(11 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord uses his characteristically robust and colourful language. There is always a tension between the time that national Parliaments wish to take for scrutiny and the pressures that national Governments, including our own, may wish to give to taking decisions. There are those in national Parliaments who regard the eight-week limit for taking a scrutiny decision as unfortunate, but I am informed by those who know the Brussels situation better than I do that the earlier national Parliaments submit reasoned opinions in the process of negotiation, the greater effect they have.
Reasoned opinions in the form of reports issued by the European Committee of this House are widely respected throughout the European Union in other national Parliaments and elsewhere. I recall with delight a Member of the European Parliament being appointed to head a committee in the European Parliament. He was asked by his clerk to start by reading three documents, two of which were reports from the House of Lords EU Committee.
My Lords, would the Minister not agree that in the short period of time that the yellow-card system has existed, the main lesson to draw is that we have to get better at enlisting other national Parliaments when we use the yellow card because that is the shortfall? Will he confirm that on the one occasion when it was used, the Commission withdrew its proposal—the Monti II proposal? Will he also confirm that the right to take action in the Court is one for this House, not the Government under the Lisbon treaty?
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, there is plenty of time for both noble Lords. I think that we can hear from the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and then my noble friend.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Dykes.
I should admit that I was in Georgia by chance the week before the parliamentary elections, and, perhaps to offset some of the comments this afternoon, I should say that the massive demonstrations that took place then after the revelation of terrible human rights abuses in Georgian prisons were impeccable. There was no violence on the part of protesters and there was no force used by the police. What we need to do, surely—
I said that what we need to do, surely, is support those people in Georgia who showed that degree of maturity in advance of the elections.
I thank the noble Lord for those comments. The previous Government were not perfect. There is a very large prison population in Georgia and prison conditions were clearly awful. The current Government are not perfect either; media freedom is still very limited, but we have to do what we can to encourage a process of transition to full democracy, which is still under way.
(11 years, 11 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I believe that this may be the first occasion on which the House has debated the work of its EU Select Committee over the previous three years. Whether it is or not, it is surely a debate worth having. I welcome the participation in it of our two distinguished and effective chairs during the period in question—the noble Lords, Lord Boswell and Lord Roper, who have both preceded me.
It is a debate worth having because it has been alleged frequently in the House by at least one of its Members that the work of the committee is worthless and because it is also suggested that the resources devoted to the work of the committee are excessive. I believe that neither of these criticisms is well founded, but it is right that a member of the committee, such as me, should be ready to defend that view in debate and not simply to assert it. I was a little disappointed to see that the noble Lord, Lord Pearson of Rannoch, made only a cameo appearance some moments ago— 10 seconds, I think. He may have gone off to get a string of garlic to hang round his neck before facing such dangerous people around the Table. If he has not, I wish that he would come and substantiate some of his claims in the sort of debate that we are having.
I will focus first on the work of the Sub-Committee on Home Affairs, Health and Education, which I have the honour to chair, and to whose members both past and present—I note that at least two of them are here—I pay tribute for their hard work and effective contributions. During the period in question, the sub-committee produced two major, thematic reports: on the European Union’s internal security strategy and on the European Union’s drug strategy. A third on the general approach to mobility and migration will be published within the next month. Since it has not yet been adopted, I will make no further reference to it in this debate.
In each of those thematic reports we have addressed European Union policies that are still being formulated and shaped, and we have thus aimed to contribute to that process, not merely to commenting after the event. I believe that we have had some success. In our work on the internal security strategy, we focused mainly on counterterrorism, civil protection and cybersecurity. Our overall conclusion can be summed up in a single, very brief phrase: Britain’s internal security neither begins nor ends at the water’s edge. We strongly recommended that a cybercrime centre be established within the existing Europol agency and not as a separate free-standing agency, and it seems likely that the Commission will accept that advice when it brings forward proposals for the development of Europol early next year. During this and other work we have done, we have formed a high opinion of the work of Europol and of its use and value to this country. That view will certainly be relevant when we take up the Protocol 36 opt-out decision in the next few weeks.
