Recall of MPs Bill

Lord Grocott Excerpts

Wednesday 14th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

I entirely agree with the noble Baroness, with whom I had the great pleasure of serving when I was acting as deputy shadow leader in the other place. We worked together on the Privileges Committee and I came to have a very high regard for her total integrity and judgment. I still have that high regard. What she said this evening was entirely right.

I think that the other place is in danger of talking itself down. That is something that we really need to focus on. I remember reading many years ago a comment by one of the great 18th century admirals—I think from memory it was Admiral Rodney—who, as many others did, served in the House of Commons. He made a remark to the effect that there was no greater honour that any man could have—it was just men in those days—than to be in the House of Commons, representing a constituency. That was long before the days of anything approaching modern democracy. When I was elected in June 1970 I certainly felt that. I am sure that those others of your Lordships’ House who have had the privilege of serving in the other place would have had similar feelings.

In any group of 600 or 650 people you are bound from time to time to have some who transgress. However, it always has been and it is—and please God it always will be—the exception. For the past few years, since the expenses scandal and the witch-hunt that followed—and it was a witch-hunt—there has been a real reluctance on the part of Members of the other place to think highly, not of themselves, but of the institution of which they have the honour to be Members. We are, in fact, playing to that tune in putting this Bill through Parliament. I accept that it is going to go through. I regret that infinitely, because I think it does no service to Parliament in general or to the House of Commons in particular. That is a deep sadness to me and, I know, to many others.

However, if the Bill is to go through, this amendment is essential. Sentences of a few days can be given for offences which are in no sense improprieties in the generally accepted sense of the word. Every institution must have the power to discipline its members. If somebody is consistently failing to obey the Speaker or to abide by the rules of the House, of course they will suffer. We know some who have done so. I can think of the late Lord Bannside as Ian Paisley; Andrew Faulds, one of my dearest friends; Tam Dalyell, who was mentioned earlier; and others, who have, for perfectly honourable reasons, even though I may have disagreed with them, flouted the rules, been named and excluded for a period. But the House of Commons would have been a much poorer place without any of those Members. The thought that anyone like that, for a parliamentary transgression, could be in danger of recall is just too awful to contemplate.

This places a great weight on the shoulders of those who serve on that committee. I am bound to say that I regret that there are lay members on the committee, because I think it should be, as it always was, a committee of Parliament. I agree entirely with the noble Baroness when she said that, as Leader of the House, she decided not to chair the committee and that the chair should be a respected Back-Bencher. I think that that was a very wise and modest decision. It was the right decision. You should be judged by a group of your peers, unless you are transgressing the law of the land, and then, of course, other procedures follow. We all recognise that. However, I would beg my noble friends on the Front Bench—and particularly the Front Bench opposite, because this originated with an Opposition-led amendment—to think again about this. For 20 days, the offence has to be reasonably serious.

The other point alluded to by the noble Baroness, which was a very good and powerful one, was that there could be a danger of politicising these things, in a party sense, particularly in the sort of frenetic pre-election atmosphere that we have at the moment. One of the distinguishing features of the other place, and indeed of this place, is that Members in committee—particularly Select Committees, one of which I had the honour of chairing for five years—look at issues on their merits and seek to have recommendations that address the issues without polarising or dividing the committee. I would deplore anything that led to the former tendency in the Standards or Privileges Committees.

The least that we can do to help mend this very broken vehicle that is being pulled before us is to accept this amendment. I hope we can accept it tonight, without any Division or controversy at all. If not, I hope it can be accepted on Report. It goes just a little way to making a Bill that has come about, frankly, because certain people do not have enough confidence in that great institution at the other end of the Corridor and because party leaders have been rather craven—I use the word deliberately—a little better than it is at the moment. We want to put this right. This amendment will achieve precisely that.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, I thought that my noble friend Lady Taylor put it very well in terms of the huge significance of a 10-day suspension, with it basically being the end of a parliamentary career. It is rather like the point about the death penalty made by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth. This is not a marginal decision between whether you give someone nine days or 10 days; it is not even the difference, to use a footballing analogy, between a yellow card and a red card. It is the difference between a yellow card and a ban for life.

We touched on this in earlier exchanges, but it seems to me that being suspended for 20 days clearly indicates a very serious offence. That is shown by the House of Commons Library research paper, according to which there have been just two cases in the last 25 years when that would have happened. As we have all remarked already, that would be even less likely to happen if it was known that it would lead to expulsion from the House because it would trigger a petition—as it would have, had this provision been in existence then. There has to be some doubt whether even the two that passed the test, if you like, would still pass the test, because Members would be very reluctant to impose a 20-day suspension.

Perhaps we are all in danger of repeating ourselves, but surely the position as it stands at the moment is that the House itself can expel someone and that, in effect, the provisions of this Bill—as it stands, a 10-day suspension; as it originally stood, a 20-day suspension—amount to the equivalent of expelling someone from the House. My view is that if that is what the House wants to do, the House has the power to do it now and we do not need a Bill to enable it to do that. To that extent, as with so many of the other provisions of this Bill, the organic mechanism by which Parliament operates tends to deal with these matters without introducing legislation that is not needed. That is the substantial point I want to make, but I want to ask a question to which I should know the answer, and I doubt whether the Minister will know the answer immediately.

I think there may be an odd juxtaposition here. Unless I am completely wrong, the Speaker of the House of Commons can suspend people. I cannot think of an occasion when someone has been expelled for as long as 10 days, but I think that, as my noble friend Lord Maxton says, if someone is suspended until they apologise, heaven knows how long that could be.

Am I then right in thinking—I would love to be told that I am wrong—that we now have a situation where 10 days, as imposed by the Standards and Privileges Committee, results in, “Thank you, goodnight, you are out”, whereas 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 days from the Speaker is, “Come back, all is forgiven and we are off to the tearoom”. I need an answer to that question because I do not know the answer to it myself. If it is the case, that needs sorting out.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

As the Bill stands, it does say,

“as the result of a report from the Standards Committee”—

so suspension by the Speaker would not be included.

[Lord Grocott]

Surely I can at least persuade the Minister that that is a seriously anomalous situation that he really should go back to his advisers and sort out.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan (CB)]

My Lords, I regarded it as an immense privilege to be a Member of the other House only for eight years. In 1966 the great, wise, far-seeing electorate of Cardigan saw fit to send me to the House—and then, eight years later, they changed their minds. It still was a splendid experience that I very, very greatly treasure.

I was present in the House on the day that Tam Dalyell, that magnificent character, was hauled before the Bar of the House. It was almost like attending a public execution. There was a deathly hush. He was, if I remember rightly, rusticated for a period of four weeks. It was because he had seen a privileged report relating to Porton Down, and there were certain sidelinings there which he had disclosed to the press. Whether it was Tam’s own idea, or that of his mentor, who shall not be named, I do not know, but I remember that there was a deathless hush in the House that day, and I remember thinking then how serious a matter it was for the House to discipline one of its Members.

We are now in a situation where there is a hysteria of self-flagellation in the House of Commons because of the misconduct of a small number of Members. I still think that the House of Commons is a very honourable institution. The vast majority of its Members in all parties are decent people, worthy of the best traditions of Parliament, but there is a mass hysteria. I support this amendment because I believe, although it is far from perfect, and there are many, many criticisms that can be made of it in a mechanical sense, it looks in the right direction. For that reason, I heartily endorse it.

