Pensions Bill [HL]

Lord Freud Excerpts

Wednesday 30th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Lord Freud)]

My Lords, this set of amendments puts forward the first of two alternative routes to achieving a combined retirement age at 66. We shall discuss the second route in the next group of amendments, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, and the noble Baroness for giving us a further opportunity to debate the issues that the amendments in this group raise. Let me start by saying that we are not insensitive to the impact that our timetable will have on the women who will face a much steeper increase in their state pension age than they were expecting. We also appreciate that we are asking them to make this adjustment with less notice than we would provide in an ideal world. However, for reasons that I shall explain, we are not in an ideal world, as my noble friend Lord Flight has just said. We remain of the view that, although this is a genuinely difficult decision, it is still the right one.

[Baroness Browning]

When my noble friend explains his intentions to the House, will he include an explanation of what the practical implications would be of helping those women most affected by shifting the burden on to the wider pensioner population?

[Lord Freud]

Yes, I will try to address that now. If we were to look for funding by asking men and women, after their pension ages were combined at age 66, to go on for a little later than 66, the sums of the adjustment—although it is not easy to do them—would be roughly £330 million a year per month. It would depend on how many years you have. I will write to my noble friend and try to spell out the figures on making that adjustment.

Let me revert to the amendment, which is fundamentally the same proposition that the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, made in Committee. I shall recapitulate why—notwithstanding the many concerns that we heard today and in Committee—we believe that we are taking the right course of action. It is common ground all around the House that we simply cannot go on ignoring the increases in life expectancy and the pressure that this puts on the state pension system now and in the future. Indeed, these amendments acknowledge that we need to move faster than the timetable that was set earlier. The impact of the upward revision in the life-expectancy projections is an extra £6.5 billion in state pension spending over the lifetime of just that cohort retiring in 2010.

As many noble Lords have pointed out, the amendment would cost the public purse upwards of £10 billion that would need to be found elsewhere. When the coalition Government came into power, we had not only to combat the huge financial debt the UK was in at that time, but put the country on a sound financial footing for the future.

I remind noble Lords that the financing of old age as a whole is the single biggest structural, long-term economic issue facing this country. We need to address the long-term costs of our pension system and ensure that we can deal with any wider economic problems that may appear on the horizon—a point made by my noble friends Lord Boswell and Lord German.

We expect public debt to be on a declining path by 2015-16, but it will still be well above pre-crisis levels. By the end of this Parliament, we will still have a national debt of £1.3 trillion. Waiting until 2020 to start moving to retirement at 66 would reduce the savings that we are looking for by a third—£10 billion off a total of £30 billion. That is the equivalent of reducing the education budget by 10 per cent over the spending review period, or one year’s capital budget for health. We have not yet heard a plausible alternative that would deliver those savings—with apologies, perhaps, to the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart. This is not an insignificant amount of money that we can easily pass up.

We believe it is right that those people who will benefit from recent increases in life expectancy make a contribution to the additional cost that comes from those longevity improvements. Women, no less than men, have benefited from increases in life expectancy. In three generations, projected average life expectancy at age 65 has risen by nine years for women. At the same time, women’s basic state pension outcomes have been rapidly catching up with those of men and continue to improve. In 2006, only 30 per cent of women retired on a full basic state pension. In 2010-11, that figure has increased to around 75 per cent. The projection is for it to reach 90 per cent by 2018, which is a big change-around in the support that older and retired women will get.

On the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, we have also taken action to ensure that the state continues to provide a decent income for people when they retire, with the state pension supported by the triple lock and key support elements for pensioners protected, such as free TV licences, cold-weather payments maintained at £25 and so on.

As the Chancellor has now officially announced, we will be consulting shortly on proposals for a simpler state pension, which will boost state pension outcomes further for the groups which are traditionally disadvantaged in the current system by low earnings and by interruptions, which is a point that several noble Lords have made. I have been challenged by my noble friend Lord German to talk more about the single tier. Every time we meet, I think there is more discussion on it than on anything else. A Green Paper is due shortly that contains two proposals. There is a proposal for a single-tier system, which will be looked at alongside the alternative option of accelerating the currently legislated changes to the current system—so-called flat rating.

The single-tier system would be around £140 a week and its main benefit would be much greater simplicity for individuals, which would give them a much clearer idea of how to plan ahead. It is also cost-neutral, a factor that is particularly valuable in the current climate, as I have pointed out. However, this is a complicated thing to do, and it is important that the reforms fit in with the programme of automatic enrolment and we will actively consult on the proposals. I take to heart the point about information made by my noble friend Lord German. I will take that back to the department and see how much clarity I can get.

