Professional Qualifications Bill [HL] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Hope of Craighead
Main Page: Lord Hope of Craighead (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Hope of Craighead's debates with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, like others who have spoken, I strongly support these amendments. I am most grateful for the most comprehensive speech by the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, who laid out clearly what the issues are, both in terms of the constitutional conflict that is in the Bill at the moment, and the consequences of it, and also the consequences for services within Wales. I think these also apply to Scotland, but I should declare an interest as someone who lives and works in Wales—that is the area of my own experience. I ask the Minister to explain quite clearly why the draft of the Bill was given to the Welsh Government only a week before it was published, and why the final version was not seen before it was laid on 12 May. To me, that does not feel like consultation or like any attempt to find a consensus agreement with devolved Administrations at all.
There is a concern that the skills shortages are being linked to the trade policy agenda, and how the new obligations on regulators could be moved and adjusted because they are driven by some trade policy, rather than by the need to ensure that we have safe and effective high-standard services for people within our nation. Although Clause 14 confers regulation-making powers on the appropriate national authority, these are exercisable only concurrently with the Secretary of State and Lord Chancellor. That seems to make it possible that the Secretary of State or Lord Chancellor could legislate in devolved areas and would not be required to obtain the Minister’s consent to those regulations. I understand that the Minister stated in a letter that these powers would not normally be used, but the problem is that once this is in legislation, such assurances do not carry any weight at all, and they are not binding on this or any subsequent UK Government. So it would seem that there are really serious risks, as the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie, outlined.
In the event that there needs to be regulatory compromise in the interests of trade—I cannot think of a specific example, but I see the confusion and conflict between these two areas—will the Minister confirm that any such regulatory compromise will be notified to Parliament, to ensure that there is parliamentary accountability for any pressure put on to compromise any standards? We have heard in this debate already about the importance of common frameworks, but I will finish by advocating that the Government look very carefully at these amendments and make sure that they do not drive a further wedge between the four nations, because the consequences really do not bear thinking about. I certainly agree with those who say that they create an additional threat to the cohesiveness of the union.
My Lords, the Minister assured the House earlier this afternoon that the autonomy of the regulators would be respected. I am sure we all take the Minister’s assurance at face value and fully understand what he is getting at, but one of the many problems that lurks within the Bill and the wide regulation-making power it creates is the risk of causing collateral damage by careless or inadvertent wording or insufficient research before the power is exercised. As I said at Second Reading, the centralised systems that the Bill seeks to create will work only if the diversity that exists across the United Kingdom is fully respected. That is especially true where the devolved Administrations are concerned.
My own experience is confined to the systems for regulation of the legal profession in Scotland, but it is a guide to how the regulatory systems among the professions may differ from each other. In my cases, they involve not just one but two regulators working together, and there are different systems for the two branches of the legal profession in Scotland. For the Law Society of Scotland, which regulates solicitors, it is the society itself, working together with the Lord President of the Court of Session. For the Faculty of Advocates, it is the Court of Session itself, whose functions are then delegated to the Lord President of the faculty. The message that these two examples conveys is that it cannot be assumed that the regulatory systems that currently exist are alike in all cases, or even in most, so great care is needed to ensure that what is being done fits the requirements and practices of the profession that is being regulated.
This brings me to Amendments 13, 24, 35 and 40, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, to which I have added my name. The point that each of these amendments is making is that prior consultation with the devolved Administrations and the regulators is essential before the regulation-making powers in Clauses 1(4), 3(3) and 5(2) are exercised. I shall say a little more about each of these subsections.
Clause 1(4), which is about providing for individuals with overseas experience and qualifications to be treated as having UK qualifications, really has to be read with Clause 1(5), which sets out a list of the many provisions that may be made in the exercise of the Clause 1 power. They are very wide-ranging. Paragraphs (f) and (g) in the list are of particular concern, as they are so wide in their scope. The words “guidance” in (f) and “other duties” in (g), which are not otherwise qualified, leave a huge amount to the discretion of the national authority.
My Lords, I will be brief. The requirement in these amendments for regulations to be published in draft form and consulted on is sensible, for the reasons that the noble Baroness has given. I just do not see why they are confined to this so-called priority list, because any profession that could be brought within the ambit of Clause 1 or Clause 3 should be treated in the same way. While we can sympathise with the medical professions and vets being priority groups over such mundane things as auditors and farriers, in practice any profession that might be impacted by these sorts of regulations, and could therefore have its standards impacted, ought to be covered in a consultation process.
I do not think the consultation process, as drafted in these amendments, should be confined to the regulators, because it is not just the regulators themselves that would be impacted by any regulations made under these clauses; so would the professionals operating in those regulated professions and all the other groups affected by them. I support consultation being in the Bill because of the unusual nature of the powers the Bill is taking, but I do not think it should be confined to the so-called priority groups.