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[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

Politics cannot be entirely dismissed from anything. Going back to that wonderful period in the 1970s, I recall seeing the excellent play “This House”, in which the noble Baroness is portrayed, about how the House of Commons behaved at the time. I suspect that politics was not entirely absent from the Privileges Committee then. The introduction of lay members to the Standards Committee was intended to make it less political and strengthen the safeguards against it being used for political reasons. That is part of the basis on which the Standards Committee is now reviewing its procedures.

[Lord Grocott]

Whatever the Minister’s reservations about the rights of this House to try and improve legislation that has come from the Commons when it relates largely to Commons matters, could he please agree that if there appears to be a bizarre anomaly in the Bill, it is our duty at least to look at it? To repeat myself, the anomaly is this: on one day, as the Bill stands, a Privileges Committee report giving a sentence of 10 days or longer could be endorsed, leading to a recall petition being triggered; on the same day, in relation to another Member, the Speaker of the House could—as I understand it—impose a suspension of longer than 10 days. Whatever his reservations about our right to amend the Bill, does he acknowledge that there appears to be an anomaly and that he will, at least, go away and look at it?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I am not aware of what the Speaker did on the same day. I will certainly look at that.

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[Lord Grocott]

I appeal to the Minister to address this matter. It is an important issue for the Committee to consider. We may not be completely comfortable with any of the amendments that are tabled but, whatever else we may think about this Bill, we should acknowledge that it introduces a new disciplinary mechanism for dealing with MPs who are considered to have misbehaved. I emphasise that it is a new disciplinary mechanism. Disciplinary mechanisms have existed for many years, including the election courts, as was said. Inevitably, I suppose, if you introduce a new disciplinary mechanism, there is a real possibility that anomalous situations will arise and that punishments will be either too severe or not severe enough. As has been recognised, the punishment imposed on Phil Woolas was not just that he had to give up his seat but that he was debarred from standing in any subsequent by-election.

The one thing I do like about this Bill is that it acknowledges that even if Parliament and petitioners think that an MP should have to fight a by-election, he or she will not be debarred from fighting the seat. The ultimate authority lies with the MP’s constituents, as it always should. It is for the voters to decide whether or not an individual is a worthy person to sit in the House of Commons. No one else should decide that—not judges or any other group of people. I think that a great injustice was done in this case. I thought so at the time but I particularly think so now that this new penalty of recall has been introduced. To tell a Member of Parliament that he cannot stand for election to Parliament is like telling a writer that he cannot write or a builder that he cannot build. That is what Members of Parliament do: they stand for election to Parliament. I appeal to the Minister to go back to his officials on this point and at least acknowledge that, whatever the merits of this Bill—he clearly thinks that there are many—it can produce anomalies in relation to existing disciplinary procedures. We could end the debate on this amendment rather rapidly if he would indicate that that is the case, as there would be very little else to say.

[Lord Tyler]

I dare to make a brief comment after what the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, said. I have sympathy with the proposed new clause. It is clearly outwith the current arrangements but it is very relevant for the reasons that the noble Lord gave because it says that the final arbiter in these circumstances should be the electorate rather than a judge. I do not want to repeat what was said earlier but wish to explore whether proposed new subsection (1) of the amendment is relevant to the circumstances that I faced in October 1974. I am afraid that all of us have travelled down memory lane today. I was defending a very small majority in my former constituency. A newspaper was delivered to a large number of households by a pro-apartheid group which alleged that the then Young Liberals leader, Mr Peter Hain, and all those who worked with him or were associated with him in the Liberal Party, including myself as a sitting Liberal MP, were effectively guilty by association of murdering babies in South Africa. That campaign may or may not have been effective.

As I did not have the resources, and because I did not think that it would be fair on my then successful Conservative opponent, I decided not to go to an election court and say that he must be responsible for the relevant leaflet. It had an imprint on it but it was not clear that it had been published by his agent, although it was published by an organisation which was run by a former Conservative MP. However, I thought then, and I think now, that there should have been some way in which those circumstances could be investigated short of effectively seeking to unseat my opponent. I think that some way could be found. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, would agree, but I think that this might fall within his first category. In that case, it would be right that, in the end, the final arbiter might be the electorate rather than a judge in an election court. There is therefore some important relevance in what the noble Lord has laid before the Committee, and I hope that it will be further considered.

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[Lord Howarth of Newport]

I do not think that my noble friend Lord Foulkes should apologise at all. I congratulate him on the way in which he has threaded his way through these thickets.

There is a common theme in this group of amendments. The proposal is that legislation should lay duties on the Speaker of the House of Commons and the Lord Speaker. I would be grateful if the Minister, when he comes to reply in a few moments, would share with the House his understanding of the constitutional rights and wrongs of legislation that lays duties on the Speaker. Are we risking breach of privilege? I refer here to the independence of the Speaker of the House of Commons. Are we once again risking the possibility of running up against the ancient tradition embodied in the Bill of Rights, or not? There may be many precedents in legislation that lay specific duties on the Speaker, but my impression has been that the Speaker should be unconstrained by legislation and that the Standing Orders of the House of Commons may lay duties upon the Speaker. So I question the appropriateness of the measures not only in the Government’s Bill as we have it, but also in my noble friend’s amendments, which refer to the role and functions of the Speaker of the House of Commons.

The position of the Lord Speaker is of course entirely different and is not analogous to that of the Speaker of the House of Commons, but none the less there may already be a body of practice and precedent that establishes certain customs, conventions and proprieties in relation to any attempt to legislate on the role of the Lord Speaker. It would be helpful if the Minister would guide us on these points.

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, perhaps I am slightly out of turn in mentioning this at this point, but it will save time. My suggestion that Clause 5 should not stand part of the Bill is included in this group. I tabled it simply to enable me to make a point that I cannot find a way of making by means of an amendment, but it is something which goes to the heart of the Bill. My view is very simple indeed, because I like simplicity. We have a very good system for recalling MPs—it is called a general election. That is the point at which MPs should be judged and perhaps removed by their constituents; that is, on the basis of their performance over the preceding period of time.

I love the word “anomaly”, which has been used today. It seems to me to be rather anomalous, or perhaps inconsistent, that this Government, who deliberately and as a matter of public policy decided that general elections will be held less frequently, should be introducing a Bill to provide for recall. Of course, if you have general elections every four years instead of every five years, then as we know from Clause 5, the recall does not operate during the six months prior to the election. If there were elections every four years, there would be more occasions when the recall provisions would not apply, which I suppose is a legalistic way of saying what I am arguing. Recall becomes redundant when general elections are held.

If the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, is to reply to this debate, I should say that I have found that not many members of his party agree with me on getting rid of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, but I am heartened by the fact that I know members of his party—I do not want to disclose names—who think that fixed terms, if they exist, should definitely be every four years, not every five years; indeed it used to be his party’s policy. That is a less bad situation as far as I am concerned, and it is undoubtedly and unarguably a more democratic and accountable system. In trying to appeal to the values that are frequently claimed as being a particular characteristic of the Liberal Democrats, perhaps I may put it to the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, that on the grounds of democracy and accountability, it is better to have elections every four years rather than every five years. Should that happen, we would have less need to invoke the provisions of this Bill for recall.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

Was it not a very great mistake, if the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill was going to be introduced merely to suit this coalition Government, not to have given it a sunset clause so that it does not go on into the next Parliament?

[Lord Grocott]

That is absolutely right, but of course we know why the five-year provision was enacted in the first place. We owe it to David Laws, who gave us an explanation in his book, which I would recommend noble Lords read, if they have not done so already: 22 Days in May. In it he states that in the course of the negotiations between the Lib Dems and the Conservatives:

“We mentioned that our own policy was for four-year, fixed-term parliaments. George Osborne made the point that five-year parliaments were better, as they allowed governments to get into implementing their plans before having to start worrying about the timing of the electoral cycle. We—

that is, the Liberal Democrats—

“made no objection to this, and Britain was on its way to five-year, fixed-term parliaments”.

