EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Friday 8th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB) [V]]

My Lords, since our marathon first debate on the UK’s Christmas Eve agreement with the EU last week, two things have happened: the agreement has entered into force and the UK has given effect to the provisions in domestic law. However inadequate one may believe it to be, as I do, it is water under the bridge, but there are plenty of loose ends remaining to tie up in the short term and some important policy choices to make in the medium to long term.

Two of the most important short-term challenges are financial services and data exchanges. On both, serious economic consequences will flow from whether the EU recognises the UK’s equivalence. Can the Minister assure the House that, in both cases, the Government will do everything they can to secure that equivalence? Do they recognise and accept that the more we seek to diverge from the EU—in practice, not just in theory—the less likely we are to achieve equivalence?

In the medium to long term, the big choice is surely whether we treat the present agreement as a ceiling, above which we do not seek to rise, or as a floor, on which other areas of co-operation, so far neglected, could be built. Which is it to be? Foremost among such areas, I suggest proper structures for co-operation on foreign and security policies, where we need to work with the EU institutions that take decisions in this field, as well as bilaterally with the member states, if we are not to drift towards irrelevance and lose influence. What is the Government’s thinking on this?

On student exchanges, the deplorable decision to turn our backs on Erasmus+ remains unexplained in any detail. Why, for example, do most other non-EU European countries find it of value? What can we do to restore reciprocal exchanges in this field, which Turing does not do? The fact is that we are at the beginning of a long and arduous journey of building our new partnership with our erstwhile EU partners, not strolling effortlessly through the sunlit uplands.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Mann, has withdrawn from the debate, so I call the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Huyton.

European Union (Future Relationship) Bill

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

3rd reading & 2nd reading & Committee negatived & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & 3rd reading (Hansard) & 3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & Committee negatived (Hansard) & Committee negatived (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 30th December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB) [V]]

My Lords, the parliamentary proceedings in which we are participating are a travesty. How else can you describe a Bill set to go through all its processes in one day; a Bill endorsing an agreement of more than 1,200 pages; a Bill accompanied by a distinctly partisan summary circulated by the Government; and a Bill which is getting no genuine parliamentary scrutiny and has not been reported on by either of the two committees of this House explicitly set up to deal with these sorts of agreements? If that is taking back control, it is certainly not effective control by Parliament.

The Government’s case needs, of course, to be listened to and examined with care. But it is not helpful when it is accompanied by a tidal wave of hyperbole, flippancy and plain untruths. Does the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in this country cease on Thursday of this week? No, not in Northern Ireland, and not in respect of issues relating to the status of EU citizens living and working in this country. Are we regaining our independence on Thursday? No, we never lost it. How otherwise could we have decided to leave the EU? Are we regaining unfettered sovereignty, that golden calf before which so many supporters of leaving the EU seem now to worship? No, this agreement we are debating inhibits the exercise of our sovereignty in hundreds of different ways, as does our membership of NATO, our acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the UN’s International Court of Justice and of the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement procedures, as do the provisions of the rules-based international order we are, quite rightly, defending and promoting.

I suggest that one of the best tests of the agreement is what is not covered by it—what we really will lose on Thursday, or at least risk losing. That includes freedom of services, which are 80% of our economy and in substantial surplus with the EU; financial services, which depend on the thread of equivalence of treatment yet to be settled; recognition of professional qualifications, which depends on a cat’s cradle of bilateral arrangements yet to be negotiated; and data exchanges, which are still in limbo. Our internal security and the ways to deal with the challenge of international crime are severely reduced from what we have now, with the Home Secretary surely alone in asserting that we shall be more secure.

The Erasmus student exchange programme is being thrown overboard as too costly, but why on earth, then, do other non-EU European countries belong to it? There is not a trace of any provision on co-operation on foreign policy and security, yet we need not only bilateral co-operation with other European countries, but co-operation with the EU’s decision-making institutions. I really would like to hear the Minister’s views on Gibraltar when he comes to reply. Why are we not sticking to the commitment that we would not enter into a deal in which Gibraltar was not covered?

This is a sorry tale before we even get to the detail. I suggest a simple set of conclusions: Britain could have done better, Britain needs to do better, and Britain will do better at some future point when we have regained some of our national characteristic of pragmatism.

