Royal Bank of Scotland: LIBOR

Lord Flight Excerpts

Wednesday 4th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords—

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, will the Minister advise the House how many banks from how many countries provide regular LIBOR information in order to produce the average LIBOR rate?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I was looking at the setting of one of the rates the other day, and there is a panel of 18 banks. I think that is typical of the number of currencies and the different time horizons, so it is of the order of 18 or so banks on each one. Of course, they are typically the complete spread of global banks. It is by no means an activity of UK banks, notwithstanding the name of the rate.

Financial Services Bill

Lord Flight Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, one takes one’s life in one’s hands if one tries to interpret the ineffable complexities of the Bill and of these amendments. However, I will try because I think that there has been some misunderstanding of Amendment 35, starting with the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, and finishing with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford. If one analyses it closely, one sees that the fears that were expressed are not justified.

First, the promotion bit of Amendment 35 is couched within the purpose of the committee, which is to,

“contribute to the achievement by the Bank of the Financial Stability Objective”.

Therefore, whatever it does by way of promotion must be within that objective. The amendment continues by stating that this shall include promoting, first and crucially,

“a stable and sustainable supply of finance to the economy”.

That is the number one priority. Only then, and subject to that, as the noble Lord, Lord Peston, made clear, is there the inclusion of promoting,

“objectives for economic growth and employment”.

For the life of me, I do not see how the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, can persevere with his concern, given that the right of promotion is subject and subsidiary to promoting a stable and sustainable supply of finance, and then has to be within the Bank of England’s financial stability objective.

Furthermore, there is no coercion here given that the economic growth objective is third on the list of priorities. Frankly, there is not a straw of difference between “promoting” these things and—in Amendment 35A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon—“supporting” them. Some may say that there is a difference, but as a lawyer I say that there is little or none. I contribute these thoughts in the hope that more light will be cast on Amendment 35.

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, I support the Government’s amendments. I would like to make two small points to pick up on the point made by my noble friend Lord Trenchard. First, when it comes to the achievement of stability, having adequate competition in the domestic market is crucial. The problem with the banking system is that it became too much of a cartel without enough competition. When cartels exist, they tend to do the same thing at the same time and the resulting problems are often large in scale.

I well remember, following the Barings problem, having many discussions with the then Governor of the Bank of England, the late Sir Eddie George. What happened then was that the lender of last resort principle was deemed to apply only to banks that were too large to fail, so smaller banks such as Hambros were closed down and sold, and we ended up with a moral hazard problem and a cartel problem. I stress that adequate domestic competition is very much part of the stability objective, whereas with economic success it is international competitiveness that is arguably more important, particularly for the role of London.

We will come to this subject later on, but there is an important difference in the interplay between adequate domestic competition and being adequately competitive internationally in terms of the two objectives of stability and economic growth.

[Lord O'Donnell]

My Lords, I rise to support Amendment 35A and in particular to speak in favour of the phrase “subject to that”. It is important that we understand why this was put there for the MPC. The basic economic principle was that low and stable inflation was the best prerequisite for long-term sustainable growth. Shocks to economies happen, which mean that inflation will move away either above or below. When that happens, the MPC has a choice. It has a choice of which path of its instruments—we thought at the time of just interest rates but obviously QE is part of it—it should choose. The legislation gives a very clear answer to that because it says “subject to that, look to the broad economic objectives”, so it should be choosing that path which best meets those economic objectives while hitting long-term stable inflation.

It works for the symmetry with the FPC because we would all say that financial stability is a necessary and sufficient condition of sustainable economic growth. When you get shocks to financial stability—and boy have we had a shock—you then have choices about how you get back from those shocks. I strongly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, that in these circumstances you do not want to have pro-cyclical regulation, which could make matters worse. It is really important that the “subject to that” is there and that that builds in the economic policy.

For those who want to explain economic policy in a lot more detail and put subsectors in, I would say that could be a very long list, so I think you have to rely on economic policy. The amendment is very clear. It refers to the Government’s,

“economic policy … including its objectives for growth and employment”.

I, for one, would ask “What is the economic policy of the Government?”. The Prime Minister made that clear when he said that we do not live by GDP growth alone and that what really matters is maximising well- being. Therefore, I think we have an overall strong objective which allows us to get to the right policies. It is not about a simple mechanistic formula.

Financial Services Bill

Lord Flight Excerpts

Tuesday 26th June 2012 Lords Chamber

That is the basis of my remarks. If the Government are determined to go ahead with placing the Bank of England at the centre, we need to find some way to defend our financial institutions, many of which make enormously profitable contributions to our economy, from the damage that might be done to them by a lot of those people, who can at best be described as incompetent.