Women retiring at 66 in 2020 should receive their state pension for 24 years on average. That is the same amount of time that we expected this group of women to receive their state pension for at the time that the pensions commission reported in 2005, when they were due to retire at 64.

Of the 2.6 million women affected by the change in state pension age, around 12 per cent face an increase of 18 months or more, and 1 per cent face the maximum increase of two years. That point was made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell. Survey data show that 70 per cent of these women are still in employment. While I accept that we are asking these women to work longer, they will benefit from additional income and a potential boost to their pension savings and entitlements. In response to the point made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Ripon and Leeds, data show that only 4 per cent of the women affected by these proposals have already retired.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, raised the issue of carers. Clearly, they are a most valuable group in society, and we acknowledge them as such. There has been a downward trend in the proportion of women who say that they are not in the labour market because of caring or domestic responsibilities—the figure fell from 10.7 per cent in 1998 to 6.9 per cent in 2010.

The data show that employment rates decline as people approach the state pension age. Currently, the average age at which women leave the labour market is two years below that of men, although it is still two years above the current state pension age for women. The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, made the point that women are less able to cushion the impact of any change. Current employment patterns for women in their early 60s are not a reliable indicator of future trends, as those women will already have started getting their state pension. It is difficult to predict with certainty how women will respond to the changes in the state pension age. I recognise that women are more likely than men to face competing demands in the form of caring and other responsibilities. Despite this, the figures show that the age at which women exit the labour market has risen steadily, from sixty-one and a half in 2004 to sixty-two and a half in 2010.

We had to act quickly to reduce the increasing costs imposed on the state pension system by the increase in longevity. It has not been possible to give a notice period similar to those given for previous increases in the pension age, but these women will still have between five and a half and six and a half years’ notice of an increase in their state pension age, enabling them in many cases to change their retirement plans.

In order to get to 66 by 2020, we have had to make some hard decisions. The noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, talked about our coalition plans. I point out to her in reply that the single-tier pension was also not in the government programme. Clearly, the new timetable creates a pension age gap between women born in March 1953 and March 1954, which increases from one to three years, but that is the most extreme contrast and applies only to women born in that month.

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[Lord Freud]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, for this amendment, and for seeking to achieve a compromise position between what we have proposed and what the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, put forward—the rather more costly proposition that we were discussing a few minutes ago. No one wants to hear a rehearsal of all the arguments that we have just gone through, so I will avoid it. I thank the noble Baroness for her ingenious approach to trying to develop this compromise position. It is a real achievement that she has got ahead of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, on a weekend when she had a towel around her head.

This amendment attempts to recoup at least part of the savings that are lost by a gentler transition to 66 years for women by increasing the pension age for men to 66 years first, and then staying within the European equal treatment directive. As she explained, the amendment is intended to ensure that no women will have their state pension age increased by more than 12 months, which would place women on a similar footing to men at least in respect of the adjustment that they would need to make. Picking up on my noble friend Lord German’s teasing about the kinks, I think that we should look at the intention here rather than at the exact drafting. I am very happy to do that, although it is nice to look at the kinks if you are a little techy about the subject.

This timetable would result in deferring the point at which a state pension age of 66 is reached until 2021. However, unlike the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, in Committee, which had the same end point, her amendment would cost some £2 billion compared to his £7 billion because the increase in state pension age for men to 66 by April 2020 would go ahead as we have planned. That is why this is such an ingenious amendment.

I must now air the issue of the equal treatment directive, which, frankly, has bedevilled the whole situation and created a lot of problems in devising how we approach it. I ought to spend a little time on the directive.

Directive 79/7 deals with the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security. It provides that there shall be no discrimination on grounds of sex in relation to the benefits to which it applies. When the Pensions Act 1995 was passed, the UK legislated to end gender discrimination in the state pension age by April 2020. Any change we now wish to make needs to be considered in relation to the position left by the 1995 Act. In particular, we need to consider whether any alteration would hinder progress towards equal treatment by either increasing the present gender gap in pension age or prolonging the period of unequal pension ages. Doubtless with the first of these considerations in mind, the noble Baroness’s timetable aims to control the gap. It is certainly the case that the difference in pension ages between men and women sharing the same birth date is no greater than it would otherwise have been under the original equalisation schedule. It does, however, result in a difference of treatment between birth cohorts. I shall try to illustrate that.

