Protection of Freedoms Bill

Lord Marlesford Excerpts

Monday 6th February 2012 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Marlesford]

37ZA: Clause 40, page 33, line 33, at end insert—
“(3) A further safeguard shall be that, unless explicitly provided for in the statute providing for the power of entry, all powers of entry shall be exercised by agreement with the premises occupier or by warrant.”

[Lord Marlesford]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 37ZA, and speaking to Amendments 37ZB and 37ZC, on powers of entry, I must say at once that, crucially, the three amendments all go together.

I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for circulating to us all on Thursday the Home Office view on my amendments. Normally one learns of objections only in the winding-up speech of the Minister, but this useful form of pre-debate negotiation has enabled me to meet at least two of the Home Office points with changes to my amendments. However, I did notice one rather surprising statement in the Home Office brief, and in fact if it were not in both the summary and the main argument I would have been tempted to see it as a misprint. The brief states:

“The Government supports action to remove necessary or unjustified powers of entry”.

That is not what I seek. It is perhaps rather sad to note that the Home Office retains its historic belief in its own omniscience, which I well remember from my days in Whitehall, but it seems to be losing its reputation for accuracy.

The first amendment makes the main point that powers of entry should be used only by agreement with the occupier of premises or with a magistrate’s warrant. The second amendment allows for exceptions where it is obviously necessary to continue with routine inspections and checks without notice being given. The third spells out specific areas where I am not seeking to change existing practice in the use of powers of entry: trading standards, the police and security services, protection of children and vulnerable adults.

The Trading Standards Institute explained to me why it needs its existing powers for its job of protecting consumers; for example, by checking goods in shops or the accuracy of a petrol pump at the petrol station, and so on. I am glad that the institute has been able to assure me and the Official Opposition that it is now content with the amendment, which would enable it to continue with its important and valuable work.

Although the essence of my argument is that powers of entry should be subject to the same constraints as the police who normally and traditionally have to have a warrant, the Home Office has helpfully pointed out to me that the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 has given constables certain new powers to enter without a warrant. That is why I have added Amendment 37ZC to cover the police and security services.

It is also, of course, necessary to continue to allow unannounced entry to those charged with responsibility for the protection of children or vulnerable adults. Thus inspecting old people’s homes, checking on children at risk or similar crucial monitoring functions must be allowed to continue without either warrant or agreement. However, I feel I must emphasise the principle underlying my amendments and why I am doing this at all.

In our country, the right to privacy and to enjoy property or conduct legitimate businesses without state intrusion has been a long-standing freedom. Indeed, it has echoes going back 800 years to Magna Carta, which sought to protect individuals from the Crown and from officials of the Crown. The fact that the police cannot, in general, enter people’s homes or businesses without a magistrate’s warrant is a cherished freedom well-known to the public and has given rise to the ancient phrase, “An Englishman’s home is his castle”, which was coined by the great English jurist Sir Edward Coke, who was responsible for the Petition of Right in 1628.

The law should protect the individual and must never be defied. In 1977, that great icon Lord Denning quoted Thomas Fuller’s 1732 dictum, “Be you ever so high, the law is above you”. The lesson in that, of course, is the huge responsibility that legislators have to ensure that the laws they make enhance and enshrine liberty rather than erode freedom. This, of course, is what this Protection of Freedoms Bill should be seeking to do.

I was disappointed, but perhaps not surprised, that the Minister should have so completely rejected my first two amendments on powers of entry when they were debated, with support from all sides, in Grand Committee, but I am well aware that the Home Office expects to have the monopoly of any improvements to its legislation. However, it is a pity that Ministers in this coalition Government should not have seen their prime duty when this Bill was drafted as being to extend real freedom rather than seeking to protect the territorial rights of the bureaucracy.

For years legislation has surged liked a tidal wave. No Government seem to have the power or even the will to stem it. More and more laws have been passed which give officials of every rank and type the right to enter premises without so much as a by your leave to inspect, check, observe, search or test whatever perfectly honest citizens are doing in their own property. This is something that the public are increasingly aware of and apprehensive about.

The real hero behind my small attempt to reinforce our ancient liberties is my noble friend Lord Selsdon. Over a period of more than a decade he has been accumulating details of the legislation which justifies my amendment. In spite of starting with some obstruction rather than co-operation from Whitehall, he has succeeded in producing a dossier in which there are more than 1,200 separate pieces of legislation giving powers of entry, in most cases without the safeguards we have the right to expect and indeed demand. They cover every sort of issue, right down to demanding entry to a private house to see whether a TV is switched on or, where a person has left a child with the people next door while they go to the cinema, to check whether those people have got a child minder’s licence. I hope that my noble friend will tell us something more about the legislative background to this debate.

