Lord Hendy
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(4 days, 7 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the House will not want a legal argument between me and the noble Baroness.
Yes, not again—we rehearsed that in Committee. However, those cases do not support the proposition that the noble Baroness advanced. The case of Young, James and Webster v the United Kingdom concerned three railway workers, who were compelled to join a trade union against their wishes—a closed shop—and the European Court of Human Rights held that they should not be compelled to do so at the risk of losing their jobs. It had nothing to do with making political payments or being associated with a political party.
The noble Lord is right that that is what the case was about. However, one of the factors in the judgment was the absence of a refund mechanism. I recall a rather fun debate between the noble Lord and me in Committee, which I hope we will not exhaust everyone by repeating today; however, it is really important that this is clarified. Article 11 will be engaged if the measure in the Bill is done; it is regressive and wrong in law and it will be subject to legal challenge. The European court found that it engages Article 11 where there is no refund mechanism. If the Labour Party or a political fund retains the subscription for even one second, it will have engaged unlawfully with Article 11.
My Lords, the difference is that, if you are a member of a trade union, you can leave the trade union. There is no compulsion to remain a member of a trade union. If you do not like paying the political—
My Lords, I will intervene once more and then that will be it, because I do not want us to repeat the ping-pong we had between us in Committee—I am sure that we can take it outside, as they say. It is of course completely normal for noble Lords in this House to disagree at times.
I want to clarify that I am not saying that this compels someone to remain a member of a union—that is not what is happening here. The way that the Bill is drafted allows the payment to be taken by the union and provides for no refund mechanism. There is a minimum period of one month before the notification of the opt-out is received, and then a permissible further cycle of salary is allowed before the subscription is stopped. There is no mechanism for a refund. So, in any opt-out, the union keeps some of that person’s money —that is what is unlawful.
I will try to finish the point in just a couple of sentences. The point is that somebody who does not like paying the political subscription can simply leave the union. If they object to it, that is what they can do. That freedom is protected by Article 11 of the European convention and is ratified in a whole number of cases. I will not develop the argument further. I would love to take it outside with the noble Baroness. We can have a drink and go into all the cases.
I just wanted to make one further point. The suggestion was made by the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, that perhaps trade unions should be barred from making political payments at all. It is an interesting argument, which nobody else has advanced. It reminds me of the point my noble friend Lord Barber made about the fact that the requirement to have a political fund, introduced in 1909, is imposed on no other organisation in this country. Companies do not have to have separate political funds, ballot their members or shareholders or answer to anybody in making a political donation. It is only trade unions that are required to hold political funds with all the paraphernalia of opting in or opting out. I am not going into that argument.
I was contemplating—I never did it, but perhaps I should have done—moving an amendment that trade unions should be relieved of having political funds at all. It was a requirement which answered the Law Lords’ decision in Osborne vs the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants in 1909, eight years after the foundation of the Labour Party, to bar trade unions from funding the political party that they had just launched. If we got rid of trade union political funds, we would not be having this argument at all.
My Lord, I will speak to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Burns, and to my own Amendments 152A and 152B. In so doing, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Burns, on this amendment. I remember the debate we had at that time. There is no question about it: every side of the debate compromised. I remember Ministers from the other place telling us that we had to compromise and we had to make concessions that we did not feel were right. The deal was done, and the deal still holds.
The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, that we should do things in the round and in one is exactly right, rather than making this piecemeal change that the Bill proposes, if there are to be dramatic changes. I accept that times have moved on and that funding for the Labour Party is largely from individuals rather than from unions. None the less, if we are to make changes, then let us look at them in the round rather than observing the piecemeal change proposed in the Bill.
I have to correct the noble Lords, Lord Whitty and Lord Hendy. Companies cannot make donations to any political party without prior shareholder approval in the period of a year—not 10 years, but one year. That approval lasts only one year and has to be refreshed at the annual general meeting. Noble Lords are encouraged to look at the accounts of any company—certainly a public company—to see that that is the case.
My Lords, this amendment is a reproduction of the amendment on secondary action that I moved in Committee. Of course, your Lordships are far too polite to give expression to the collective groan that would otherwise emanate from all sides of the House.
