Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Beecham

Monday 15th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, Amendment 1A may be less controversial than the matter that we have just finished discussing, although in matters of the law you never quite know. The amendment was originally tabled in the name of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, and I added my name to it. My noble friend has had to travel to northern England today on business, so is unable to be here in time to move this amendment. I am moving it on his behalf.

The amendment is very simple: a one-word change to Clause 3, the clause entitled “Responsibility”, to which the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred earlier. It replaces “generally” with “predominantly”, so that the clause will read:

“The court must have regard to whether the person”,

demonstrated a “predominantly”,

“responsible approach towards protecting the safety or other interests of others”.

The question was whether the use of “generally” was sufficiently focused to achieve the appropriate balance in individual cases. The adverb “generally” has three definitions in the Collins English Dictionary. The first is “usually; as a rule”. The second is “commonly or widely”. The final one is,

“without reference to specific details or facts; broadly”.

I suspect that what your Lordships’ House will wish the courts to consider, if this Bill passes into law, is whether the defendant will first claim that he was demonstrating an approach which on that occasion was in the main responsible in protecting the safety of others as opposed to the approach which usually, but not necessarily on that occasion, was responsible. Replacing “generally” with “predominantly”—we return to the Collins English Dictionary definition, which is,

“for the most part mostly and mainly”—

should provide the courts with the power to examine the approach of the defendant at the material time and avoid them having to consider the approach demonstrated at other times or taking the matter even wider, enabling them to take into account the approach followed other than that at the material time.

This Bill has an important role to play in reassuring potential volunteers, but equally it should not encourage behaviour which is thoughtless or irresponsible and thus puts others at risk. This change of word may better balance the two aspects, and I hope that the amendment will find favour with my noble friend. I beg to move.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, Clause 3 is the one clause in the Bill which the Government acknowledge embodies a substantive change in the law. In Committee, I moved an amendment to remove “generally” from the requirement on the court to consider whether,

“the alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty … demonstrated a generally responsible approach towards protecting the safety or other interests of others”.

Neither at Second Reading nor in Committee did the Minister define the meaning of “a generally responsible approach”, and in replying to the debate in Committee he acknowledged that the term was “unusual” in statutory terms. Indeed, he indicated that he would,

“consider carefully whether and to what extent it adds anything to what is in the clause at the moment and whether, on balance, it takes the matter any further”.—[Official Report, 18/11/14; col. 414.]

We await with bated breath the outcome of the Minister’s deliberations along with his response to the amendment tabled by his noble friend, who is seeking to ratchet up “generally” to “predominantly” in the proposed clause.

I have to say that neither term is satisfactory in terms of either definition, which is entirely lacking, or effect. Why should someone suffering damage through an act of negligence or breach of statutory duty be denied compensation on the grounds that the act or omission was in effect a first offence, or at any rate a rare offence? What, for that matter, constitutes a “responsible” approach? How does the Minister define those terms? Moreover, and crucially, the clause is not limited to social action, responsibility or heroism, terms which are in themselves undefined and undefinable, or to personal injury cases. We are dealing not just with safety but, in terms of the clause, with other interests. As I reported in Committee, the Minister in the House of Commons, Mr Vara, affirmed that the clause,

“could in principle be applicable in relation to other instances of negligence such as damage to property or economic loss where issues of safety may not necessarily be relevant”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/10/14; col. 693.]

Why should a negligent builder, medical practitioner, accountant, surveyor or even solicitor—I declare my interest—escape liability for what might even be catastrophic damage because he has been hitherto “predominantly” responsible? Negligence can lead to large losses outside the realm of personal injury. Is not the reality that this badly drafted clause is yet another concession to the insurance lobby, which ordinarily would of course stand behind the defendant in such claims?

Many Members of your Lordships’ House will have received an e-mail today from one of those pressure groups which so exercise the Lord Chancellor in relation to judicial review. In this case, the pressure group is one which we can be confident he entirely approves of: it is the CBI. Its curiously worded communication supports Clause 3 on the grounds that it,

“provides better protection against accidents for those firms—particularly the small and medium sized companies that already have good health and safety processes in place”.

Of course, it does nothing of the sort. It provides “better protection” against claims for negligence arising from accidents and it extends, of course, to large employers as well as medium-sized and small employers.