At the point that the noble Baroness’s timetable parts company with the proposals in the Bill—that is, for women born from 6 October 1953—the pension age gap between men and women for that birth cohort would stand at five months. It falls to three months for the following cohort but then starts to rise again, to a year for men and women born in March 1954, before rejoining the path set by the 1995 Act, albeit at a year older. By reducing and then increasing the difference in the state pension ages between men and women, and by delaying the final point of pension age equalisation by 12 months relative to the timetable legislated in 1995, the amendments can be seen to be adverse to the progressive equalisation of pensionable age both in themselves and by reference to the Pensions Act 1995.

As I said, the noble Baroness’s proposals would still reduce the overall savings by around £2 billion. While this is significantly less than the £10 billion price tag attached to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, it is still not a negligible sum. As I have tried to explain, the issue around this amendment is the extent to which it runs contrary to the progressive equalisation of pensionable ages currently on the statute book. As structured, it risks breaching the European directive and being unlawful. Therefore, I am not in a position to support the amendment or even to make any warm noises about it or the possibility of action being taken in another place, as the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, suggested. However, this House has expressed strong feeling on this matter and the message has undoubtedly gone out loud and clear. On that basis, I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Murphy]

I believe that I must respond to the Minister since I moved the amendment. I have listened to the debate very carefully and thank everyone who has spoken in support of the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross. I say to the noble Lord, Lord German, that I do not have a clue why the kinks have arisen. If I was the Minister, I would say at this point, “The noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, will write to you with her responses”. I am sure that we would all like to know the answer to that.

I am very disappointed with the Minister’s response.

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This is not the first amendment in the group. Depending on my noble friend Lady Turner and on the Minister’s reply, we are minded to test the opinion of the House when the amendment is called.

[Lord Freud]

My Lords, this group of amendments in effect aims to provide mitigations to the state pension age timetable. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, for giving us the opportunity to discuss the issues surrounding those in ill health and those in arduous or dangerous employment. Similarly, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, for her proposed changes to the pension credit qualifying age timetable.

The amendments were tabled with the intention of helping those people who might be described as vulnerable, as noble Lords pointed out. I very much agree with the principle that we should assist those who require additional support. However, a balance must be struck between doing the right thing for those people and making the system more complex and harder to understand when it comes to delivering that support.

As I said, Amendment 9 allows for mitigations to the proposed change to the state pension age timetable for those in ill health and those in arduous or dangerous employment. While I have great sympathy for the people these amendments aim to help, the arguments against accepting them that I set out in Committee have not changed. The changes would make the system too complex.

I will pick up a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, about the life expectancy of people on low incomes. There is good news here. Male manual workers saw a two-year increase in life expectancy at the age of 65 between the 1992 to 1996 and the 2002 to 2005 assessment periods. Women manual workers saw a one-year increase. When one drills down into the figures—I was looking at them this morning—one sees an acceleration for manual workers. Perhaps the nature of manual work is easing. In the latest period, life expectancy for both men and women improved more rapidly for manual workers than for non-manual workers. Between the 1997 to 2001 and the 2002 to 2005 periods, male manual workers saw their life expectancy rise by 1.2 years, against 0.8 years for non-manual workers. Clearly in this latest period there is very good news.

As I said, we have already made strides on the value of the state pension by introducing a triple lock. As we discussed, we are looking to reform and simplify the state pension, which has become unbelievably complex.

[Baroness Drake]

Perhaps I should have intervened a sentence or two earlier, but I was not sure whether the Minister had finished on the longevity point. I accept his point that the life expectancy of certain lower socioeconomic groups has also improved. However, the evidence of the Marmot review and of a recent NAO report also shows that inequalities are increasing in healthy life expectancy, and that this group is less likely to be healthy and therefore less able to re-enter the workforce at short notice in the accelerated timetable. I accept the general proposition about improving the state pension age.

[Lord Freud]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Drake. We could get into a long debate here that perhaps would not be hugely valuable. The figures for life expectancy, healthy life expectancy and disability-free life expectancy are all moving up. They are moving up at slightly different rates for different people, but the general movement is in an encouraging direction. Healthy life expectancy is moving up almost as fast as life expectancy—just slightly slower.