Most of these provisions are in secondary legislation—statutory instruments—and it is only recently that Parliament has had the power to examine the merits rather than just the vires of statutory instruments. It does so through the House of Lords Merits of Statutory Instruments Committee, which was established in 2003. This supplements the Statutory Instruments Joint Committee of both Houses. The Merits Committee is doing an excellent job and, interestingly, it has had cause to draw the attention of the House to proposals for fresh powers several times during the past few months.

On 15 December 2011 in Grand Committee the Minister told me that the Home Office felt that my amendments were,

“going a bit too far”,

and suggested that,

“we want to look at all the powers we have and are asking all departments to do so”.—[Official Report, 15/12/11; col. GC 379.]

With more than 1,200 pieces of legislation, noble Lords will realise how little progress would be made. Indeed, I anticipate that the bureaucrats would find a reason why powers should be retained in their existing form in nearly every case. There has been widespread support for my amendments from Liberty, which I much welcome.

I would remind my noble friends on this side of the House that the Conservative manifesto specifically undertook to,

“cut back the intrusive powers of entry into homes. Public bodies (other than the police and emergency services) will require a magistrate’s warrant, and approval for such a warrant will be restricted to tackling serious criminal offences or protecting public safety”.

My amendments seek to support and implement that commitment. I would have expected my noble Lib Dem friends, with their proud commitment to civil liberties, to be chasing the Government on this issue.

Following the principles of the 18th century Whig statesman Edmund Burke, I fervently believe in the role of the state to hold the ring: to protect the population from ill treatment or exploitation. Those who may need such protection include the old and the infirm, children, employees, consumers, savers, investors and many other groups. I would never deny to the state the powers that it needs to provide this protection, but many of the powers of entry as they exist today can intrude, intimidate and even oppress. That is why they need to be constrained.

As this will probably be the last occasion for a decade or so that we have a Bill which is tailor-made for this reform, I shall, if necessary, ask your Lordships to support me in the Lobby on what I hope we can all agree would be a significant step forward for the right of privacy, individual freedom and democracy. As always, the wording of my amendments may not be precisely what the Home Office needs, but provided I can get a commitment from the Minister to do so, I will be happy for the Government to tidy them up at Third Reading. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)]

My Lords, we return to an issue that my noble friend discussed in some detail in Committee. He has brought forward his two amendments, Amendments 37ZA and 37ZB, marginally amended in that he has, I think, changed from “owner” to “occupier”, which is probably an improvement in the amendment, and has added Amendment 37ZC, which disapplies the restrictions imposed by Amendments 37ZA and 37ZB in particular circumstances; I will get to that in due course.

I made it quite clear to my noble friend in Committee that I have some sympathy with what he is trying to achieve in dealing with the 1,200 or so powers of entry that we have. We agree—my noble friend and I, and others—that there is a need to add further safeguards to the exercise of those powers of entry. That is why, as part of our coalition agreement—I emphasise that this is part of that; this is a coalition desire—we brought in Clauses 39 to 53 to provide some safeguards relating to the exercise of powers of entry. Where I differ from my noble friend is over his general approach; in particular, we continue to question the wisdom of adopting what would be a blanket, one-size-fits-all approach, which is what he is seeking to do.

I believe that the provisions already in the Bill offer a better way forward. Clause 42 places a duty—I stress that this is a duty—on the responsible Ministers to review each and every power of entry within two years of Royal Assent. I appreciate that there were some complaints from my noble friends Lord Cope and Lord Vinson about just how long that was going to take, but I have to make the point that there are some 1,200 of these powers of entry—of which getting on for half were introduced by the party opposite, the party in which the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, was such a luminary, and therefore I find her remarks on this subject somewhat interesting.

It is important that we review those powers of entry carefully and go through them and we have given ourselves the job to do that within two years of Royal Assent. Clause 40 enables new safeguards to be added to particular powers of entry by order. Again, I make no apology for that, but I remind the House that many of these powers—the majority of them—will already have in them a need to obtain a warrant or some other consent. The idea that all these powers are giving unnamed officials broad powers of entry without having to seek a warrant is just not the case. The majority of them already require that. My noble friend and others have expressed a degree of scepticism that that review will be undertaken. However, I can assure him that it is down there in the Bill; it will be a requirement on us to make sure that review is done within the two years, and that is why it has been written into legislation.