Beyond Brexit (European Union Committee Report)

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 12th May 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, when I saw the title of the report that we are debating, which has been so excellently introduced by my noble friend Lord Boswell, I wondered whether our esteemed EU Select Committee was pulling our collective leg. Then I saw the date of the report—March last year—and realised that it was addressed to a different Government in a different Parliament and, shamefully, not debated when it should have been ahead of our leaving the EU this January.

The negotiations on our new partnership—I use the word to which we committed ourselves in the political declaration, not the Government’s reductive terminology of a free trade agreement—have begun, but so far they seem to be more a dialogue of the deaf than a prelude to a partnership. The Government seem to be applying social distancing to that political declaration, which provided an agreed framework.

Of the bones of contention so far identified, that of the level playing field is, in a way, bizarre, because we agreed in the political declaration to the following wording:

“Given the Union and the United Kingdom’s geographic proximity and economic interdependence, the future relationship must ensure open and fair competition, encompassing robust commitments to ensure a level playing field.”


Do the Government recognise that statement as one to which we subscribed?

Then, there is the Government’s determination to avoid an overall agreement out of a desire, apparently, to guard against the withdrawal of concessions in a different sector from the one in dispute. I fear that is futile and doomed to failure. Why? Because under the Swiss deal the EU has done exactly that, when it found that the Swiss were moving away from free movement and the EU withdrew access to Erasmus and research co-operation.

Thirdly, there is the implementation of the Irish protocol to the withdrawal agreement. Does anyone believe that checks and controls can be avoided? Obviously, there will be light ones, but none at all?

I fear that the verdict has to be that we are winning few friends and influencing few people. Why do we not just exempt the rest of the EU from the possible quarantine arrangements if they come here by aeroplane?

European Union: Negotiations (European Union Committee Report)

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 16th March 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes]

I will come on to that in a short while. I was saying that dynamic alignment is simply not what the British people voted for in 2016 or in last year’s general election. It is right that it forms no part of our approach to our longer-term relationship with the EU.

One symbol of being an independent nation again is fisheries. The EU seems to think it can recreate the existing quota arrangements, which are so disadvantageous to our home fishing industry. That simply cannot happen. The fishing industry may not be the most important contributor to the nation’s GDP, but it is symbolic of what it means to be a free nation: controlling our own waters and setting the rules by which we will be responsible conservators of our fishing stocks.

I am also completely behind the Government’s decision that we should not seek any extension of the transition period at the end of this year, even in the face of the current pandemic, which may well disrupt negotiations but does not present an excuse for not completing them. It is essential that we move to prepare for life without a comprehensive agreement if we do not make enough progress by the summer. I have never been afraid of trading on WTO terms and I will not start now.

All in all, I believe that the Government’s approach as set out in Command Paper 211 and as illuminated by the wonderful speech last month by Mr David Frost, our chief negotiator, is terrific. I hope that the House will support it.

I turn now to the other Motions before us, namely the Motion in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, on behalf of the EU Select Committee, and the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. If I had to sum up both of these Motions, I would say that they are seeking to rerun battles that have already been fought and lost. I was absolutely amazed that the EU Committee managed to hang its first report on Section 29 of the EU withdrawal Act. I shall express no opinion on the validity of the argumentation around this as set out in chapter 1 of the report. It may well be technically accurate. I do not, however, believe that Section 29 was intended to be used for the purpose of requiring a debate on the negotiations on our longer-term relationship. I had understood that section to allow Parliament to raise important issues about EU legislation passed in the transition period and therefore applying to the UK while we do not have any representation in the EU.

Noble Lords will be aware that the terms of the 2020 withdrawal Act differed significantly from the version of the earlier Bill that was considered by the last Parliament. The earlier Bill required the approval of Parliament to the Government’s negotiating objectives, which themselves had to be consistent with the political declaration. It also required three-monthly reports to Parliament on the progress of negotiations. Those provisions were inserted in a doomed attempt to get the last Parliament to pass the withdrawal Bill. But since then, the general election has given a huge mandate to the Prime Minister to “Get Brexit done”. The provisions for involving Parliament in the negotiations were removed from the Bill which became law in January this year. The will of Parliament is now clear: these provisions of parliamentary scrutiny are neither necessary nor desirable; yet here we are with the EU Committee using Section 29 of the Act to achieve a debate on negotiating principles, and even calling for the Government to publish a comparative analysis of the political declaration and the Command Paper.