The e-mail goes on to suggest that,

“this clause will encourage the courts to recognise that safety is a shared responsibility”,

as if the courts do not already do so, and do not make findings of contributory negligence when a claimant fails to take proper precautions, or dismiss a claim when he is wholly responsible. Of course, again, the CBI ignores the fact that the clause extends to all types of negligence, including by small and medium-sized businesses which might well find themselves a victim of negligence other than of the kind leading to personal injury.

As the CBI’s response eloquently exemplifies, this whole Bill has all the hallmarks of being drafted by the Lord Chancellor on the back of a small envelope. This clause, in particular, is deeply objectionable. Unless the Minister is prepared to abandon the clause, I shall invite the House to divide and consign the envelope to the parliamentary waste bin.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, I, too, congratulate the Government on leaving out the 11 words at the end of this clause. Particularly following our debate in Committee, it appeared to me that a “person’s own safety” is not necessarily a part of heroism, so it is a useful removal.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, in speaking to his amendment to leave out the clause, said that his reasons for wishing to do that were broadly the same as his reasons for tabling Amendment 1, which concerned Clause 2. I understand that, and therefore draw the conclusion that I drew a couple of hours ago. I hope that my noble friend will resist that amendment.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, asked what was added by the reference to heroism in the Bill. The answer is that it allows the Government to bestow an acronym on the Bill; otherwise, it would simply be the “Social Action Responsibility Bill”. Now, we have the words “and Heroism”, which make a convenient acronym. That is an interesting way of proceeding with the drafting of legislation and I concur with the noble and learned Lord’s criticisms of that process.

Having said that, the Minister has at least made a concession by, in effect, accepting the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to which I subscribed, as I said before. It was of some comfort that St John Ambulance, which was certainly in touch with me and, I suspect, other noble Lords, welcomed that change. The clause does not substantially affect anything, as we have already heard. However, in so far as this modest change makes it marginally more palatable, I welcome the Minister’s concession. He has not been able to offer too many concessions, but I am glad that he has prevailed on the Lord Chancellor on this occasion to make a gesture of an unfamiliarly generous kind to this House. I support the amendment.

Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Beecham

Tuesday 18th November 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, it is interesting that the noble Lord seeks to give carte blanche to any organisation, whether it be a statutory organisation or a voluntary organisation, to preside over a situation in which injuries can be sustained but no compensation paid because the organisation would have difficulty in funding the claim. There are considerable difficulties with that approach. The first is that it entirely removes any incentive to prevent accidents occurring in the first place. This Bill is supposed to encourage people to volunteer. The effect of the noble Lord’s amendment would be to encourage statutory and other authorities to take no precautions whatever because they can always demonstrate that they need more money. It would be more relevant if the noble Lord addressed his colleagues on the government Benches to ensure, for example, that the health service and local authorities are adequately funded to carry out all their responsibilities, whether dealing with potholes or treating people properly in hospital and avoiding clinical negligence claims and the like.

It strikes me as extraordinary that the noble Lord should be making a proposition which would completely exclude compensation for an innocent injured party who proves injury, bearing in mind that all these cases depend on a claimant proving on the balance of probabilities that he or she has been the victim of negligence leading to the injuries for which he or she seeks compensation. Those are quite extraordinary propositions, and I hope the Committee—and in due course, if the noble Lord brings the matter back on Report, the House—will not countenance them. They would remove from compensation a large number of people who are entirely justified in making a claim.

Let us be quite clear: nobody has any sympathy with claims farmers or anybody attempting to make a fraudulent claim, whether or not they are represented by —shall we put it gently?—overambitious solicitors or others in promoting such matters. Many of us regularly report to this House being approached by such organisations on our telephones, computers and Blackberries, let alone through adverts in the press and other media. That is something that is entirely reprehensible. We are at one with the noble Lord in wanting to see those matters regulated. I congratulate the Government on the steps that they are taking in that respect. These proposals go much too far and would have an adverse effect on people with legitimate claims. I hope that, on reflection, the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw them.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support the amendment of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, which seems a potentially sensible and proportionate addition to the Bill.

In this group, we have a clause stand part debate in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I was wondering if they were going to speak to this because I have an interest in it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham]

Can the noble Lord explain the relevance of the cases he has just cited to the Bill—or, to put it the other way round, the relevance of the Bill to the cases he has just cited? The Bill is speaking about claims for negligence.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

What I am talking about here is the provision that the court,

“must have regard to … the alleged negligence or breach”.

In the case of the Oxford museum, the solicitors were indicating that failure to have CRB checks could render the museum liable for a negligence claim in the event of there being a problem.

