Protection of Freedoms Bill

Lord Henley Excerpts

Monday 6th February 2012 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)]

My Lords, we return to an issue that my noble friend discussed in some detail in Committee. He has brought forward his two amendments, Amendments 37ZA and 37ZB, marginally amended in that he has, I think, changed from “owner” to “occupier”, which is probably an improvement in the amendment, and has added Amendment 37ZC, which disapplies the restrictions imposed by Amendments 37ZA and 37ZB in particular circumstances; I will get to that in due course.

I made it quite clear to my noble friend in Committee that I have some sympathy with what he is trying to achieve in dealing with the 1,200 or so powers of entry that we have. We agree—my noble friend and I, and others—that there is a need to add further safeguards to the exercise of those powers of entry. That is why, as part of our coalition agreement—I emphasise that this is part of that; this is a coalition desire—we brought in Clauses 39 to 53 to provide some safeguards relating to the exercise of powers of entry. Where I differ from my noble friend is over his general approach; in particular, we continue to question the wisdom of adopting what would be a blanket, one-size-fits-all approach, which is what he is seeking to do.

I believe that the provisions already in the Bill offer a better way forward. Clause 42 places a duty—I stress that this is a duty—on the responsible Ministers to review each and every power of entry within two years of Royal Assent. I appreciate that there were some complaints from my noble friends Lord Cope and Lord Vinson about just how long that was going to take, but I have to make the point that there are some 1,200 of these powers of entry—of which getting on for half were introduced by the party opposite, the party in which the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, was such a luminary, and therefore I find her remarks on this subject somewhat interesting.

It is important that we review those powers of entry carefully and go through them and we have given ourselves the job to do that within two years of Royal Assent. Clause 40 enables new safeguards to be added to particular powers of entry by order. Again, I make no apology for that, but I remind the House that many of these powers—the majority of them—will already have in them a need to obtain a warrant or some other consent. The idea that all these powers are giving unnamed officials broad powers of entry without having to seek a warrant is just not the case. The majority of them already require that. My noble friend and others have expressed a degree of scepticism that that review will be undertaken. However, I can assure him that it is down there in the Bill; it will be a requirement on us to make sure that review is done within the two years, and that is why it has been written into legislation.

My noble friend Lord Lester also worried about the fact that we were bringing in various Henry VIII powers to make amendments, and felt that that was not in line with what the Joint Committee on Human Rights had asked for. I should make it clear to my noble friend that we responded to the Joint Committee’s report in November last year, and in that reply we pointed out that the Delegated Powers Committee had made no recommendation in respect of those delegated powers that we are assuming. Clause 40 allows us to add safeguards, as proposed by my noble friend Lord Marlesford, in appropriate cases, and we will certainly do that.

I will focus my detailed remarks on Amendment 37ZB, as it was in respect of this amendment that my noble friend’s arguments were, on the face of it, the most seductive. This amendment offers persons exercising a power of entry three options: first, they can obtain the consent of the occupier; secondly, they can obtain a warrant, usually from a magistrates’ court; thirdly, the power may be exercised without a warrant or the agreement of the occupier in any case where it can be shown that the aim of the use of the power would be frustrated if a warrant or agreement were sought.

I hope that there is general agreement that we cannot, in every case, demand that entry is effected only with the consent of the occupier or on the authority of a warrant. To illustrate that point, the House will recall the outbreak of foot and mouth disease where, had requirements such as these applied, I fear the consequences for livestock may have been much greater. Obviously, consent could have been withdrawn, and that carries its own risks.

To take another more recent example, the new Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act contains a number of powers that grant constables the right to enter and search premises without warrant. For instance, there is a power to enter and search premises if a constable has a reasonable suspicion that the individual who is subject to a TPIM has absconded. In such circumstances, the police clearly must act quickly to check whether the individual has absconded, and if he has, to try to find evidence to help locate him. The law is designed to protect our national interest and provide security to the public but could very well be frustrated by these amendments.

We must also consider the very serious questions of delay, where the exercise of overcaution or prolonged deliberation by the authorities might place at risk the health of animals, individuals or the wider public. Similarly, the need to obtain a warrant or, for instance, locate the occupier of the premises in question in order to get their permission to enter could lead to the loss of valuable time in some cases.

That is not to say, as I made clear at the beginning, that we do not support the use of warrants and seeking consent where that is appropriate. However, as we are all aware, there are a large number of powers of entry that exist today, and operational imperatives differ widely. We do not want to impede an authority’s ability to respond to matters effectively and to take decisive action, and so we consider that such operational decisions are best taken by the relevant authorities.

My noble friend has argued that his Amendment 37ZA caters for such circumstances by providing a let-out in stating that,

“where the authority using the power can demonstrate that the aim of the use of the power would be frustrated if a warrant or agreement were sought”.