So, as described by David Laws, the five years were introduced so as not worry about the timing of the electoral cycle, which I think is a polite way of saying “without having to worry about the electorate”. Will the Minister at least acknowledge that the best way of dealing with this business of accountability may be to have rather more frequent general elections?

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

My Lords, the amendments and clause stand part in this group look specifically at the role of the Speaker in the recall process; how the Fixed-term Parliaments Act relates to the provisions of the Bill; at what point on approaching the general election do these provisions no longer come into effect; what do we do if the MP who is under threat of recall happens to be the Speaker of the House of Commons; and is there a role for your Lordships’ House and the Lord Speaker in matters relating to the other place?

During my contribution at Second Reading, I raised the point that there appeared to be an omission in the Bill. What happens if the MP subject to the recall provision also happens to be the Speaker of the House of Commons? I am pleased that the Government have tabled Amendments 68, 69 and 70 to deal with this and put provisions in place to deal with this event if we find ourselves in a position where the Speaker has triggered the recall provision. The Chairman of Ways and Means is the principal Deputy Speaker and quite rightly the person who should undertake these functions if the circumstance arises.

Amendments 54 and 59, put forward by my noble friend Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, require the Lord Speaker to lay before your Lordships’ House any notices required by Clauses 13 or 14 that it is proposed are laid before the House of Commons. Each House of Parliament has procedures that enable it to conduct its business, regulate its affairs and deal with issues and problems. With the passing of legislation, for example, there is co-operation and agreed procedures to get a Bill on to the statute book.

However, the Bill concerns how we deal with MPs who have done wrong and have met the conditions of recall. The procedures for notifying the Commons are clear in the Bill, whether it be notification of the termination of the process or notification that the petition was successful. In those circumstances, I do not see any role for either your Lordships’ House or the Lord Speaker—although I agree with my noble friend Lord Foulkes’s comment in the previous debate that there are other roles for the Lord Speaker to take, and we should look at that another time.

It would be confusing for one House to notify another House about matters that concern one of its Members. I think that we should also remember that this Bill, when it gets on to the statute book, will, I hope, be rarely used. When it used it will receive considerable media attention. This is no local event and it will not have a local feel. I have no doubt that Members of your Lordships’ House will be fully aware of what is going on.

My noble friends Lord Foulkes of Cumnock and Lord Hughes of Woodside have also tabled Amendment 35, the effect of which is to reduce from six to three months the period before a general election when the provisions do not apply, the Member is already subject to a recall petition and the seat has been vacated. I can see that this reduces the time that the Member is exempt from the provisions, but I think that the reduction to three months makes things very difficult in practical terms.

It is proposed that the petition is available for signing for eight weeks and if successful a by-election is held, which can easily take four weeks—we are at three months. For these and similar reasons, the six months on the face of the Bill is the correct length of time, because it deals with the practicalities of this process and allows a reasonable period of time which is in no way excessive to deal with the practicalities we face.

I hope that my noble friend Lord Foulkes of Cumnock understands why I am unable to support this and his other amendments—although I have a feeling that they will be coming back in amended form on Report.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, I will start by answering the question on the role of the Speaker. I will take that away and make sure that we are absolutely correct on that. My understanding is that, unlike in a by-election where a writ is moved, the Bill provides for the Speaker to exercise certain administrative functions to enable the process to work efficiently. It is based on the Recess Elections Act 1975, which also places administrative duties on the Speaker. We will look at that carefully; it is clearly an important point.

The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, leaves me breathless, in a sense, because if we are talking about 13 months instead of three months, we are in an entirely different world of course. As the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said, we had considered that on the existing basis that six months before the next anticipated election is the point at which local by-elections are not undertaken. I understand that in 1973 the Speaker’s Conference looked at the question of when by-elections should not be called and recommended:

“In the fifth year of a Parliament, some relaxation of these guidelines should be allowed, in order if possible to avoid by-elections being held immediately before a general election”.

We are therefore incorporating into the Bill previous accepted practice.

On the question of the Lord Speaker, perhaps we can have a discussion off the Floor. As the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said, it has not been the practice to inform the Speaker of the other place formally when we take particular actions here. As to whether it should be introduced—it would clearly be appropriate for this to be on a reciprocal basis—I am not sure.

The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, raised a very interesting, wide question about four-year parliaments versus five-year parliaments—which, again, I would be very happy to talk to him about. I have been doing some quick calculations, which I hope I have got right. There have been, including the election we are about to face, some 19 general elections since 1945, seven of which have led to five-year parliaments. Had we had the Fixed-term Parliaments Act in 1945, there would have been 15 general elections including the coming one—just four fewer. If we had had a four-year Fixed-term Parliaments Act in 1945, we would now be past the 17th general election and half way through to the 18th. So we are not talking about a vast difference.

I am sure that the noble Lord does not want to go down to the two-year, Congress style, where electioneering takes over everything and reasonable government has to stop, but let us discuss this further outside the Chamber. The noble Lord raises some very interesting, long-term questions about constitutional reform that we clearly need to discuss further.

[Lord Grocott]

The good news is that in five of the seven parliaments that lasted for the full five years, the Government in power were thrown out. Clearly, we hope that is a precedent that will be seen this time.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

The noble Lord is, as always, wonderfully optimistic. The interesting question of how many parties will lose the next election is one which we can return to at a later point.

Government Amendments 68, 69 and 70 deal with the role of the Speaker. The purpose here is to emphasise that we are talking about the Speaker as an institution rather than as a person. The Government were responding to an amendment tabled by the MP for Cambridge, Julian Huppert, and proposed that this would be properly looked at in the Lords. In the absence of the Speaker, one of the Deputy Speakers—for example, the Chairman of Ways and Means—will deal with those functions that are appropriately held. I end by assuring the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, that I look at the appropriateness of those functions and at the precedents that we always have to look back to. On this basis, I hope that the noble Lord can withdraw his amendment. I look forward to some interesting conversations in the corridors.

Recall of MPs Bill

Lord Grocott Excerpts

Wednesday 14th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, I wonder if the Minister could help. I know that these are consequential amendments relating to the third trigger, which was added during the course of the Bill. It seems to me, though I am not a lawyer, to present a considerable anomaly, which is that a particular offence in relation to parliamentary expenses where there is a guilty verdict and a fine in a court results in a by-election, while any other offence—which lots of people might consider to be more serious—results only in a fine. I do not know about the law, but that might include, perhaps, sexual harassment, defrauding the public purse in some respect other than parliamentary expenses, drink-driving or something of that sort. Surely, in the operation of the law—I am looking desperately around, hoping that a lawyer might help me—it is bizarre if there is a more severe penalty for a lesser offence. That seems to be the case with this group of admittedly consequential amendments.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to say a few words on this issue and this amendment seems an appropriate point as it deals with the third trigger. What worries me is the accretion of triggers—the first, the second and the third—because I suspect that if we pass this Bill, which does not seem to have many friends anywhere, we will end up with more triggers in subsequent legislation. We are starting on a very dangerous course.

As my noble friend Lord Hughes of Woodside said at Second Reading, this is the thin end of a wedge, because the green light will be given to people such as Zac Goldsmith to come up with his amendments again in the next Parliament. He is a multimillionaire who treats being an MP as a hobby rather than as an occupation, a calling or as something that is really worth while. I look at some noble Lords opposite, for whom I have the greatest respect, who carried out their jobs as Members of Parliament with great diligence. I disagreed with them on policy and on everything else in relation to what they did, but they looked after their constituents, took up issues and worked hard. Now we are getting dilettante MPs coming in and we end up with this kind of legislation.