Law Commission

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Beecham

Monday 12th May 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend on the Front Bench is well aware that I am no lawyer. He and indeed other Members of the Committee may therefore wonder why I have trespassed into this rather specialist area of the legal world—the role of the Law Commission. The answer is that a few years ago, when the new procedure devised to enable your Lordships’ House to consider Law Commission Bills not only faster but more effectively was introduced, I had the privilege of serving on the first Bill so dealt with, the Perpetuities and Accumulations Bill, which gave me first-hand knowledge of the valuable work done by the Law Commission.

When I talked to staff at the Law Commission, in a rather charmingly self-effacing, self-deprecating way they described their work as being “care and maintenance”. That gravely underestimates the value of what they do. For example, their work on the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act—another Bill Committee on which I served—made significant improvements to the position of the man in the street seeking to obtain insurance. It restricted the ability of insurers to ask open-ended questions of the “Are there any other questions and facts that the insurer ought to be aware of” variety. The Bill Committee received evidence of cases where this had been much abused. An individual was refused treatment for his cancer on his private health insurance because he had failed to reveal to the insurer that he had visited his doctor—about flu, not cancer—a few weeks before his cancer was diagnosed.

I argue that the Law Commission does valuable work in improving equality of arms, in clarifying aspects of historical legislation that modern developments have made obscure, and generally—in that rather overused modern phrase—in helping to make the law fit for purpose. Of course, there are limitations to the work of the Law Commission. It must not and cannot trespass into party-political issues. Notwithstanding that, it provides a light-touch, swift way of keeping our law up to date. I was therefore distressed to learn that a number of Law Commission Bills that are, so to speak, on the runway do not appear to be being cleared for take-off. I want to focus on three of those now.

The first is a report on easements and covenants, published in June 2011—nearly three years ago. Inter alia, restrictions on landowners creating easements and covenants with variable impacts restrict their ability to obtain mortgage finance and so impact the development of large estates. The Bill would ease those challenges.

The second is an insurance contract law Bill, which is essentially a commercial follow-up to the consumer insurance Act that I referred to earlier. The Bill is particularly important for small businesses, such as a shop or a small family metal fabricating business, where the owners’ personal assets are co-mingled with those of the commercial operation. There is a practical reason for urgency on that Bill, in that Mr David Hertzell—the Law Commissioner responsible for all the work done on that Bill to date—retires in December this year. It would surely be an unnecessary own goal to lose his experience and expertise.

The third is a third parties (rights against insurers) Bill. A version of it received Royal Assent in 2010 but, for reasons that I have not been able to ascertain, it has never been implemented. It now needs to be updated by a short supplemental Bill. The Act’s purpose is to protect the insured where the insurer has gone out of business. It therefore has particular relevance for “long tail” claims, such as those relating to asbestosis.

The Government could, if they chose, quickly take forward that group of Bills. Are those Bills going to have the regulars of the saloon bar of the Dog and Duck dancing on the tables? No, they are not, but they are individually going to make a significant difference in their specialist areas. In particular, I venture the thought that your Lordships’ House is not going to be overburdened with legislation in the next Session. Therefore, what better way to use the House’s time and expertise than in considering these important but non-contentious pieces of legislation? I look forward to hearing, at least in outline, how my noble friend sees progress being made on these and indeed other Law Commission Bills.

A repetition of what happened to the Law Commission’s Bill on termination of tenancies for tenant default would surely be unacceptable. It was originally published by the Law Commission on 31 October 2006—seven and a half years ago. To date, no response to it has been forthcoming, from this or the previous Government. Governments are of course entitled to decline to take forward particular pieces of legislation but it is surely unacceptable not to respond to the Law Commission’s work. The Bill would do much to help businesses to stay in business by removing the perverse incentive that currently exists for landlords to change the locks on properties as early as possible. Sadly, the commission has concluded that since, as I explained, more than seven and a half years have now elapsed since the first consultation, the Bill is out of time. Consultation will have to begin again and all the public funds so far expended have been wasted.

For the remainder of my remarks, I will look forward at two Law Commission Bills currently in consultation. The first is the regulation of health and social care Bill. I have a shrewd suspicion that my noble friend Lord Kirkwood and the noble Lord, Lord Patel, will wish to pursue this in more detail. Health and social care professional regulation is currently provided under the provisions of the Medical Act 1983 and a series of parallel Acts for other health professions. In the words of the General Medical Council, the Medical Act is,

“outdated, complex, highly prescriptive and difficult to change. This makes it difficult to innovate and respond quickly and efficiently to society’s expectations in a rapidly changing healthcare environment”.