However, I do not accept that this provides the answer. It is not entirely clear to whom any urgent or unannounced need to enter premises should be demonstrated and proven. The approach taken in this amendment could lead to endless, time-consuming and expensive litigation, with aggrieved persons challenging the lawfulness of the exercise of a power of entry in a particular case, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee made clear. Such a challenge could be mounted on the grounds that the public authority in question had not demonstrated that the given exercise of the power of entry would have been frustrated if the agreement of the occupier had been sought or a warrant obtained. I hope that was not what my noble friend was intending when he drafted his amendments, but I fear that it could be the likely outcome.

I appreciate that there have been concerns, expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, and my noble friend Lady Eaton, relating to the Trading Standards Institute and the Local Government Association, which raised some concerns about Amendment 37ZA and 37ZB along the lines that I have set out. I appreciate also that my noble friend Lord Marlesford was trying to deal with those concerns by tabling Amendment 37ZC. In a sense his amendment makes my case for me, because at its heart is an acknowledgment that one size does not fit all, and that there must be exceptions to the blanket restrictions that my noble friend is seeking to impose by means of his Amendments 37ZA and 37ZB.

However, in providing exceptions purely for trading standards officers—undefined, as my noble friend Lady Eaton said—constables and members of the Security Service, or in pursuance of the protection of a child or a vulnerable adult, Amendment 37ZC simply highlights the fact that there will be other circumstances where the exception should apply. What about the powers of entry under the Gas Safety (Rights of Entry) Regulations 1996? I carefully took an example from a previous Conservative Government rather than from the previous Labour Government. These regulations offer powers of entry to premises for the purposes of preventing gas escapes, surely something that is very important—it would be necessary to move very quickly and there might not be time to obtain a warrant.

What about the powers to enter and search for evidence on premises occupied or controlled by a person who is under arrest for an indictable offence? Such powers are not just exercisable by constables but also by customs officers, immigration officers and members of the Serious Organised Crime Agency. To give another example, what about the powers of firefighters under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 to enter premises without consent for the purposes of protecting life and property? I put it to my noble friend and to the House that the exception should apply equally in those cases.

I could provide more examples—I am sure there will be others—but until we have conducted the review I have promised, and which the statute makes clear will happen, it will be impossible to say with confidence that these amendments would not seriously inhibit the ability of law enforcement officers and others to protect the public.

As I have indicated, we wish to achieve an aim similar to the one my noble friend suggests. The new Home Office gateway has already removed in some cases—I can give this assurance to my noble friend Lord Cope—the right to enter private homes unless accompanied by a warrant. These include regulations relating to forestry law enforcement, wine manufacture and inspecting animals for disease. We have said that notice must be provided where it is reasonable to do so and appointments must be made with home owners and businesses before powers are exercised.

As I have mentioned, we will be reviewing all 1,200 or so powers of entry, and Clause 40 allows us to add necessary new safeguards on a case-by-case basis. The new code of practice, about which my noble friend Lord Selsdon was cynical, will be introduced under Clause 47 and will govern the exercise of powers of entry and set out further safeguards to protect the rights and civil liberties of individuals and businesses.

I put it to my noble friend that this is a preferable approach which provides greater legal certainty. I therefore ask him to withdraw his amendment. However, if he should seek the opinion of the House, I would encourage your Lordships to reject the amendment.

[Lord Marlesford]

My Lords, I thank everyone who has taken part in this interesting and useful debate. I was drawn to the clarity with which the legal mind of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, approached the issue; there is much attraction in it. However, the concessions I have made, which have been referred to, were intended to meet some of the points raised.

The noble Lord, Lord Borrie, was able to produce many arguments about why, in some way or other, the proposal had not gone far enough—even in the case of trading standards officers, who have expressed complete satisfaction with what I have done.

I listened with great interest to my noble friend Lady Eaton, who gave a full account of a case in Yorkshire. I am sure it was an important, useful and maybe typical case, but I found myself thinking that had the people involved needed to get a warrant they would have been able to execute the case every bit as effectively as they did without one because the timescale she described would have made it perfectly possible.

The noble Lord, Lord Neill of Bladen, made a good point. The tendency at the moment, which has grown up over the years, is that if you want an extra power of entry you just stick it in. That has been the culture which, in a sense, we are trying to counter.

The noble Lord, Lord Lester, produced, as he so often does, the human rights legislation as being the solution to it all. I would remind him—well, not remind him because he knows it as well as I do, as do most of your Lordships—that human rights legislation, although desirable in theory, is about the slowest and most expensive route for correcting wrongs as can be imagined. The European Court of Human Rights is absolutely bunged full and is years and years behind. I would strongly recommend that we find a better route for anything which depended on using it. I see that the noble Lord is about to make a further defence of the Human Rights Act. I give way to him.