The Future of EU Enlargement

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Wednesday 26th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, I speak as a habitual complainer about the dilatoriness of the scheduling of debates on the reports of this House’s Select Committee on the European Union, and indeed of other committees. However, it is only fair on this occasion to congratulate the usual channels on having arranged this debate promptly and in a particularly timely fashion, coming as it does when the EU is taking stock of its further enlargement policy.

The timeliness of the debate is wider than such rather ephemeral considerations. A combination of the distraction of the eurozone crisis, and a certain air of enlargement fatigue, has caused this issue to drift towards the margins of the policy debate about the future of the European Union, both in Brussels and elsewhere in Europe. Yet, as is shown by this report, the quality of which owes much to the skilful chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, the further enlargement of the EU is of significant importance to the future security and prosperity of the union, and to its prospects of playing a stabilising role in its immediate neighbourhood and beyond. We would be deluding ourselves if we thought that the process of definitively putting behind us the mayhem which engulfed the Balkans in the 1990s could be achieved without setting all the countries in that region on a sustainable path towards membership. We should equally be deluding ourselves if we thought that we could turn our backs on Turkey, the most vibrant economy in Europe and a rising regional influence, without serious negative consequences for ourselves. We should also be deluding ourselves if we believed that cold-shouldering the European aspirations of countries which emerged from the former Soviet Union to a shaky independence would not further Russia’s ambitions to create for itself a sphere of influence around its borders. Quite a lot is therefore at stake in the way the EU handles its further enlargement, and it cannot be said to be doing so very skilfully or very purposefully at the moment.

In addition to these general geopolitical considerations in favour of further enlargement, I want to focus on three specific issues: first, the need to avoid importing into the EU existing territorial disputes, either between future member states or between them and their neighbours; secondly, the need to guard against backsliding by new member states on their commitment to the Copenhagen criteria for membership after they have joined the club; and, thirdly, Turkey, where recent developments have been troubling for its friends even though they should not, I would contend, have shaken their fundamental support for Turkish accession.

With the benefit of hindsight, most people now recognise that the EU’s handling of the accession of Cyprus with the division of the island unresolved was, to use a diplomatic phrase, suboptimal. The report that we are debating said as much, and it has since been roundly denounced for it by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots—a symmetry of denunciation which in my own lengthy and fairly painful experience of trying to resolve the Cyprus problem normally means that you have got it about right. It is not hard to identify similar disputes in relation to the existing candidates and aspirants: Cyprus, again, in the context of Turkish accession; Serbia and Kosovo; Macedonia and Greece; Moldova and Transnistria; and a whole rash in the republics beyond the Caucasus. That does not make them any easier to resolve. In the case of Cyprus’s accession, one can see that the EU would in theory have done better to make settlement of the dispute a condition of accession. However, to have done that at a time when the leader of the Turkish Cypriots, the late Rauf Denktas, and the then Government of Turkey were making any attempts at compromise completely nugatory would have been to hand them a veto which they would not have hesitated to use. There are parallels with some of the future members. Each case will need to be treated on its own merits and the EU needs to address each in a timely and proactive fashion as it is doing, admirably in my view, in the case of Serbia and Kosovo. There is no magic solution, no template, for every case. What one can say is that some unilateral attempts at exercising pressure, such as Greece’s continuing blockage on even opening negotiations with Macedonia, are both counterproductive and deplorable. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, on that point.

There is also the problem of backsliding on the Copenhagen criteria and other values and responsibilities of membership. There is experience of that in the cases of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. It has become painfully evident that the EU is better placed to handle such problems before a country has joined the Union than it is afterwards, although some instruments are available even after accession, if extremely hard to apply. Again, as in the case of international disputes, there are no obvious, easy and universally applicable solutions, but it seems desirable to ensure that, before a country accedes, the basic values which justify its membership are firmly entrenched in that country’s laws and constitution, and that the machinery to uphold those values is in good working order. I rather doubt whether new dispositions for handling post-accession transgressions will prove either negotiable or operable.

Recent events in Turkey cannot have left any of Turkey’s friends untroubled. Even before the demonstrations in Istanbul, the repression of critical press comment had cast a dark shadow over the remarkable progress made in recent years. The peaceful demonstrations were, from the outset, met with the disproportionate use of force, and the Turkish Prime Minister’s rhetoric has been extremely divisive. That said, it is equally important to say what this is not; it is not a series of events in any way analogous to the uprisings in the Arab world against undemocratic dictators. Turkey is a working democracy, and it is for Turks, using their democratic institutions, to work out their solutions to the problems and protests that have emerged, while above all respecting the rights of citizens to peaceful protest and to express their views through a free press.

What role should outsiders play? They should certainly not, I would argue, block or suspend the already pretty stagnant process of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations. One thing comes clearly through the pages of the report that we are debating: the EU’s ability to influence candidate countries varies in proportion to the progress being made in the technical aspects of the accession negotiations. If that process moves along, long though it may be—and the process with Turkey has a long way to go—and if it is on a clear and sustainable path, the EU can exercise real conditionality and can hope to have real influence; if not, it cannot.