This Law Commission Bill is different from most of those that have gone before in that it is long and complex. Most Law Commission Bills are quite slim but this Bill is telephone directory-thick, and of course it has the capacity to become party political. The Bill is in danger of falling between various stools. Nevertheless, for the reasons that I have already outlined, it is a badly needed Bill in order to keep our regulatory framework up to date and so improve the protection of patients. So where is this Bill now? Is it still a Law Commission Bill or will it become a Department of Health Bill? If so far it is neither, when will the decision be made as to which legislative process is to be adopted?

I now turn to an area in which I have long taken an interest—the world of charities. Charities and voluntary groups do wonderful work across our civil society—in particular, tackling those hard-to-reach groups that present particularly intractable and challenging social problems. To their great credit, the Government recognise the role of the sector, but the charity sector is much impeded by an outdated legal structure, notably the fact that the current law makes no distinction between the duties of a trustee of an ordinary trust as opposed to a charitable one. This, linked to the complications and complexities of what is known as permanent endowment, has significantly impeded the development of social investment and the consequent growth of charities that could benefit from the availability of finance so provided. A Law Commission consultation paper on these issues has recently been published and the consultation period closes on 18 June. I hope that my noble friend will be able to tell me that the Government propose to move forward swiftly to the implementation phase thereafter.

Before I conclude, I have one further point. The Lord Chancellor produces an annual report on the work of the Law Commission. A little bird told me that the report for last year was to be published last Thursday, 8 May. I have searched on the parliamentary website for it without success. Fearing that this only revealed my technological incompetence, I sought the help of the Printed Paper Office, also to no avail. I should be grateful if my noble friend could confirm its whereabouts.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

I have read it.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, is clearly more expert than I am at this. Half an hour ago, the Printed Paper Office told me that it did not have a copy. I now know its whereabouts. I thought that it might be published with a view to trying to spike my guns, but there we are. I look forward to the pleasure of reading it in due course.

I have argued that the Law Commission does valuable work that is far too valuable to be left to moulder on a Whitehall shelf. Proposals are awaiting implementation and the Government should use time in the next Session to bring these forward. I recognise that I have asked my noble friend a number of detailed questions, although I hope that I gave his office at least an outline of the lines that I proposed to follow. I would be perfectly happy if he were minded to write to me and Members of the Committee in reply.

What I am looking for is a general sense of urgency and commitment. Someone once described a Minister’s job as being a mixture of bomb disposal and Dyno-Rod. I want to be reassured this afternoon that my noble friend is the man from Dyno-Rod.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I commend and support the noble Lords, Lord Kirkwood and Lord Patel, for their urging of the Government to proceed with the important legislation that they have described to the Committee in this debate. I will speak more generally about the work of the Law Commission. I plead guilty to technological ineptitude of a high order, but I was nevertheless able to download the report that was published, as the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said, last Thursday and able to obtain a hard copy this morning, so I have a slight advantage over the noble Lord in the ineptitude stakes when it comes to this debate.

It was interesting to read the Report on the Implementation of Law Commission Proposals. It is an annual report published by the Ministry of Justice, and it finds the Lord Chancellor in splendid Candide mode. He reports in his foreword that new procedures were introduced in 2009 and have,

“reduced the time and resources required for a non controversial Law Commission Bill to pass through Parliament”.

He refers to the Government’s “improved record on implementation” during the year and claims that there has been,

“significant progress on implementing the Commission’s proposals”.

He holds,

“the excellent work of the Law Commission in very high regard”,

and says that,

“the progress we have made during this past year demonstrates the continued relevance and resilience of the Commission’s work”.

Well, no doubt it does, but it would be more persuasive of the Secretary of State and the Lord Chancellor if in fact some of the long-outstanding proposals made by the commission had been activated during that time, or indeed an even longer period of time. After all, as we have heard, a number of proposed Bills have lain around for some considerable time. There has been the electronic communications code Bill, referred to in paragraph 45 of the report, which was published in February 2013 and to which apparently a response is indicated by the end of 2014. That means it will be nearly two years before someone in Government gets around to responding. Then there is the public services ombudsman Bill, referred to on page 49, which was published in 2011 and to which a response is apparently to be made available this summer. If a local authority took three years to respond to something, the Local Government Ombudsman would be rather critical of what little progress had been made.

