Trade (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership) Bill [HL]

Lord Frost Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 21st November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Frost (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to support the Government on this important Bill at Second Reading, and to congratulate my noble friend on his excellent maiden speech. I must say that I cannot claim quite the same experience of the noble Lord’s time as Prime Minister as others who have spoken so far today. I was, for part of the time, a humble bureaucrat in the system, working for Vince Cable on EU trade agreements—so we are none of us perfect—and then as head of the Scotch Whisky Association. I must say that, while I was doing that job, his Government either froze or cut the duty on Scotch whisky, to which he alluded in his speech—a policy which has since, regrettably, fallen into abeyance. Perhaps his return to government will herald a change in that policy as well. Who knows? I guess we are going to find out tomorrow.

In this context, I pay tribute also not just to my right honourable friend the current Secretary of State for Business and Trade, who got this agreement over the line, but to her three predecessors who kept the CPTPP on the agenda when it was not obvious that it would stay on it. I single out in particular my right honourable friend Dr Liam Fox, who kept the prospect of joining the CPTPP alive in a Government who, at times, seemed—how shall we put it?—unduly attached to remaining part of the EU customs union and other trading arrangements. Of course, if they had succeeded in that, it would have precluded CPTPP accession and we would not be having the discussion we are having today—so he deserves to be congratulated on that.

I will say just a word about the process that we are in. I think it is fair to say that I do not always agree with my former mentor, the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, who spoke earlier, but I do agree with the points he made about the process. It is a little strange that, after Brexit, the degree of scrutiny and the ability to comment, shape and, indeed, vote on major trade agreements that this Parliament has in both of its Houses is actually weaker than when this country was a member of the European Union. Obviously, I supported and worked for Brexit and I do not think it is right that we have less ability to shape these things than we did when we were in the EU. I have said that to Select Committees of this House and of the other place. We should look at that in the interests of democratic scrutiny and developing a trade policy that we can all buy into in the future. I hope that can be looked at one day.

We have heard a lot already about the economic benefits of accession to this trade agreement. I will not repeat what has been said already, but I want to highlight a couple of slightly more technical points. First, the rules of origin provisions in this agreement are generous—unusually so. They provide for full accumulation, as has been said. That is potentially of considerable value and will be of particular benefit to firms, perhaps especially SMEs, that seek to diversify and make secure their supply chains, away from China perhaps in particular, because many will need to do that in the coming years. Indeed, many are already doing it. Of course, as the CPTPP enlarges, that will become a more worthwhile provision—so, again, it is very good to see that we will be part of that.

I also want to highlight the value of the arrangements for conformity assessment bodies in Clause 2. I note in passing that the EU refused us these arrangements during the negotiation of the trade and co-operation agreement, so it is good to see that, at least in some of our trade agreements, we are part of them. It is the difference between being part of a trade agreement that is genuinely about facilitating trade and one that is about a power relationship between the two partners. So, once again, it is very good that we are part of that. Of course, it should go without saying—but I do not think it has been said yet—that we get all the benefits of the CPTPP without having to pay in £15 billion a year to the budget or make ourselves subject to a foreign court to get them.

So much for the economics; the key arguments for the CPTPP are more strategic than purely economic. I will briefly highlight three aspects. The first is diversification of our national trade policy. As we all know, increasing openness and competitive forces on our own economy is crucial to boosting productivity and growth, so it is not surprising, although a bit disappointing, to hear from some noble Lords a set of worries about precisely that openness to competitive forces, whether on ISDS, food, agriculture or on much else. The problem we have in this country is not too much competition but too little, and trade agreements are designed to boost that competition, boost efficiency and bring more growth.

Since leaving the EU, we have not pushed as far as we should in this direction. Indeed, our trade policy so far can be seen as in many ways a giant preference scheme in favour of the European Union. That is particularly true in agriculture, where EU goods enter without tariffs and quotas; no other trading partners have that at the moment, so it is vital that we open this up, and begin to open up our trading options globally. The CPTPP is part of this. It is a bit disappointing that in our accession protocol the transition to zero-tariff access for some agricultural products is a little slow, and even includes permanent quotas in one or two places. I understand the political logic that has led to that, because the NFU is a mighty power in the land, but this will defer some of the gains to our consumers. Again, it is something that we might look at one day in the future and take a more liberal approach.