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, I am unclear as to what are the Government’s proposals, the Opposition’s proposals and even the Treasury Select Committee’s proposals. It strikes me that a great deal of complexity is made out of a situation which should be extremely straightforward. The Bank of England should have a board of directors—you can call it the court, if you like—composed of proper individuals independent of the Bank of England who have substantial experience in the financial services industry and who have all the powers of a board.

I am a commissioner of a minor regulator, the Guernsey Financial Services Commission, and we operate as a board controlled by non-executives to which the executive regulator is accountable and where the board has the power to fire the chief executive and the requirement to understand and be on top of every regulatory issue that is in the course of being addressed. I cannot see why the Bank of England should not have a board of that nature. Indeed, the court has a lot of the powers required to exercise that role. It is just that it has not done so for many years and has been an ornament.

We then have the question of what the FPC should do. Some have said that it will take over as the board that runs the Bank of England. However, it seems to me that the FPC should be a specialist body which focuses on the fundamental issue of what is going on in the banking industry and advises the board on financial stability; it should not be a substitute for or take over from a proper board of the Bank of England which covers all the issues. However, if there is a specialist body and a proper board in this structure, I cannot see what is wrong with it.

I also have to agree that, certainly between 2007 and 2008, the Bank of England did not exactly do very well. Much to my chagrin, it was really the ECB that managed to keep the banks and the City of London afloat, since the Bank of England, extraordinarily, did not recognise a major run on the banking system that was far greater than the one in 1974, which I also lived through. My reply on that point is that these bodies need to contain a majority of independent people. If the board or the FPC is not controlled by independents, then they will be in the control of the governor. Both bodies need independent people who can stand up to the establishment of the Bank of England.

I look forward to learning from the Minister precisely what the amendments mean. Solving the situation should not be particularly difficult but is actually a matter of common sense.

[Viscount Trenchard]

My Lords, I, too, share the nervousness of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, about the governance of the Bank of England, and I agree that the Bill is extremely complicated. I take my hat off to those who have worked hard on the Joint Committee. Their task was very much harder than the one that the noble Lord and I had—under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Burns, who is in his place—when we scrutinised the then Financial Services and Markets Bill some 12 or 13 years ago. This task is clearly much more difficult given that it does not attempt a total rewrite of that legislation. Although I am not sure whether the PRA or the FCA will be the continuing entity of the FSA, as I understand that two-thirds of the FSA personnel will be moving to the FCA, I believe that for most purposes the PRA will nevertheless be the continuing entity.

Although I understand why the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, has moved his amendment, I am afraid that I am unable to support it. Like my noble friend Lord Flight, I believe that the situation is quite simple: the Bank of England has a perfectly good Court of Directors—a term which I think sounds rather good. Some of your Lordships may think that it sounds arcane and fusty but, on the other hand, it has a certain amount of gravitas. To change it to “supervisory board” would be very un-British. In my business life, I have come across many supervisory boards, in Holland and in Germany. In many cases, I find them semi-detached, rather remote and rather nervous to exercise their powers. If we were to adopt the term “supervisory board” it would give a weak impression—much weaker than the rather heavy-sounding Court of Directors gives. I do not think that there is no problem with the court’s name. However, I agree that its accountability needs to be strengthened, given the additional powers that the Bank will receive. Certainly, some changes need to be made to the governance of the Court of the Bank of England.

The noble Lord also referred to the asymmetry between the Monetary Policy Committee and the proposed Financial Stability Committee, in that the first is independent of the court, whereas the new Financial Stability Committee would be subordinate to the court. I do not think it necessary, in this connection, to strive for total symmetry, because the Monetary Policy Committee has a very specific responsibility, to set interest rates, which is a technical matter. It is essential that it continues to conduct its business in a transparent and independent way and to be composed of persons who are able to provide technical expertise in determining interest rates. The Financial Stability Committee will have a much broader remit. Regarding the oversight of our prudential regulation, both macro and micro, I do not quite understand why it is necessary that the two be so separated; it makes the structure more complicated than it need be. So I have sympathy with the noble Lord’s purpose, but I cannot agree that to replace the court with a supervisory board would be the right way to go.

