Middle East (IRC Report)

Lord Grocott Excerpts

Tuesday 4th July 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, it was a privilege for me to be a member of the committee. The report that we compiled has been pretty well received by most of its contributors. A special thanks, of course, to the noble Lord, Lord Howell, who did a great job as chairman, and a very special thanks to the staff of the committee. It may not be apparent from the text of the report, but it was compiled in great haste because of the advent of a completely unexpected—certainly on my part and, I think, on that of most other people—general election, which put a heavy burden on our staff, particularly our policy analyst, who was outstanding in putting it together.

It has to be said that the evidence that we received and many of our findings about the Middle East today do not make happy reading. To describe much of the region as troubled and unstable is a huge understatement. As we put it:

“The region is violent; disfigured by inter- and intrastate conflict and by sectarian divisions”.


There is also the involvement of foreign powers in the region. One witness said to us in terms that there have been massacres and brutal episodes of sectarian violence intermittently for 1,400 years in the region but, he added, in the broad sweep of history, it is noticeable that tensions have been at their most bloody when external powers have been involved.

This inevitably raises the question of Britain’s involvement in the region. Our activities have been intense, over a very long period and often in dramatic ways. There is the drawing of international boundaries in the colonial period, the involvement in the region during two world wars, the Balfour Declaration, the overthrow of Mosadeq in Iran, the Suez crisis, wars in Iraq, Libya and Syria, the oil trade and arms sales—on and on, not all triumphs.

It is not unreasonable to ask: might it not be better for Great Britain and everyone else if we disentangled ourselves and left well alone? The committee’s view was that this would be neither realistic nor desirable, if for no other reason—in truth, there are many reasons—than, as one of the witnesses pointed out,

“what happens in the Middle East does not stay in the Middle East”.

It seems impossible to discuss any aspect of British foreign policy these days without mentioning Brexit, and our committee does not disappoint. Nearly all the witnesses were questioned on the subject, and I can report—wait for it—that our conclusions are essentially benign. As we report:

“The significance of Brexit on the Middle East is, on balance, less than elsewhere. Policy in the region relies on bilateral relationships and security commitments”.


Sir Derek Plumbly, former British ambassador to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, told us that Arab Governments,

“tend instinctively to look beyond the EU to national governments”,

and we received evidence that a number of states in the region would welcome the development of bilateral trade and other relationships with Britain post Brexit.

On overseas aid, where much of our budget is channelled through the European Union, and while there can be economies of scale in doing so, in the words of Neil Crompton, director of the Middle East and north Africa department at the Foreign Office, Brexit might be “slightly liberating”, in that UK diplomats spent,

“an awful lot of time negotiating EU positions that we do not always agree with”.

Surely anything which eases the pressure on diplomats cannot be all that bad.

However, while our membership of the EU may not be pivotal to our trade, aid or defence policies in the Middle East, there is no doubt that our key allies in Europe remain, and will continue to remain post Brexit, enormously important. As Jack Straw, who gave evidence to the committee, said, the reality has always been that foreign policy at EU level requires France, Germany and the United Kingdom to agree to it, and that is how it will be in future.

That is particularly true in the case of Iran. As we write in paragraph 205:

“It is in the UK’s interests to pursue a better relationship with Iran, and we recommend that this should be a key priority for the UK”.


A pivotal part of that relationship is the joint comprehensive plan of action involving Britain, France, Germany, the US, China and Russia. The signing of an agreement on a subject as sensitive as Iran’s nuclear programme, while undoubtedly a considerable achievement, was unsurprisingly viewed with a mixture of anxiety and hostility by the Saudis, the Gulf states and Israel. And yet—and this is one of those things that often comes out when you are taking evidence—despite all the national rhetoric, frequently, and in many important ways, relationships between the Gulf states and Iran, and even between Saudi and Iran, in trading terms if nothing else, are developing all the time, whatever the comments by national Governments. But of course the Trump Administration are hostile to the deal and, as Jack Straw again said in his evidence, there is a feeling among the Iranians that their country was humiliated by the deal and has received nothing in return. Our committee said that it was in our country’s interests to continue to support the deal, irrespective of any opposition from the US, and that it is in our economic as well as our strategic interests to open up new sources of finance and investment in Iran.

While at least we could identify a strategy that, albeit slowly, might improve the Iranian situation, there was nothing positive whatever to report about Israel/Palestine. While virtually every international actor and, indeed, the principal parties to the dispute themselves pay lip service to a two-state solution, the prospects of it being achieved according to our witnesses are at best on hold or at worst diminishing by the hour. The central problem—and there is no way of evading this—is the continued growth of illegal Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian land, which makes the possibility of a viable Palestinian state ever less credible. Since 2009 alone, more than 80,000 settlers have moved into Palestinian land, bringing the grand total to well over half a million. Our witnesses ranged from Jack Straw, who said that the settlement activity made the establishment of a two-state solution incredibly difficult, to the then Minister, Tobias Ellwood, who said,

“the growth of settlements is coming perilously close to making that”—

a two-state solution—“an impossibility”.

Yet I am sorry to say that our Government have been sending mixed messages, as we report, on this crucial issue. We supported UNSC Resolution 2334, which said that,

“the establishment by Israel of settlements in the Palestinian territory … constitutes a flagrant violation under international law and a major obstacle to the achievement of the two-State solution”.

Yet on 29 December, we distanced ourselves from then US Secretary of State John Kerry, when he said that the,

“status quo is leading towards one state and perpetual occupation”.

In January this year, we again distanced ourselves, this time from the Paris conference, which included 70 countries that reaffirmed their commitment to the two-state solution.

It was absolutely clear from our witnesses that the two-state solution itself is perilously close to moving from being a difficult though feasible strategy to a meaningless, unattainable mantra. The Israeli Government’s public position is to support the two-state solution but, in practice, their policies are not even benign ones of inactivity; they are active ones of settlement-building, which inexorably makes their declared strategy unachievable. Our committee was clear that the consequences of the two-state solution becoming impossible would be a grave development for the region, and that playing our part in resolving the conflict must be a high priority for British foreign policy. Irrespective of any contrary view coming from Washington, we should give our clear support to the French-led international initiative. If the Israelis with their settlement activity further imperil the prospect of a solution, we should be ready to support appropriate United Nations resolutions. As a demonstration of our commitment to two states, we should give serious consideration, as the Commons did in the last Session of Parliament, to recognising a Palestinian state. There is a logical gulf somewhere between supporting a two-state solution and only recognising one state.

It would be easy to be overwhelmed by any inquiry into the scale of the problems faced by a region as vast and challenging as the Middle East. We concentrated our recommendations on those areas where we could make practical suggestions that we felt were important for British foreign policy while being realistic about our country’s capacity to change things for the better. But doing nothing, as we are frequently reminded, is in itself a policy option, and by no means always the best one. I have focused on just a couple of areas, Iran and Israel/Palestine, where our extensive involvement goes back decades and where I believe we still have the capacity to make a difference—and I believe that we should.