The political declaration has no legal force and, as the EU Committee’s report makes clear, neither the Government nor the EU are using the political declaration as the starting point for their negotiations. We have moved on. I respectfully suggest that the EU Committee does as well.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

Will the noble Baroness explain why it is that she believes that the European Union is not behaving in a manner consistent with the political declaration when my noble friend’s report says quite explicitly that it is?

[Baroness Noakes]

I will say to the noble Lord only that it may have the headings of the political declaration but the content is significantly different in a number of places, as indeed was set out in the EU Committee’s report.

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[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

Well, my Lords, that really was back to 1958.

Were the coronavirus pandemic not dominating the public debate almost to the exclusion of everything else, the admirable and forensic report of your Lordships’ EU Select Committee, which was so excellently introduced by my noble friend Lord Kinnoull and which we are discussing today, and which deals with the opening positions of the UK and the EU in the post-Brexit new relationship negotiations, would be getting a great deal more attention, and rightly so. The political and economic choices that will be made in these negotiations will be felt for a long period—a period measurable in decades, not just in months and years—and very possibly long after the consequences of coronavirus will have been consigned to the history books and academic research. The consequences of the post-Brexit negotiations are likely to be seriously negative, which is no doubt why the Government are still refusing to publish any impact assessment of the proposals that they have put on the table in Brussels.

This report tells us that, on 31 January, this country ratified a political declaration annexed to the withdrawal agreement which set out the framework for our new relationship with the EU, and that from 3 February onwards—a mere four or five days later—every statement made by the Government treated that framework with blithe disregard, often contradicting it. Before anyone jumps up to say that the political declaration was not legally binding, I would not dream of suggesting that it was, but the time was when this country prided itself that its word was its deed. No more, apparently. Such blatant disregard for what we signed up to will carry a heavy cost in lost trust and confidence on the other side of the negotiating table. That will no doubt become clear when the two parties meet to thrash out the details of the Northern Ireland protocol to the withdrawal agreement, the interpretation of which by the Prime Minister bears no resemblance to what he actually signed up to.

The level playing field will clearly be a major bone of contention. In the political declaration we agreed—I emphasise: “we” agreed—and ratified the following words:

“Given the Union and the United Kingdom’s geographic proximity and economic interdependence, the future relationship must ensure open and fair competition, encompassing robust commitments to ensure a level playing field.”


There is not much ambiguity there, you might think, but the Government are driving a coach and horses over it by turning to the precedents of the EU’s agreements with Japan, Canada and South Korea, all many thousands of miles distant and much less interdependent with the EU, and ignoring the fact that agreements with its neighbours—Norway, Switzerland and Ukraine, for example—all have elaborate level-playing-field provisions.

Why are we insisting on the principle of regulatory divergence before we have even worked out in what sectors divergence might be to our advantage? I noted that today the noble Lord, Lord Goldsmith, made it quite clear that we have not worked that out yet on motor vehicles and chemicals. I wonder whether business really wants us to diverge. Surely it would have made more sense—and still makes more sense—to discuss the practicalities of divergence, not the principle of it.

Then there are all those regulatory agencies for which we seem determined to set up or restore separate, national institutions come what may, for largely ideological reasons. That will involve more costs, some no doubt to be loaded on to business, and more civil servants. Will it also mean more safety and protection for consumers? That is not terribly likely. Think of the implications of leaving the European Medicines Agency. As for internal security and law enforcement—on which the EU has made great strides in recent years from which we have benefited substantially—if the use that we have made of those new instruments is anything to go by, will we be safer without the European arrest warrant, or less safe? I think the answer is the latter.

One of the most blatant departures from the political declaration, which has already been mentioned, is the way that we have turned our back on any systematic co-operation with the EU on foreign and security policy, opting instead for bilateral ad hoc approaches. However, we will have no control over this. If the EU decides to act together on an issue of foreign policy, security, defence or sanctions, we will have no choice but to deal with it on that basis or not at all. Will we have more or less influence on the formulation of EU policies if we refuse systematic co-operation? That question is not too difficult to answer.

