reasons because I would be largely rehearsing the arguments that I made an hour and a half ago.

It is generally anticipated, though not certain, that the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee will be one of the bodies appointed to carry out some scrutiny of the regulations, as and when this particular part of the Bill comes into force. The Bill as drafted envisages a period of 10 working days for a report to be produced by the SLSC that would then come before the House, and the House would make its mind up about its view of that report on the instrument. The Government use the example—the dreaded precedent—of the 10-day period provided under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. In the SLSC report that I referred to earlier, we proposed that the period should be extended from 10 days to 15. We said in paragraph 58:

“We know from our own experience in scrutinising proposed negatives under the 2018 Act that, depending on the day of the week on which a proposed negative has been laid, meeting that 10-day deadline could be challenging”.


Under the Bill, the regulations to be scrutinised are of an entirely different level of policy implication, importance and significance. This view and the proposal for a five-day extension—by no means a huge length of time—have been endorsed by the Hansard Society, which Members of the House will be aware is an academic expert in matters of parliamentary procedure.

In Committee on this Bill on 8 March, at col. 876, my noble friend, having heard the debate on these amendments, was kind enough to offer to go away and reflect. I have no doubt that he did his level best, but I fear that he was rebuffed because the Government said in their response to the SLSC report of 10 May:

“Having considered this carefully and in particular how the existing 10 day sifting practice works, the Government remains of the view that a 10 day sifting period is sufficient for SIs laid using the powers in the Retained EU Law Bill … The retained EU Law programme is a similar challenge”—


to 2018—

“but it is no more complex or demanding”.

I have just two points on that. First, to describe this Bill as no more complex and demanding, compared to that of 2018, is, I am afraid, plain wrong. It is a much more significant piece of legislation than the 2018 Act. Secondly, the members of the SLSC do not come to this view ex cathedra. We think about it, but we also talk and take into account the views of the highly experienced and dedicated staff, who produce excellent reports which come before your Lordships’ House every week.

To conclude, I suppose I could just about have got my mind around my noble friend’s view that it should be 10 days after all when we were under the cosh of the 31 December drop-dead end date. We do not have that now, so the time pressure that was otherwise going to be imposed has now been released and reviewed. I urge my noble friend to go back to the chateau behind the lines and ask the general commanding to think again. If the Government do not think again, it will be yet another example of how they appear intent on marginalising Parliament at every single opportunity.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Hope of Craighead

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 12th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, we come to a matter that we discussed at some length in Committee, so I will cut to the chase. An award of damages that will be paid out over a long period—for example, to provide care to someone previously injured in their 20s—is based on two very important assumptions: how long the person will live and what rate of return can be expected from the sum awarded. If the damages are awarded in the form of a lump sum, these two factors assume a particular and increased importance. The first of these factors, the length of time that a person is expected to live, is inevitably based on averages, so if the injured person lives beyond the expected average then there is a risk that the individual will spend the last few years of their life in financially straitened circumstances. As regards the second factor, if the investment performance falls below that which is anticipated then a similar outcome will result.

As we have already discussed, there is a way for the individual to avoid both the longevity risk and the investment risk. He or she can do so by taking the award in the form not of a lump sum but of a periodical payment order, a PPO. Under a PPO, part or all of the award can be paid weekly, monthly, quarterly or whatever to suit the injured party, and paid normally on an inflation-proof basis for the rest of a person’s life. Sadly, though, we have discovered that PPOs appear to be the poor relation as regards the methods of awarding damages. We discussed in Committee the various structural reasons why this was so—the preference of insurance companies for a swift solution and the capital required to back a PPO, the potentially seductive nature of a very large lump sum compared with the more modest amount of a periodic payment and so on.

My amendment is designed to tip the balance more in favour of PPOs, so that in cases where lump-sum damages exceed, say, £1 million and/or the award will be paid out over more than 10 years and/or the individual is of a risk-averse nature, the court should press for the award to be made in the form of a PPO. To be clear, the court should not compel; that would be completely inappropriate. If a person is determined to have a lump sum, a lump sum they must have. However, the court should certainly encourage PPOs. None of this appears to run counter to the wishes of the House of Commons as expressed by the Justice Committee in its report on the discount rate, nor indeed the thinking of the Government as expressed in their response to that report.

So how to achieve this desired result? Giving the Minister the power to make regulations in this area might interfere with judicial independence, so it appears that the only avenue remaining is the use of the Civil Procedure Rules of court, and that may perhaps be a clumsy way to proceed. If my noble friend cannot accept my amendment, and I fear he may be unwilling to do so, I hope he will be able to make a clear and unequivocal statement that the Government favour the increased use of PPOs in the sorts of cases that I have described so that, with the views expressed in your Lordships’ House today and previously in Committee and, no doubt, in due course in the other place, courts can be in no doubt about the will of Parliament in this important matter.

