(7 years, 9 months ago)
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My hon. Friend makes a fair point, although in the comparison he draws he also possibly makes a point about the expense of defence procurement.
Those of us of a certain age cannot help but be transported back in time when we learn of the SFO’s requests for so-called blockbuster funding to pay for major investigations. Some Members will know that I am a keen pop music fan, and it is exactly 44 years ago today that the glam rock anthem “Blockbuster” by The Sweet was at No. 1 in the UK charts. Now, I am not sure that the 17-year-old future right hon. Member for East Ham was a great glam rock fan, but I am sure that his hair was fashionably longer back in 1973.
The cost of funding the SFO’s blockbuster investigations now invariably takes the SFO well beyond the Treasury’s year-on-year allocation of funding, as we have heard from other Members. Last year, the SFO’s spending reached some £65 million, which was a 12% uplift on the 2015 figure. Blockbuster funding has been applied for, not on an exceptional basis but for four of the last five years, so presumably that form of funding is here to stay permanently, at least in the eyes of the Solicitor General. I would be interested to hear what he has to say about that.
As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier) has pointed out, at the end of last year the SFO successfully secured funding to pursue criminal investigations against the Monaco-based Unaoil, which stands accused of securing complex corrupt contracts for a range of multinationals, including Rolls-Royce. I understand that the ongoing investigations over Barclays in Qatar and a range of potential fraud cases involving foreign exchange may yet have to be subject to special blockbuster funding appeals. Although I accept the Government line that that sort of mechanism allows the SFO great flexibility in the allocation of work, I trust that, as large and complex investigations become the norm, a serious re-evaluation of the pros and cons of the funding system for the SFO will be carried out.
I have to say something else, which I know will lead to my parting company with my right hon. and learned Friend in his paean to how wonderful the SFO is: I deeply regret that the reform of the entire workings of the SFO is overdue, and I believe that was yet another missed opportunity for the coalition Administration who were in office between 2010 and 2015.
For my part, as long ago as the autumn of 2009 I wrote two essays for the ConservativeHome website in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis, setting out what I regarded as a proposed blueprint for the SFO. Then as now, I contend that an effective financial enforcement system requires the promotion of deterrence and competition, in order to boost consumer protection. Even at that time, a year after the financial crisis began, it seemed clear that, despite grandstanding galore from politicians, there was—indeed, there remains—a growing unease at the paucity of substantial change in the aftermath of that crisis.
Nowhere did that feeling resonate more than in the field of enforcement, where the prospect of adopting US-style powers to prosecute alleged wrongdoers in financial services has of course been dashed. Although over the past year or so the SFO has finally secured LIBOR convictions, it is in all honesty a body that I am afraid has long lacked clout and the respect of those who are most engaged in the financial industry.
As the right hon. Member for East Ham has said, the SFO has been operational since 1988 and the Roskill reforms. It is responsible for the detection, investigation and prosecution of serious fraud cases in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Although it is operationally independent—as it should be—the SFO comes within the remit of the Attorney General and is given the power to bring criminal prosecutions directly. In contrast, the FCA is able to impose civil sanctions and launch criminal cases on matters such as market abuse, working in tandem with the City of London police and the Crown Prosecution Service.
There are some lawyers—perhaps those who are less close to the SFO’s workings—who continue to lament the difficulties associated with securing convictions for fraud, especially given the collapse of a number of highly complex jury trials. For that reason, many people feel that the introduction of a system of plea bargaining similar to that in the USA would not work. No one will risk blowing the whistle or turning themselves in when the likelihood of a successful prosecution being brought is—at least in recent years, as we have seen—so slim.
The SFO’s problems are not necessarily personnel problems; I agree with what was said earlier. However, having spoken to experts in this field, I have come to believe that one of the organisation’s main problems is in finding cases to investigate. Only when the police or the Attorney General have firm cause to believe that a criminal act has occurred is the SFO permitted to get involved. Moreover, when a case does get under way, its prosecutors routinely face months of battling defence lawyers before they can even get to trial. Of course, the defence has a strong incentive to engage in a war of attrition, in order to derail a prosecution on legal technicalities.
As a result, I think we have faced this task of reforming the financial services system and inculcating in the minds of its participants that sense of right and wrong, with an “umpire”—the SFO, in this case—that too often has lacked the tools or the respect from the market to do its job properly. I am not making any personal criticism of David Green, who, while at the helm, has developed a number of improvements to the SFO in the last three or four years.
Instinctively, I support a more robust economic crime policy, which would place the promotion of commercial competition at the heart of a new code of enforcement designed to deter fraudulent, anti-competitive or criminal activity. Such a policy should centre upon a new agency in place of the SFO, which would combine the SFO and the FCA’s enforcement division.