Members of Parliament should have the power and the authority to look after their constituents without fear or favour or threat, and should know that they can stand up to vested interests without always looking over their shoulder. Once we pass this Bill, and particularly if we take further steps, we will have MPs looking over their shoulder week in and week out. I could give dozens of relevant examples, which my noble friend, a former Speaker, will know well. For example, Tam Dalyell was so persistent on the “Belgrano”, Aldabra and even, I am afraid to say, devolution. However, he might have been intimidated if he had had to look over his shoulder, anticipating challenges, because of this kind of provision.

Other examples include Chris Mullin, who raised the issue of the Birmingham Six, and the Liverpool MPs who looked after the interests of the relatives of people killed at Hillsborough, and kept on and on about that in spite of vested interests. Tom Watson is raising the issue of historic child abuse and feels in a strong enough position to do that. However, if MPs are always looking over their shoulder, they will have less strength to do that.

I have the greatest respect for the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire. I have known him a long time. Indeed, I knew him when he was simply William Wallace. I used to listen to him very keenly because of his knowledge of international affairs and had great respect for him. He said at Second Reading:

“We have put forward the Bill believing not that it is the golden trigger”—

actually, I think that he meant the silver bullet, but never mind—

“that will somehow revive public trust alone, but that it is one element among many that we need to begin to re-establish public trust in democratic politics and in Westminster”.—[Official Report, 17/12/14; col. 221.]

I do not see many leaders in newspapers such as the Daily Mail saying, “Well done, Westminster. This is re-establishing trust by bringing in a Bill to recall Members of Parliament”. I just do not see that it will do that. I think that trust in Westminster would be restored if we ensured that the legislation we passed was sensible, workable and intelligent. This legislation is none of those. It is not sensible or workable—and it is certainly not intelligent.

I was not able to be here at Second Reading, but I read the debate in great detail. Many Members of this House rightly said that they were in favour of the principle of recall but none of them said that they agreed with this Bill. It is a terrible Bill. It was brought in right at the end of the Session and rushed through the House of Commons. It was not given proper consideration in the House of Commons, and even I have had my arm twisted to agree to all its provisions and not create too many problems.

Yet there are things that the Bill could deal with. When Members of Parliament cross the Floor they are not obliged to be recalled. That is not included in the Bill. You would think it would be, would you not? I do not like giving credit to Mr Carswell and Mr Reckless, but I will, because at least they triggered by-elections by resigning. There is no obligation to do that. I mean no disrespect to some noble Lords who are here now, but I would have thought that crossing the Floor, being elected as a Conservative and moving over to become a Labour Member—in fact, there are two of them staring at me; I feel their eyes piercing—might present an argument for taking this matter forward.

There was once a Tory MP—I am trying to remember his name—who in his last term of office as a Member of Parliament went to live in California.

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[Lord Gardiner of Kimble]

My understanding is that the gentleman would no longer be disqualified.

I will conclude, because in effect these amendments are technical. They are about implementing the will of the other place and ensuring that all convictions for providing false or misleading information in relation to parliamentary expenses claims under Section 10 of the Parliamentary Standards Act—

[Lord Grocott]

I know that the Minister is being patient and reading his resounding conclusion. He mentioned decisions in the other place, and quite rightly and properly treating them with enormous respect. He even gave us the figures—I think he said that the vote on this amendment was 281 to 2. The figures themselves—I put it to the noble Lord gently—tell a bigger story than they apparently present. In my maths, something like 370 Members did not take part in the vote at all. I think we all know part of the reason why that took place in the way that it did. It is because many Members feel very intimidated indeed about making a stance on issues relating to parliamentary expenses. One can understand it with an election just around the corner. Please can we make it almost a rule in Committee that large majorities with even larger numbers of absentees do not necessarily mean the wholehearted support and commitment of the House of Commons?

[Lord Gardiner of Kimble]

Well, the obvious rejoinder—I am sure that the noble Lord will take this in the spirit I intend—is that if one looks at the voting numbers and abstentions in a House that is considered by many to be rather too large, one might get an interesting result. So I am not sure that I am fully persuaded, although of course I understand what the noble Lord is seeking to do.

I should conclude, because a lot of the points made by noble Lords have been of a Second Reading variety. My task before your Lordships is to move amendments that we believe are necessary to effect what the House of Commons has sent us. They are, as I say, technical and consequential, but they have given us a good opportunity to open the batting. I know that there will be other amendments where some of the details of some of the points noble Lords have made in their opening remarks can be discussed fully.

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[Lord Soley (Lab)]

I begin with an apology to the noble Lord, Lord Tyler—two apologies, to get my mea culpas out of the way: first, because I missed some of his opening remarks on these amendments, and secondly, because he was good enough to send them to me in detail a week ago or so by e-mail, and ask for a response. I have not given him that response yet—he is about to get it now. I have to say that this is a seriously bad idea. A core reason is that it brings judges into a direct role with Parliament, which judges themselves will resist very strongly. They will be right to resist it, because once we blur that line between parliamentary democracy and the judiciary we get into very murky waters, where you end up drawing lines where you do not wish to draw them. I am sure—and if there are lawyers here at the moment, they will be the first to agree—that the thing judges hate more than anything else is trying to deal with political cases. So I strongly recommend that we do not go down this road. I will go into just a little more detail—I do not want to spend long on it. The principal point here is the all-important one: judges and Parliament should be kept separate as far as possible.

On the secondary matter of misbehaviour, the misconduct issue is incredibly hard to interpret when it takes place in the context of politics. Many examples have already been given of elected Members of Parliament who might get into a situation where they clash with the law because they are either supporting a demonstration or a strike, or opposing it, or taking a stand on any number of other issues, and who may themselves fall foul of the court. In the e-mail the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, sent me he said that he was trying to address some of the points I had raised at Second Reading. However, this does not deal with them—it aggravates matters.

We need, as far as possible, to follow the Burkean principle that parliamentary representation is decided by the electorate, and that by and large you overrule that only in the most extreme cases—murder or other very serious offences of that type. Otherwise, we get into a position where the court decides. That is why I have such a strong objection to what happened in the case of Phil Woolas MP, where the court decided that he could not stand again. It is so profoundly wrong. It goes right back to the battle that Bradlaugh had with Parliament. He refused to take the oath on the Bible, so the House of Commons refused to let him become a Member. He promptly went back to the electorate, who elected him again and so on. One might say that that makes the case because he won, but there are examples where it would not.

The noble Lord, Lord Tyler, did not think that there was much in the slippery slope argument. One case in which it would have been a very slippery slope would have been when an MP objected to the First World War. If we consider the attitude and atmosphere around the country in the context of the First World War, an MP taking a pacifist position might well have been in very serious difficulty. As I said in my Second Reading speech, it is a mistake just to look backwards: look forwards. If people were to campaign for one of the opposition groups in Syria—not ISIL—and if the legislation here on terrorism were so tough that they got arrested when they came back, but the group they had been supporting in Syria was not one of the extreme groups, where would we be?

There are umpteen examples where this goes wrong. We should stick with Burke on this. If the electorate decide that somebody is their MP, that should remain the case until the next general election, unless there are some very special circumstances. The more we pull back from that practice, as Burke himself pointed out, the more difficulties we get into. I know how much thought the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, puts into these things, but I will add that members of the judiciary dread cases where they are pulled into a political process—and they are right to dread them. It is all-important that we keep a clear distinction between the law and Parliament.