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 27, which is principally in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town. There is a lot to be said in this particularly obscure Bill for the publication of regulations in advance of their being made, so that people can see them in draft and consider them before they take effect. Regulators themselves would of course be consulted if this amendment is passed, but publication gives the opportunity for the wider public to scrutinise them, and no doubt inform this House and the other place, before the crucial point comes when the regulations are made. So I support this particular amendment.
There is a lot of force in the point just made by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, that to confine this provision to the priority professions perhaps misses the point. Perhaps there should be a requirement across the board. There are other important professions that are not in this list. I am not claiming this particularly for the legal profession, as there are certainly other professions that are absent from this list, given the enormously long list of people who are within the purview of this Bill. The amendment may be a starting point but, for what it is worth, I support it.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble and learned Lord. I put my name to these amendments because I regard full and transparent consultation as very important. At its heart, the integrity and independence of our regulators is at stake. The problem is that the Bill gives far too many powers to Ministers. In the previous debate the Minister said that future trade agreements will not compromise standards. I wonder what our farmers and fishers think of that. We know that the Government are desperate for trade deals and that they have a track record of carelessness about their details. Clause 3 gives Ministers a completely free hand when it comes to trade agreements.
This debate is also set in the context of the independence of health regulators and fears that it may be compromised. Earlier, the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, made a cogent analysis of the interrelationship, or lack of it, between this Bill and the current extensive consultation by the Department of Health and Social Care on the reform of the health regulatory bodies. Those proposals are extensive and, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, give extensive powers to each regulator to streamline its own processes. I support that, because the public will benefit from more streamlined approaches to fitness to practise, which will deal with issues more quickly.
However, alongside this, it is widely expected that the forthcoming NHS Bill announced in the Queen’s Speech will contain extensive provisions on the very same regulatory bodies in health that we are talking about today. One provision will be to allow Ministers, by regulation, to abolish a regulator and establish others. I have huge reservations about this, because surely it puts their independence at risk if, on a whim, a Minister can get rid of a regulator that they do not like. When you put that prospect together with this Bill, alarm bells start to ring. Consultation is not everything, but it is a safeguard. My noble friend’s amendment would provide one such safeguard that I believe we need.
My Lords, Amendment 23 in my name deletes Clause 3(2)(c), which provides regulations under this clause and relates to the charging of fees. That is at odds with the terms of Section 31(4) of the European Union (Future Relationship) Act 2020, which provides that no fees should be charged. That Act does not allow for the imposition of fees in regulations designed to implement the trade and co-operation agreement. So this is a probing amendment that gives the Government the opportunity to explain why they have a completely different approach in the Professional Qualifications Bill from that in the future relationship Act. I look forward to hearing how the Minister can explain that away.
Amendment 47 has also been signed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, who will be much better at explaining it than I could ever be.
I am very grateful for that invitation but before I get to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, I support what the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, has said in support of Amendment 16 about the need for
“reciprocal arrangements with other jurisdictions, including individual Member States of the European Union, for those with UK qualifications”.
This amendment is of particular interest to the legal professions in this country, in view of the achievements that were made right across the board in all three jurisdictions—Northern Ireland, Scotland and England and Wales—in that respect while we were in the EU.
I am quite sure that the professions do not want to lose the benefit which those arrangements were able to achieve. There is a gap here that the trade and co-operation agreement with the EU has left unfilled. Amendment 16 goes some way to addressing and filling the gap in the interests of those who would like to benefit from the kind of arrangements we previously had under the European Union.
Coming to Amendment 47 in the name of noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, it seeks to clarify the provision in Clause 9(4) about the risk that the duty of a regulator to provide information may contravene the data protection legislation. The same point arises in Clause 10(7), which is the subject of another amendment by the noble Lord, Amendment 50. Unfortunately, it is not in this group but will arise later on. Perhaps one is addressing the same point this evening. It also arises in regard to Clause 7(5), which raises exactly the same point. The Minister will appreciate that one is dealing here with a duty to disclose information. It begs the questions: first, does it breach any restriction under rules or contract, for example, or, secondly, does it breach the data protection legislation?
Concentrating on Clause 9, its structure is really quite interesting because it provides the duty in its subsection (2). It is a duty to provide
“any information … that is held by the first regulator … that relates to the individual”
and
“that … is requested by the second regulator.”
Then we come to its subsection (3), which says:
“A disclosure of information under this section does not breach … any obligation of confidence owed by the first regulator, or … any other restriction on the disclosure of information (however imposed).”
Those words are perfectly clear. They provide a complete answer—a complete defence—to a claim for breach of contract or a claim that the rules have been breached. For example, if I objected to the information being released by the first regulator that related to me on the ground that I had entered into a contract preventing the release of that information, I would simply be deprived of my contractual right to complain, because that is exactly what subsection (3) says.
The problem is subsection (4) which says:
“Nothing in this section requires the making of a disclosure which contravenes the data protection legislation”.
If that subsection had said that no disclosure which contravenes the data protection legislation shall be made, or words to the same effect, it would mean that, despite the firm duty in the earlier part of the clause, one was simply not required to disclose anything which would breach the data protection legislation. However, it does not say that; it just says that nothing requires you to do it.