I move the amendment again for two reasons—first, because the issue raises important factors of which I shall remind your Lordships briefly in a moment and, secondly, because support for it from various unions and resistance to it by the Government in Committee, and, I surmise, today on Report, give the lie to the repeated allegation that this Government are a puppet manipulated by the trade unions.
The amendment contains six measures aimed at restoring statutory protection for solidarity action, which subsisted between 1906 and 1984. As before, I am grateful for the support of ASLEF, the Bakers Food and Allied Workers Union, the BMA, the Fire Brigades Union, the RMT, the University and College Union and Unite.
Your Lordships will be pleased to hear that I shall not rehearse the arguments that I made in Committee, save to remind the House of two. First, solidarity action is an inherent aspect of freedom of association, which is the jurisprudential and international underpinning of trade union freedom and, at a more mundane level, the very essence of trade unionism. Solidarity between workers is not confined to the happenstance of employer identity, especially in the light of the fragmentation of enterprises in recent years.
Secondly, the issue is one of the rule of law. Lord Bingham’s eighth principle requires compliance with international treaty obligations ratified by each state. Those obligations are elaborated by the supervisory bodies established by the relevant treaty to which the state adheres. Their decisions are as much part of international law as is the treaty that authorised them. The right to strike is guaranteed by ILO Convention 87 and Article 6.4 of the European Social Charter of 1961. The decisions of the supervisory bodies of each hold that a prohibition on secondary action by a ratifying state violates these respective provisions. Of course, the United Kingdom has ratified both ILO Convention 87 and, specifically, Article 6.4 of the European Social Charter of 1961. The UK is also represented on both the ILO supervisory committees, the Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Association. From time to time, it has appointed a representative to the European Committee of Social Rights.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, and my noble friend Lady O’Grady of Upper Holloway, for contributing to this debate, and to the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, for setting out the Lib Dems’ position. I will now speak to Amendment 150, tabled by my noble friend Lord Hendy, and Amendments 150AA, 150B, 151 and 152 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom.
On Amendment 150, we are clear that industrial action should take place only where there is a dispute between a group of workers and their direct employer and we will not change this position. Secondary or solidarity action has been prohibited for several decades and the Government will not change this. Permitting secondary action would enable parties with no direct stake in a dispute to take co-ordinated action, increasing the risk of disruption to employers and the public, and would allow industrial disputes to escalate beyond the original context and across different employers. The Government are clear that we are compliant with our international obligations under ILO Convention 87, Article 11 of the ECHR and Article 6 of the European Social Charter, all of which protect the right to strike but also permit restrictions on industrial action necessary in a democratic society.
As noted by the European Court of Human Rights in the RMT case in 2014, there is a democratic consensus in the UK in support of the prohibition of secondary action and a broad acceptance of the public interest reasons for it, spanning the gamut of political opinion.
Furthermore, the UK is not an outlier. Similar countries such as Australia, Canada, Austria, France and the USA also prohibit or do not protect secondary action. The UK’s model reflects our unique industrial relations framework and economic context, and protects the ability to strike, while also protecting the rights of others. The Government have no intention of changing this.
On Amendment 150AA, 150B and 151, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, Clause 73 of the Bill is required because the Supreme Court ruled in April 2024 that Section 146 of the 1992 Act is incompatible with Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. That is because it fails to provide any protection against detriments—that is, sanctions short of dismissal—intended to deter trade union members from taking part in lawful strike action organised by their union or penalise them for doing so. I have no doubt that many Members of your Lordships’ House agree that the UK cannot continue to be in breach of our international obligations. The Bill will correct this by inserting new Section 236A into the 1992 Act, to provide that:
“A worker has the right not to be subjected … to detriment of a prescribed description by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by the worker’s employer, if the act or failure takes place for the sole or main purpose of preventing or deterring the worker from taking protected industrial action, or penalising the worker for doing so”.
The prescribed detriments will be set out in secondary legislation following a consultation.