The second strategic aspect of CPTPP is about embedding our engagement with east Asia, particularly with close allies such as Japan. The Indo-Pacific tilt is clearly more than just a tilt, and CPTPP goes with AUKUS and the ASEAN dialogue partner status as one of the three pillars of strategic engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, let us hope that there will be a fourth pillar before too long, in the form of an FTA with India.

The third and final aspect is the signal that CPTPP membership gives about this country’s global trade policy aspirations and role. As the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, said, it is to be deplored that we are moving to a world of blocs, industrial policy and protectionism. Although there is room for a little more focus on national security in trade and investment, this development will generally see reduced incomes, reduced growth and probably further international tensions.

By its very existence, the CPTPP can and does already stand for something different. It is a different kind of grouping; it is a group of mid-size but extremely important powers that support open and global free trade. They are an open and free-trading counterweight to set against these broader undesirable global trends. It is absolutely natural for Britain to be part of that arrangement and to push for these things further within the CPTPP at a global level. Maybe in winding up, or later, the Minister could set out a little more what the aspirations to use the CPTPP are, and what ability it gives us to shape and broaden out our own trade policy, now and into the future.

Those who said the UK could never pursue an independent trade policy outside the EU have been proven wrong. With CPTPP accession, we have FTAs covering over 60% of our trade, goods and services, and the only reason we have not reached the 80% target is the reluctance of the US to do new trade agreements with anybody, not just us. This is a big success area, and getting into the CPTPP is a big part of it. That is why I am delighted to support the Government on the Bill and getting it through rapidly soon.

Foreign Policy

Lord Frost Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd May 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Frost (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the right reverend Prelate for giving us the opportunity for this debate and for his thoughtful opening remarks. I agree with large parts of what he said, and I am sure we can all endorse the wish that we should work to make this a more peaceful world.

This is a timely debate because it comes on the back of the Government’s Integrated Review Refresh on foreign policy, one of the rare intellectually coherent documents to come out of government. I pay tribute to the role of my friend Professor John Bew, foreign policy adviser now to three Prime Ministers, in writing it. I was a little involved in writing the 2021 original review, so I welcome the fact that this 2023 refresh maintains some fundamental elements of that review’s approach, particularly the emphasis on systemic competition as a key feature of today’s international system, and the clarity that

“traditional multilateral approaches and defending the post-Cold War ‘rules-based international system’ are no longer sufficient on their own”.

Too much of our post-Cold War diplomacy seemed to put too much emphasis on process rather than substance, a belief that the unique mission of the UK was to preserve the processes of international interaction —in which we, as a P5 member, have a privileged position—rather than to consider whether the outcomes of that system actually suited this country’s interests.

This new realism is welcome, and I hope it will be coupled in future with a more clear-sighted view of international institutions and how they work—to see them not so much as producers of global norms or as global NGOs but more, for the time being at least, as what they are: arenas for conflict between the great powers. We saw during the pandemic how the WHO became extremely influenced—perhaps captured—for a time by Chinese perspectives, and I look for these lessons to be learned in our attitude to the pandemic treaty currently being drafted in Geneva.

The IR refresh also states:

“Today’s international system cannot simply be reduced to ‘democracy versus autocracy’, or divided into binary, Cold War-style blocs”.


It is certainly true that that is not the only thing going on in the world, but at the same time it is hard to deny that it is a—perhaps the—major feature of the current world scene. The newly revived strength of purpose of NATO and its east Asian partners on the one hand, and, on the other, the closer relationship among China, Russia, Iran and others is surely a clear organising principle at the moment, and it is foolish to think that the latter countries wish us well or to deny that we are engaged in some sort of global competition with them.

It is true that many states around the world are not in either of those camps, but in this world, the strength of purpose and attractiveness of the main players is crucial in determining how those other states play their hand. We have seen in the reactions to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that many of those countries, even those with broadly free societies and those we regard as our friends, do not necessarily always wish to line up with us in condemning Russia if it affects their own direct interests.

