Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 2nd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bew (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has again referred to the issues raised in the eloquent letter read out by the noble Lord, Lord Browne. First, I want to say something directly to his constituent on behalf of the House. This is what the House of Lords does. We have a big thing about Henry VIII powers and would do this with any Bill. I fully expected that and nothing I have heard has been the remotest surprise in several days of debate on the Bill. There has been not even the slightest tincture of originality. However, the problem is that the Bill, unlike the other Bills the House deals with, is not quite being dealt with in the normal way. This is part of a three-dimensional strategy of the Government. The other dimension is negotiations with the European Union. When I said weeks ago in this Chamber that these negotiations would proceed and would clearly not be badly affected by the existence of the Bill, I was greeted with howls of disapproval. In fact, we all know that they are proceeding and they have not been affected by the Bill. That is one dimension and the reality.

The other point is that this is related to a strategy that may very well fail to get the institutions of the Good Friday agreement up and running before the 25th anniversary of that agreement. This strategy may well fail, but anybody who thinks that the immediate dropping of the Bill now would help with the return of the Good Friday agreement and that strategy is also wrong. The UK Government are acting under the international agreement—Article 1(5)—which permits the Government with sovereign power to address the alienation of one or other community, as we did over the Irish language a few weeks ago and as we are now trying to do with this issue, because there is significant alienation in the unionist community over the cause of the protocol.

I simply want to make the point that, although I have been slightly cold in response to the noble Lord’s constituent’s resentment, I understand it—but this is what the House of Lords does. It will do its thing about regulatory powers, delegated powers and so on, and it ought to do that thing. What we and the noble Lord’s constituent are entitled to ask is that it should take some account of the fact that we are involved in a three-part process. The Bill is not quite just a thing in this way. It coexists with other key elements: the negotiation with the European Union, which the House now accepts, somewhat grimly, is going on unaffected by the Bill and is by far the best outcome; and the need to act under our international obligations to address the alienation of one community. I simply suggest that it would be less irritating to the noble Lord’s constituent if those points were at least acknowledged.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I will briefly follow the noble Lord, Lord Bew, because he raised a point of great importance: we are breaking our teeth on a problem with three parts. At the moment, the Government are giving us absolutely nothing in terms of reporting on what is going on in Brussels. It is simply described as a “running commentary”, as if that were answer to the problem—well, it is not.

I lived through the last time the United Kingdom negotiated with the European Union as a third country, known as our accession negotiations. The process of the negotiations was reported on regularly to both Houses of Parliament by the Heath Government. No one said that was a running commentary or the wrong thing to do. We cannot go on like this, without the slightest idea of what is going on in Brussels, because it very much affects what we are discussing here. As the noble Lord, Lord Bew, rightly said, there is not the slightest sign to show whether our discussion here, and the Government pushing this absurd legislation through in an untimely manner, are either helping or hindering what is going on in Brussels.

I plead with the Minister to programme a moment at which the Government will give both Houses a progress report—not of everything going on in Brussels, but so that we have some idea of how that piece fits in with the others.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, Clause 15 contains what the DPRRC called the “most arresting” powers in the Bill, allowing Ministers to rip up and rewrite an Act of Parliament by granting the power to classify parts of the protocol as excluded provision or to tweak the precise nature of that classification, with virtually no parliamentary oversight.

The Minister will argue that the Government have constrained themselves by listing nine permitted purposes for which changes can be made to the application of the protocol, but that list changes very little. The DPRRC describes it as

“a very broad set of circumstances”.

Unlike SIs made under the EU withdrawal Act 2018, which must be accompanied by a declaration of the good reasons for them, the DPRRC says that there is no obligation for a Minister to include a statement setting out why the regulations are being made.