On the drugs strategy, as in so many areas with which our sub-committee deals—internal security and migration are others—we found ourselves in a policy area where there are mixed competences and where the principle of subsidiarity is alive and well and is actually being applied. We did not think in any of those cases that the boundary between the European Union as such and national competences should be shifted; rather, we thought that the European Union’s input should be better focused and less broad-brush. We called for a wide and inclusive public debate on drugs. I wish I could say that that call has been heeded, but it has not. The paucity and poverty of public debate on drugs is truly shameful.
In addition to those thematic reports, the Lisbon treaty has heaped on to our plate a whole range of new responsibilities reflecting the fact that now, for the first time in the EU’s history, national Parliaments have been given a clear role in the EU’s legislative processes. Thus, we not only intervened in a yellow card subsidiarity procedure in respect of the draft seasonal workers directive but we produced opt-in reports on the passenger name recognition directive and on the proceeds of crime directive. On the first of those, our recommendation to opt in was accepted by the Government; the second has not yet been so, but I very much hope that it will be at the adoption stage. In one area—the data protection directive—I fear that the Government failed to implement their commitment under the Ashton-Lidington undertakings to provide time for a debate before the opt-in period expired. That was lamentable. The noble Lord, Lord McNally, accepted that that had been an error and the Government’s decision to opt in was in any case what the committee had recommended. Least said, soonest mended.
In conclusion, I shall turn to two matters that fall outside the purview of my sub-committee. First, there is the EU’s multiannual financial framework, which has been referred to by other speakers, on which the main committee has spent much time and effort. The European Council’s failure at the end of last week to reach agreement was regrettable but not surprising—nor was it unprecedented. The gaps between the different groups in the Council were too wide to bridge at one attempt. That was exactly what happened, too, in December 1987, but it did not prevent a satisfactory agreement being reached in February 1988. The problem is that these budgetary negotiations really are zero-sum games: one country’s gain is another’s loss and the overall common interest tends to get overlooked as the competition for resources becomes more acute.
Our committee supported the Government’s aims to achieve a real-terms freeze over the next seven years. We did not consider that a cut was either desirable or achievable. The fact that the Prime Minister was able to work together with a group of like-minded member states was admirable and greatly increases the chances of an ultimate outcome with which the UK can live, even if it may contain some difficult compromises. Failure to reach agreement in the new year, particularly if the UK were alone to be responsible for that, would not, I believe, be in this country’s interests given that in the absence of an agreed MFF the European Union would have to fall back on an annual budgetary system that could well produce higher figures and an even less desirable distribution between policies.
The second matter, to which several other noble Lords have referred, is the decision that the House took earlier this year to cut the resources allocated to EU scrutiny and to abolish one of the Select Committee’s sub-committees. To have taken that decision shortly after the Lisbon treaty had considerably increased the overall work of European scrutiny and just when national Parliaments had gained a foothold in the EU’s legislative process was, I would say if I was being polite, counterintuitive. I would call it aberrant. I trust that when these matters next come up for review—for example, at the beginning of the next Session—that lamentable decision will be reversed. Unless the Minister, in replying to the debate, is tempted to retreat into procedural obfuscation and to argue that this is a matter for the House and not for the Government, I urge him at least to make it clear that the Government want to see the work of the EU Select Committee properly resourced and up to the challenges that it faces in the years ahead.
I stand corrected. I am not sure whether the justice and home affairs inquiry has yet taken evidence from the Irish Government, who have a clear stake in the question of the opt-out or the opt-in. It may be that the Irish Government—
Just to enlighten the noble Lord, as he has effectively asked a question, the call for evidence does address the Irish dimension. It will, of course, be a matter for the Irish Government to decide whether or not to offer evidence. I do not think that we should go around telling other Governments what they should do. It has been made clear to them that evidence would be extremely welcome.
I thank the noble Lord very much for that. I happen to know that there are those within the Irish Government who are enthusiastic about coming to give evidence, and I look forward to them accepting the invitation that has been made.