There are many reasons for this, but one, I fear, is the current perception that many have of the United States. The US remains the most powerful single country in the world, and it is our closest friend and ally, but it is made less attractive as a society and as an ally by its uncertain leadership under its current President and by the apparent grip that hard-left values have on the Democratic Party and on some parts of US society. We know from comment in other countries round the world that this is weakening US soft power. To many, the US seems in decline, as do we, its western allies.

Where the US and its allies withdraw, we see others occupy the space, most obviously in the recent China-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, in the gradual rehabilitation of Syria in the region and in the readiness of Turkey—an ally, at least on paper—to play with both sides in the Ukraine war. We must hope that the US finds it in itself, as so often in the past, to renew its strengths and return effectively to the world stage.

How can our country play its hand in this increasingly difficult world? I will suggest four ways from the many that one could list. First, we should not give in to those who say that we cannot have influence on our own—only as part of a bloc. Obviously, big countries are stronger and more powerful than smaller ones, but the same is not true of large groups of countries compared with smaller ones. The collective uncertainty of purpose shown by the EU in the early weeks of the Ukraine war and, more recently, with regard to China, suggests that the EU as a unit is, more often than not, less than the sum of its parts. Our ability to assess, decide and act quickly and show leadership is a huge advantage, as the early days of the Ukraine war showed.

Secondly, we must invest in our friends, new and old, through thick and thin, and build genuine partnerships and alliances through difficulties, avoiding a tendency we sometimes have to preachiness. Raising our own defence spending on hard power is a crucial part of building the credibility of these relationships. We have begun that with AUKUS and the incipient defence arrangements with Japan, and I hope that in due course the CPTPP will help us to strengthen all those relationships in Asia still further. We have newly strong partnerships with the countries of central and eastern Europe as a result of the Ukraine war, but we must also keep investing in others that matter, particularly the Gulf countries. I worry that some of our long-standing friends think we might be losing interest in them and beginning to look elsewhere.

Thirdly, one country that I am concerned that we do not influence as much as we should is the United States. Although the defence and security relationship is strong, the political relationship and the relationships between much of the bureaucracies are not as taut as they used to be. When I entered the Foreign Office 30 years ago it was a much stronger and closer relationship. I fear there is a view in Washington that the British effort, via the embassy and beyond, is not as dynamic or effective as it once was and not as well plugged into the Republican Party than it could be. Indeed, I have heard it said by well-placed commentators that not just Israel or Ireland but countries such as Poland or France are more effective on the Hill than the UK nowadays. I welcome the Minister’s thoughts on this.

Finally, we need a clear policy towards China. We had the Foreign Secretary’s speech at Mansion House last week. I did not see it as quite as accommodating as many commentators seemed to, and it certainly got across the multidimensionality of the relationship, but it still seemed to be trying to have it all ways and to overestimate our ability to persuade China on issues that are of importance to us. The four elements of our policy might be, “We talk to you, we seek to influence you if we can, but we don’t really trust you and we certainly want to make ourselves less dependent on you”. Overall in that relationship, the right place for us to be is tougher than the EU and closer to the US.

This is a difficult, dangerous and turbulent world. If we are to navigate it effectively, we must stick by our friends, raise our game and stand up to those who wish us harm. I am confident that this is the Government’s intention. If we can do this, I am sure that we will survive, prosper and succeed.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Lord Frost Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 31st October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I am not going to comment on the politics of Northern Ireland—I am a mere lawyer—but the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, raised a particular point on Article 16, and the answer given by the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, as I understood him, was that there were discussions about that, and statements were made at various times by various politicians. But the fact of the matter is that Article 16 is part of the protocol; it cannot be ignored.

What it says is that it provides a procedure for dealing with

“serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties that are liable to persist, or to diversion of trade”.

It is a very broad concept; it provides a means by which such disputes can be resolved and, as I have said before in debates on this Bill, I simply do not understand how the test of “necessity” in international law can be satisfied when the Government have available, and are not using, a provision that is expressly provided in the protocol. You simply cannot resile from an international agreement because of problems when the protocol itself, the international agreement, provides a means of addressing them; it is as simple as that.

There is one other legal point. The noble Lord, Lord Browne, deserves an answer. He rightly emphasised that Articles 1 and 2 of the protocol preserve the Belfast agreement in various respects, upholding and emphasising it. As I understood it, his argument is that the Bill is consistent with international law because the protocol, in his view, undermines the Belfast agreement. However, if I may respectfully say so, there is an insuperable difficulty with that argument: this country signed the protocol on the basis of the view that the protocol was consistent with the Belfast agreement in the context of the difficult problems posed by Brexit.