It may be worth while undertaking a review at some future date of whether the use of PPOs is increasing. That might be along the lines of Amendment 89 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, to which I have no doubt he will speak fruitfully in a minute or two. In the meantime, though, I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I should like to say a word in support of Amendment 50, which is in my name and builds on an amendment tabled in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, to which I put my name but to which I was unable to speak because at the very moment he rose to speak I was taken out of the Chamber for a business meeting, so I never got to say what I should like to say now.

I have proposed for the noble and learned Lord’s consideration an expanded version of his amendment, and I should like to explain the background to it a little more so that the point is firmly before the House. On page 7, line 32, subsection (2) of proposed new Section A1 provides that proposed new subsection (1), which talks about the duty of the court to take into account the rate of return prescribed by order by the Lord Chancellor,

“does not however prevent the court taking a different rate of return into account if any party to the proceedings shows that it is more appropriate in the case in question”.

At first sight, that is quite a reasonable provision which the courts might feel able to use from time to time, but, as case law has developed, the door has effectively been shut on any use of the provision in these terms in cases where it is most likely to be wanted, which is those of injury of maximum severity.

In Warriner v Warriner 2002, the Court of Appeal, drawing on points made in Wells v Wells, stressed that on policy grounds there was a need for negotiations to be conducted with reasonable certainty as to the result and to eliminate unnecessary costs and the leading of extensive evidence. Building on the principle stated in Wells, which I of course support, it refused to interfere with the rate of return prescribed. That point was repeated in subsequent cases and more recently in the Court of Session in Edinburgh, where the same principles apply. The Lord President, Lord Carloway, made it clear in the case of Tortolano v Ogilvie Construction Ltd in 2013—Court of Session Inner House Cases, page 10—that there must be something special or exceptional about the case and that the fact that the injuries were catastrophic, which puts the level very high indeed, was not a special or exceptional case factor that would justify departing from the specified rate.

My point is that the Bill repeats almost exactly the wording of the Damages Act 1996, on which the case law has been built. There is one tiny difference. The formula in the 1996 Act was “does not, however, prevent”. In the Bill, we find the slightly different words “shall not, however, prevent”. But the crucial wording, in particular the word “appropriate”, is still there. If the wording of the Bill remains as it is, my concern is that it is effectively a dead letter because the courts, following established case law in the Courts of Appeal both north and south of the border, will feel that there is no case for interfering at all, even in the most extreme cases, where, as I have suggested, the need for even more precision and care in the rate of return is most compelling.

There is reason to be a little more generous at this stage. As the noble and learned Lord is well aware, the basis on which the rate of return is to be struck is to be taken at a slightly different level from that on which Wells v Wells was based. In Wells, the House of Lords used a rate of return that was inflation-proof—adopting a relevant government bond which had that rate of return—to avoid any risk of losing touch with inflation. Now, instead of a very, very low level of risk, there is to be an assumption that more risk will be acceptable than a very low level of risk, although it is less risk than would ordinarily be accepted by a prudent and properly advised individual investor. So there is a change towards a slightly greater element of risk, although not that high. The point is that any change in the level of risk being contemplated raises the possibility that in these extreme cases, the level may fail to achieve what is needed to provide the injured party with what is necessary to compensate them fully for the loss and injury sustained.

Simply to repeat the same formula is unsatisfactory. I was grateful to the noble and learned Lord for agreeing to a meeting the other day at which I was able to explain the point. I think the meeting was left on the basis that an attempt would be made to find a form of words that would not undermine what the Government seek to do but would, at the same time, allow the courts to look afresh at the idea of departing from the rate—although one would of course not want them to do so as a matter of course or have any unnecessary delay or expense in going through these complicated cases just to achieve a different rate. It would have to be a case that really justified such attention.

Some points can be drawn from Wells that may be relevant to my point. First, I was looking at the award in the form of a capital sum—we are talking about that rather than what the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, was talking about a moment ago—in which the income will not be reinvested. The ordinary investor would reinvest the income to keep the capital sum as inflation-proof as possible, but in our case the income would be used to meet the needs of the injured party. At the same time, the injured party would be drawing on the capital sum, because it is a diminishing fund, the idea being that at the end of the claimant’s lifetime, or when the injuries have finally resolved themselves, there will be nothing left. So we have the extraordinary situation of a sum of money where the income cannot be used to protect against inflation and, at the same time, the sum is reducing. As Lord Lloyd of Berwick pointed out in Wells, if you are having to draw on the capital to meet these costs because the income is not good enough, in a diminishing market, that runs the real risk that the market may not recover sufficiently to bring the award up to the level needed to sustain the injured party for the rest of the period during which that party needs to be sustained. There is a difficult area here: in some cases, particularly if you alter the level of risk, you run into the possibility of the injured party not being fully compensated.