My noble friend Lord Lester also worried about the fact that we were bringing in various Henry VIII powers to make amendments, and felt that that was not in line with what the Joint Committee on Human Rights had asked for. I should make it clear to my noble friend that we responded to the Joint Committee’s report in November last year, and in that reply we pointed out that the Delegated Powers Committee had made no recommendation in respect of those delegated powers that we are assuming. Clause 40 allows us to add safeguards, as proposed by my noble friend Lord Marlesford, in appropriate cases, and we will certainly do that.

I will focus my detailed remarks on Amendment 37ZB, as it was in respect of this amendment that my noble friend’s arguments were, on the face of it, the most seductive. This amendment offers persons exercising a power of entry three options: first, they can obtain the consent of the occupier; secondly, they can obtain a warrant, usually from a magistrates’ court; thirdly, the power may be exercised without a warrant or the agreement of the occupier in any case where it can be shown that the aim of the use of the power would be frustrated if a warrant or agreement were sought.

I hope that there is general agreement that we cannot, in every case, demand that entry is effected only with the consent of the occupier or on the authority of a warrant. To illustrate that point, the House will recall the outbreak of foot and mouth disease where, had requirements such as these applied, I fear the consequences for livestock may have been much greater. Obviously, consent could have been withdrawn, and that carries its own risks.

To take another more recent example, the new Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act contains a number of powers that grant constables the right to enter and search premises without warrant. For instance, there is a power to enter and search premises if a constable has a reasonable suspicion that the individual who is subject to a TPIM has absconded. In such circumstances, the police clearly must act quickly to check whether the individual has absconded, and if he has, to try to find evidence to help locate him. The law is designed to protect our national interest and provide security to the public but could very well be frustrated by these amendments.

We must also consider the very serious questions of delay, where the exercise of overcaution or prolonged deliberation by the authorities might place at risk the health of animals, individuals or the wider public. Similarly, the need to obtain a warrant or, for instance, locate the occupier of the premises in question in order to get their permission to enter could lead to the loss of valuable time in some cases.

That is not to say, as I made clear at the beginning, that we do not support the use of warrants and seeking consent where that is appropriate. However, as we are all aware, there are a large number of powers of entry that exist today, and operational imperatives differ widely. We do not want to impede an authority’s ability to respond to matters effectively and to take decisive action, and so we consider that such operational decisions are best taken by the relevant authorities.

My noble friend has argued that his Amendment 37ZA caters for such circumstances by providing a let-out in stating that,

“where the authority using the power can demonstrate that the aim of the use of the power would be frustrated if a warrant or agreement were sought”.

However, I do not accept that this provides the answer. It is not entirely clear to whom any urgent or unannounced need to enter premises should be demonstrated and proven. The approach taken in this amendment could lead to endless, time-consuming and expensive litigation, with aggrieved persons challenging the lawfulness of the exercise of a power of entry in a particular case, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee made clear. Such a challenge could be mounted on the grounds that the public authority in question had not demonstrated that the given exercise of the power of entry would have been frustrated if the agreement of the occupier had been sought or a warrant obtained. I hope that was not what my noble friend was intending when he drafted his amendments, but I fear that it could be the likely outcome.

I appreciate that there have been concerns, expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, and my noble friend Lady Eaton, relating to the Trading Standards Institute and the Local Government Association, which raised some concerns about Amendment 37ZA and 37ZB along the lines that I have set out. I appreciate also that my noble friend Lord Marlesford was trying to deal with those concerns by tabling Amendment 37ZC. In a sense his amendment makes my case for me, because at its heart is an acknowledgment that one size does not fit all, and that there must be exceptions to the blanket restrictions that my noble friend is seeking to impose by means of his Amendments 37ZA and 37ZB.

However, in providing exceptions purely for trading standards officers—undefined, as my noble friend Lady Eaton said—constables and members of the Security Service, or in pursuance of the protection of a child or a vulnerable adult, Amendment 37ZC simply highlights the fact that there will be other circumstances where the exception should apply. What about the powers of entry under the Gas Safety (Rights of Entry) Regulations 1996? I carefully took an example from a previous Conservative Government rather than from the previous Labour Government. These regulations offer powers of entry to premises for the purposes of preventing gas escapes, surely something that is very important—it would be necessary to move very quickly and there might not be time to obtain a warrant.

What about the powers to enter and search for evidence on premises occupied or controlled by a person who is under arrest for an indictable offence? Such powers are not just exercisable by constables but also by customs officers, immigration officers and members of the Serious Organised Crime Agency. To give another example, what about the powers of firefighters under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 to enter premises without consent for the purposes of protecting life and property? I put it to my noble friend and to the House that the exception should apply equally in those cases.