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, in one respect at least I feel a considerable empathy with the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, and that is in terms of marginal seats. When I was first elected, I had an electorate of 91,000. My opponent got 33,000 votes and I got 33,000 and a few more—so with a margin of about 300-odd and an electorate of 91,000, I can say that an acute awareness of the views of all my electors was never far from my mind. So I can understand that point. How easy it would have been for 10,000 or 15,000, perhaps, to have signed a petition very early on saying that they did not think I was much good as a Member of Parliament.

That is where my sense of understanding ends, because, unless I am reading this very badly, the series of amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, give effect to the thin end of the wedge argument that we have raised repeatedly, and about which we have been told not to worry. The new clause proposed in Amendment 30, “Hearing of parliamentary misconduct petition”, states, in proposed new subsection (3):

“The parliamentary misconduct hearing may consider evidence adduced by the petitioners that the respondent has”—

in proposed new subsection (3)(f)—

“brought into disrepute the office of Member of Parliament”.

I cannot think of an easier basis on which to claim that a Member of Parliament is not acting as perhaps he should have been.

The noble Lord will no doubt take this as a direct attack on his party, but I am afraid that it is the best example that I can think of. I repeat that information may be adduced that a Member by his conduct has,

“brought into disrepute the office of Member of Parliament”.

I simply put it to him is as neutral a way as I possibly can the example of a Member of Parliament who, immediately prior to an election, appears on video saying, “We will abolish student fees”, and, within six months or so of being elected, becomes a key member of a Government who argue passionately for the trebling of student fees. I do not happen to think that that should be a reason for petitioning—

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

Is that not covered by proposed new subsection (8) in Amendment 30, which excludes parliamentary conduct in a ministerial capacity? I wondered why that was there. The noble Lord has enlightened me.

[Lord Grocott]

If that is the answer, it is, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, knows perfectly well, not a very good one.

As I say, I simply put it to the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, that the proposed measure is so all-encompassing that the thin end of the wedge argument is encapsulated in these amendments. I do not want to see MPs thrown out in these circumstances. I do not want to get personal and refer to any particular MP who I would be very pleased to see spend more time with his family. However, we should not seek to remove Members of Parliament for certain actions that they have taken, for which they are answerable in any case as and when a general election comes about.

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

My Lords, I hope noble Lords will forgive me if I have misunderstood the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, but I think that he said that there was an exception to the rule in the case of some Members of Parliament from Northern Ireland who make it a point not to come to Westminster to take the oath. However, we have been talking about expenses and it should be remembered that the Members concerned are not slow to claim their full expenses, including secretarial expenses, and in some cases—I hope noble Lords will forgive me if I am wrong—I believe that they claim their allowance for living in London. I am very fond of Northern Ireland but I remember that a Member of Parliament from Northern Ireland, Frank Maguire, who may have served alongside the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, was famous in connection with a vote of confidence. Frank promised his electorate that, if elected, he would attend Westminster only when abortion was being discussed and for nothing else. We could have a situation whereby some Members of Parliament would not even be looked at by the proposed judicial body whereas others would be by reason of their non-attendance. That is where I see flaws in the argument.

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[Lord Maxton]

My Lords, I am reluctant to speak in this debate. I did not take part in the Second Reading debate and I have not even read it, unlike the noble Lord.

I am not clear about this amendment. There are two types of misconduct in the House of Commons. There is a very small number MPs who, for whatever reason, fiddle their expenses and who quite rightly should be done for that. Equally, there are Members of Parliament who carry out acts of misconduct in the Chamber of the House of Commons itself, who for whatever reason refuse to obey the Speaker’s rulings, who refuse to sit down, and who will not give way. I have been in the Chamber when, in the end, the Speaker has sometimes been forced to call the Serjeant at Arms to remove the person. The person can then be given a suspension from the House of Commons which is longer than the 10 days. It would trigger these amendments and trigger this Bill, as far as I understand it.

I recall that my uncle, for instance, accused a junior Tory Health Minister at the time—the man was called Banbury—of being a murderer. He was asked by the Speaker to apologise and withdraw the remark, and he refused to do so. He believed that the matter was one of taking milk away from nursing mothers. His wife had just died, after childbirth, as a result of that. He believed that he was right, to the point that he was suspended from the House. It was almost a sine die suspension, in Glasgow football terms. The suspension was in effect until he came to the House and apologised.

I am not sure that these amendments would cover those sorts of offence. If they do, then it is totally wrong that they do. Such offences are a matter of misconduct within the House of Commons Chamber. They break the rules of the House of Commons. It is therefore for the Speaker and Members of the House of Commons to decide that, not for some outside organisation, such as a couple of judges sitting—who, as others have said, would not be prepared to undertake this task.

Lastly, that same uncle of mine did not object to the First World War. It so happens that he was not a Member of Parliament at the time. He went to prison, not because he was a conscientious objector; he went to prison because he committed an act of sedition under the law. He urged munitions workers in Glasgow to go on strike when the war was on. As a result he was sentenced to a year in prison. If he had been a Member of Parliament, would it have been right that he should therefore have been forced into a position in which he could not be one thereafter? Some people would say that it would have been. In my view, he should not have been forced into this position. He would not have been re-elected in 1918 if he had been a Member of Parliament, because Ramsay MacDonald, who was equally opposed to the war, was not re-elected.

[Lord Grocott]

He soon got back.

[Lord Maxton]

He soon got back: I accept that. My uncle would have been elected. It was he who coined the phrase: “Why should we bother counting my votes? Let’s just weigh them, because I know I am going to win”.

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[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

That is a very good question. I could spend an hour or two on that, although the Minister and other noble Lords will be pleased to know that I will not. We could start with the constitution of the United Kingdom and talk about the total inconsistency between one part and the other. That would take us down the highways and byways—not the Liberal ones on this occasion, although it could perhaps be some of them. Instead, I move to Amendment 13.

The clause that this relates to deals with two further provisions to the first recall condition, referring to imprisonment and detention following an offence. It deletes a proviso which states that the first recall condition includes offences committed before the MP became an MP. It also deletes a proviso which states that the first recall condition does not include offences committed the day before this section comes into force. Acute Members will notice that Amendment 16,

“Page 2, line 24, after second ‘MP’, insert ‘unless that offence was disclosed before the MP became an MP’”,

contradicts the one to which I have just referred. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Finkelstein, would have jumped up and pointed this out if I had not done so myself. It attempts to amend the subsection that the previous amendment deletes, so if we had deleted it, we could not have amended it. It gives the House an option.

The reasoning for this amendment, which was also provided by the Law Society of Scotland, is that Clause 2(1) elaborates the reference to an offence in Clause 1(3) as including an offence committed before the MP became an MP. If an MP was elected by the constituents after he or she had been convicted and sentenced for that offence, there should not be a recall because he or she was already elected in the full knowledge that that offence had been committed and that he or she had been sentenced for it. I am not talking about where there might be an appeal or whatever but where the matter had been dealt with. That would be clear because the constituents must have known about the MP’s offending history prior to the election but nevertheless elected that individual. I do not see any reason why these two amendments from the Law Society of Scotland cannot be accepted.