I come back to the point about the state pension age and the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Turner. A state pension age that is different for different groups would take us further away from the goal of a new flat-rate, single-tier pension based on contributions, which is simple to understand. It is important for the state to be clear how much someone will receive in retirement, and it should be equally clear about when they can receive it. A variable state pension age will not help this. Now is not the time to bring in further complexity by introducing bespoke state pension ages for individuals.

Adding to the complexity of this concept is the problem of defining prolonged ill health or arduous and dangerous employment. It might seem straightforward to produce a list of health conditions and occupations, but our direction with welfare reform is precisely the opposite, away from categorisation of people towards individualising and looking at how they can function and what they are doing. We are looking towards assessing each person’s appropriate pension age. Then we begin to get into very difficult territory, which we will discuss under the personal independence payment and the capability assessment. I need not spell out for a third time how difficult that is.

People are working longer and are living longer and healthier lives. We need a system that takes into account recent changes. I must accept, with regret, that some people, due to ill health, have to leave work before they reach state pension age. However, it should be acknowledged that support is already available for those people. Although they may not be entitled to a state pension immediately, that does not mean that they are left with nothing. As my honourable friend the Minister for Pensions recently said, it is not a case of going from a £97 pension to zero: working age benefits will continue to be available for those whose state pension age has increased and those who are unable to work because of health problems. They may very well be able to claim employment support allowance. Support through other benefits and credits is available today and will continue to be available in future, whatever the state pension age. Indeed, the introduction of universal credit will make it much easier to see precisely what entitlements are.

We need to ensure the sustainability of the state pension system and our proposals strike the best balance between the impact on individuals and fairness to the taxpayer. I should make one slightly technical point, to which I think many noble Lords will be sympathetic. Changes to the state pension age should be made only following agreement in this place and another place. For the Government to be able to vary the provisions of the schedule through regulation is a significant power, and one which should not be treated lightly.

I turn to Amendments 11 and 14. The arguments remain the same. It is vital that our system strikes that balance. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, for tabling the amendments and allowing us to consider the role of income-related support for those over a specified age. The amendments would keep the pension credit qualifying age in line with the existing legislative timetable for women's state pension age. Their effect would be that the pension credit qualifying age would diverge from the women's state pension age from 2016, as proposed by the Bill. The amendments, while seeking to ensure that the pension credit qualifying age cannot be higher than the state pension age, also leave the door open to retaining a pension credit qualifying age below the state pension age—possibly permanently. That seems to me to be based on a fundamental misapprehension. The underlying assumption seems to be that by keeping the pension credit minimum qualifying age pegged to state pension age, we seek to attack the incomes of older people. That is just not the case. We think that, for all people of working age, the appropriate form of support is a working-age benefit.

The Government introduced the Welfare Reform Bill, which sets out the proposals for universal credit by 2016. There is widespread support for the principles underpinning universal credit—in particular, the principle that work should always pay. We should define people of working age by using the state pension age, not that of pension credit. We have used that only because state pension age has not been equal between men and women. The upper age limit for universal credit will be set at the pension credit qualifying age. That ensures that the appropriate work-focused and work-related support is targeted at those of working age. Providing an arbitrary age for pension credit which breaks the link with state pension would also compromise that important aspect of welfare reform. If it is not state pension age, when should it be?

[Baroness Drake]

I must correct the noble Lord, because I think that he is misrepresenting my amendment. It asks the Government only to commit to separating pension credit qualifying age from the women's state pension age for four years, from 2016 to 2020, to mitigate the impact on a particular group. It does not ask them to commit to a policy beyond 2020; that is for the Government to decide. We already have a precedent for separating state pension age from the qualifying age for pension credit, which is that of men. The amendment would not by the back door set a formula for the future; it simply provides that for a four-year period from 2016 to 2020 there is a separation to mitigate disproportionate impact. It does not require the Government to commit beyond that.

[Lord Freud]

Let me accept that that is the intention behind the noble Baroness’s amendment—although when we costed it, we had to make an assumption about how we then bring it back up to pension age. We need not be technical. It is important when we debate these matters that we debate the underlying intention and not worry about precise things.

I reinforce my point: if we divorce the minimum qualifying age for pension credit from the state pension age, with the exception that the noble Baroness pointed out, the minimum age for pension credit becomes arbitrary, and people would well ask why it is at that age, not one year sooner or one year later. As life expectancy increases, more and more people will want to improve their incomes by working for longer. We should celebrate and encourage that. The amendment goes completely against that principle. We are clear that we want people below state pension age to work if they possibly can. The point of the proposals is not to take money away from people, as some noble Lords have said, but to encourage people to go on working longer, which should leave them with more income. We cannot give up on those people. They deserve our help and support in their endeavours to support themselves.