I could provide more examples—I am sure there will be others—but until we have conducted the review I have promised, and which the statute makes clear will happen, it will be impossible to say with confidence that these amendments would not seriously inhibit the ability of law enforcement officers and others to protect the public.

As I have indicated, we wish to achieve an aim similar to the one my noble friend suggests. The new Home Office gateway has already removed in some cases—I can give this assurance to my noble friend Lord Cope—the right to enter private homes unless accompanied by a warrant. These include regulations relating to forestry law enforcement, wine manufacture and inspecting animals for disease. We have said that notice must be provided where it is reasonable to do so and appointments must be made with home owners and businesses before powers are exercised.

As I have mentioned, we will be reviewing all 1,200 or so powers of entry, and Clause 40 allows us to add necessary new safeguards on a case-by-case basis. The new code of practice, about which my noble friend Lord Selsdon was cynical, will be introduced under Clause 47 and will govern the exercise of powers of entry and set out further safeguards to protect the rights and civil liberties of individuals and businesses.

I put it to my noble friend that this is a preferable approach which provides greater legal certainty. I therefore ask him to withdraw his amendment. However, if he should seek the opinion of the House, I would encourage your Lordships to reject the amendment.

[Lord Marlesford]

My Lords, I thank everyone who has taken part in this interesting and useful debate. I was drawn to the clarity with which the legal mind of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, approached the issue; there is much attraction in it. However, the concessions I have made, which have been referred to, were intended to meet some of the points raised.

The noble Lord, Lord Borrie, was able to produce many arguments about why, in some way or other, the proposal had not gone far enough—even in the case of trading standards officers, who have expressed complete satisfaction with what I have done.

I listened with great interest to my noble friend Lady Eaton, who gave a full account of a case in Yorkshire. I am sure it was an important, useful and maybe typical case, but I found myself thinking that had the people involved needed to get a warrant they would have been able to execute the case every bit as effectively as they did without one because the timescale she described would have made it perfectly possible.

The noble Lord, Lord Neill of Bladen, made a good point. The tendency at the moment, which has grown up over the years, is that if you want an extra power of entry you just stick it in. That has been the culture which, in a sense, we are trying to counter.

The noble Lord, Lord Lester, produced, as he so often does, the human rights legislation as being the solution to it all. I would remind him—well, not remind him because he knows it as well as I do, as do most of your Lordships—that human rights legislation, although desirable in theory, is about the slowest and most expensive route for correcting wrongs as can be imagined. The European Court of Human Rights is absolutely bunged full and is years and years behind. I would strongly recommend that we find a better route for anything which depended on using it. I see that the noble Lord is about to make a further defence of the Human Rights Act. I give way to him.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

I was not going to do that; I was going to point out that the remedy is in our courts, not in Strasbourg, to get an injunction or compensation under the Human Rights Act.

[Lord Marlesford]

Of course, if people do not like what our courts say, they go to the European Court of Human Rights. Most astonishingly trivial cases have been put to it. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister had some phrase for the multitude of cases going to the European Court of Human Rights. With the greatest respect and affection for my noble friend Lord Lester, I suggest that we do not use the European Court of Human Rights as a solution to these particular problems.

The Minister produced the same arguments as last time. He expressed a degree of sympathy but he did not answer in any detail the concerns of my noble friends over the progress of this review. All this debate has done, in a sense, is illustrate the way in which people will always find some ingenious argument or other to support a position. I remember my noble friend Lord Hurd, when he was a junior diplomat in Beijing—I think it was his first posting—writing a letter, which I was shown, to a certain noble Lord about a visit to Beijing of a senior politician who he described as being inclined to take up an impossible position and then cast around for clever ways of supporting it. The noble Lord, Lord Hurd, saw this as the sure mark of a second-class mind. I thought that was pretty damning but there is a danger of trying to find arguments against this. I do not feel that any substantial argument has been put forward.

The noble Earl, Lord Erroll, got it right when he said that if we do not pass this now, nothing will happen. We have had years of nothing happening. I was grateful for the support of the Leader of the Opposition when she said that we must at least get the Government to come back at Third Reading with something. Otherwise, this whole issue will clearly go to sleep again. Over the past few years we have had a surfeit of ill prepared legislation. It is our duty to improve it, whatever the Whips may say. Otherwise, it is hard to justify the survival of your Lordships’ House. I would like to test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Marlesford]

37ZB: Clause 40, page 33, line 33, at end insert—
“(4) A further safeguard shall be that, notwithstanding the statute providing for the power of entry, a power of entry may only be used without warrant, or without agreement with the occupier of the premises to be entered, in cases where the authority using the power can demonstrate that the aim of the use of the power would be frustrated if a warrant or agreement were sought.”