The DPRRC report does not take issue with Clause 16, although this also confers very broad powers on Ministers: they can make any additional provision that they like in relation to additional excluded provision. Once again, we need the Government to publish indicative regulations: we currently have no idea how the use of these powers would look or how often they would be used. We are told that the tearing up of the protocol is to bring stability and predictability to trade across the Irish Sea, yet these powers theoretically allow Ministers fundamentally to alter trading arrangements at short notice, with no reasoning, consultation or formal scrutiny. As with Clause 14, the provisions appear unworkable, and granting such discretion to Ministers is likely to increase uncertainty and instability.

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[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

Although the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, has developed his argument with great eloquence, and at considerable length, he has not yet explained to my satisfaction why it was that his party did not object to the holding of a referendum that took Northern Ireland out of the European Union against its expressed wish as being a breach of the Good Friday agreement?

[Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Lab)]

My Lords—

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[Lord Caine (Con)]

The vote will be on Articles 5 to 10, regardless of any changes in domestic law made by this Bill.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, will recall that securing the consent mechanism was, in the view of the Government at the time, one of the key measures which paved the way for them to agree to the revised Northern Ireland protocol in the autumn of 2019. It follows therefore that it would make no sense for the Government subsequently to remove what was seen at the time as a key part of the protocol. It is perhaps because this point is so self-evident to the Government that we did not see the need to protect this element of the protocol under Clause 15(1). The clause is not intended to provide an exhaustive list of every single article of the protocol that we do not intend to alter and therefore we have not listed other articles which we have no intention to amend.

For the avoidance of doubt, I can confirm to the noble Baroness that the democratic consent process remains an integral part of the Northern Ireland protocol. The protocol should not, and indeed cannot, continue unless it retains the support of a majority of Members voting in the Northern Ireland Assembly. Again, I hear the points made by my noble friend Lord Dodds of Duncairn in that respect, but I am just setting out the position as it stands.

I hope that this reassures the noble Baronesses, Lady Chapman, Lady Suttie and Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, that we have no intention of using the powers to alter in any way the mechanism in Article 18.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

The Minister gave a reply to the question about what the basis of the consent vote in 2024 would be, but I really did not understand what he said. Surely the vote in 2024 will take place on the Northern Ireland protocol and its arrangements for implementation as they stand at the time of the review, not as they are now and not as they would be if the Government unilaterally changed the protocol and destroyed it in the process—then there would not be a review at all. The answer is surely quite simple. It cannot be said with precision, because we do not know what the provisions of the protocol and those for its implementation might be at the time the vote takes place, but that is what it will be on.

[Lord Caine (Con)]

The noble Lord is right that it is probably not fruitful to speculate on what the circumstances might be in 2024. Our first objective is to have an Assembly in place that would be able to consider these matters and take the decision.

In conclusion, I hope I have provided some assurance to noble Lords about our intentions in respect of the powers in Clause 15, Article 18 of the protocol and the consent mechanism. I therefore urge the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 31st October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I intervene briefly in support of these amendments requesting that the Government provide an economic impact assessment.

Nothing could better characterise the extraordinary nature of our debates today, Wednesday and next Monday—and their unreality—than the fact that the Government are asking us to enact a Bill that gives them complete powers to do whatever they like in circumstances where it has been impossible, in the Government’s view, to get a negotiated solution. I recognise that the Government’s preference is for a negotiated solution. They are proposing that we give them a blank cheque for that without telling us what the impact on the British economy or the economy of Northern Ireland might be. That is frankly bizarre. It is not truly credible.

Of course, we all know that, in the event and after we have given them those powers, they would probably publish something, but we need to know now. We need some guesstimates—I accept they could be only guesstimates—of what the likely consequences would be if the Government’s preference for a negotiated solution cannot be achieved and they use the powers in the Bill that they are asking us to enact. I cannot honestly think of an argument against it.

Five years before we joined the European Communities, the then Labour Government issued a White Paper under George Brown which was an impact assessment of joining the European Communities. Why is it impossible to do that now? Why can the Government not say what the impact would be if the car goes over the cliff? I hope the Government will relent and will provide some impact assessments of these matters, because we really need to see them before we are asked to vote on the Bill.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office (Lord Caine) (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman of Darlington, for Amendments 12 and 15 in her name.