The other misapprehension is that there is inadequate provision in the universal credit for those who cannot work—people in ill health or people who have worked in manual jobs, who may not be able to continue working as state pension age increases. Again, that is simply not the case. Universal credit is intended to provide appropriate levels of support for those of working age, including those who, for whatever reason, are unable to work or have limited capacity for work.

The amendment will give no comfort to those who want to make entitlements much clearer and more transparent in an effort to ensure that they reach those who need them. It would mean providing complex and confusing information to customers. Unfortunately, it would come into place just when we are introducing universal credit, which is designed to have a pure, simple messaging to people to convince them of how they need to interact with the state. By producing this new, complicated system, we would undermine that simple messaging.

Quite apart from the messages, it would also add significantly to the complexity of the benefits system, confusing the people it is designed to help and the organisation delivering it. In order to deliver that confusion, which would obscure entitlements and potentially discourage people from working in the years before they get their state pension, the amendment would present the taxpayer with an unaffordable bill. For the financial years 2016-25, we estimate that it would be around £1.9 billion, and there would be further costs in the years to follow, depending on when it is withdrawn.

The amendment would add complexity to the system and have the effect of withdrawing valuable in-work support for people below state pension age. It would obscure entitlements for those who need them most and incur a very substantial increase in expenditure. I think I have clearly set out the rationale for the Government’s position. It is simply impractical to assume that the system will be improved by adding further complications to an already complex beast. For these reasons, I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Turner of Camden]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. I think he agrees that there is a problem here, but what he is telling me is that it is too complicated to resolve in the way that I have suggested. I will read very carefully what he said about it because I got the impression that he understands that there are problems about people who do dangerous and difficult work—people on whom we all depend in a modern environment. We do not notice that they are doing it until they cease to be there to do it, and we are not expecting that to happen very soon.

I thank my noble friend Lady Drake for what she said about pension credit. It is quite clear that her amendment on pension credit is intended to deal with the less well off. In that respect, it has to do with my amendment, which is concerned with poorer people. I therefore support what she said.

On my amendment, as time goes on, we may well see, although I hope it does not happen, that if you have accidents or incidents at work, there will be pressure for changes in that respect. I do not think we have finished with the argument about dangerous and difficult work. People do not expect to have to go on working in that kind of environment without any reasonable prospect of an earlier retirement. I shall read with interest what has been said about my amendment. What my noble friend does about her amendment is, of course, entirely up to her. I think it should be supported. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Stoneham of Droxford]

I have already allowed one intervention and I should like to move on, since this is a short debate.

Finally, it is important to understand that too low a threshold may well encourage more lower income people to opt out than would a more realistic one. For those reasons, I support the proposal set out in the Bill.

[Lord Freud]

My Lords, there is clearly a lot of consensus in the House around auto-enrolment, but I am afraid that one of the areas where there is genuine disagreement—there are not many of them—concerns the right earnings triggers for it. The amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, seek to introduce a lower entry point for automatic enrolment, and we need to look at them with the amendment which seeks to cap annual rises in the automatic enrolment trigger to the higher general level of earnings and prices. Let me take a few moments to explain why it is our view that the threshold we are proposing is right and why reverting to a lower trigger would not be right. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, pointed out, we reached a recommendation on the level by leaning on the Johnson review, which considered a number of factors: earnings dynamics, family characteristics, and the replacement rate which the noble Baroness finds distasteful.

Let me explain why the replacement rate is an important factor. If you are earning a certain level of income through your working life, it does not necessarily make sense to take money out of that to have a better income later. That should be a choice for the individual—that is the theory of replacement rates. When you are looking at asymmetric paternalism and encouraging people to do things that they might not do if they thought about it harder or were equipped to make those assessments, it does not necessarily make sense to create a situation where people find themselves scrimping and saving during their working life to have a slightly better lifestyle when they are older. That might be the right choice, but it should not necessarily be something that we encourage.