These amendments seek to prejudge a full and open consultation on this issue by setting out the circumstances in which the detriment protection—whatever the prescribed detriments may ultimately be—will not apply. Indeed, as part of the consultation, we look forward to hearing the perspective of employers on why they may consider detriments could be appropriate in certain circumstances.
I must also add that, importantly, the protection from prescribed detriment applies only where the sole or main purpose of subjecting the worker to detriment is to prevent, deter or penalise the worker from taking protected industrial action. For example, if a worker is subject to a detriment solely or mainly because they have damaged property, this protection will not apply. Moreover, the criminal law still applies to pickets and others taking part in industrial action, just as it applies to everyone else.
Finally, on Amendment 152, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, Clause 75 seeks to repeal the Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Act 2023. The repeal of the strikes Act is a manifesto commitment that this Government have a mandate to deliver. Minimum service levels unduly restrict the right to withdraw labour and undermine good industrial relations, and our plan to make work pay pledged to repeal the Act. No work notice has ever been issued by an employer to seek to meet a minimum service level during strike action, and the legislation has never prevented a single day of strike action. Evidence suggests that this is due to employer concerns around worsening industrial relations and the complexity of implementing a minimum service level under the legislation. This demonstrates the futility of that Act and why we intend to repeal it upon Royal Assent.
We believe that negotiation and co-operation are better ways to ensure essential services continue during any industrial action, while respecting workers’ rights. Evidence given at the time the strikes Act was being introduced, including from employers, was that existing voluntary arrangements worked and ensured that vital services were able to continue during periods of industrial action. We are simply returning to this situation. We want to reset the relationship with both employers and trade unions to resolve disputes through meaningful negotiations. Repealing the rights of the strikes Act will help us to achieve that. I therefore respectfully ask my noble friend Lord Hendy to withdraw Amendment 150.
My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who spoke in the debate on my amendment. I have a couple of words by way of reply.
I point out to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that the P&O Ferries scandal was not the basis of the argument that I advanced to the House but simply an egregious example of the absence of the right to take secondary action. Noble Lords will recall that that case involved some 800 seafarers who were sacked instantaneously and replaced immediately with agency crews recruited in third-world countries. In doing so, P&O Ferries knowingly and intentionally broke the law. It could do so because it knew exactly how much compensation it was liable for, and it paid it. The unions, on the other hand, were unable to call on fellow workers in the Port of Dover and other cross-channel ports to support them in an industrial dispute to reverse that decision. The seafarers themselves, of course, were on the stones; they were unemployed. A strike by the direct workforce would have been completely pointless. I mentioned it because that is the last example of the ILO commenting on the UK ban on secondary action. It said that the Government and social partners should sit down together and endeavour to negotiate some form of permissible secondary action. The ILO has been consistent on the position since 1989, repeatedly saying that the 1990 law to which my noble friend Lady O’Grady referred was incompatible with Convention 87.
The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, pointed out various circumstances, which I will not debate with him now, that would make the return of secondary action in this country unacceptable. The point is that special circumstances are not a legitimate justification for a state not to comply with its international obligations. That point was made clear by the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General in a speech that he made about a month ago, but it is a fundamental principle of international law.
Finally, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, who commented on the suggestion that the phrase “connected with” ought to be brought back, that phrase is the one that was deployed in the original drafting of the Trade Disputes Act 1906.
I thank my noble friend Lady O’Grady for her support and for reminding the House of the fragmentation in employing enterprises, often precisely to achieve and exploit the bar on secondary action, to weaken workers. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Goddard and Lord Hunt, for their comments.
To the Minister, my noble friend Lord Leong, I make three quick points. First, I am afraid I do not agree with his comparative law analysis. I have done some work on this over the years, and it is not the case that the countries that he mentioned bar secondary action—at least, not all of them do, although the United States does. Secondly, I accept, as I did in Committee, that we are not in breach of Article 11 of the European convention, but I simply cannot see how it can be argued that we are not in violation of ILO Convention 87 and the European Social Charter’s Article 6.4. The supervisory bodies have said so over and over again. Thirdly, of course I recognise the Government’s position, and my noble friend will not be surprised to hear that I do not intend to test the opinion of the House. I respectfully ask to withdraw my amendment.