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[Lord Flight]

My Lords, these committees seem to me to be very different bodies. The MPC and the FPC are, in essence, intellectual bodies reviewing policy, one in the monetary area and the other in the stability of the system. They are not bodies employing hordes of people carrying out an executive function. This is in contrast to the PRA, which will be an organisation employing lots of people doing a detailed regulatory task, and the court itself, the board that runs the Bank of England which does all the banking and other things. They are very different entities, and the PRA and the court actually need chief executives. I think it very reasonable that the chief executive of the PRA—you can call him the deputy governor, that is fine—and the chief executive of the Bank of England should be the governor himself. Thus the governor should not be chairman of the court, which should have an independent chairman. When it comes to the MPC and the FPC, the chairman is actually the person who is hosting the taking of the decisions, and so I do not think it is inappropriate for the governor to be chairman of both or at least chairman of one.

[Lord O'Donnell]

I support the noble Lord, Lord Flight, in that and pick up on what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, was saying about this issue. I completely agree that the problem is whether the governor concentrates on one area to the exclusion of the other. You risk making things worse if you make the governor chair of one of these committees and not the other. I would say that you cannot have a Governor of the Bank of England who is not sitting on the Monetary Policy Committee. I just cannot see how you would have a governor who does not have a vote on the interest rate for this country. It does not seem to make any sense whatever. The Financial Policy Committee is going to take decisions on instruments such as loan-to-value ratios which will have quite an important bearing on macroeconomic issues which also matter to the MPC. I completely accept the issues about concentration of power. They are very important and should be handled through the accountability relationships that we set up. I also agree that the third body is very different and therefore the governor should not chair it, but the MPC and the FPC overlap so much that I do not think it is feasible not to have one person chairing both. If you were governor, and sent your deputy to chair one of these meetings, can you imagine how much time would be spent instructing them on what you thought they should do and getting feedback? It is far more transparent and open that one person chairs both.

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[Lord Burns]

My Lords, I support Amendment 6 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft. As she said, in terms of strengthening the power of the court or the board of directors, whatever we are going to call it, giving the appropriate powers, respect and position to the non-executive chairman of that court would be a very important part of making it an effective functioning body.

I was Permanent Secretary at the Treasury in 1993 when Eddie George was appointed governor and Rupert Pennant-Rea deputy governor without any warning being given to any of the members of the Court of the Bank of England. It caused a great deal of upset among members of the court who felt that they had been undermined by the lack of warning. In a world where we are trying to build some good corporate, modern, transparent governance, as we have heard today, giving a role to the chairman of the court, at least in terms of informing him or consulting him, would be an important part of it.

With respect to the amendments covering the powers of the Treasury Select Committee, my noble friend Lord Turnbull has set out the analysis of that position. It would be wrong to underestimate the power of the Treasury Committee simply in terms of its ability to summon people and to question them. I regard the Treasury Committee—I have watched it for many years and I appeared before it many times—as a very skilled body in terms of oversight. It fulfilled its role in terms of challenge, questioning and advice. I would rather it did the job that way rather than by seeking to have vetoes over positions. It can make a huge impact simply by the way it brings people in, talks to them, summarises its opinions and then leaves it in the hands of Ministers to decide how far they wish to take account of those views and whether they really want to push it. At the point at which they want to push it, the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, probably come into play.

I particularly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Peston. I cannot remember an occasion when the term of a Governor of the Bank of England was shortened other than by his own will. I would have thought that it would be an issue of some significance that would require not just the House of Commons but, as the noble Lord, Lord Peston, said, Parliament in general to agree it.

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, I also support the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, for essentially the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Burns, and as part of the process of restoring the court to being a proper board.

I want to comment on Amendment 5. I have mixed views, but I think it is quite healthy that someone being appointed to such an important role should be subject to vetting in the same sort of way that occurs typically in the United States and that it probably is the Treasury Select Committee that is equipped to handle that vetting.

If I may digress, the present Governor of the Bank of England studied economics at the same university as me at the same time, and anyone that knew that knew that the teaching of economics at that time at that university was appallingly bad. That illustrates that it takes some effort to assess the sort of mind that someone being appointed to that job has got. The absence of any form of politically accountable examination is probably wrong in today’s world. Therefore Amendment 5 is worthy of serious consideration.

[Lord Northbrook]

My Lords, I disagree with Amendment 5. It gives the Treasury Select Committee too much power. As I understand it, the Treasury Select Committee already holds pre-commencement hearings with those who have been selected to become governors and deputy governors. Furthermore, as I understand it, the Government have no powers to remove a Governor of the Bank of England; rather the Treasury must give its consent if the Bank decides the governor has met the criteria for removal. It is the Bank’s decision to make. The pre-commencement hearings provide the right balance between giving Parliament an opportunity to question the new appointee on their views and qualifications without bringing into question or placing doubts over the appointment itself.