I seek by the amendment to suggest for the noble and learned Lord’s consideration a slightly different formula of words in that critical proposed new subsection that would enable the court to escape from the straitjacket of existing case law in cases that justify a fresh approach. On that basis, I have expanded a little on the formula of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, to draw attention to the need for this sum to be sufficiently large to meet the needs of the claimant for the rest of the period. It is in that context that I ask the noble and learned Lord to consider my amendment in deciding what best to do to avoid simply repeating a dead letter.

Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Hope of Craighead

Monday 29th June 2015 Grand Committee

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I understand the noble Baroness’s concerns on this point and why she feels this may be a loophole which may be abused by the Charity Commission. Nevertheless, we need to give the Charity Commission additional powers, as the noble Baroness said. It has produced quite extensive guidance on how it proposes to use the power, and I cannot imagine that if the Minister, whoever it was, was to propose a change under subsection (4), the sector would allow it to go by unchallenged. The sector would surely be up in arms if it felt that its independence or its freedom to appoint trustees was being infringed. I accept what the Joint Committee on the legislation said, but we are in danger of unnecessarily trammelling the hands of the Minister. These things will need to be looked at from time to time—for example, who would have thought about terrorist fundraising five or six years ago?—and no doubt there may be other issues in the future that will need to be dealt with.

Will the Minister say whether this is subject to the affirmative resolution procedure or the negative procedure? My ability to support the noble Baroness will depend slightly on his answer to that question.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I shall add a few words based on the Joint Committee’s report. The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, is right that this is the clause which caused the committee most concern. We have before us, among other things, a very carefully worded memorandum from the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, the meat of which is set out at pages 96 to 97 of the Joint Committee’s report. That Delegated Powers Committee draws attention to a number of problems that subsection (4) of new Section 178A gives rise to, including the risk of retrospective legislation bringing in offences that were not in the purview of the section when they were committed, without any provision for what would happen to people who were unaware that this might cause them to be disqualified. The committee considered various other aspects, but overall its conclusion was that subsection (4) of the new section should remain in the Bill.

Although the Joint Committee discussed this very fully, we reached the same conclusion, which was put in the report. We were content that the order-making power should be available in the form and subject of the procedures that were proposed, but I draw attention to paragraph 208, which contains the recommendation, that,

“when using the power, the Minister should be required to consult fully on whether it is appropriate and proportionate to include an offence within the list of disqualifying offences”.

The process of consultation would be directed to the variety of problems discussed by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in its report. There is a question as to whether that requirement should be statutory, or whether it is enough that the Minister would be prepared to say that he would be content to follow what the Joint Committee recommended: that he would consult fully on whether it was appropriate and proportionate to include an offence within the list of qualifying offences. I speak only for myself, but if the Minister was prepared to give an assurance of that kind, that would go some way at least to meeting the noble Baroness’s concerns.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I draw attention to the last two sentences of paragraph 183 of the Joint Committee’s report, at pages 53 and 54. They refer to an exchange between me and the Minister speaking for the Home Office, the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde. I pointed out to him the difficulty faced, according to the evidence we received, by people who are trying to gain access to areas where people are in dire need of food, warm clothing or whatever else when somebody there is, in effect, a gatekeeper and refuses any transit to the areas where these people are without some form of payment.

One would of course support what the noble Lord, Lord Ashton, said as a general rule—one does not want people to pay money to terrorists for any reason—but the New Zealand legislation has addressed the problem by putting in the phrase “without reasonable excuse”. Something of that kind would go some way to addressing this problem, because a hard-edged refusal to contemplate any situation where money is paid by somebody—not to assist terrorist activity but simply to get access for a humanitarian purpose—would seem to be too severe. I would have thought that there is a need for some degree of flexibility, although like everyone else I recognise that this is a very sensitive issue and the last thing one wants to do is encourage terrorism. There is a conflict of two diametrically opposed interests here, and the hard-edged and uncompromising line, as described in the noble Lord’s reply when I put forward my suggestion, is prejudicing those who are in need of humanitarian assistance.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, having also been a member of the Joint Committee, I support the need for flexibility on this. I used the example at Second Reading of the Yazidi women who have been enslaved by ISIS and whom it is allegedly possible to ransom for $10,000. Clearly that money is going if not directly then indirectly to ISIS and these charities are faced with an incredibly difficult decision. On the one hand, morality drives you towards wishing to rescue these wretched women who are in a state of sexual slavery. On the other, there is the danger that if you do it, you may end up being prosecuted for the reasons that we have been discussing. I support the need to find some way through this thicket. Whether it is a DPP statement of guidelines or whatever else, I do not know, but we should not let it just ride through our Committee without having a real go at getting clarity as to how charities can operate, not only for the benefit of the individuals concerned but for the reputation of this country. Our soft-power reputation for making an important contribution to providing humanitarian aid in various parts of the world is important to us, and we need to spend time making sure that we maintain it.

Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Hope of Craighead

Tuesday 23rd June 2015 Grand Committee

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, there is a great deal that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, said with which I agree. Perhaps I can take this opportunity to pay my own tribute to the work that she, along with other Members of your Lordships’ House who are present, did on the committee. There is a great deal of force in her point about the importance of the notice that is being given to trustees as to what the Charity Commission wants to do with regard to publication. However, I have a concern about the removal of the word “how” and the substitution of the words “when and where” for this reason: when you think carefully about what the words really mean, the effect of the amendment is to narrow the amount of the information that is required by the provision. There are other things built into the word “how” which are not there—the manner in which this is to be done, and how often, are two examples. One point that the Charity Law Association raised with us and is in a memorandum it sent to us in connection with the Committee stage of the Bill is the element of publicity itself and whether anonymity is to be given to the trustees who are the subject of the publication. If one restricts the amount of information simply to “where” and “when”, it leaves out the possibility of further inquiry as to the precise way in which this is to be done.

I appreciate the word “how”. After all, a three letter word seems very weak but, if you think about it, it is actually quite a powerful word because it embraces so much within it. If you read that together with what is in subsection (6) which enables people to make representations as to “how”—I repeat the word “how”—the publication is to be done, one can see that it gives scope for a good deal more inquiry.

I have huge respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Barker—I am entirely in sympathy with what she is seeking to do—but I would respectfully suggest that “how” is probably the best word to use. If it is to be replaced by something else, then there would need to be more in it than simply “where” and “when”. I find that a little untidy, which is why I suggest that we leave the word “how” as it is.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I have some sympathy with the noble Baroness’s amendment. I hoped that she would have inserted those words in addition to “how”, so that it would have been “how”, “when” and “where”.

Before I address the pros and cons, because this is the first time I am speaking in Committee, I want to take this opportunity to let noble Lords know of a potential, tangential interest that I may have in a matter which will come before them at a later stage. It concerns fundraising. The charities report that I produced, which was published in July 2012, has a whole chapter—Chapter 8—devoted to fundraising. It is 17 pages long and makes a number of recommendations, none of which I resile from. In fact, I think many are equally, if not more, appropriate today.

In my non-political life, as can be seen on the register of interests in your Lordships’ House, I am non-executive chairman of a company called Nova Capital Management. Nova is a specialist private equity firm which is focused on what are known as “secondary directs”. This means that Nova purchases groups of companies on behalf of groups of institutional investors—often an unloved and neglected division of a much larger company. Nova provides intensive support for management of the individual companies within the group with a view to achieving improved operating and financial performance which, in due course, is reflected in a superior sale price. I play no part in the day-to-day operation of Nova, let alone of any of the individual companies in the various portfolios.

In December 2011, Nova created a company called CNH Capital Partners to take over a public company called Parseq plc. It has three divisions—two need not concern us at all. The third, Parseq Services, has a series of subsidiaries which provide business processing outsourcing services to banks, local authorities and utility companies from locations stretching from Glasgow to Brighton. In February 2013, seven months after my review was completed, the board of Parseq decided to expand its operations by acquiring a company called Panther Group. This, in turn, has a number of subsidiaries. One of these, Pell & Bales, undertakes telephone fundraising for a number of leading charities, including Christian Aid, RNIB, Cancer Research UK, Barnardo’s, the National Trust and the Royal British Legion.

As a result of the death of Olive Cooke, Pell & Bales has been caught up in the storm over charity fundraising, in particular because an undercover journalist from the Sun was embedded in the business in order to investigate the sector. In its major article of Saturday 6 June, the Sun concluded:

“There is no suggestion Pell & Bales did anything illegal. Indeed, the company is scrupulous in instructing its employees to stick to acceptable practices”.

I understand that the management of Pell & Bales has since reported the Sun to IPSO as a result of what the company believes are breaches of the press guidelines.