It is not too late to remedy some of these defects as the negotiations proceed—not too late even to reach mutually beneficial arrangements over fisheries which give our fishers a better deal than they had in the past, so long as we do not take an all-or-nothing approach. But imposing artificial deadlines which ignore what is written in the political declaration about the possibility of extending the transitional period and threatening to walk out in June are not the best ways to promote out interests, nor are they likely to succeed. That is why I support the resolution in the name of my noble friend Lord Kinnoull and the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and why I regard the Motion in the name of the noble Lord, Lord True, as grossly inadequate to meet the challenges that lie ahead.

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[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner. She made some very interesting new points to inform your Lordships’ debate. I thank the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, for introducing this debate. His committee rightly concludes that the recent Council decision raises matters of vital national interest.

I believe that the matters that the committee raises are not exactly new, because we have been debating them since before the referendum of 2016 and, indeed, before that. Indeed, a majority of the electorate voted to leave because they considered that remaining in the EU raised matters of vital national interest. They thought that reclaiming our right to have our laws made in this Parliament by MPs accountable to the British people was one of these matters.

I am sure that your Lordships are grateful to the noble Earl’s committee for its report and for promoting debate on our EU negotiations, which will, whatever their outcome, profoundly and permanently change the United Kingdom. However, even if we had not left the EU, the continuing incremental transfer of competences to the European institutions would have continued to profoundly and permanently change the country.

I regret that the negotiations leading to the withdrawal agreement were conducted ahead of and separately from the current negotiations on our future relationship with the EU. As your Lordships know very well, Article 50 states that the negotiations on the withdrawal of a member state shall take account

“of the framework for its future relationship with the Union.”

My understanding is that it was expected that the framework for the future relationship would be agreed at the same time as the withdrawal agreement. Article 50 does not suggest or imply that there should be two separate sets of negotiations or agreements. The EU insisted that we should agree the terms of withdrawal first, dealing with the future framework in the separate and non-binding political declaration.

The political declaration, as your Lordships are well aware, provided for a number of possible outcomes, ranging from continued close alignment with EU laws and regulations, to a clean break with full restoration of national sovereignty but also starting from a point where our legal and regulatory systems are identical.

The Conservative Party manifesto—on which the new House of Commons was elected—made it very clear that the Government would seek a future relationship with the EU based on a free trade agreement similar to that enjoyed by Canada; leave the single market and the customs union; and not agree to the continuing jurisdiction of the ECJ in this country. The Prime Minister made it clear in his Greenwich speech that if the EU would not agree to an FTA similar to that which it has with Canada, the UK would seek trading arrangements similar to those which the EU has with Australia.

I am opposed to the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, which seeks to exercise control over the actual process of our negotiations, or even debate the terms of emerging agreements. This would detract from our negotiator’s ability to obtain the best possible result for the UK and make it more likely that we will not be able to reach agreement with Mr Barnier and his team. I therefore urge your Lordships to reject this amendment, which, if agreed, would send the wrong message to the EU, and damage the authority of Mr Frost and our negotiating team.

One area where the Government’s Command Paper differs significantly from the EU’s decision is state aid. Indeed, the amended text of the decision adopted on 25 February implies not only that the EU will require the UK to continue to apply existing state aid legislation, but that it will be expected to adopt new or amended EU state aid rules in future. But the UK is very far from being the worst culprit of the excessive use of state aid. As the Prime Minister pointed out, and as the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner has just reiterated, the EU has enforced state aid rules against the UK only four times in the last 21 years, compared with 29 enforcement actions against France, and 67 against Germany. The recent hardening of the EU’s position on state aid will make it very difficult to reach agreement on a satisfactory FTA within the time available.

I would like to say a few words about services, especially financial services, based on more than 40 years’ experience as an investment banker. The political declaration suggested that the EU and UK should seek close and structured co-operation on regulatory and supervisory measures, including by working together in international bodies. As a member of the committee’s Financial Affairs Sub-Committee, formerly chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, and now chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, I can confirm that we have discussed this matter to a considerable extent. Our witnesses have included the present Governor and the Governor-designate of the Bank of England. Both have expressed the view that we should not be a rule-taker from the EU and should in future adopt a regulatory regime which recognises London’s connections with other important financial markets, such as New York and Tokyo.