The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, referred to the Bill about easements. That is not a matter likely to inflame public opinion or, I suspect, cause a great deal of division among Members of either House. Yet, as he pointed out, it was published in 2011 and a response is apparently due—I do not know whether the Minister or his advisers can tell us exactly when, but it is some time this year. Certainly, that is another three-year period. It is even worse for the High Court criminal procedures Bill, which was put forward in 2010. At page 55 we learn that a response will be made in the summer of 2014. That is a four-year gap.

As the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, rightly pointed out, there is the important termination of tenancies for tenant default Bill, which has been around for, as he said, seven and a half years. It is fair to say that the previous Government talked about doing something and did not get around to doing it, but it is four years on even since those days. It is interesting that in the 2013 implementation report, the Government stated that they had “discussed the proposals” and were,

“continuing discussions with the Commission”,

in relation to commercial tenancies. Those were referred to especially by the noble Lord, Lord Kirkwood. It will be interesting to learn if the Minister is able to update us today or subsequently on just how far those discussions have gone.

I have a closer interest in another aspect, which is private tenancies. A year ago, the Government were saying that they were also considering whether improvements could be made to the evictions procedure in the residential sector. Before Mr Grant Shapps—or Michael Green, as he is otherwise known—begins to accuse the Government of Venezuelan tendencies in respect of private rented property, perhaps the Minister will indicate whether the Government are seriously looking at this issue. They have been rather dismissive of proposals made by the Labour Party about elements of security of tenure, yet at least a year ago they were talking about looking seriously at precisely those issues.

In addition to those matters, there are still a number of outstanding matters in which the Government have apparently abandoned any prospect of taking Bills forward. With regard to the participating in crime Bill in May 2007, the cohabitation Bill in July 2007 and the conspiracy and attempts Bill in December 2009, the Government have indicated that they have no intention of taking up those recommendations for reform during the current Parliament. So that is one complete Parliament—one and a half, in two cases—gone without any action being taken, with no good explanation why the Government have come to that conclusion.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

I had conversations with the Law Commission about where we were on these various issues. In two of the cases that the noble Lord has mentioned, the commission was concerned that they would get it into the arena of party-political warfare and concluded that it was not suitable to proceed further. That was the commission’s conclusion, not the Government’s. It is not a fair accusation that the Government have not acted; the Law Commission itself felt that these were not the right areas for it to be involved in.

[Lord Beecham]

The noble Lord may be right in respect of bringing stuff forward at the last minute in a five-year Parliament, but years have gone by. It cannot be said that political considerations would have been particularly relevant two or three years ago on matters that by that time had already been outstanding for four or five years. If these matters had been political, they would not have been included in the Law Commission’s programme in the first place or indeed agreed by the Government, because the Government agree these things. On the timing of an eventual Bill, I take the noble Lord’s point—it would perhaps be inappropriate to do that in the run-up to an election—but we have no indication at all of why the Government decided not to proceed with these Bills.

There are a couple of other Bills where apparently some sort of conclusion may be expected. There is a remedies against public authorities Bill, which celebrates its fourth birthday in 10 or 12 days’ time, on which the ministry committed to providing by Easter 2014 a complete analysis of the results of a pilot scheme. Are the Government ready to pronounce upon those results and, therefore, their intentions regarding that Bill? The other Bill to which there was a commitment to provide a response during the summer is a High Court jurisdiction in criminal cases Bill, which is now nearly three years old. Will we in fact get a response this summer, and is it possible for what I suspect will be such highly technical matters to be brought forward during the dog days of this Parliament—although, frankly, it does not look as though there will be much else to do? Then, as I said, there is the public services ombudsman Bill, to which a response was expected from the Cabinet Office, not the Ministry of Justice, by Easter. I am not aware that any such response has been in the public domain; again, perhaps, if not today then subsequently, we might find out.

All this raises questions not about how the commission works—it is doing its work—but about how that work is received and dealt with at the government end. It was interesting to read the triennial review of the Law Commission on this subject. Paragraph 43 asserts:

“The Law Commission faces many difficult challenges at the moment. It is currently developing its 12th Programme of Law Reform in an uncertain climate. The Protocol governing the Commission’s work provides that before approving the inclusion of a project in the overall programme the Lord Chancellor will expect the relevant Minister to give an undertaking that there is a serious intention to take forward law reform in this area”.

Touching on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, it then asserts:

“With the timescale for the 12th Programme spanning the next General Election, the Commission and Ministers will be making decisions in a context where there is a great deal of uncertainty about whether the incoming Government will support any project”.