Since the Bill was introduced, the Government have engaged extensively with groups across business and civic society in Northern Ireland, the rest of the UK and internationally. In addition to routine engagement, as I have mentioned, during the summer, the Government held over 100 bespoke sessions with more than 250 businesses, business representative organisations and regulators to inform the details of how the dual regulatory and trade boundary models should work in practice. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, I refer to some of my own engagement, not just with the dairy and agri-food sectors, but with business representative groups in Northern Ireland. That has been a similar experience to that of my right honourable friends, the Minister of State and the Secretary of State. We are very committed to this and we are reflecting on the huge wealth of feedback that we have received as we continue to develop the details of the underlying regime.

The clause is designed to provide stakeholders in Northern Ireland with certainty that the Government will deliver the solutions we have outlined. The House will have the opportunity to scrutinise regulations in the usual fashion, and the Government will provide all the usual accompanying material under normal parliamentary procedures. The full details of the new regime will be set out in, and alongside, regulations made under the Bill, including economic impacts where appropriate, so that Parliament may make informed scrutiny of the new regime which is being put in place.

The regulations themselves will be the product of engagement with businesses to ensure the implementation of the new regime is as smooth and operable as possible. Stakeholder views are of course important, but it is ultimately for Ministers to exercise these powers, and for Parliament to scrutinise and hold them accountable in the usual way. An additional requirement for the Government to lay an assessment and a report when it makes regulations using this power is therefore, in our view, unnecessary, and in that spirit, I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 3rd March 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, debates on the Northern Ireland protocol tend to generate more heat than light. Let us hope that today’s debate will buck that trend; my noble friend, Lord Jay, certainly set us off that way. At the end of this debate, it would be very useful to have a clear picture from the Government of the facts on the ground, the trends of the Northern Ireland economy since the protocol entered into force a little over a year ago, and how those trends compare with the rest of the island of Ireland and the rest of the UK.

However, a few salient political points stand out. First, the supporters of leaving the EU in the 2016 referendum grossly misled the public, particularly when the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Theresa Villiers, assured all and sundry that leaving the EU would have no adverse or destabilising effect in Northern Ireland. Secondly, the vote in 2016 provided no democratic legitimacy for leaving in Northern Ireland since there was a clear majority for remaining. Thirdly, the solution finally enshrined in the protocol negotiated by the noble Lord, Lord Frost, whom I welcome to the Back Benches, was described by the former Prime Minister, Theresa May, as one that no British Prime Minister could accept. Fourthly, there was never at any point and at any time any basis for the assertion by the current Prime Minister that the protocol would require no checks and controls on trade in goods between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. No wonder there is so much confusion, disinformation and distrust.

Does that mean that the problems that have arisen over the implementation of the protocol are all the fault of one side ? Certainly not. Nor does it mean that the protocol is without blemish and could not be improved—of course it could. The European Commission has recognised that by coming to the table with detailed proposals for improvements. The sooner after the May elections those negotiations can be concluded the better.

What surely must be avoided is inflicting more damage on the structures of the Good Friday agreement by dragging out the process. That agreement was a massive and painful achievement. It needs to be preserved, not used as a pawn in the political manoeuvring over the protocol.

I have one final point. The fate of the Good Friday agreement is a matter of deep concern to our closest ally, the United States, and its current President. The sooner the problems over implementing the protocol can be sorted out, the sooner what has become a serious irritant in UK-US relations can be put behind us. The converse is also true: if the UK-EU negotiations drag on or, worse still, break down in acrimony, there should be no doubt about the negative consequences for our relationship with the United States.

Climate Change

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 6th February 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I hope I may be forgiven for concentrating my remarks in this extremely timely debate—for which I thank the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton—on the international negotiating challenges presented to this country by its chairing of the COP 26 meeting in Glasgow in November. It is a formidable challenge, all the more so as it comes on the heels of the relative failure of COP 25 in Madrid at the end of last year. We need to avoid being proprietorial about this. Chairing a massive international conference such as this does not mean you own it, nor that you can hope to fashion the outcome to your will and to fit your interests—but if it turns out a failure, even a relative failure, you can bet your bottom dollar that this country will get a disproportionate amount of the blame.