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[Lord McFall of Alcluith]

The rules do not include wrong policy and I never suggested that they did, but what I am saying is if there is a charged atmosphere in Parliament and there could be a scapegoat, perhaps the governor or a future governor would leave as a result of that. We must be mindful of that situation and I gave a parallel, if not an exact one, of what happened a few weeks ago on that particular issue. We also have the governor now being appointed for eight years. That was adopted after being suggested by the Treasury Committee and no one has commented on it in this Chamber. I think it is something which needs much more reflection from the Government.

The noble Lord, Lord Burns, spoke about the chairmanship of the court. I would suggest to the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, that this is a big challenge to the Bank of England, which at the moment is not perceived to have that challenge. That aspect of challenge is really important. I could give noble Lords an example from my time on the Treasury Committee. No names, but I was approached by the representatives of a number of non-executives during the financial crisis and asked if I would see them. They wanted to tell me about the situation on the board of their company and explain why no change was affected by them; my answer was, “Absolutely not. You’re on your own. If you’re a non-executive and you cannot challenge, you should not be on the board. You should leave the board as a result of that”. The aspect of challenge still resonates and we need that. It is the issue that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, was pointing to and the Minister needs to reflect on it.

The noble Lord, Lord Flight—if I can wake him up, no, I do not think I can—made the point about Mervyn King and economics teaching. He made the distinction that it was the economics teaching that was bad and not the present governor’s teaching—

[Lord Flight]

The former—

[Lord McFall of Alcluith]

Yes, the former, exactly. Economics has lost its way on this issue. I would point the noble Lords to a good letter in the Financial Times yesterday that said economists are there for the well-being of society and that they forgot that. There needs to be a fundamental rethink of the economics curriculum. When Alan Greenspan appeared before the Senate, he said the intellectual edifice that was built up has now crumbled as a result of that.

Other noble Lords have made the point that Amendment 5 is going too far, but we need reflection on it and I can understand where people are coming from. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, raised the issue of Parliament’s involvement and pre-appointment consultation. I think the Government can do something in terms of pre-appointment consultation, whether it is overt or covert. I would suggest that if they do not want any further annoyance at the other end of this building, they should reflect on that issue and come back with something in terms of pre-appointment. It can be done, it is feasible.

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[Lord Flight]

My Lords, I welcome both the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, on behalf of the Government and Amendment 11, in providing for reviews of the conduct of the Bank of England. A review covering mid-2007 to date is well overdue. However, I note, quite correctly, that the amendments come with the caveat that anything that would be against the national interest if it were published may not be made generally available. The one issue that I do not really understand is the need for yet another committee. Why cannot the board of the Bank of England discharge the roles of the oversight committee? The board of a regulator would normally do that, in my experience, so adding yet another body seems slightly unnecessary. I noted the point that there may be some people on the court of the Bank who cannot review themselves, but I do not really see that as a problem. If somebody on the court was, for various reasons, prejudiced against doing some review or other, that is fine and they would not participate. I am nervous about proliferating committees, and I would welcome the Minister’s explanation as to why this cannot be a duty of the court.

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[Lord McFall of Alcluith]

My Lords, I beg to move this amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and myself. It is quite a simple amendment. The principle behind it is that the external members of both the Monetary Policy Committee and the Financial Policy Committee should be in the majority, to counter groupthink within the Bank itself. The Treasury Select Committee had taken evidence on this and was very clear on it, as was the Joint Committee on the draft Bill, which recommended that there should be a majority of non-executives on the MPC. Both the Government and the Bank of England disagreed. The Bank of England said very clearly,

“Decisions about the relative numbers of internal and external members of the MPC and FPC are ultimately for Parliament.”.

If those decisions are for Parliament and there is a cross-party consensus on that, Parliament’s will should be observed in this case. The Bank made the point that,

“diluting internal membership to the point where the Committees could not be presented as distinctively Bank Committees would undermine the Government's purpose of asking the Bank to undertake these activities in the first place”.

If the Government feel, as they have said, that increasing the number of external members on the Monetary Policy Committee would make it unwieldy, given that that would take the number to 11, there is a simpler way of doing that. That is to ensure that there are two fewer members of the internal executive on the committee, which would result in the MPC’s internal members numbering four and its external members numbering five. When we talk about external members, I am very much aware of the experience that I had and that you can get groupthink with external members as well.

The concept of diversity is really important and, as was mentioned in other debates in the Chamber today, we should be ensuring that there is representation of women on the committee. The MPC and the FPC have exclusively all-male boards. There are women who were at senior level at the Financial Services Authority and who have now left—for example, Margaret Cole, who was the managing director of its conduct business unit. She made a great contribution in ensuring that the industry listened to the Financial Services Authority, and she made a lot of real improvements on insider dealing. Sally Dewar left the authority too. These women have left, so that needs to be taken into consideration here as well.