The more difficult one for the Government to accept might be Amendment 4. This relates to the first of the two criteria—that the offence must have resulted in a sentence of imprisonment of more than a year. Noble Lords will know that, under the present arrangement, if Members of the House of Commons and, indeed now, of this place are sentenced to more than a year, there is automatic exclusion. That is part of our provision in this House. It is part of the provision in the other place. The point I want to raise is that it is not whether it is a year or 18 months or six months, it is a question of who decides. Should it be this House or the other place that decides in relation to the Members of this House or the other place, or should this cumbersome, expensive, complicated recall mechanism be enforced? Why, if it is less than 12 months, should it be this complicated, expensive trigger mechanism, but, if it is more than 12 months, we are able to deal with it ourselves? Why can we not deal with all of them ourselves? Would it not be more sensible for us to deal with Members of this House who are convicted, whatever the length of their sentences, and for Members of the other place to deal, equally, with their Members, irrespective of the length of their sentences? What is magic about one year? What is special about one year? We will come to this in relation to other amendments later on. What is the logic behind it? There is no logic.

[Lord Grocott]

I raise with my noble friend a practical point that he might be about to address. If a sentence of less than a year becomes the law, it could trigger a petition and then the petition could lead to a by-election. My advice to any Member of Parliament facing this kind of situation—it might be for the good reasons of principle that several noble Lords have referred to—would be to bypass the whole question of a petition being raised to call for a by-election. The sensible thing to do would be to resign the seat immediately, which we know from Clause 5 would cancel the whole mechanism of petitioning and recall, and, rather than go through all that rigmarole and all the publicity that might be associated with it, say, “Right, I am probably going to be subject to a recall in any case, so I am going to resign the seat and make the whole section of the Bill redundant”. That would certainly be my advice, so let us get it out.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

My view—I think I said this—is that the recall procedure is daft. It is expensive, complicated, and all of it should be dealt with by both Houses for their own respective Members. We should throw this out and go back to the House of Commons and let it decide in relation to people who have been sentenced for less than a year or more than a year. I think it is right that they should be dealt with by Parliament, not by this kind of recall procedure. I put the amendment in precisely so that it could be discussed.

[Lord Grocott]

Is not my noble friend, in wrestling with these amendments which attempt to improve the Bill, just illustrating the difficulty that all of us feel who know that this is a bad Bill? May I suggest the answer that he should be giving; that is, it would be far better to leave the law as it is, which is that if you are sentenced to more than a year, then “You’re out, mate”, and if it is less than a year, then the chances are that it is something which existing procedures would deal with in any case—perhaps the informal procedures of parties, that would not re-endorse a Member of Parliament? There are all sorts of mechanisms of that sort which in practical terms come into play. The real lesson is that we are trying to make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear, and we just have to do the best we can.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

I could not have said it better myself; in fact, I did not say it better myself. That was an excellent explanation of it with which I completely concur. I tried to say that with increasing degrees of inability to do so.

My last question to the Minister is equally serious. Let us suppose that someone is given a suspended sentence. Does that count? It would be perfectly possible for me to say, when the noble Lord, Lord Finkelstein, appeared before me, “I sentence you, Lord Finkelstein, to a year in a prison, but I’m going to give you a chance and I’m going to suspend the sentence to see if you behave for the next year. If you behave, then that sentence will not be imposed”. Would that apply? I am not clear whether suspended sentences are counted in relation to the Bill. There is no guidance. It is just something that occurred to me. No doubt there will be many more problems in relation to the Bill which will come out during not just this discussion but if, heaven forbid, the Bill was to be triggered—to use that awful word—which we all hope it will not be.

Amendments 4 and 13 are probing amendments, but Amendments 3 and 16, which have been drafted by the Law Society of Scotland, are serious and important, because there is that inconsistency about offences committed overseas and there is also the question, raised in the second Law Society amendment, about offences committed before a general election. If the Minister cannot accept the amendments today, I hope that he will say that he will have a look at them between now and Report and see whether these two problems might be properly dealt with. I beg to move.

[Lord Finkelstein]

My Lords, I very much hope that if I am ever accused of a serious offence, the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, will not be the judge. I want to run through a list of offences for which you can be sent to prison for less than a year: assault with intent to resist arrest; assault on a police constable in the execution of his duty; racially aggravated common assault; domestic burglary; fraud; false accounting; and sexual assault—this is obviously not a full list. In other words, it is possible to be sentenced for very serious offences for less than a year. All that this Bill does—and it is a very simple Bill; it is not, as has been repeatedly and falsely suggested a complicated, burdensome, cumbersome and expensive Bill—is to provide the general public with a simple mechanism which allows them to remove Members of Parliament should they see fit in circumstances that are limited in it. There are a very few common-sense circumstances in which people would expect to have such a power. We have discussed at great length today many ridiculous ideas which are not in the Bill and said how strongly we are against them, and I think that we can all agree that we would be against them if they were in the Bill or if anyone proposed them in future Bills. Therefore, there is great unity in the Committee on the subject of hypotheticals.

However, if we confine ourselves to the subject of what is actually in the Bill, is the House of Lords seriously saying to the general public, at a moment of disillusion with politics, that we wish to deny a limited range of powers to them which would be available to the boss of any employer in any company and would be used in the circumstances set out in this Bill?

[Lord Grocott]

As the noble Lord, Lord Finkelstein, is saying that we need to be in the real world rather than dealing in hypothetical examples, could he give the Committee some examples of Members of Parliament, let us say in recent years, who would have been caught by this less than a year’s sentence of imprisonment triggering a recall, so that we can have some idea of the evil that we are now trying to put right?

Recall of MPs Bill

Lord Grocott Excerpts

Wednesday 17th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend of many years. He reminded us of the mission creep that might be involved in a Bill such as this, which I will come to in a moment. It is also a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Cooper. It is always a daunting experience to kick off here, but I am sure that he will have no difficulty with the interests that his speech evoked.

Those are the nice things that I am able to say, but I now turn with considerable weariness—I think that is the best way describing it—to yet another attempt by this coalition Government at constitutional reform. Following the old Nye Bevan maxim of not looking in a crystal ball when you can read a history book, I will have two minutes’ history lesson on this Government’s record so far on constitutional reform. Let us not forget that this is a significant constitutional reform measure. No less a body than the House’s own Constitutional Committee made that clear in its report just published.

I have two or three examples so far. The first is the proposal for a referendum on changing the voting system. Some of us said, “Please don’t do this”. It was supported by the leadership of all three parties, which is always a danger sign. Incidentally, that is a characteristic of the Bill that I shall talk about in a moment. Happily, it was rejected by the electorate, but at great cost—some £75 million. Then we had the proposal for a directly elected second Chamber, but without any attempt to define its powers or the relationship between the two Chambers. Happily, that again was rejected, in that case by the House of Commons, and not without an expenditure of well over £500,000.

[Lord Tyler]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I am sure that he would not wish to mislead the House. The Second Reading of the Bill brought forward by the coalition was passed by 338 votes at Second Reading in the House of Commons, with large majorities particularly in his own party as well as in the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties.

[Lord Grocott]

I think that, not for the first time, the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, is rewriting the procedures of the House of Commons. He knows perfectly well that that Bill would not have got through the House of Commons without a timetable Motion—a kind of Motion that his party vehemently opposed when in opposition. I am happy to go through the history lesson of Liberal Democrat policies but, entertaining though that would be, I shall resist the temptation.

Briefly, we also had debates about the great constitutional merits of having directly elected police and crime commissioners. Again, I think that they were supported by pretty much everyone at one stage, but again it cost £75 million to hold the elections. Not so many people now think that it was a great idea because the turnout at the vote was 15%. Then, of course, we had the constitutional innovation supported by all three parties of referenda for directly elected mayors in 10 cities where the good citizens of nine of them said what some of us hoped they would say, which was, “No, thank you very much. We don’t want this at all”. I should say that were I ever to write a book—the House will be relieved to know that I will not—on this Government’s record on constitutional reform, the title I would give it would be I Told You So.