I declare an interest as having been at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, where I worked for a team headed by the Prime Minister, Sir John Major, and the noble Lords, Lord Howard of Lympne and Lord Blencathra. Since that promising start, there have been plenty of warm words about checking and reversing climate change and all too little effective action to achieve it. Current trends mean that, if we cannot break out of that contradiction at Glasgow, the chances of mitigating —let alone reversing—climate change will slip away from us and this world will be faced with increasingly damaging consequences for us all.

The first requirement for success is that there must be a team effort, not just an occasion for burnishing our own national image. That will mean working closely with our Italian partners, with whom we are sharing the chair during 2020. You do not hear an awful lot about that in government statements, though I recognise that the Italian Prime Minister was here this week. It also means working as a team with the United Nations, because this is a UN process—not just a national one—and there is a mass of UN expertise, from scientific to negotiating skills, that could play an integral part and needs to be harnessed, not marginalised, in any team effort.

The other requirement is to realise that this is a political process involving national decisions to be taken at the highest political level in every country involved. Important though the technical aspects of dealing with climate change are, they will not cut through if the politics are not right. That means our own Government getting involved at the top level—that is to say, the level of the Prime Minister—and our team being headed up at a level that would ensure access at the top level to Governments all around the world. In that context, and without wishing to comment on the personal aspects of it, I welcome the Government’s recent decision to upgrade the leadership of our team. Since climate change policy is not a party-political issue, would it not be sensible to put together a team that cuts across party lines and disregards them, as the French did in the run-up to the Paris conference? The UN has shown us a really good example of that by the inspired choice of Mark Carney to head up their team.

In the major diplomatic effort that will have to be made, we can hope for no help from our closest ally, the US, but can we attempt to persuade President Trump at least not actively to cut across our efforts, which if successful would, after all, benefit the US every bit as much as the rest of the world? We will need to bring it home to our friendly countries, such as Saudi Arabia and India, which played an unhelpful role in Madrid, that a repeat of that will not be without consequences or pass unnoticed. At every stage we need to work in a co-operative partnership with China, without which we have little chance of success. Of course, the engine room of any successful campaign will be our recent partners in the EU, without whose solid and active support we will get nowhere. That is quite a challenge for 2020, but one to which we have every interest in rising.

Horizon 2020

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 27th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

My noble friend is absolutely right. We have been a vital participant in the Horizon programmes and their predecessor framework programmes. There is no doubt that going forward our participation will make them work better, and the negotiations must therefore deliver against that objective.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, will the Minister give a really clear assurance that, when the negotiations on the next relationship between the UK and the EU start in March, the British Government will put on the table their desire to co-operate with the Horizon programme and their proposals for doing so? The new programme may not yet have been funded but you can bet it has been negotiated.

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

The noble Lord is absolutely right. We have been very clear thus far that we wish to participate going forward. The nature of the association agreement will be subject to those ongoing negotiations, but for scientists on both sides of the channel and of the Irish Sea, our collaboration is as vital now as it has ever been.

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting
Monday 20th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, this is perhaps one of the most significant amendments before your Lordships’ House. It deals with a major constitutional issue—the accountability of the Executive to Parliament —and with matters of prime concern to our country’s future: that is, the trading, security, diplomatic and cultural links that we build with our close allies and close neighbours across the continent.

The trade talks in particular will have major implications for the regions and nations of our country, and for different sectors of our economy. Despite this, the Government seem to want to listen to no one. Business has been pleading with Ministers to involve the relevant businesses in the trade talks, with alarmed reactions over the weekend, as we have all seen, to the Chancellor’s statement that there will be no alignment on EU regulations going forward, diminishing any chance of frictionless trade.