One concept that has not been addressed in the financial services industry overall has been the consumer. I battled for years to get a consumer representative on the Financial Services Authority, and we eventually got one on it. Let us think on a wider front and keep in mind the words of the former Monetary Policy Committee member Professor Charles Goodhart, who said, as someone echoed today, that if you are excluding 50% of the population then you do not have the best talent pool. Let us have external members, eliminate groupthink and let the will of Parliament prevail.

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, my two amendments follow those in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McFall, and are essentially probing. They up the stakes from having six members appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to having eight and require that all members of the FPC are,

“sufficiently independent of the Bank of England”.

To me, the issue is this: the FPC will be crucial. Its job is to detect things going wrong in the financial system and to direct institutions to put things right if they are in trouble. My view is that if the FPC is just part of the Bank of England, it runs the risk of being overdominated by what I will call the Bank of England establishment. It is important that FPC members are independent and, if they can be persuaded, may be people with central bank experience from other economies, who are the sort of people who will be good at the job for which they are chosen.

That gives rise to another issue which I have only just appreciated. The wording is slightly ambiguous. The implication is that members of the FPC must be directors of the Bank of England, members of the court. That seems to be slightly questionable. I am not sure that all members of the Monetary Policy Committee are members of the court. The FPC is parallel to the MPC in its role, and it would not be satisfactory if the Court of the Bank of England got to such a size that it was unwieldy. I question, therefore, and think it might be worth considering, whether there should be the requirement that FPC members are directors of the Bank of England. That does not seem to add anything.

However, the main point is to achieve a body of people that delivers the job it is there to do. It is not directly relevant, but I am mindful that the one banking system that entirely escaped all the troubles of 2007-09 was that of the Lebanon. The governor of the Central Bank of Lebanon, who is a very wise old bird and has seen many things before, spotted the trouble coming in terms of mortgage instruments and kept the banks of the Lebanon out of it all in good time. We want an FPC that, whatever the next problem is that faces us, will be capable of steering in that sort of direction. The wider the experience it has, the better.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, I do not wish to upset the noble Lord, Lord McFall, or my noble friend Lord Flight, but I urge my noble friend to resist these amendments. If we look at the objectives of the Financial Policy Committee, it needs to be a pretty focused, pretty small body. Having 14 people, or 12 people, depending on which of those amendments one is addressing, seems not to lead to the operational focus and directness that this particular policy committee will need. Having four external members will give a perfectly adequate external perspective; more would be more likely to confuse than to illuminate.

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[Lord Sassoon]

I need every cheer I can get at this hour of the evening—I am very grateful to my noble friend. Let me press on. This group deals with various aspects of FPC membership, and I will address in turn each of the amendments that have been moved.

Amendments 21 and 21A would fundamentally alter the balance of membership of the FPC by adding either two or four additional external members. Following the advice of my noble friend Lord Hodgson, I disagree with these amendments for three reasons. First, the ratio of the FPC between Bank executives and non-Bank members is six to five, which closely mirrors the MPC, where the ratio is five to four. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Burns, I can confirm that as with the MPC, the FPC members will act as individuals, and that no change to the membership of the MPC is proposed in this. The MPC model has worked well, and is much admired around the world, and we should not fix something that is not broken.

[Lord Flight]

I thank the Minister for giving way. Is it six or seven members? By my account there are the governor and the two deputy governors, the chief executive and the two members appointed. That makes seven. The whole point of my private amendment, which suggested that there should be eight members, was to give a majority. Are all three deputy governors to be members?

[Lord Sassoon]

The three deputy governors are to be members—I count that up as a six to five ratio. It is not correct that the Bank has seven insiders. The Financial Conduct Authority is an independent regulator, which is emphatically not one of the Bank members. I doubted whether I could count to six at this hour, but it is six. However, I am grateful to my noble friend for getting that clarification.

Financial Services Bill

Lord Flight Excerpts

Monday 11th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, I declare my interests as set out in the register. In particular, I am the senior non-executive director of Metro Bank, the new retail bank, and a commissioner of the Guernsey Financial Services Commission and thus myself a regulator. I also led for the Conservative Opposition 13 years ago in Committee in the other place for FiSMA, and even before that, back in 1974 I was briefly seconded to the Bank of England lifeboat, which did a pretty reasonable job in sorting out a lesser but very serious banking run at that time.