It is perhaps incongruous that the SFO stands under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General, although I very much appreciate that the right hon. Member for East Ham put that arrangement into some sort of historical perspective. Nevertheless, we should now look to place the SFO’s responsibilities within the remit of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, so that the SFO would work alongside the Competition and Markets Authority. By associating consumer protection with fraud and trust-busting, we would give competition its correct place as a central priority in the future commercial landscape.
Is it not a problem to place the supervision of a prosecutor with a spending Ministry—a political Ministry? Obviously, the advantage of leaving the SFO and the CPS where they are—that is, under the supervision of the Attorney General—is that, in that respect, the Attorney General and the Solicitor General are not politicians, but protectors of the public interest. As soon as a Cabinet applies pressure upon a political Secretary of State, and we have seen this recently with the—
I very much take on board what my right hon. and learned Friend says, and I understand his concerns. He made a powerful point towards the end of his speech about the importance of there being public trust in the financial services sphere if it is to be the success we all hope it will be in the post-Brexit world.
To effect the necessary sea change in attitude and create a body with the powers of its US equivalent, we would need to be able to impose substantial fines on wrongdoers. Such fines could play a role in covering the costs of any new organisation. Clearly, there would be a need for some legislative changes, but measures would also need to be put in place to protect whistleblowers and offer genuine immunity to those who were aware of anti-competitive practice when they came forward.
(8 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberWe probably know more about Roman law than trust law from our time at university, but as I recall, it was indeed in 1602 and thereafter, during James I’s time, that charitable heads came into play. That is not unimportant to the debate. There has been a lot of radical change quite recently, which has upset the very essence of what charities should be about, as my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Wendy Morton) pointed out.
Clearly, I need to take my right hon. Friend around with me in a knapsack, particularly when I am speaking in the Market Harborough Conservative club. He is just the chap they want to hear more from.
To return to the serious point we are discussing, a longer period to enable charities, the Charity Commission and the Government to work out how best to move forward with the clause 9 provisions would be to the advantage of all. That would enable us to get rid of any glitches and look out for any Heffalump traps that may be lying there for the unwary.
My hon. Friend the Minister was very kind and met me in his Department with his officials on Tuesday 19 January. It came across to me that he was in listening mode and that the Government are very likely to move towards me to some extent. If he does, that would be very helpful. If he is able to say so on the Floor of the House, that would be even more helpful. That would enable me to do what I promised him and not press my amendment to a Division. I am here to try to produce clarity and better legislation. If he and I can do that together, in partnership, then everybody goes home happier.
I would like to touch briefly on a number of the paragraphs in my amendment. There are 11 areas specified. I appreciate that the Government have tabled their own amendment, which to some rather limited extent alleviates some of my concerns, but to be honest with my hon. Friend the Minister, the Government will need to go a little bit further than amendment 3 if all the concerns the charities I speak for, or have some connection with, are not to have their worries continue.
Subsection 23(a) deals with the first problem area:
“the number of people employed by charities who will be affected by the extension of the disqualification framework to cover senior management positions”.
For reasons of time only, I will not set out extensively the arguments that apply here, but we are concerned about an absence of detail so far expressed in Committee or in any other public pronouncements made by the Government in relation to this particular impact. I urge the Government to do a bit of work to see how many people employed by charities will be affected by the extension of the disqualification framework insofar as it relates to senior management positions.
Subsection 23(b) relates to
“the number of people who are trustees of, or employed by, charities who will be affected by the extension of the list”.
Again, will the Government please have a think about this and recognise that it is not a negligible problem? This is not just a whinge from a trustee of the Prison Reform Trust. This is quite an issue, which needs to be thought about. The impact of clause 9 needs to be considered in co-operation with the charities and the Charity Commission, so we can get this right for the long term.
I will provide just one example in relation to paragraph (b): a glitch caused by an unwitting failure to consider the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, as reformed in 2014. Under the 2014 amendments to the 1974 Act, rehabilitation periods for a convicted person were to some extent reduced. For example, an individual convicted of a sexual assault is sentenced to three years in prison. Assuming the individual does not reoffend, that conviction will become spent seven years after the end of the sentence. However, they will remain subject to the notification requirements indefinitely, with a right to review after 15 years. Under the Bill as currently drafted, the individual would automatically be disqualified from being a trustee for at least 15 years and potentially for the rest of their life. Under the 1974 Act, as amended, once an individual has been convicted, if they remain conviction-free for a defined period of time they are legally recognised as being rehabilitated. That is just a simple discrete example of where the Government, the Charity Commission and the charities sector need to get together and see how best to move forward.
Subsection 23(c) relates to
“the impact of the new disqualification framework on former offenders who are seeking, or intend to seek, employment in the charitable sector, including on their recruitment, retention, career prospects and long-term rehabilitation and resettlement”.