That raises two points. First, in respect of matters that cannot be concluded in this Parliament, will the Government facilitate discussions between the Opposition and the commission about what a future Government might do? I ask that particularly in the light of recent decisions by the Prime Minister not to facilitate discussions between the Civil Service and the Opposition until much later this year—much closer to a general election than has been indicated in the past. As noble Lords will understand, I have very strong objections to that of a political kind. However, with Law Commission Bills we are not talking about highly controversial political matters anyway. I cannot see that discussions would be at all embarrassing to the Government; these are not government policies that will be under review. I cannot see any difficulty in facilitating a discussion between the Opposition and the commission about the commission’s own agenda. It would be helpful to an incoming Government, which I hope to see—and which noble Lords opposite hope not to see—or for any future Opposition to have that kind of relationship with the commission, so that the whole process can be accelerated and the Law Commission does not have to start from scratch.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Beecham

Monday 23rd July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, this amendment and the other amendments in the group relate to what are extraordinarily wide powers that Clause 11(2) and subsequent subsections would confer on the Secretary of State to amend, for the purposes of the legislation, the definition of “relevant civil proceedings”. The Delegated Powers Committee looked in some detail at these matters and I rely heavily on its observations. It raised significant concerns and made it clear that, while, of course, the procedures are confined to civil proceedings, the effect of the Bill is to permit any such civil proceedings to be ones in which the procedures can be invoked.

Subsections (2) to (4) of Clause 11 confer a very wide power on the Secretary of State to amend the definition and to amend the definition by affirmative order. In so doing, courts or tribunals can be added or removed and rules can be prescribed. The committee stated that:

“The powers are undoubtedly wide”.

They might, indeed, in the view of the committee, be exercised so as to specify a coroner’s court. Of course your Lordships will recall that the question of inquests has been mentioned more than once. The Lord Chancellor has indicated that procedures would not apply to inquests but, on the face of it, that decision could be changed under the provisions of Clause 11(2), by order, to be approved, as I have indicated, by affirmative resolution. In addition to that, there is the possibility of some urgency being required in the mind of the Government and that is also a question which the committee addressed. There is the possibility of a made affirmative procedure being invoked under which a change could be instituted by, effectively, tabling an amendment. Although, ultimately, that would have to be approved, it would take effect immediately.

The committee, while acknowledging the Government’s concerns about urgency, pointed out that if a situation arose in which it was felt that an application needed to be made in proceedings before a court or tribunal which was not initially specified and for which, therefore, an order would have to be brought forward, the Government,

“does not explain why it is thought that an order which attracts the draft affirmative procedure should offer any speedier means of meeting that perceived need for amending legislation than, for instance, a short Bill fast-tracked through both Houses”.

It said, and I think that there is considerable force in the argument, that that approach,

“would at least ensure that control over further extensions of the ‘closed material procedure’ would remain with Parliament, rather than with the Government”.

Nevertheless, it took the view that the House should consider,

“the scope of the powers conferred so that it may appreciate the unconstrained nature and extent of the provision that might be made under them by this or any future government. The House may wish to consider whether the Bill should be amended to restrict that scope or to include any such safeguards as the House might regard as necessary for ensuring Convention rights are observed and for protecting the interests of open justice”.

The Constitution Committee thought that the made affirmative procedure might be more appropriate, but the Delegated Powers Committee felt that that would perhaps be the least likely way to meet the need for urgency.

The provisions here are extensive. The procedure that the Government propose to adopt does not really allow sufficient parliamentary scrutiny and leaves the decision, as the Delegated Powers Committee made clear, in the hands of the Government when there is an alternative if a situation of urgency arises. Your Lordships might think that this is much too broad a power to be left in the way that this clause and its subsections provide and I sense that the other amendments in this group reflect that view. I hope that the Government will reconsider and go back, before Report, to the recommendations of the Delegated Powers Committee and seek to amend this provision as it currently stands to one that is more acceptable and more consonant with the procedures of parliamentary scrutiny of what might be significant changes to the scope of the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, I have tabled Amendment 70 in this group. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has covered the points and I do not wish to weary the Committee with repetition. Amendment 70 would remove subsections (3) and (4), as well as subsection (2), and is therefore more brutal in its application. One of the briefings I received on this part of the Bill said that this was a potentially,

“unwarranted extension of an unsatisfactory procedure”.