We now come to the Recall of MPs Bill. It is a measure of constitutional significance that will, as the Constitution Committee has said, affect the United Kingdom’s representative democracy. If you are doing that, the very least you would expect from the Government is a clear case for why this important constitutional change is required and what its effects would be. It seems to me that the case simply has not been made. We all know that, in practice, if Members of Parliament have been the subject of severely inappropriate behaviour, the mechanisms of the parties come into operation. Very often, such MPs resign and by-elections follow in any case. The House of Commons research paper on the Bill asks: how many people would have been caught by this Bill had it been an Act of Parliament 25 years ago? The answer is two. It is a Bill of 60 pages with numerous clauses and addendums. Do we really need a Bill of this length and complexity to deal with just two cases? Admittedly, the numbers of who would be affected might go up because of the amendment referred to by my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours. He demolished the Bill quite eloquently, so there is certainly no need for me to add anything to that.

Let us be under no illusions. The Bill would inevitably affect the behaviour of the Commons, knowing the difference between a nine-day suspension and a 10-day suspension. It is not the difference between a yellow card and a red card; it is the difference between a yellow card and a ban for life. I do not believe that anyone seriously thinks that if the Commons effectively said that there should be a recall, or a recall petition, and if having a recall was advertised all around the constituency, it is pretty much inconceivable that the MP concerned would be re-elected at that or any subsequent election. That may be a good thing, but do we really need this whole recall mechanism and this Bill to deliver that objective?

We all agree that certain behaviour is unacceptable, so let us have no bricks thrown around the debate on that. The House can expel people if it wants to, it can suspend them for as long as it likes, and in practice the parties exercise their own discipline. However, as my noble friend Lord Hughes has just said, it is a short step from unacceptable behaviour to unacceptable policies. My noble friend made that case very strongly indeed. Perhaps I may add a personal additional point. Representing, as I did the first time I came here, a constituency with an electorate of 90,000, in which I had a majority of around 360, and in which the opponent I defeated polled 32,000 votes, I think it would have taken him and his supporters about 10 minutes to get a petition together to chuck me out, had he wanted to do so and had the mechanism been in place. That is particularly the case today with electronic petitions. We simply do not need this Bill and there is a real danger of mission creep.

I have to say that the Bill has a lot of the characteristics of a fag-end Bill of a fag-end Parliament. We all know that the reason for the delay is that when the Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee considered the Bill in draft, it said:

“We recommend that the Government abandon its plans to introduce a power of recall and use the Parliamentary time this would free up to better effect”.

That is terrific advice and is well worth considering now.

I would like to suggest a way of doing this, because of course we do have a system for recalling MPs—it is called a general election. I am something of an expert on the recall of MPs, having lost an awful lot of general elections. That is something which concentrates the mind. Oddly enough, this coalition Government, which want to introduce recall, have legislated to ensure that we have fewer general elections. It was an astonishing thing to do and it went through on the nod. Five-year fixed terms mean that, whereas since the war elections have taken place on average every three years and 10 months, they will now take place by law every five years. That inevitably raises the need for recall. If that pernicious Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 had been in operation since the war, there would have been 13 general elections instead of 18. This coalition Government therefore think that we have had too many general elections since the war, so no wonder they think we need recall. Why not extend the period between elections so that it is even longer?

I have a simple suggestion to make in line with the recommendations made in the report of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, which basically says: drop this Bill and bring forward another one. Why do the House and the party leaders not get together and support a Bill to repeal the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011? Modesty prevents me mentioning the Bill’s sponsor, but at a stroke it would move us substantially towards more accountability for MPs and would be far better than this Recall of MPs Bill.

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[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, this has been a very impassioned debate in many ways. On the question of how many elections we should have had since the Second World War, I can remember very well the two indecisive elections of 1974, and the weakness of government which resulted from that, which led to a Labour Government first having to run to the IMF and then losing their majority and having to come to the Liberals, as we then were, for outside support. I do not in any sense go back on my support for the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. I think of the two elections in 1964 and 1966, when Labour was successful in getting a second majority, and the two attempts in 1974, when Labour was unsuccessful in getting a second majority. If there were to be a second election in 2015 if no party obtained a majority, I have no doubt that that would happen again because such a procedure is promoted to the public, so I do not resile from my support for fixed-term Parliaments.

[Lord Grocott]

What about the two Liberal elections in 1910? The noble Lord presumably now feels that there should have been five years between those two elections.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, I was not involved in that election; perhaps the noble Lord was. However, I have to admit to the House that early one morning, when I was half awake, my mind turned to the noble Lord, Lord Grocott. I had an image of a debate in this Chamber in about 1831, in which an Earl Grocott denounced the proposals for major constitutional change as being unnecessary and disturbing the established traditions of party patronage. Perhaps the noble Lord and I might discuss off the Floor which proposals for constitutional reform over the past 150 years he might have supported at the time.

All three parties committed to a recall system in their manifestos, and this was included in the coalition’s programme for government. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, had some fun talking about parties that do not carry out all the pledges in their manifestos. All three parties were committed to this in principle in their last manifestos, which provides a certain basis for it. I remind her of something that I have said previously to other members of her party—namely, when one examines the 1997 Labour Party manifesto, the clearest pledge was to bring forward proposals for electoral reform. However, the Labour Party then entirely abandoned that pledge, as it did with a number of other things as well.

This Bill will introduce a system where MPs will be subject to a recall petition where they are found guilty of wrongdoing under a specific set of triggers, as set out in the Bill. Regulations have been mentioned. I assure noble Lords at the outset that before Committee we will put in the Libraries of both Houses an early draft of the regulations which will need to be made under the Bill, which will set out the areas that will need to be covered. The regulations will build upon the principles and precedents in electoral legislation. Noble Lords will have recognised already the extent to which the drafting of the Bill has followed as closely as possible the language in a number of previous Bills about electoral and political regulation.

Some large and detailed issues have been raised. Most of those who have spoken have said that they supported the principle of the Bill. I think I counted at least three, perhaps up to five, speakers who explicitly or implicitly opposed the principle of the Bill. Let me start with the detailed scrutiny issues that have been raised. I particularly welcome the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, who raised a number of specific questions that we must address in Committee and on Report. There is the question of whether this is a secret and open process, and how far the process is in the hands of the constituents themselves or outside, wealthy groups. There are also questions on how many signing points there may be within the constituency and who will check on permissible campaigners and permissible donors. Those are very much the sort of point on which we, as a revising House, would wish to focus in our further consideration.

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[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, I take that point.

The noble Lord, Lord Grocott—the Earl of Grocott, as I shall always think of him now—and the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, both said that we should leave this—

[Lord Grocott]

Perhaps I can nip this in the bud. If the noble Lord insists on referring to me as Earl Grocott, could he at least acknowledge that, contrary to his party and its supporters, when the views of Earl Grocott respecting the voting system were put to the Great British public, they supported the noble Earl by a majority of 2:1, rather than the Liberal Democrats?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I thank the noble Lord.

The noble Lords, Lord Grocott and Lord Hughes, said that we should leave this to political parties. Part of our problem in current-day British politics is that the golden age, when political parties were mass parties and mass movements, has gone. When I first stood for Parliament the membership of my political party—the third political party, the Liberals—was larger than the membership of any of the three parties today. The Conservative Party had more than 1 million members; the Labour Party was a mass movement, with large trade unions and very large constituency membership. We all know that that is, sadly, not the case now.