I regret that the EU did not match our decision to grant temporary equivalence to EU clearing houses for two years, but was willing to grant this only for one year. Does the Minister concur that, in agreeing the basis of granting and withdrawing the recognition of equivalence in financial regulation, we should not establish a cumbersome and bureaucratic bilateral structure for assessing divergence with the EU which would, in effect, tie our rule-making more closely to Brussels than to other important financial markets, such as those of the US and Japan? Does he also agree that in future the UK should seek to maximise its influence in establishing best practice and designing proportionate regulation at the global level, through bodies such as the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, IOSCO? There are several EU financial rules, such as AIFMD, Solvency 2 and MiFID 2 which contain elements which we tried to resist and from which we may wish to diverge. If the structures we agree with the EU unduly restrict us from divergence, it will complicate our freedom to reach agreements on regulatory equivalence with third countries such as the US and Japan.

I agree with the former Chancellor who called for a durable equivalence relationship, whereas the EU has stated that its equivalence decisions can be withdrawn at 30 days’ notice unilaterally, as it has done in the case of Switzerland. This has increased the cost of trading in Swiss stocks, especially in the case of smaller companies.

On defence, the Government’s Written Ministerial Statement contains no specific reference to defence but states that foreign policy alignment, which is likely to be substantial, does not in itself require a joint institutional framework. However, the EU’s decision reflects the political declaration in agreeing that the UK may co-operate in certain projects under the European Defence Fund and PESCO. Our Armed Forces enjoy a close collaborative bilateral relationship with those of France. Does the decision mean that UK-France defence co-operation will be possible only under the framework of the EDF or PESCO in future? Does that mean that in order to co-operate, British forces could work with French forces only under the command of a European general?

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

Perhaps I can give the noble Viscount an answer to his question. The answer is no, it does not mean that. It could only mean that if the French agreed to make it mean that, and they will not.

[Viscount Trenchard]

I thank the noble Lord for his assurance.

As noted in paragraphs 34 to 40 of the report, the decision envisages an overall institutional framework, which suggests the EU wishes to enter into an association agreement. Does the Minister agree that such an arrangement would be inconsistent with the Written Ministerial Statement, which proposes a suite of agreements appropriate to a relationship of sovereign equals? Will he confirm that the Government have made it clear to the EU negotiators that the UK will not entertain such a semi-detached continuing relationship with the EU which would make it impossible for this country to respond positively and flexibly to the opportunities that our new freedoms to pursue an independent trade and regulatory policy will provide?

I much look forward to other noble Lords’ contributions and especially to my noble friend’s winding-up speech.

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[Lord Hamilton of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, your Lordships’ House has always regarded itself as the guardian of our constitution. Of course, included in our unwritten constitution, although many people wish it were not, is the whole question of referenda. I know that many people think we should never hold referenda in this country, but the fact is that it was decided that we should.

I want to put a hypothetical question to your Lordships’ House: what would have happened if all the Euro-enthusiasts, described by a noble Baroness on the Liberal Democrat Benches as Euromaniacs, had succeeded and kept us in the EU when the country had voted to leave—or, indeed, kept us in Brexit in name only when the country had made it quite clear that it wanted to leave the EU? I totally accept that this is a hypothetical question because the whole situation has now changed. For that reason, I do not expect my noble friend the Minister to reply to this—he should not reply to hypothetical questions—but your Lordships’ House should give thought to this matter because, let us face it, that referendum was in the 2015 Tory manifesto and was honoured in both the 2017 manifestos of the two major parties, which said that they would honour the result. If at the end of all this we had decided that somehow we were going to stay in the EU, where would that have left democracy in this country? We must think about this very seriously. Your Lordships’ House has done itself no credit in its role of scrutinising the whole business of European legislation and conspiring to do everything it could to ensure that we would never leave the EU at all.