The wider issue we all face is the gap between globalisation—internationalisation—and publics who regret the extent to which power is slipping away from local control. Last summer I read an excellent book by Dani Rodrik, the Turkish economist who is now at Harvard, on the limits of globalisation in which he talks about the underlying contradiction between popular desire for stability, local control and understanding what has happened, and the driving forces of a global economy—the global social elite, immigration, et cetera—that appear to be taking power away from the local level and sweeping away autonomy, identity, sovereignty and democratic accountability. That is the tension that we all face. In the United States the American Tea Party takes it out on international law, international organisations and the federal Government. In Britain, by and large, our often disturbed and discontented public take it out on the European Union. Part of what we have to do is address that contradiction to see how far we can persuade our public that some of the regulation that now appears to them to be imposed from the European Union is unavoidable, desirable and necessary, and to persuade the European Union in return that it should not attempt to regulate everything in sight or expand its competences too far.
(11 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the subject of this debate might seem at first sight to be a little esoteric, but I suggest that it is not. It is, in fact, at the heart of any meaningful effort to make progress towards the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons, which was set out in President Obama’s Prague speech. However, the issue is equally at the heart of achieving that other objective, which is supported by a wider body of opinion than the first, of a world with far fewer nuclear weapons than exist now, and with such weapons stood down from the state of high alert that currently persists and playing a less prominent role in the defence and security strategies of the states that possess them. Add to those considerations the facts that President Obama has recently been elected to a new term of office, that the Democrats have a larger majority in the Senate than they had before that election and, at the same time, that a sweeping shift in the leadership of China is taking place—the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, told us some interesting things about that—you have all the conditions for a highly topical debate.
The tireless efforts of the noble Lord, Lord Browne, as the convenor of the Top Level Group of UK Parliamentarians for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation, and of the European Leadership Network, which met last week in London, are so noteworthy that he must be warmly congratulated, not least for the wide-ranging speech with which he opened the debate.
If nuclear disarmament discussions between the nuclear weapons states, the P5, often resemble a dance of the seven veils, it should be recognised that China has not, as yet, shed much in the way of those veils—fewer than most of the other nuclear powers. Its statements of nuclear strategy, which have just been referred to, are cast in the most general of terms and are bereft of any of the specifics that would be needed to provide the transparency required if genuine steps towards disarmament were to be achieved. That may not have mattered much, so long as China’s nuclear arsenal was pretty small and so long as the US-Soviet and, subsequently, the US-Russian strategic weapons negotiations were effectively the only game in town. However, given that China is reportedly alone among the P5 in still adding to its arsenal, and with the need for negotiations outside that original duo becoming more pressing, that is no longer the case.
Moreover, in the context of verification processes, to which in general terms China has always shown itself to be remarkably allergic—that was as true in the discussions on climate change as it is of nuclear disarmament—China will surely be a necessary component of any steps towards wider nuclear disarmament. China’s firm support for bringing the comprehensive test ban treaty into force, which will require its own ratification but which has not taken place, will be an important element of any renewed effort to get the United States Senate to ratify that treaty. There is therefore plenty to discuss with the Chinese, even if they were not the closest allies of two extraordinarily problematic possessors of nuclear and weapons, Pakistan and North Korea, and a crucial component in the international efforts to head off a third, Iran.
Fortunately, there already exists one forum for such discussions, to which the noble Lord, Lord Browne, made reference, in the shape of the regular, if so far pretty infrequent, consultative meetings between the P5—the five nuclear weapons states recognised as such under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The discussions, for which the noble Lord, Lord Browne, deserves a share of the credit, were initiated a few years ago. What is needed now is for those meetings to become more frequent, and for them also to become more operational and less academic. For example, those consultations could, first, make progress towards defining the terms of a fissile material cut-off treaty that would be supported by all five of the recognised weapons states, if ever Pakistan’s veto on even beginning the negotiation of such a treaty in the conference on disarmament could be removed or circumvented. Secondly, a better understanding could perhaps be reached in that P5 forum on how verification measures could be achieved without the risk of proliferation, and draw on the experience of the Anglo-Norwegian research project, known as VERTIC. Thirdly, consideration could be given on how to handle multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations among a wider group of countries, should a further round of US-Russian nuclear weapons reductions make that a realistic possibility.