On FiSMA, I was fiercely of the opinion that the central bank should retain responsibility for supervising the banking sector. It seemed natural that a central bank would be more likely to know what is going on. I spoke out equally strongly against the tripartite committee because when a crisis comes someone needs to be in charge. Both these issues were demonstrated most unfortunately in the 2007-10 crisis. I accept that the Bank of England has not acquitted itself that well recently. Indeed, in 2007-08, the Bank was still relying on its economic model, which told it that everything in the garden was dandy, and failed to spot a major banking run gathering momentum right outside its back door, where there was a Northern Rock office with queues of people lined up. The Bank of England needs some re-equipping and some intelligence restored in order to do the job that is going to be put on it and on the PRA.

I would like to stress concerns voiced by others about the costs. I see it from the other side of the coin. In various investment management businesses, I see piles of paper that do no one any good, when really all that is wanted is integrity and, if you breach integrity, serious punishment. Everyone seems to forget that it is the consumer who pays. When interest rates are artificially low and equity markets have done nothing for a decade, no wonder no one wants to save when there are now enormously substantial regulatory costs as well. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, was quite right: what is wanted is proportionality; regulation generally needs slimming down and looking at more effectively on a cost-benefit analysis. I also make this point to many of the consumer lobbies, who want more and more—allegedly in the interests of consumers—and forget that it is their consumers who are going to have to pay for it.

It is dangerous to bury “buyer beware” completely. People need to understand what they are investing in and buying. Telling them, “Oh, it doesn’t matter, the Government will look after you. If anything goes wrong, you will get refunded”, is an extremely unwise mentality in the marketplace. Neither the FSA nor the new body should be expected to educate mature adults, which is a waste of time anyway, but much more should be done in schools. Financial literacy should be part of the core curriculum. It is gradually gaining momentum in terms of some tuition, but it is still pretty thin and most schoolteachers regard it as something with which they do not want to get their hands dirty, so more requirement should be made in that area.

Another noble Lord made the point that the Bill does nothing at least to look at how the accuracy of data in reporting to regulators should be checked; nor has it done anything about FRSA, which contributed greatly to the banking crisis by hugely overstating bank profits in good years and vice versa in bad years and led to bank accounts that no one can understand. The accounting profession has some blame to bear and needs some reform as well.

I hope that the Government will accept that the Bill needs quite a bit of tidying-up before it becomes law. I pick on one or two particular areas in the PRA. Life companies and their balance sheets are very different from banks. They need fair representation and need to be handled very differently from banks. The transfer of consumer credit arrangements, which I argued for 15 years ago, is something of a halfway house and needs looking at before this legislation is passed.

The new fashion in transparency is fine up to a point, but excessive transparency can have dangerous, contrarian effects. Banks will write minutes as they think the regulator wants to see them and decisions will be taken outside the board meeting. Let us not have excessive transparency. In the area of publishing warnings, I know of situations in which the FSA got a major warning of a company completely wrong. If that had been published, the business might have been irrevocably damaged quite unjustly.

The main innovation in the Bill is obviously the FPC, to provide macroeconomic and market oversight. I agree with my noble friend Lord Lamont and the noble Lord, Lord Desai, that the MPC and the FPC have to be one; if they are not, not only will there be conflict between the two but both bodies will overlap in the tasks that they are there to perform.

The PRA and the merged FPC and MPC need pro-growth as well as stability mandates. As many others have pointed out, the financial services are a major employer and the biggest industry in this country. I am sure the Minister will say that they are not anti-growth, but, as with the Fed, there should be a balance.

There is the question of accountability. Should those committees be ultimately accountable to the Treasury Select Committee? There is a star chamber element to the powers proposed for the FPC, and again there is room for at least some consultation with the industry.

My two main points are about competition and governance. We have competition as a major objective for the FCA only in relation to the consumer. It seems blindingly obvious that a big part of our problems has been oligopoly in the banking sector. I remember arguing in about 2000 with Sir Eddie George that, post-Barings, it was very unwise that lender-of-last-resort powers were limited to banks that were too big to fail—a lot of the smaller banks, such as Hambros, closed down and one had the very moral hazard problem that I thought the situation would lead to. Although competition will not solve anything, the more competition and the more providers you have the better. As we see in America, it is much easier to let banks fail if you have a wide range of providers. We should face the fact that one of the major problems in the banking sector is oligopoly.

Perhaps not intentionally but because regulators are frightened of making mistakes, the FSA is a major anti-competitive force against new banks and new banking licences. We in Metro Bank had to spend about £15 million before we were even led to hope that we might get a banking licence. The FSA changed its mind on several key factors several times and took a year and a half to decide. I certainly understand that we do not want a repeat of 1970 to 1974, when banks were given licences too easily, but we have gone a long way in the other direction. Even at a more humdrum level, all the anti-money laundering legislation requirements make it a nightmare to change your bank account. The transferability of bank accounts is now perfectly possible technically, so I should like the Bill to include a requirement for the banking system to put bank account transferability in place, which would do a lot for competition. It is expensive for new banks to access the payment systems cartel. That needs opening up and the PRA should be thus empowered.