We fail to engage the public. That is partly because there has been social transformation, and communications transformation, as the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, said. Globalisation has affected the way that the public look at politicians. We have lost that age. It is not only in Britain: we see it in the United States, Germany, France and elsewhere. In an age of instant communication—I think the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, referred to the “online mob”, by which I think he means 38 Degrees; I am sure that 38 Degrees will quote him on that tomorrow, as it is likely to do—we have a problem that the public are irreverent about all elites, not just politicians, and see a Westminster bubble as much as they see a Brussels bubble. We need to do a whole host of things together, across the parties, to begin to re-establish public trust in our institutions. I think, very strongly, that decentralisation, devolution and the revival of local democracy is a very important part of that. However, I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Norton, that political leadership and political persuasion is something we have failed to make towards a disillusioned electorate. Perhaps a little less partisan sniping as we go towards the general election and more common defence of reasoned debate is something that we all need to reflect on.

The noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, talked about a slippery slope, but there are other slippery slopes. The slippery slope towards mass popular disengagement in politics is also one that we are on.

We have put forward the Bill believing not that it is the golden trigger that will somehow revive public trust alone, but that it is one element among many that we need to begin to re-establish public trust in democratic politics and in Westminster. I look forward to Committee, when we will discuss some of the detailed issues that have rightly been raised.

Hansard Society: Audit of Political Engagement

Lord Grocott Excerpts

Thursday 16th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, we all need to take account of the extent to which, in the course of the Scottish referendum campaign, people across Scotland, including young people, got re-engaged in politics in a way in which they are not engaged in politics in England. It is quite clear from the barracking that there was across the House just now that not everyone in this Chamber agrees with the wise words of my noble friend Lord Tyler on the voting system, but we need very much to focus on the problem of alienation. If we were to find ourselves on a less than 60% turnout in the next general election and the party that then took office got less than 35% of the vote, which is to say fewer than one-quarter of the total votes possible, there would be clear questions about the legitimacy of that Government. I saw in the Guardian, so it must be true, that Labour’s strategists had indeed been talking about the 35% point at which they might possibly have a majority Government on a less than 60% turnout. There are some real problems that we all have to face.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as chairman of the Hansard Society, which is a broad church including people as widely separated in view as the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, and myself. I put it to the Minister that one thing that really turns the public off is the inordinate length of current election campaigns, which was, I fear, an almost inevitable consequence of fixing parliamentary terms at five years, no matter what. Does he at least agree that there may be some merit in my Private Member’s Bill, which is due to get its Second Reading shortly, entitled the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 (Repeal) Bill?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

The noble Lord, as so often, demonstrates his wonderfully conservative approach to all matters of constitutional reform. I do not agree with him. I think part of the lesson of the Scottish referendum was that a remarkably long campaign produced enthusiasm and a real focus, my Scottish friends tell me, on some of the underlying issues, which is perhaps something we need to do in a national campaign.

Voting: Young People

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Monday 7th April 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

The Government have considered it, and have not accepted it.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

Does the Minister agree that one of the factors that may lead to young people not registering—or, if they do register, not voting—would be if, prior to an election, a major political party were to promise to fight to reduce tuition fees but immediately after the election join with others to treble them?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

The noble Lord thinks he makes a very fair point. I might also point out that one of the reasons for people not being interested in elections is that so many seats are safe seats and they know who is going to be elected anyway so there is no point in voting. The noble Lord will remember that he actively opposed the alternative vote.

Leveson Report

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Monday 1st July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, we are well aware of the battle between the press and politicians, with deep and entrenched mistrust on both sides, which is not doing much good either for the reputation of the British press or that of British politics. I have to admit that the subtlety of the process whereby the Privy Council considers royal charters is something that I ought to have dug into much more deeply in preparing for this Question. I shall have to write to the noble Baroness on the timing of the consideration of both these royal charters.

[Lord Grocott]

May I gently suggest to the Minister that if he sees this as essentially a problem between the press and politicians, he misrepresents or misunderstands where the whole genesis of the Leveson inquiry came from? It came from a profound mistrust between the press and the public. Surely, the job of democratically elected politicians is to do their utmost, preferably on an all-party basis, to reflect the wishes and concerns of the public.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, the Government well understand the strength of feeling among the public on the misuse of press freedom in recent years. We have not yet reached the end of the story—we are still moving and there are some hiccups on the way.

EU: UK Membership

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Thursday 13th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, we have certainly not forgotten about France or the other 25 members of the European Union. Bilateral discussions and multilateral negotiations are a constant process. We welcome the report from the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee and I recommend it to Members of this House.

[Lord Grocott]

Given that these days we are regularly given the benefit of different members of the Government giving different opinions on government policy, will the Minister, with his academic and political background, give us the latest definition of what he understands by the term “collective responsibility”?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, we are a coalition Government. However, I remember that during the previous Government there were occasions when Ministers—and special advisers—actively briefed against one another.

Referendums

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Tuesday 5th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I am glad that the noble Lord is such a man of the people in all these respects. I recall that, three months before the 1975 referendum, opinion polls were overwhelmingly in favour of leaving, but that, in the course of the campaign, opinion was informed and thus altered.

[Lord Grocott]

While we are reflecting on the wisdom of the British people, would the Minister like to reflect on some very successful referendums that have been held in the past two or three years: first, on the good sense of the public in rejecting any notion of a fancy new electoral system for Westminster parliamentary elections; and secondly, on nine out of 10 British cities rejecting fancy directly elected mayors? On the basis of this, might it be a good idea to hold just one more referendum, on deciding whether the elections to the European Parliament next year should be on the basis of first past the post?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, the noble Lord, as always, demonstrates what a splendid conservative he is on all matters of constitutional reform.

Ministerial Code

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Tuesday 5th February 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

The noble Baroness will be aware that allegations of this sort arise from time to time. She will remember the case of Damian McBride in the previous Government. On the whole my experience in government is that special advisers work very well with their Ministers, but the Ministerial Code is quite clear that special advisers are appointed by Ministers, subject to the Prime Minister’s approval, and are accountable to their Ministers. If they behave outside their responsibilities, it is their Ministers who should hold them to account.

[Lord Grocott]

That does not seem to square with what happened in the case of Jeremy Hunt if, as the Minister has just said, Ministers are responsible for the activities of their special advisers. We had a Secretary of State acting in what was described as a quasi-judicial capacity who was clearly and demonstrably sympathetic to one side rather than the other in a very important ministerial decision. Surely it is an odd conclusion that the special adviser should lose his job and the Minister should not only remain in his job but be promoted.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I am not fully aware of exactly what happened in that case, and I am fully prepared to write to the noble Lord if I can get some further information. Of course, if special advisers operate beyond what the Minister has asked them to do, they must take responsibility as the Minister requires.

House of Lords: Appointments

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Tuesday 9th October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, the Government are not proposing to increase the size of this House. Sadly, we have lost 40 Members since May 2010; I dare say that, sadly, we may lose more over the next two years. The question of refreshing the House from time to time therefore arises.

[Lord Grocott]

The Minister’s Leader, the Deputy Prime Minister, has repeatedly said—and I agree with him, which surprises me—that the House of Lords, the Second Chamber, is too big. How can it be that I agree with the Minister’s Leader while he disagrees with him? Can he explain to us why he disagrees with the Deputy Prime Minister?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I am very glad to hear that the noble Lord agrees with Nick. We in this House have to be very careful about saying, “We’re all very comfortable here and we all want to stay, and no one else should be allowed to come in until there has been a longer process”. Over a five-year period we need to consider the balance of the House and the question of the occasional refreshment of its Members, and we are certainly not going to close our minds to that in an interim House. We will certainly encourage some of the older Members to consider statutory retirement or a long-term leave of absence.