I therefore support what the noble Lord was saying about the dangers of mission creep, which we have discussed before. As we keep hearing it stressed that this is going to be a very rare procedure, it seems strange that we should allow courts to be added in what is essentially a pretty cavalier manner. I am all for statutory instruments and their positive nature, but they are unamendable and inherently too weak to tackle something that is as dangerous and difficult as this area that we have been discussing these past few days.

Subsection (4)(a) refers to “explaining the meaning” of “rules of court”. Do they really need to be explained? Are we not, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, has explained to us, able to rely on judicial discretion and ability to interpret? I am concerned that explaining the meaning of the rules of court carries with it, in some more sinister way, an instruction as to what they mean and what judges should do. Similar wording in subsection (4)(b),

“enabling provision of a particular description to be made by such rules of court”,

seems to me, as a non-lawyer, to carry with it a degree of direction and fixed purpose that does not fit well with the sensitivity of the nexus that we have been discussing between civil liberties and the need to protect national security.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Beecham

Tuesday 17th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

As does the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I had the misfortune to sit beneath the portraits of both those distinguished judges at my school and my college. I could not escape them but I would not wish to escape the noble Baroness.

Despite these warm words, I am somewhat disappointed by the noble Baroness’s reply on the amendments. Amendment 67A seeks, in effect, to replicate the independent review process of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation without adopting that individual, as the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, suggested. Having said that, it would not be beyond the wit of government to appoint a second independent reviewer of terrorism legislation and allied matters if that were thought to be required. It is the independence of the review that is essential. Furthermore, the post-legislative review process is normally designed to take place after three to five years. Five years is too long. This is a rather different piece of legislation from most of that which would be reviewed. We are dealing with some fundamental rights and a fundamental change in the justice system. It deserves special consideration. I hope the Government will think again about that. The same really applies to Amendment 67B. It is important that there should be in the public domain regular checks on precisely what use is being made of these procedures. Concerns have been expressed in Committee today that, like Topsy, the use of these things may simply grow. The legislature needs to keep an eye on developments here. The assumption is that there will not be many. That is an assumption which needs to be tested regularly. A compilation of statistics on an annual basis should help that.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

Does the noble Lord agree that the phrase “mission creep” could be made for this sort of thing? We just find it spreading out. Mission creep would be a most dangerous aspect of this legislation.

[Lord Beecham]

I concur with that view, hence the need for regular reporting, not just of the statistics. The next amendment I will move will deal with other aspects. There does not appear to be available in general an indication of how much use is being made of the process under the present regime. It will be even more important when we are looking at the new developments that the Bill proposes. I am somewhat disappointed with the reply. It may well be that we will have to return to these issues on Report. In the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Beecham

Tuesday 27th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, briefly, I support the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. I have been involved in restorative justice through a charity called Why Me? for some years. I became involved because it offered a victim-oriented strategy, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. Restorative justice offers an opportunity for the person who has been offended against to address the trauma that they have suffered, to see how and why it came about and, in that way, to achieve some sort of closure. On the other side, it has had significant effects on reoffending. As the noble and learned Baroness has pointed out, offenders will say, “There was just a name on a charge sheet but when I see that it belongs to a person with a home and a family, which I have broken into or broken up, I begin to see some of the dreadful things that my actions have done”. Therefore, I am anxious that the Government should accept this amendment.

There are only two reasons why they might not accept it that I can see. First, there might be a need to restrain public spending. I accept that there is a need for this sort of activity to be carried out by well trained people to be effective. However, there will be a net benefit. If we can continue to achieve the reduction in reoffending rates that has been achieved in the past, there will be a reduction in costs as we avoid some of the costs of reoffending. Secondly, the Government have said that this amendment is overly prescriptive but I have some difficulty in understanding why. As the noble and learned Lord pointed out in his opening remarks, this just adds to the menu of options available. Therefore, it is not prescriptive in my reading of how the amendment has been drafted.

In conclusion, my concern is that if we are not careful, the idea of RJ will fall victim to what I call the Daily Mail effect. Restorative justice is not an easy thing to defend. It can appear a bit touchy-feely. One or two cases that led to difficult headlines in the newspapers could lead to the Ministry of Justice saying, “This is a bit difficult. We had better back off from this one”. Therefore, my reason for strongly supporting the noble and learned Lord’s amendment is that if we get it into the Bill, we will then have something that can be used in the future and cannot be brushed away by some unfortunate event that might lead to public opinion turning against it and putting temporary political pressure on the Government of the day.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, from the opposition Front Bench I strongly support the amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord. I do so not just because he was a distinguished judge and a most eminent Lord Chief Justice, whose words should be weighed very carefully by all sides of this House; not even because he is a fellow Novocastrian and a fellow honorary freeman of Newcastle-upon-Tyne; but because what he proposes makes such eminent sense, as several of your Lordships have pointed out. The record of restorative justice is one of success. It is not universally successful but, as we have heard, it has made a significant impact on reoffending rates, is cost-effective and, as the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, pointed out, is an alternative to other forms of punishment that are generally more expensive and often less efficacious.