We have heard from the food and drink industry about its fears, both for particular parts of the industry but also with wider implications of likely food price increases. Indeed, it even talks of the death knell of the concept of frictionless trade with the EU. Agriculture, the motor industry and manufacturing are all worried about jobs, investment and their competitiveness in their vital EU markets. Despite that, they feel excluded from the Government’s thinking. As the CBI says, businesses need to be brought into trade talks with both the EU and the US, and it calls on government to work with business

“closely, comprehensively and transparently throughout every stage of negotiations, from mandate setting through to implementation.”

It is right—as are consumers and farmers, whose futures are at stake.

Shutting Parliament out of the discussions on the objectives of, as well as the progress on, negotiating talks, means that it is almost impossible for MPs to represent and answer external concerns that are brought to them on a daily basis. It seems clear that that is exactly what Ministers want to shut out: any voices that conflict with their ideology or which bring them practical problems about the implementation of new rules and checks, and tariffs or indeed non-tariff barriers. No wonder that some think that this is about allowing for a final no-deal relationship at the end of December: a free-for-all, WTO basis for our trading, with immense risks to part of our industry and regions.

In the election, the future of UK plc was voted into the hands of the Government. However, in our system of democracy, that does not mean that the Government should not be accountable to Parliament and should not get its plans approved by Parliament, as all their other plans are, via debate, a vote on the Queen’s Speech, and votes on their Bills, which are enacted only with the agreement of Parliament. Here we are talking about something else: the preparations for a treaty which will affect our living, working, trading, policing, security and environmental relationship with those close friends and near neighbours—decisions which will, one way or another, affect every citizen now and in the future.

So it is perfectly normal to say that, just because the treaty will not be a Bill, that is no reason not to have the equivalent of Second Reading and Committee before we arrive at the final Third Reading equivalent—that is, the final treaty, which will come to Parliament for approval only at the end via the CRaG. At that ratification stage, it is basically too late to say, “Well, actually no, not really—this bit doesn’t work”, “This affects our industry” or “That affects a particular region”. It will be too late then to make changes to the treaty.

So, without this amendment, which gives Parliament a say, Parliament will be shut out of these crucial talks, other than through the odd take-note debate or response to a Statement. That is not enough for your Lordships’ House, and it is certainly not enough for the elected House of Commons. We must ensure that the Commons has some real input throughout the process and, crucially—something that is allowed for in the amendment —if a December deal looks unlikely, the Commons must have some ability to make the Government explain their plans for that eventuality. That is what Amendment 15 would provide. I beg to move.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I support the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. I point out that the amendment on the Order Paper on Report is a considerably reduced text from the one that was discussed in Committee. That is to say, those of us who have put our name to it have listened to some of the Government’s objections—in particular, to their wish to avoid any appearance of a formal mandate—and we have gone for a much lighter procedure, which is now on the Order Paper. So attention has been paid to what was said from the government side.

However, the case for this amendment has been hugely strengthened since Committee last week by the interview that was given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Financial Times last Thursday. In that interview, he made policy that had not hitherto been set out, without, as far as one can see, the agreement of Cabinet, certainly of the House of Commons, or of this House, or even knowledge of what he was about to say. So the case for setting down some process by which the Government need to come to both Houses and explain what they are doing at various stages in what will be an extremely complex negotiation has been greatly strengthened by that action by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The position he took on the question of no regulatory alignment is akin to the decisions that were taken by the previous Prime Minister when she went to the party conference in the autumn of 2016 and, in one breath, ruled out the single market, the customs union or any jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. That did not end terribly well, and I rather doubt whether what the Chancellor of the Exchequer now said will end terribly well either. What he said sounded—and is, if you read the wording—extraordinarily categorical. He did not say that there will not be alignment on all matters—that we will not, as it were, remain in total alignment with European regulations—but that we will not be in alignment on anything.