There is a compelling case, too, for a much more intensive bilateral discussion between Britain and China on nuclear matters than has hitherto taken place. I hope that the Minister will say something about that and will commit the Government to stepping up those exchanges. They may not be likely to produce instant results but they could contribute to establishing greater confidence and understanding between the two parties, which will be an essential component of success in any future, wider negotiations.
Any dialogue with China on nuclear matters will need to address also the issues raised by the cases of North Korea, Iran and Pakistan. If North Korea is to be brought back into the six-nation talks, and if these are to make progress, China will need to play a more proactive role in its bilateral dealings with North Korea than it has done hitherto. Let us hope that the new leadership in Beijing will be prepared to look at that and will recognise and respond to the need. Then if Iran’s nuclear ambitions are to be brought back firmly within the ambit of its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the potential disastrous outcomes of either a nuclear arms race in the Middle East or of hostilities in that region are to be avoided, China will need to give wholehearted support to the twin-track policy of sanctions and the offer of serious negotiations to which—it must be faced—it has not up to now given wholehearted support. Thirdly, if the conference on disarmament is not to lose all its not very abundant credibility as a forum for negotiation, China will need to help persuade its ally Pakistan to cease blocking negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty.
In conclusion, we should face up to the obvious facts. China’s role as a global actor in pretty well every sphere of policy is on the rise. Clearly that goes for nuclear policy, too. The case for intensified discussions, both multilateral and bilateral, between this country and China is unanswerable—but is it going to be answered?
(12 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the problem of creeping competence has been there for some time. I remember a pamphlet published 10 years ago by a rather bright young man, whom my wife once taught, called Nick Clegg on doing less better. That is what many of us want to achieve in Brussels. We all know that the Commission sometimes wants to take powers over everything. I regretted that there was a report the other week from this House’s EU Committee on Commission proposals for closer co-operation on grass-roots sport. It seems to me that grass-roots sport ought to be left to the grass roots and that sport at the international level should be dealt with by the EU. That is a reasonable, long-term proposal. Liberal Democrats have held that view for a long time and continue to hold it, perhaps against the centralisers at the European level within the Labour Party. I see the noble Lord shaking his head.
My Lords, what would the Government’s response be if, in the intergovernmental conference about to meet, a member state other than Britain were to introduce a proposal for the repatriation of some portion of the single market?
My Lords, I am happy to say that that is extremely unlikely. We are some way off an intergovernmental conference. The German Government believe that we can have a very short IGC next March and hope that ratification of limited treaty change can then take place by the end of 2012. The position of Her Majesty's Government is that treaty change is not necessary, as we argued when ratifying the Lisbon treaty and again on the EU Bill. The Lisbon treaty has an enormous amount of headroom under which powers can be taken, and we think advantage should be taken of that, rather than getting into the messy, unavoidably uncertain and long process of treaty change.
(12 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, a great deal of unhelpful statements are being made on both sides. It was brought to my attention that one British national newspaper the other week published an advertisement by the Israeli Ministry of Tourism that showed the state of Israel as including Judea, Samaria and the Golan Heights. That is not entirely helpful for an agency of the state of Israel, either. There are real problems, and both sides recognise that. If we concentrate on the problems on both sides, we will not get back to negotiations, which is, above all, what we need to do.
My Lords, if the matter were to come before the United Nations General Assembly and the proposition was that Palestine should be given a status higher than its existing one, and one that has been used in the past by sovereign independent states such as Switzerland, would we in that circumstance be able to vote for it?
My Lords, there is not yet a proposition before the General Assembly. When that emerges, we will take our decision in the light of our commitment to make sure that everything that is done promotes negotiation between the two parties.