Having signed the agreement, with respect, it is trite as a matter of international law that the United Kingdom cannot unilaterally resile from the protocol because, under political pressure, it now wishes to take a different view. Therefore, this Bill, as I have suggested before, is quite simply inconsistent with international law.

[Lord Frost (Con)]

My Lords, I appreciate that I am a relative newcomer to this House, but I had understood that in Committee discussion is supposed to focus on the amendments before us. What I have heard today is very much a rerun of the discussion we heard in this place last week, with repeated invocations of issues of principle around this Bill and the protocol, which are extremely important but might not be resolved in this debate simply by repeating the points over and over.

I have been trying to follow the detail of this on my electronic device, with my documents in front of me—I know the technique may not be familiar to everybody in this House, but I am trying my best. I was not intending to speak but, as some points of principle have been raised, I feel it is right to put certain circumstances on record.

I will make three brief points. First, I feel we are having a highly abstract discussion about a very concrete and real situation. Noble Lords all know what is happening in Northern Ireland at the moment and what has happened over the last year and in recent months: the constant, gradual deterioration of the real political situation in Northern Ireland, the undermining of the institutions of the Good Friday agreement, and the degradation of some of the habits of co-operation and working together that we have seen over the years. This is a real situation, which must be dealt with. This Bill is a way of dealing with it and the Government—rightly, in my view—believe it is the best way of doing so.

We have to engage with that. We have to take real-life action to deal with the problems that exist on the ground in Northern Ireland. Important though discussions of international law and a reinvocation of why we signed this agreement may be, they do not deal with the real situation on the ground now. The Government are the Government of this country, and they are right to put forward proposals that deal with this situation. The best way to deal with it would be to expedite this Bill, not to delay, defer or withdraw it. The best contributor to stability in Northern Ireland would be to get this on the statute book and enable people to know what they are dealing with.

Secondly—

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Frost (Con)]

No other noble Lords have taken interventions, so I will complete my points if I may.

It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, who made the points I was about to make about Article 16. When I was on the Front Bench here, I repeatedly stated that the conditions for meeting Article 16 had been met but we would prefer to proceed by negotiation. I was looked at as some sort of barbarian by many people in this House, and elsewhere, for daring to contemplate such a possibility. Yet it now seems that it is what many people would wish to do to resolve this situation—the natural way of doing so. I am very glad that is the view, but I am afraid that my view is that the situation on the ground in Northern Ireland has gone beyond that and Article 16 will not be the best way to resolve that.

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for giving way. The view that I think many around the Committee hold is that the triggering of Article 16 was something that we did feel would be premature and we had all expected that there would be negotiations with the EU. However, the opposition to triggering that stage never envisaged that something like this Bill could be introduced which would rip up the whole protocol before negotiations had even been completed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Frost (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for her comments; she is correct to say that the situation last year was different from this year. We did not invoke Article 16 in the end and many people were disappointed about that. Since then, the situation has moved on; it has deteriorated. I think this Bill is really the only way of resolving it.

Thirdly and finally, many noble Lords seem to believe that a negotiated way through this would be made easier by withdrawing the Bill. I profoundly disagree. It is very much the best way through to find a negotiated solution and that is what I wanted to do last year. The observed behaviour of the European Union, through last year and this year, is that it does not wish to negotiate about the fundamental core of the problem. The proposals it has put on the table are at the margin; they are not to do with the core of the difficulties in so many areas—not just trade but state aid, VAT and other issues that go into the depths of the protocol. I do not believe it will unless it is forced to engage with the fact that the UK Government have an alternative, which is to use the powers in this Bill. If we take the Bill off the table, we are removing such limited leverage as the UK Government have to deliver for their people, the people of Northern Ireland, a better outcome.

I will wind up there. It is very important that we do not show infirmity of purpose on this and that the Bill continues. I urge the Minister in winding up to make it clear that we intend to move forward with it.