He is effectively ruling out the possibility for example of the motor industry being put on a system of alignment. That would not be a ridiculous thing to happen, since it has been working to the same standards with its continental counterparts for something like 25 years. However, he has ruled all of that out, so the case for requiring that from now on the Government should at least tell and consult both Houses about what they are planning to do and how they are getting on seems to have been greatly strengthened in the interim by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

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[Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly on this, largely echoing a lot of what the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, said. In Committee, much was said about how the Government are “deliberately cutting” Parliament

“out of any meaningful role”, [Official Report, 15/1/20; col. 719.]

to quote the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. We heard it again just a moment ago, when she said the Government are shutting out voices from the debate.

I concede entirely that—as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, rightly put it—this amendment is a watered-down version of the one debated in Committee, but my objections to it remain the same. I will not overstate the case; it is important not to do so. For example, I would not claim that this amendment will bind the hands of Government, and of course it will not thwart Brexit. I will make just two simple points.

The first is that the amendment creates what I see as a legislative straitjacket that binds us into an inflexible parliamentary process that cannot really take account of the diplomatic and political reality of the negotiations, which—as we all know—by their very nature will not abide by the bi-monthly reporting cycle that the amendment sets out.

The second and much more profound point—this is what the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, was referring to—is that Parliament already has considerable powers of scrutiny to hold the Government to account. I know my noble friend slightly dismisses them; I do not. I see them as absolutely intrinsic to the way that this House and the other place work. I am not talking here about the shenanigans we saw in the last Parliament, with MPs taking control of parliamentary business, but those traditional means of scrutiny—the other means that Parliament has, in this House and the other place, to interrogate and scrutinise.

I asked the Library to do some research for me. I asked how many PNQs, Urgent Questions, Oral Statements, Select Committee reports, Written Statements, Oral Questions and Written Questions have touched on Brexit since the day of the referendum. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, may say that this is nothing or is irrelevant; I totally disagree. In the calculation the Library made, it excluded the Bills we have debated, including the 650 hours this House has spent on debating EU-related issues. Let me give your Lordships the results of this exercise. Since the referendum, there have been, in Parliament as a whole: 10 Private Notice Questions related to Brexit; 32 Urgent Questions; 116 Oral Statements; 179 Select Committee reports; 743 Written Statements; 6,241 Oral Questions and supplementaries; and 15,366 Written Questions. I do not think this can be just waved away as nothing; I see it as fundamental. This is 22,687 items that drive a coach and horses through the need for this amendment, 22,687 ways in which Parliament has had a meaningful role. It can interrogate Ministers on the points that the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, made, and I believe this is 22,687 reasons why we do not need the amendment.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

If the noble Lord’s research had gone a little further back, he might have been quite startled by what he found. He would have found that the procedures laid down in this amendment are almost precisely those that the Conservative Government applied in 1970 when negotiating our accession. Regular reports to Parliament, regular Questions by all in both Houses—they are all there, and there is nothing wrong with it.

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

I totally take that point, but I do not believe we should be setting this out in statute—as the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, said. There is nothing to prevent the Government and Ministers coming to this House and the other place to make that point, nothing to prevent MPs calling for Urgent Questions and so on and so forth, so I am sorry to say that I disagree with the noble Lord.

Brexit: UK-Irish Relations

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 5th September 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, it is good that the House is debating this important but often overlooked and marginalised issue of the consequences for the whole island of Ireland of last year’s referendum vote and the Article 50 negotiations now under way. It is good, too, that we are doing so on the basis of yet another careful, judicious and evidence-based report from your Lordships’ EU Select Committee, and of the excellent introduction to that report by my noble friend Lord Jay of Ewelme. The report shows something of the extraordinary fecklessness demonstrated by the supporters of leaving the EU when they have not very often addressed the possible risks and dimensions of winning that vote. Now we are facing those risks and neither they, the supporters of leaving, nor the Government seem yet to have any very convincing answers to these questions.