I made this point in general at the outset of my remarks. The one thing we, as people interested in reducing recidivism, need to concentrate on is getting people back to work, or getting people into work—of course, many people in prison have never been in work. If we want to get them back or into work, we need to reduce the barriers to that as sensibly as we can.
Subsection 23(d) relates to
“the impact of the new disqualification framework on former offenders who are currently employed in the charitable sector, including on their retention, career prospects and long-term rehabilitation and resettlement”.
That is the same point, but with a different shade.
Subsection 23(e) deals with
“the impact of the new disqualification framework on people with criminal records who are trustees or employees of charities which are partners in, or are contracted by, community rehabilitation companies (CRCs) and its impact on the successful running of those organisations”.
In line with Government policy under the coalition Government in the previous Parliament, community rehabilitation companies have been set up. They are contracting with charities to deliver rehabilitation and probation services. It would be a pity if good policy was undermined by making it much more difficult for ex-offenders to work with more recent offenders in order to rehabilitate them. Again, we need to think very carefully and collectively about that.
Subsection 23(f) deals with
“the effectiveness of the existing waiver process provided for under section 181 of the Charities Act 2011”.
Charities have significant concerns regarding the effectiveness of the existing waiver application process and the ability of the Charity Commission to administer the additional applications that will result from the introduction of the new framework without any additional resources. In the past six years, the Charity Commission processed only six waiver applications. The Government suggest that this shows it is effective in granting waivers but that fails to recognise the disproportionately low numbers of waiver applications compared with the number of trustee positions and the estimated number of people with unspent convictions for existing disqualifying offences. Once one has expressed the point, I hope its obviousness becomes clear to the Government. Again, the charities I speak for, the Charity Commission and the Government need to sit around a table and thrash out how best to deal with that. As we say, six to 12 months is not long enough for that to be achieved.
Subsection 23(g) deals with
“the impact of the new disqualification framework on the number of applications for waivers to the Charity Commission”.
It must follow, surely, that the extended disqualification framework is highly likely to increase the number of waiver applications, not simply as a result of the extension but of an increased awareness of the framework that will inevitably flow from the production of guidance and general awareness raising. The Government, however, have not provided any assessment of a likely increase in waiver applications as a result of the extension of the disqualification framework. More troubling is that the Minister has confirmed that no additional resources will be provided to the Charity Commission to administer the waiver application process. The obvious inference is that the process will slow down and become more sclerotic. I hope it will not, but let us discuss the matter and iron out the problem in advance.
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe experience of the constituent of the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan), which I was interested to learn about, illustrates the difficulty that faces us. I do not suppose that anybody in the House—certainly not the Home Secretary or the Minister—wants to do anything that makes it more difficult to catch terrorists and others who wish to do us, our allies and our citizens harm. None the less, in our enthusiasm to deal with the problem, we need to come up with the best answer, and in my view the best answer includes much greater judicial oversight than is currently in the Bill.
I share the great honour, with my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), of being a former shadow Attorney-General. In fact, I was shadow Attorney-General twice, although I do not know whether that makes my arguments twice as good or half as good—I do not imagine it is of any relevance whatsoever. However, I think we need to extract from the Government a little movement. I hope that the Minister, in his response, can reassure me on this matter. I do not mind whether that movement comes in this House or the other place. I do not share the objections of my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) to altering the Bill in the House of Lords. We are a bicameral Parliament, and if the Lords can come up with an answer that is politically acceptable, elegant and efficacious, let them do it. If it satisfies me and the Government, I am all for it.
My objection is not that there is not a great power of intellect in the House of Lords; it is that if the Government have already made up their mind to do it, they should do it here, rather than waiting for a defeat in the Lords.
I see. That is a different point from the one I was addressing, so I apologise to my hon. Friend. Either way, I want the Bill adjusted for greater judicial oversight.
My hon. Friend is not as anxious as I am about the temporary exclusion orders in clause 3. I would not be as anxious as I am if the expression “temporary” related to a period far shorter than two years. To me, a temporary exclusion order means a matter of months, at the most, and possibly only days and weeks. Once one moves from days, weeks or a few months, one moves into something other than temporary, which bolsters the arguments behind the need for judicial supervision. I do not like the word “permission” in new clause 2 tabled by the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson), but I do not think we should be frightened of judicial supervision. By “judicial supervision”, I mean getting to grips with the substance of the case, not judicial review, irrespective of the fact, as my hon. Friend accepted, that judicial review is a bit meatier and has more teeth than when it started. I share the concerns of many hon. Members, therefore, that although the Home Secretary—particularly this one—will be entirely well motivated, we should not allow her or her Ministers to persuade us that their motives trump our concerns about the absence of judicial oversight.