I turn to the report. Much comment has been made about the level playing field, but also included in that is the fact that the role of third countries has been completely redefined. I thought that a third country was a country that did not happen to be in the EU—as simple as that—and that once you signed the withdrawal agreement and left, you were no longer in the EU but were a third country, but oh no, that seems to have been redefined. Now, for some reason, our closeness to the EU puts us in a unique category, and the amount of trade that we have with the EU puts us in a special position. I was somewhat surprised because, reading the report—

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

Obviously the noble Lord did not listen very carefully to the quotation that I read from the joint declaration. It makes it quite clear that we recognise that geographical proximity, and the extent of our independence, require a level playing field. Perhaps he could answer that question.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

That is the point I am trying to make; this should have been answered in the report. It does not matter where it comes from. Whether our closeness to the EU makes any difference to our relationship with it is questionable. The problem is that we have had the nerve to vote in favour of leaving the EU. Therefore, the EU must redefine the position of a country that leaves so that it can mete out special treatment to that country and somehow discourage others from leaving as well. This report should have addressed these issues. Does it make any difference whether or not a country is close to the EU? Does the size of trade make any difference? I agree that our trade with the EU is probably greater than that with the United States, but the United States does a massive amount of trade too. Nobody is asking for a level playing field with the United States, and they would be told where to go if they tried. We should be questioning these things, as I hoped the report would. Perhaps the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, can tell me why this was not included in the report.

Brexit: Financial Assistance for Businesses

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Wednesday 26th February 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Agnew of Oulton]

I am not sure if the noble Lord is talking about Northern Ireland or the United Kingdom in general. We have intensively engaged with the 3,000 UK/EU-only high-value traders over the last 18 months—that is, £250,000 or more. They report a high level of readiness; 71% reported themselves ready in October, and that number is going up every month. Yes, there will be frictionality. When we went into the general election, our simple message was “Get Brexit done. Restore sovereignty to this country.” I know there are many noble Lords who are not comfortable with that but it is our direction of travel.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, will the Minister recognise that he has indulged in a little bit of selective quotation? He has quite correctly referred to the statement that Northern Ireland remains within the UK customs arrangements, but he has not quoted the statement which is equally in the agreement and says that the customs rules of the European Union will apply to Northern Ireland after the end of the transitional period, as well as during it. Could he just tell us where those rules will be applied, physically and geographically?

[Lord Agnew of Oulton]

My Lords, the protocol protects the all-Ireland economy. It also makes clear that Northern Ireland is and remains part of the UK’s customs territory, and it allows the UK to ensure unfettered market access for goods moving from Northern Ireland and Great Britain. In October, the Prime Minister told the House of Commons that there would be no checks between Great Britain and Northern Ireland but that there would be some light-touch measures. That was reiterated by my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, when he too said there would be light-touch administration.

Detainee Issues

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 18th July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Cookham]

Perhaps it would help my noble friend if I refer to the specific paragraph in Sir Adrian’s letter. He said:

“It was argued in number of responses to the consultation that there should be a post-notification process for individuals who have been mistreated following a failure properly to apply any new guidance or principles. This would enable them to seek redress. Reprieve and Freedom from Torture, in a joint submission, made substantive representations regarding the UK’s international obligations in this regard”.


I will write to my noble friend when I have discovered the other part of Sir Adrian’s recommendations, which builds on the current position, but makes more explicit that there is now an obligation, if people come across mistreatment, to pass it up the chain. I recognise that the paragraph I just read out was not directly relevant to my noble friend’s question.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

The Minister has revealed the Government’s recent steep learning curve on extraordinary rendition, helped along the path by the activity of my noble friend Lord Tyrie. Do the Government now take the view that extraordinary rendition and what happens to people so rendered could bring anyone complicit in it within the scope of the International Criminal Court? That seems the common-sense conclusion from what they have found.

[Lord Young of Cookham]

The noble Lord may be right. If it were an offence under the law just referred to, as Ministers are obliged by the Ministerial Code to abide by national and international law, they would be precluded from taking action that ran the risk of that breach.

G20 Summit

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 8th July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, this debate could and perhaps should have taken place a little earlier—ahead of the G20 meeting—but at least we now have the benefit of knowing the outcome of the meeting, and can make some assessment of it. It has been most excellently introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Howell, whose rotation off the chairmanship of the International Relations Committee is deeply regretted by all its members, myself included.