As a steady supporter of Turkish accession, I hope that the Government will maintain that case, while making it clear that Turkey’s eventual accession will require unquestioning and credible adherence to the Copenhagen criteria. In that context, the agreement reached in the Foreign Affairs Council yesterday to delay the opening of the next chapter of Turkey’s accession negotiations until the autumn, while perhaps better than some of the alternatives, merits no more than one cheer.

As we in this country debate our future in the European Union—and I welcome the Prime Minister’s recent statement that our future lies in the European Union—it is surely essential that we develop a positive reform agenda for the EU as a whole. Within that agenda, I would argue, the further enlargement of the EU should have a prominent place.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Kilclooney]

My Lords, I first congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, and the members of his European Union Committee on this excellent report, which clearly outlines the opportunities and challenges as nations apply to join the European Union as new members. As the noble Lord said, it is timely that this report be debated in this House: not simply because Croatia is likely to be confirmed as a new member this week, but also because there are ongoing issues of major importance at this time. For example, there is the European Union and United States trade agreement; CAP reform, which I hope may be confirmed this week, especially for Scotland and Northern Ireland, where agriculture is important; and the ongoing major issue of banking union within the EU.

I well remember that when I was a member of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, we regularly met the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. One occasion always stuck in my head. The Prime Minister said: “You should encourage greater enlargement of the European Union, because the more countries that join, the more likely it is to collapse”. That was the understanding of what enlargement would mean in practice. There could be some truth in it. Croatia is now about to become a member and yesterday it was agreed to commence Serbia’s accession negotiations and an association agreement with Kosovo as well. Of course, all this is subject to the approval of the European Council, but enlargement is ongoing.

One of the conditions is that new members in the European Union should also accept the euro as their currency. The Chancellor in his Statement on the economy today said that the eurozone is in crisis. That phrase has been used by several contributors to this debate this evening. It is the case in Portugal, Spain, Greece, Greek Cyprus and the Republic of Ireland; you have only to look at the Financial Times today to see the leaked tapes about the banking situation in the Anglo-Irish Bank to realise that there are ongoing problems in the eurozone. There are increasing fears about Italy as well over the next six months. As recently as last week, a senior French Minister said that the worst in France is yet to come. So the question arises: should accession of new members to the European Union require compulsory membership of the eurozone? Why not provide them with the same opportunity as the United Kingdom to be a member of the European Union but not a member of the eurozone?

Turkey was mentioned in the report. I well remember the European Council meeting in Luxembourg. Perhaps Members of our House have forgotten the events of that lengthy session, which went on and on until one minute before midnight, when it came out with a compromise—the deadline was midnight. The compromise was that Croatia and Turkey could apply to join at the same time. That was then agreed by the European Council.

I come from the island of Ireland, and I recognise sectarianism when I see it. As a Member of the European Parliament, I recognised that France and Germany would not agree to 80 million Muslims coming into the European Union. I remain convinced that that is the underlying problem as Turkey tries to become a member of the European Union. As has been mentioned, Turkey has its problems. Democracy in any country is not simply rule by the majority, it also requires the consent of the minority, and that does not seem to apply in Turkey today. We have the decision yesterday to start further accession talks on Turkey, which has aroused opposition from Germany, France, Austria and Greek Cyprus. It seems difficult to foresee Turkey being able to join the European Union, and I say that as one who has been a friend of Turkey for 40 years. It may well be that Germany is right and that a special arrangement with Turkey is now the way forward.

There has also been reference to Cyprus. I am delighted to see that the committee has stated in its report that it was wrong to allow Greek Cyprus to join on its own. The decision to allow EU membership before a settlement was foolishness in the extreme, and many of us said so at the time. However, the application was supported by Her Majesty’s Government on the recommendation of its advisers on Cyprus. They should now all hang their heads in shame, and many of them are now publicly doing so. Only last week, I heard one who was involved in the discussions saying so.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I am most grateful to the noble Lord for allowing me to intervene to say that I am not hanging my head in shame. I explained the situation in my speech, which perhaps the noble Lord did not hear properly. I did not say, and the report does not say, that Cyprus should not have been admitted. It states that the European Union was not sufficiently zealous at ensuring that a solution was reached before.

[Lord Kilclooney]

I have to say that I heard the noble Lord’s speech and listened to it very carefully. I have to say that his opinion at the time of the accession of Cyprus was wrong and that some of those who agreed with him at the time now say that it was wrong and are apologising. I hope that, some day, he will do the same.

On Cyprus, reference has been made to Turkey’s role, but Turkey encouraged the Turkish Cypriots to vote for the Annan settlement—oh yes—and the Turkish Cypriots voted for the settlement in Cyprus. It was the Greek Cypriots who voted against the United Nations Annan plan for a settlement, so it is wrong to finger Turkey, as is suggested in the report; it was others who created the problem.

In foreign affairs and security, the EU has only France and the United Kingdom really to rely on, because they are members of the United Nations Security Council. The others will talk a lot but do very little. As enlargement proceeds, questions should also arise as to whether the EU should cease to have a role in foreign affairs and security.

In conclusion, clearly the European Union needs to revise existing treaties as it considers a revised relationship with the United Kingdom itself.