[Baroness Wheatcroft (CB)]

I did not plan on speaking in this debate, but I think it is only right that somebody should thank the noble Lord, Lord Frost, for explaining to us how bad things have become in Northern Ireland as a result of the treaty he negotiated. I am very happy to do that. I will, however, keep my speech brief and not make a Second Reading speech.

Of course, I support these two amendments but hope very much that we will not get to vote on them. To echo the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, we have been asked to put lipstick on a pig again. We have been asked to do that many times in the last couple of years, but to my knowledge, this is first time that the pig is not only ugly but illegal. On that basis, we should not get to vote on it. What we should do now, as others have said, is invoke Article 16. If negotiations are not working, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, there is a route open to us but passing an illegal Bill is certainly not it.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Frost Excerpts

Wednesday 18th May 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Frost (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to take part in this debate and to follow my noble friend Lord Cormack in what is my first opportunity to speak in this Chamber since my departure from government in December. I begin by endorsing the Government’s intention, as set out in the gracious Speech, to

“address the most pressing global security challenges”

and, in particular, to

“continue to invest in Her Majesty’s gallant Armed Forces”.

The world is an unusually dangerous place at the moment, as many have said, and the contribution of this country is crucial.

I make two points on the issues regarding Brexit that have been raised by many noble Lords. First, before we left the European Union, many argued that we would inevitably be marginalised in global affairs after Brexit—I think that they have been proven wrong, and I give just a few examples. We have raised defence spending well above the 2% of GDP limit; I agree with those who have said that more needs to come, I think it should and I expect that it will. We have moved our policy on China significantly to a much tougher place though, again, there is probably further to go there. We have taken the lead, given our historical responsibilities to Hong Kong, in offering very generous resettlement to people from Hong Kong. The AUKUS arrangements show that we still bring strength and capabilities to foreign and defence policy that many other countries do not.

We got it right on Ukraine earlier than most; we judged correctly that arming Ukraine would make a difference to the outcome. In fact, the UK is the second largest donor of military aid behind only the US; we are the biggest in Europe. With our friends in central and eastern Europe, we have spoken up clearly about the principles involved in this war, such as that of resisting Russian aggression, in contrast to the equivocation that we have seen from some other places. The agreements that we reached last week with Sweden and Finland show that British policies, British capabilities and British influence still count for a lot.

On trade policy, despite the many predictions that we would not be able to establish a national trade policy, the Government have in fact rolled over nearly all the EU trade agreements, improving some, and negotiated two new agreements with Australia and New Zealand, with more to come. I hope that we will be a member of the CPTPP very soon. There is also the real prospect, I hope, of an agreement with India.

I always argued that, on foreign policy and in trade, the gain from being able to act decisively and quickly around clear principles and to lead and encourage others would outweigh any loss of influence on the EU’s collective policy—I think that has been proven. We have not had to spend endless hours in the EU’s foreign policy, trade and energy Councils seeking vainly to persuade others and then submitting ourselves to a lowest common denominator policy. We have acted quickly and, very often, others have followed us.

Secondly, on Northern Ireland, which again many noble Lords have raised, I just want to make a few points. We are told that fixing very obvious problems with the Northern Ireland protocol will cause huge and irreparable damage to our foreign relations and international reputation. I do not agree with that, of course. Any observer can see that the protocol is undermining the Belfast agreement and weakening the Government’s ability to govern Northern Ireland. Any observer can see that it needs fixing. There is no need for a trade war; if it comes, it will not be our choice, I guess. Some argue that the war in Ukraine makes it the wrong moment to address this question; on the contrary, the great events that are under way make it all the more important for us to fix the issues that are dividing western countries. To me, it makes it all the more surprising and disappointing that the EU will not help us to solve this problem and continues to be so unconstructive.

I therefore welcome the Statement made by my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary in the other place yesterday. There is no alternative to proceeding as she suggests. I urge the Government to move quickly with the proposed legislation, and I hope that this House will not frustrate it when it is so important to the unity of this country. Of course it is right that we should remain open to negotiation. A negotiated settlement would still be better but, in my experience, only clarity about objectives and robustness in presenting them gets results. Knowing the Foreign Secretary, I am sure that that is how she will intend to proceed.

To conclude, under this Government we are standing up for our country’s unity, its integrity and its international reputation. A free Britain counts for something in the world again and long may it remain so.