Secondly, the PRA should be required to protect the competitiveness of this country in the financial services industry. One of my main concerns with both the Bill and the Vickers report is that we will end up making this country uncompetitive. Our banking industry is already the second most unprofitable in the world, so that will not be good news for jobs.

On the issue of accountability and governance, I cannot see why the court should not be a proper board. The Guernsey Financial Services Commission is a proper board: we have to meet to take decisions about everything; we can sack the head of the commission if he is no good; and we are held accountable in turn. The days of the court being an ornament are gone. It should be a proper board with, bluntly, the power to sack a governor if he turns out to be no use, and the governor should certainly be properly accountable to that board.

I conclude by saying that I give great credit and acknowledgement to my noble friend Lord Sassoon for the work he did in opposition in planning the reorganisation of our supervisory and regulatory arrangements, which was clearly needed. The gist of what is before us is very much in the right direction. I hope—and I think—that the Government realise that there are quite a few items to be thought about further and tidied up, that sufficient time will be left and that the deliberations in Grand Committee will be such that we end up with good legislation.

Tobacco: Smuggling

Lord Flight Excerpts

Thursday 26th April 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, we are in an open consultation period. At the end of that period, it will be for the Government to assess all the evidence. But I am grateful to the noble Lord for drawing our attention to another important piece of topical evidence.

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, many noble Lords may remember reading Parson Woodforde’s diaries in the 18th century when duty on brandy and coffee was very high and Parson Woodforde, along with everyone else, bought smuggled goods. Have the Government dispassionately looked at what might be a level of taxation that would deliver optimum tax revenues?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I remember vaguely reading Parson Woodforde’s diaries. I did not read them in the 18th century, as my noble friend suggested, but in the 20th century. It is a difficult balancing act. As noble Lords know, the policy of the Government has been to raise duty above inflation in order to deal with health issues but that has implications, of course, for smuggling and other illegal sales. Therefore, this is a more difficult balancing act where we have a health priority as well as a revenue maximisation one.

Economy: Budget Statement

Lord Flight Excerpts

Thursday 22nd March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, I congratulate the Chancellor on his Budget which, by and large, makes the best scope of the limited manoeuvre that he has and one understands the political constraints that are upon him.

The first obvious point, that many other noble Lords have made, is not backtracking from the programme to phase out the deficit in the public finances. In overall terms, what we have is modest cuts in spending that have been able to pay for welcome increases in personal allowances.

I support the comments made earlier in this debate by my noble friend Lord Higgins about leaks and the point that they have led to unfair and wrong publicity over the abolition of additional personal allowances for older people. It is fairly clear that if you take together the increase in state pensions, the new £140 pension and the increase that is on its way in personal allowances, overall, those pensioners will be better off. I hope that that message will be put across successfully.

I welcome especially the supply-side reforms, such as the corporation tax cuts. We do not have that much to offer but it is crucial for us to be competitive on that front. I welcome the enhancement of incentives in EIS, VCT and with EMI schemes for investment in small cap business. I declare an interest as chairman of the EIS Association. I welcome the increase in personal allowances and moreover the reduction next year in the top rate of income tax.

It seems to me that the Opposition are engaging in crocodile tears and playing politics. It was quite clear for most of the period of the Labour Government from 1997 onwards that Prime Minister Blair, his advisers and his Cabinet considered that a 40 per cent tax rate was the highest tax rate compatible with a successful economy.

I also accept some of the pragmatic measures taken to stimulate growth, although I am somewhat uncomfortable with the belief that government know best on where and what to do. I certainly hope that the changed measures for North Sea oil will result in reviving production and correct what I think were mistakes made last year. Certainly, support is needed for the life-science industries and I hope that the Government will address the issues raised in the House by my noble friend Lord Ryder on the Government’s problems with EU regulations.

I support what are bluntly Keynesian initiatives to invest in infrastructure and on a public/private basis. The increase in export credit is particularly necessary. The facilities that this country has been able to offer have been very poor in comparison with, say, France or the USA. I am sceptical of some of the other particular public-sector initiatives. To me, they smack a little too much of the sort of tinkering that we saw from Gordon Brown.