Our letter to the Prime Minister noted that the G20 was falling short of its earlier promise when it helped to handle the aftermath of the world financial crisis in 2007-09. Has the Osaka meeting changed that judgment? I do not think it has. It is still falling short of its ability to deal with a whole range of issues which are crying out for effective collective action—including, most prominently, trade policy and climate change—but that does not mean that we could do without the G20. To coin a phrase, if it did not exist, we would need to invent it, bringing together as it does the countries with 80% of the global economy, and bridging the divide between fully industrialised countries and those that are still developing. The G7, which has only industrialised countries, is not a substitute for that.

We should have no illusions about how alarming the situation on trade policy currently is. A whole range of unilateral, illegal protectionist measures initiated by the Trump Administration are shaking to its foundations our open-trading system, which has brought such benefits over the past 70 years. This is the most immediate and most fundamental challenge to what we frequently refer to as the rules-based international system, which it is in our national interest to support and strengthen. The Trump/Xi meeting dealt with some trade issues, but let us not kid ourselves. It was not a ceasefire, as it has been described by rather gullible journalists. It merely avoided making a bad situation a lot worse. What action are the Government taking to reverse that trend towards protectionism? What will be done to ensure that the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement procedure does not collapse in a few months’ time as a result of the US refusal to appoint new adjudicators or panel members?

On climate change too, the result was certainly sub- optimal, but the commitment of 19 of the 20 participants to the Paris accords was, in my view, better than accepting the weasel words that the US would have preferred. The great challenge that lies ahead is in implementing and strengthening those Paris accords, inadequate as they certainly are, and that lies ahead, but I would like to know what strategy the Government have for doing better when the UN Secretary-General calls together a summit meeting on climate change this autumn.

I have two final points. Others have made the point that it is necessary to find some way of monitoring progress in fulfilling commitments in the periods between these annual meetings. I would like to hear what the Government think can be done about that. Suggestions have been made about the IMF or the OECD doing it; there are perfectly good ways in which participants could be brought up to the fact that they are not actually doing very much to fulfil the warm words they agreed at the last meeting. Secondly, I give three cheers for the successful conclusion of the EU-Mercosur agreement, which was announced during the summit, even though that achievement looks set to become yet another piece of Brexit-related collateral damage if the two aspirants to the Prime Minister’s post get their way and take us out of the European Union by 31 October.

Brexit: Stability of the Union

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 17th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, future generations of historians mulling over and analysing the dysfunction and muddle of the Brexit negotiations will, I suspect, have particular difficulty understanding and explaining how the charge was led by a party that still calls itself the Conservative and Unionist Party and by the Democratic Unionist Party of Northern Ireland, the hardest and purest of Brexit supporters, despite the risk, I would say with some confidence, of actual damage to the United Kingdom’s own union and very possibly its unity. No amount of prime ministerial labelling of the union, metronomically, as “precious” will conceal that reality. So all credit to the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, for shedding some light on this rather neglected aspect of Brexit before it is too late to do anything about it except bemoan it.

At the time, were we warned about these risks that would be incurred, especially in Northern Ireland, if the UK voted to leave? Of course we were. A few days before the vote, the two Prime Ministers who did most to build the Good Friday agreement, John Major and Tony Blair, jointly gave a stark warning. Since then, precursors of the damage to come—discord over the role of the devolved Administrations in the Brexit process, failure to constitute an Administration in Belfast and the turmoil over the Irish backstop—have multiplied.

In Scotland and Northern Ireland, as others have said, there were clear majorities in favour of remaining in the EU. The democratic legitimacy of those votes is indisputable, but you do not often hear that recognised by supporters of Brexit—and you never hear it recognised by the DUP. Overriding that legitimacy with the leave votes in England and Wales is precisely the sort of majoritarian supremacy that fuels the cause of Scottish independence and of the union of the two parts of Ireland. Will that be different if Brexit goes ahead on the basis of leaving with the Prime Minister’s deal, or without a deal at all? I doubt that. The contrary is far more likely—and I would include Wales, even though its voters opted to leave.

The Government’s own studies indicate a considerable and continuing loss of economic growth as a result of Brexit, and the less prosperous parts of the country, among which Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland undoubtedly rank, are likely to suffer disproportionately. The much-trumpeted prize for the UK of having its own trade policy is likely to result in concessions to trade partners such as the US, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil and Argentina that will damage sheep and beef farmers in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. Even fishermen, among the strongest supporters of Brexit, are likely to be disappointed as the cruel deception of the Government’s claim that access to markets and access to waters are totally different things is shipwrecked on the rocks of the EU’s interests in the post-Brexit negotiations.

