(1 year, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I warmly support the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser of Craigmaddie, to which I have added my name. I agree with every word she said in her introduction. I could not have said it better and I have nothing to add.
My Lords, I follow the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, with just a few words. As we have been reminded, I tabled Amendment 63, which has already been debated. The Minister will remember that my point was about legal certainty; I was not concerned with devolution, although I mentioned Amendment 58 just to remind him that we are dealing with all parts of the United Kingdom in the Bill and it is important that the expression should have the same meaning throughout all parts.
We are faced with the interesting situation which arose in the strikes Bill: the subject matter of the Bill is reserved, but one must have regard to the fact that its effects spread into devolved areas, which have their own systems of justice, health and education. That is why there is great force in the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, has been making. I join the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, in endorsing what she said without going back into the detail, but remind the Minister that devolution exists, even though we are dealing with reserved matters.
(3 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 23 in my name deletes Clause 3(2)(c), which provides regulations under this clause and relates to the charging of fees. That is at odds with the terms of Section 31(4) of the European Union (Future Relationship) Act 2020, which provides that no fees should be charged. That Act does not allow for the imposition of fees in regulations designed to implement the trade and co-operation agreement. So this is a probing amendment that gives the Government the opportunity to explain why they have a completely different approach in the Professional Qualifications Bill from that in the future relationship Act. I look forward to hearing how the Minister can explain that away.
Amendment 47 has also been signed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, who will be much better at explaining it than I could ever be.
I am very grateful for that invitation but before I get to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, I support what the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, has said in support of Amendment 16 about the need for
“reciprocal arrangements with other jurisdictions, including individual Member States of the European Union, for those with UK qualifications”.
This amendment is of particular interest to the legal professions in this country, in view of the achievements that were made right across the board in all three jurisdictions—Northern Ireland, Scotland and England and Wales—in that respect while we were in the EU.
I am quite sure that the professions do not want to lose the benefit which those arrangements were able to achieve. There is a gap here that the trade and co-operation agreement with the EU has left unfilled. Amendment 16 goes some way to addressing and filling the gap in the interests of those who would like to benefit from the kind of arrangements we previously had under the European Union.
Coming to Amendment 47 in the name of noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, it seeks to clarify the provision in Clause 9(4) about the risk that the duty of a regulator to provide information may contravene the data protection legislation. The same point arises in Clause 10(7), which is the subject of another amendment by the noble Lord, Amendment 50. Unfortunately, it is not in this group but will arise later on. Perhaps one is addressing the same point this evening. It also arises in regard to Clause 7(5), which raises exactly the same point. The Minister will appreciate that one is dealing here with a duty to disclose information. It begs the questions: first, does it breach any restriction under rules or contract, for example, or, secondly, does it breach the data protection legislation?
Concentrating on Clause 9, its structure is really quite interesting because it provides the duty in its subsection (2). It is a duty to provide
“any information … that is held by the first regulator … that relates to the individual”
and
“that … is requested by the second regulator.”
Then we come to its subsection (3), which says:
“A disclosure of information under this section does not breach … any obligation of confidence owed by the first regulator, or … any other restriction on the disclosure of information (however imposed).”
Those words are perfectly clear. They provide a complete answer—a complete defence—to a claim for breach of contract or a claim that the rules have been breached. For example, if I objected to the information being released by the first regulator that related to me on the ground that I had entered into a contract preventing the release of that information, I would simply be deprived of my contractual right to complain, because that is exactly what subsection (3) says.
The problem is subsection (4) which says:
“Nothing in this section requires the making of a disclosure which contravenes the data protection legislation”.
If that subsection had said that no disclosure which contravenes the data protection legislation shall be made, or words to the same effect, it would mean that, despite the firm duty in the earlier part of the clause, one was simply not required to disclose anything which would breach the data protection legislation. However, it does not say that; it just says that nothing requires you to do it.