It is as well to begin with one salient fact: when they voted in the referendum last June, the people of Northern Ireland voted by a substantial majority that their future would be best assured by remaining in the EU. That fact cannot be gainsaid or belittled, nor should it be. What we are discussing now is, in the judgment of that majority, a damage limitation exercise, and those who so incessantly call for the referendum outcome to be respected here should respect that fact too. The party in the north that now supports the Government needs to recognise that it was in a minority in that vote.

I would like to touch on two issues that come up less often than those of the border for goods and services and the free movement of people—indeed, they have not come up at all—the future of the network of the EU justice and home affairs legislation, and the situation that might arise with regard to EU membership should the people of Northern Ireland decide at some point in the future by a majority, as provided for in the Belfast agreement, to join the state of Ireland. First, there really should be no doubt about the critical role that the EU’s justice and home affairs legislation has played in recent years in depoliticising law enforcement across the whole island of Ireland. That was the conclusion to which the then Home Secretary—now the Prime Minister—came at the time of our opt-in/opt-out negotiations in 2013-14 on justice and home affairs. We need some clarity from the Government about how they plan to sustain that joint co-operation after we have left. If we left without a deal, we would simply go in this instance over a cliff edge—no WTO, no plan B, just plain thin air. I would like to hear from the Minister about that because there is not a word about it in the paper produced by the Government, and not one of the speakers in today’s debate has yet referred to it.

Secondly, there are the implications should the people of Northern Ireland ever vote freely and fairly for unification. Some seem to believe that this was some kind of clever plot by the Irish Government when they made reference to that in the EU guidelines. It is not, actually; if you look at it carefully, it is simply to recall the precedent set when the people of East Germany voted to join the Federal Republic of Germany without giving any rise to the need for new accession negotiations, as would be the case if Scotland voted for independence, on which it is quite clear that there would need to be accession negotiations. The inclusion of that in the guidelines merely repeats the precedent that was created in the case of East Germany.

The free movement of people is going to take a lot of effort by the Government and the EU, which broadly subscribe to avoiding the imposition of new controls between the two parts of Ireland. Frankly, it is not going to be enough to simply recite “common travel area” endlessly as if that were some kind of magic potion. The hard fact is that the common travel area has never so far, throughout its existence, operated when part of the island continued to apply the EU treaty provisions on freedom of movement while the other did not. We need to know now not just that the common travel area is to be sustained but how that is to be done in the new circumstances. Perhaps the Minister could say something on that because, again, the desire to do that is in the Government’s paper but there is nothing on how to do it.

Trade in goods and services is another area where the desire to avoid the reimposition of border controls will not in itself be enough. How is it actually to be done, by whom and where? Why have the Government simply discarded, even before Brexit negotiations began, the two simplest means of avoiding any border control—namely, staying in either the single market or the customs union? Why did they decide that without thinking about the problems that it would cause in Ireland? Now they are going around trying to patch them all up.

On those two points—free movement, and trade in goods and services—the Government’s recent paper is full of admirable aspirations, which I share, but short, if not bereft, of detail on how to get from here to there. Not surprisingly, the passages on trade have caused plenty of sucking of teeth by the EU side, which is most at risk if the Government’s magic ideas turn out to be impracticable. There has been less criticism of the passages on freedom of movement. That is understandable because it is we who are at risk—or at any rate the Government, who wish to impose strict controls on immigration to this country—if the approach in the paper is applied.

I hope that your Lordships’ EU Select Committee will subject the ideas in the most recent paper to some careful scrutiny and that the Government will be forthcoming on the practicalities of how their ideas are to be given effect, in case they are to be agreed in Brussels.

That leaves us with one final point. The improvement in Anglo-Irish relations in recent years has been outstanding and brings huge credit to all the parties concerned—the British Government, the Irish Government and the parties in Northern Ireland. They deserve that credit. We must not put it at risk in the difficult negotiations that lie ahead. We will be far more likely to succeed in that if we stop treating the problems being caused to both parts of the island as if they were collateral damage, which are simply bad luck because we took a decision to leave the European Union and they just have to lump it—to grin and bear it. If that is the attitude that we take, nothing but trouble lies ahead.