Then there will be the discord that is likely to reign over the exercise of the UK’s miserably diminished influence on the shaping of EU policies post Brexit. Are there not likely to be differences between Edinburgh, Cardiff, and Belfast and Westminster and Whitehall over trying to influence trade and regulatory measures in Brussels? Will Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales not fight their corners in Brussels, thus further weakening the influence of the UK? Of course they will—and each setback in the unequal relationship between the UK and the EU will foster the sense of separation.

If even a part of these admittedly gloomy predictions is borne out, our union is in for a rough ride in a post-Brexit world. Would it not be more sensible and honest to recognise now that continued membership of the EU is far more likely to consolidate the unity of the UK than its leaving the EU, and then to give all four nations that make up the United Kingdom a say on whether to accept the deal that the Prime Minister has negotiated or whether to remain in the EU? Of course, that could result in an outcome similar to that in 2016, in which case it would have to be accepted, but we would at least have demonstrated that we had paid some attention to the attitudes and opinions of all parts of the union and that we regarded the stability of the union, which today’s debate has so usefully brought to the fore, as something that we not only paid lip service to but really meant.

European Union Referendum: Alleged Russian Interference

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 19th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Cookham]

If I may focus on the first part of the noble Lord’s question, which is about Russian involvement in covert activities, he may know that the Intelligence and Security Committee, on which two noble Lords sit, is currently investigating Russian involvement in the 2016 referendum and the 2017 general election. It makes sense to allow that important inquiry to be completed, and then we will have a clearer view of the impact, if any, of Russian involvement in the election, which is the subject of this Question. So far as Galileo is concerned, I commend the noble Lord’s ingenuity but I have listened to fellow Ministers give very adequate answers on Galileo and I will not attempt to rise to that level.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, will the Minister say whether the Government are satisfied that the Electoral Commission has access to all the rather complex means—obviously, I do not want to go into intelligence matters in this House—that foreign Governments have to interfere in our affairs? Is the Electoral Commission really equipped to carry out that inquiry in all its aspects?

[Lord Young of Cookham]

The noble Lord makes a very good point in that, obviously, it makes sense for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, not the Electoral Commission, to have overall responsibility for our relationship with Russia. It makes sense for the DCMS to have overall responsibility for “fake news” and for the Information Commissioner. It makes sense for the Cabinet Office to have overall responsibility for electoral law and a dialogue with the Electoral Commission. Where all these things come together, which I think is the noble Lord’s point, clearly, we need a collective view. It makes sense to await the outcome of the ISC inquiry that I mentioned a few moments ago, the DCMS inquiry into fake news that is currently under way, and the Electoral Commission inquiries into the referendum campaigns. When we have all that, we can stand back and see whether we have the right resources and the right information in the right place and come up with a collective view on the serious issue raised in the original Question.

Immigration Statistics

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 12th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Cookham]

The noble Lord will recall that this issue was debated extensively by your Lordships when the then Higher Education and Research Bill went through this House. When the Bill left this House an amendment was carried to delete overseas students from the migration figures. When that legislation hit the statute book, that bit was omitted. In the meantime, the ONS will continue to follow the UN standard, which is to count anyone who is here for more than a year as a long-term migrant. That practice is followed by the USA, New Zealand, Canada and Australia. There is an impact on services if people stay here for longer than a year, and the ONS, which is independent, has decided to continue to use the United Nations definition.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

Does the Minister recognise that his description of the Bill that left this House was not entirely accurate? It required the Government to change not the statistics but the policy; and to stop treating students as economic migrants, not to stop counting them. Would he further recognise that defective statistical methods have been used to count students leaving after the end of their student visas—one of the false reasons the Government have used to justify their policy?

[Lord Young of Cookham]

It is not the case that the Government’s policy has deterred international students from coming to this country. According to the latest figures, study-related visas were up by 8% in 2017 to more than 220,000. The Government have made it absolutely clear that there is no cap on the number of genuine international students coming to this country—they are welcome. We are the second most popular destination after the United States for such students and roughly 40% of our overseas students now come from China, in a competitive market.