If we only consider replacement rates, then the analysis done by the review shows that individuals with earnings in the £10,000 to £15,000-a-year range throughout their working life would, through the combination of the state pension and income-related benefits, receive replacement rates that are often in excess of 100 per cent. If it had been replacement rates alone that guided the setting of the threshold, it would have been set somewhere between £10,000 and £15,000. However, that clearly is not the whole story and the review recognised that. It recognised the importance of dynamic earnings, which mean that some of those who have low earnings today will still benefit from saving as they are likely to go on and earn more in the future, a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis. However, even that is not straightforward either—when a person’s earnings are low there is a genuine question about whether it is right to encourage them to save at particular times when they may very well have a pressing need to use all their income to meet present living costs.

That led the review team to consider individuals’ family circumstances. These may well mean that a low-earning individual with a higher-earning partner might benefit from saving even when their earnings are low, as it would help provide a decent replacement rate for the family as a whole. In the vast majority of families with both partners working, their total earnings are significantly higher than the earnings of just one individual. Bearing all these complicated and interrelated factors in mind, the aim of the independent review was to set a threshold which maximises pension saving for those for whom saving is valuable, while minimising the number of those brought in for whom it is not. In doing this and making its recommendations, the review team struck a very careful balance.

It is simply not correct to assert that all low earners will benefit from pension saving throughout their working life due to dynamic earnings, receipt of working tax credits or the fact that they live with partners who earn more; nor is it correct to say that all low earners will not benefit from saving. That is why we have the opt-in to allow those who will benefit from saving to choose to do so. Individuals who opt in and have qualifying earnings will of course still benefit from an employer contribution.

No earnings threshold will ensure that automatic enrolment is perfectly targeted, encouraging saving among all those who need to save while excluding all those who should not—unfortunately, the world is not that simple. That is why the review team sought to identify the correct balance between all these factors. The Government accepted its findings, including the adoption of a higher earnings threshold; this was widely welcomed by stakeholders. We believe that the starting point that we have proposed in the Bill on the basis of the review recommendation strikes the right balance between ensuring that we do not encourage persistently low earners or those experiencing a period of low earnings to save, while ensuring that those who clearly will benefit are able to be automatically enrolled.

We all agree that setting an appropriate earnings threshold for auto-enrolment is absolutely central to the success of the reforms. The arguments that I have heard today and during Committee have not persuaded me that there is sufficiently compelling evidence in favour of setting a lower threshold in the Bill when this is compared with what the review team has already considered in detail in reaching its recommendation.

Let me turn to the second element of the issue: the mechanism for revaluing the automatic enrolment thresholds year on year. The aim of the independent review was to set a threshold for automatic enrolment which maximises pension saving for those for whom saving is valuable, while minimising the number of those brought in for whom it is not. In doing this, the review team recommended that the automatic enrolment earnings trigger should be aligned with the tax threshold, currently £7,475. The presumption of the Johnson review was that the trigger would remain aligned with the tax threshold, unless future action by Government resulted in a fundamental change in its purpose or the relationship between them. The Johnson review is clear about its view on the right direction of travel.

The Chancellor has now announced the personal tax threshold for 2012-13 as £8,105. It is logical that this announcement has prompted the question, which my noble friend Lord Stoneham raised, as to whether it is our intention to uprate the automatic enrolment trigger to this figure for live running in 2012. We will want to undertake detailed work over the coming weeks and months to assess the impact of aligning the earnings trigger with that threshold of £8,105. We will look in particular at whether the right balance continues to be struck in terms of who is brought into auto-enrolment using this trigger, especially with regard to low earners and women.

It is appropriate to share with the House the figures that demonstrate the impact of moving up to £8,105. It would remove around 100,000 individuals from automatic enrolment. It is also appropriate to share with the House the fact that the bulk of those are likely to be women—our figure is 79 per cent, a proportion consistent with the impact of the rise to £7,475.

It is too early to say definitively that because £8,105 is the personal tax threshold for next year this will also be the auto-enrolment trigger. However, I can say that our expectation is that we would align with this figure, unless the evidence suggested that this was the wrong thing to do. It is therefore worth my repeating here the commitment I made at Committee that as well as the uprating order being subject to an affirmative debate, we will prepare an impact assessment to accompany the uprating order for each of the first five years up to and until shortly after the 2017 review. This will give us the opportunity to explain in detail to the House how and why we are proposing to uprate the auto-enrolment trigger and inform the affirmative debates that we will have annually.

Times are changing—as we debate these issues, the Chancellor has announced not only a new personal tax threshold but a major review of the operation of tax and national insurance contributions. It is vital therefore that we retain for the long term the flexibility in the uprating power to allow us to consider a number of factors.