I cannot think of any reason why the Government should resist an amendment phrased in the way that this is. There is an analogous process called “justice reinvestment”, which is a rather more collective way of making reparation, whereby offenders put something back into the community through a community payback scheme or something of that kind. Justice reinvestment is not part of this amendment, although it is a valuable process. If the Government reject the amendment, we will not see justice reinvestment but, in effect, justice disinvestment. That would be a mistake, from which only the victims of crime—and the taxpayer, for that matter—would suffer.

I hope that the Minister, when she replies, will see the enormous persuasive logic of the case made by the noble and learned Lord, supported as it has been on all sides of the House. I hope that the Government will recognise that to incorporate an amendment of the kind that the noble and learned Lord has moved will strengthen, not weaken, the Bill. I hope that they are prepared on this occasion, as they have been on other occasions, to listen to the sense of the House and accept the amendment.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Beecham

Wednesday 16th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

Not only that, my Lords, but he was a teller. The noble and learned Lord this morning quoted my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer and I should like to repay the compliment by quoting what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, said on that occasion. He said:

“I hope we will vote once more against the Commons amendments. I hope more fervently that we may not have to do so again”.—[Official Report, 21/3/05; col. 23.]

Clearly, he would have been quite willing to do so again, had your Lordships’ House on that occasion not ultimately acceded to the views of the other place. The Leader of the House perhaps ought to rely on rather stronger support than that inadvertently offered by the noble and learned Lord.

I am utterly persuaded by the views of my noble friend Lord Rooker. There are many in this House on all sides who have been persuaded by the force of his logic. I certainly hope that your Lordships will, if necessary—and it seems to be necessary—again approve my noble friend’s amendment and again invite the other place to think seriously about the direction in which it is taking this country and its constitution.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, I shall make a brief intervention. I did not participate in the debate this morning, although I did so at Report, 10 days ago, in a way that I am afraid my noble friend found slightly disobliging. I also voted in a disobliging way then and again earlier today.

I found the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, persuasive on four grounds. First, as he has said when he moved it, we should avoid setting or reinforcing the precedent that referenda should not have thresholds. I do not like referenda. We elect Members to go to the other place to take difficult decisions and I think that referenda that decide important issues of public policy with small turnouts are doubly undesirable. The second reason for supporting the noble Lord’s amendment is that it sets the binding, mandatory threshold at a level that would command public confidence. It is the stickability and credibility argument. A 40 per cent turnout, at which 21 per cent, or one in five, will have had to vote in favour, seems to strike the right balance. Thirdly, the amendment means that if there were to be, as I fear there will be, substantially differential turnouts in different parts of the country because of the different types of elections taking place—parliamentary elections, Assembly elections and, in London, no elections at all—those for whom the referendum goes in the wrong direction need to be assured that there has been a reasonable overall turnout. I think that 40 per cent is that right level. Finally, the amendment is not a fatal amendment because the referendum would become advisory if the turnout was below 40 per cent. Indeed, the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, would not have had my support because it sought to tie the hands of the Government, as opposed to enabling them to have the opportunity to consider the advisability of proceeding, when we knew what the final turnout was.

The amendment is being put forward once again by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, in his normal robust and combative way—and it is none the worse for that. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, in his more silky and persuasive form, sought to raise the debate to a higher level and has made remarks such as that the amendment is in line with our parliamentary democracy and high principles. I hope that he will forgive me if I say that, when I see how his party has changed its voting position in the other place, there may be high principle, but there must be at least a whiff of political opportunism around the other Chamber.

We have now asked the other place to think about this issue twice and we have had a clear answer twice—by 70 votes last night and by 79 this evening, if my mathematics are right. We have heard a powerful speech from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the amendment, he was right to tell us that we are discussing an issue that focuses narrowly on a matter that affects the other place alone. Therefore, while I continue to have considerable and very grave doubts about the course on which my Government are embarking, I am afraid that I have now concluded, after two disobliging votes, that the time has come for the Members of the elected Chamber to make a final decision, because they alone will have to live with the consequences of their deliberations.