As I have explained, my very tangential association with Pell & Bales began six months after I completed my review. There can be no suggestion that it was in any way influenced by that association. Some might argue that I have nothing to declare. I think it best if I explain this position on the first occasion I speak in Committee. This amendment is not about fundraising but I judge that the sooner I lay out the facts and explain my position, the better. In the highly charged atmosphere of cases such as the tragic death of Olive Cooke, truth and accuracy can be early casualties.

With that declaration, I turn to the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. As I explained, the ideal situation would be to have “when and where” added to “how”. An example is the impact not only on a trustee, but on a charity. The charity might have been given an official warning—or a warning of a warning under new Section 75A(3)—but perhaps I and my fellow trustees do not agree with the commission’s determination. We make representations, but the commission decides not to accept them. Our charity has a significant funder and I want to talk to him or her about this case and give the trustees a view of the issues. Such a conversation or discussion is made much clearer if I know when and where the news of the official warning is to be released—the date, time, methodology and so on. “How” could mean no more detail than by a press release on a date yet to be determined. That would be unfair to the charity, which may be contesting the view and wants to be able to talk to its funder to ensure that its side of the argument is heard, without which the case might go by default.

With respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, I do not entirely take his point because, for a charity trustee, some further clarity in the wording would be a good idea. Therefore, I look forward to hearing my noble friend’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I just add a word to what the noble Baroness, Lady Warwick of Undercliffe, said by drawing attention to two paragraphs in our report—paragraphs 120 and 121. In paragraph 120, we refer to evidence from the Charity Law Association. It told us that, in its view,

“the wording of this power was ‘very wide’ and that it had concerns about how conduct would be deemed relevant for consideration by the Commission”,

if it was given that very wide power. In paragraph 121, we referred to the Muslim Charities Forum—this is on page 41 of the report—which expressed a concern that,

“the provision would allow the Commission to pass judgment on the political views of charity trustees, potentially infringing upon freedom of association and expression”.

A particular concern—and we quote from its evidence—was that trustees might, in a personal capacity,

“express support for Palestinian Statehood, speak out against the crack-down on Freedom of Association in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, or merely voice their anger at aspects of Western foreign policy”.

That could all,

“potentially fall under the net of supporting terrorism and/or extremism”.

It would then fall within the very broad description which is given in the two paragraphs to which these amendments refer.

I have to confess that we did not make any specific recommendation in our report. However, in paragraph 124, we state:

“we share the concerns of the JCHR and other witnesses about the risks associated with the power and its lack of clarity”.

I wanted to make these points to emphasise that there was a strong evidential basis for the concerns that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, has expressed. These two references are in addition to those that the noble Baroness, Lady Warwick, mentioned in her short speech.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, having served on the pre-legislative scrutiny committee, I understand the concerns about the width of this clause, but if we were to accept this amendment, we would go from a very broad power to a very narrow one. As I read it, we have to take into account, first, the effect of a person’s behaviour within the charity about to be inquired into and secondly, the conduct of that person in any other charity. That does not seem satisfactory because there are clearly issues that range more widely. The behaviour of a trustee in general life is an indication of their seriousness. For example, the existence of county court judgments would indicate that their personal financial behaviour may be a bit erratic. It may be that they had been a director of a commercial company which had gone bankrupt and which had been unfavourably commented upon by the companies’ inspectorate. It might even have resulted in them being banned as a company director for a time. These are all issues which the Charity Commission might reasonably take into account when considering a particular situation, if what can be seen as a proven rotten apple is likely to result in damage to the position, reputation, trust and confidence in the charitable sector generally.

While I have some sympathy with the concerns of the noble Baroness, I do not think striking out subsection (3)(b) of new Section 76A is the right answer. It would be too narrow a prism and the Charity Commission would have its hands unduly tied. We must find some better way to sort it out.

Consumer Rights Bill

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Hope of Craighead

Monday 24th November 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I was not sufficiently fast on my feet, but when he comes to reply to this debate, perhaps the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, could make it clear whether the delicate implication of his amendment is that the Competition Appeal Tribunal is judicially underpowered for its tasks at present or, in particular, in the future.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I will reply to that very briefly. I thought that I made it clear that the amendment is really provoked by the expanding jurisdiction in Schedule 8. The present position copes satisfactorily—it is not the ideal situation—but the expanded jurisdiction will greatly increase the workload of the tribunal and its visibility, because it is going to deal with private litigation as well as the regulatory authorities. It is that particular feature that is concerning the Lord Chief Justice and, I dare say, his equivalents north of the border and in Northern Ireland. I do not want to criticise anybody on the tribunal at the present time; I am trying to look forward to the expanded jurisdiction and see that it is served as well as possible.