The Budget has a coherent growth strategy and there is a shift from public to private-sector investment. I am also pleased that the Budget did not tinker further with tax incentives for pension savings. It seems that, by constant tinkering, this country has substantially wrecked what was a very successful pension-saving situation up until 1997. I would like to have seen a more philosophical base and framework behind the tax reform in some of the supply-side growth policies. Although I understand the political reasons for bashing the rich, my own view is that taking that line is inappropriate and unwise, particularly for a Conservative Chancellor.

The Budget includes some items on which I have concerns. First, it would have been better to leave child benefit alone and found the cuts elsewhere. Child benefit was a substitute for a very rational income tax allowance for those who had the substantial burdens of bringing up children, whether rich or poor. Even though the measures announced yesterday improve upon the initial proposals, there is a still a steep rate of tax on individuals with between £50,000 and £60,000 per annum. To me, it is fair that those with the costs of raising children should enjoy a tax benefit. The economy could not go forward unless children were raised and there to do the work for those of us as we get old.

I personally think that the 7 per cent stamp duty tax was somewhat less than wise. It is yet another burden on London and the south-east, which already subsidises the rest of the country by over £50 billion per annum. It will be counterproductive in that it will simply reduce the rate of turnover as it is reduction tax. It is also another attack on aspirants. London has the problem that house prices are far too high because of the many wealthy foreigners who come here—more than 50 per cent of the market. For those wanting to buy a house in London, it is already bad enough and too expensive. This is just putting the cost up further.

I am also extremely concerned at the proposed measures to limit tax relief to 25 per cent of people’s incomes. As it stands, that would appear to apply to charitable giving, which seems a complete madness and contrary to the whole big society concept. I am not clear, but there could be elements of retrospective taxation here. The whole EIS situation rested on the fact that venture capital investment has not been very successful in this country, largely because the public sector is far too large. A lot of these investments fail but there has been the known ability, where they fail and you lose all your money, to offset that against income. If that is removed, there is an element of retrospection to it in that people have made investments on the basis that that was there. No matter how politically justified, I am uncomfortable with all forms of retrospection in the tax area.

My main point is that the Chancellor spoke of Britain not getting left behind compared with the growing economies of Asia and South America. It is correct that this Budget has done something towards addressing that, but we have a long way to go. Being 10th in the league table of the most attractive economies is nothing to boast about. In fact, we are not a particularly attractive economy in which to do business. Many will have seen Willie Walsh’s article, and the Chinese find this a very difficult and unattractive place to do business.

We have a long way to go. In my book, we are above all dragged down by a public sector that is too large and which has negative productivity, so that the private sector has to run even faster both to offset the negative productivity in the public sector and to achieve some growth. With a 50 per cent public sector you are never going to be a successful economy; you need to get below 40 per cent and towards 35 per cent. I hope that the Government’s objectives to achieve that by 2017 will come about. But the truth is that there is still masses of waste in the public sector, with duplication of activities, quangos doing things that add nothing of any value and, basically, excess regulation. It is a pity not to see a slightly more radical approach on those fronts.

I conclude by wishing the noble Lord, Lord Heseltine, every success in the challenge that he faces. There is no one better to do that job, and I think that individuals can achieve things even in the face of difficulties. If this country is going to succeed and prosper in comparison with Asia over the next 20 years, we will not be able to continue with welfare and NHS expenditure representing over half of public expenditure, with some 25 per cent of GDP through that route. We will have to make ourselves enormously more competitive, get rid of a lot of regulation that damages this economy and address the issue of regulation that damages our economy and comes from the EU. In the 1980s and 1990s, we were focused on not wanting our economy to become sclerotic, as the economies of most of continental Europe had become. That is what has happened to us, and we need to be a lot more radical in order again to become a vibrant economy.

Banking: Accounting Standards

Lord Flight Excerpts

Monday 19th March 2012 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Flight]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they have any plans to review the application of international financial reporting standards accounting standards to the banking sector.

[The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Sassoon)]

My Lords, following the financial crisis, the International Accounting Standards Board has taken steps to revise international valuation standards for complex financial instruments. The question of whether there should be a distinct accounting regime for banks was raised in the preliminary report of the Financial Reporting Council inquiry into going concern, chaired by my noble friend Lord Sharman. The panel is considering the response to this report at present. We await its final report with interest.

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, in reply to a question on 19 December the Chancellor of the Exchequer advised that there needed to be a debate about the role of IFRS in the banking crisis. On 19 January, the head of financial stability at the Bank of England commented in a speech that banks needed accounting standards other than IFRS. Does the Minister agree that IFRS contributed to the banking crisis, as it served both to exaggerate profits and capital in good times and vice versa in bad times, and is in need of review?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, having a look at accounting standards in relation to banks is certainly significant. I would not go as far as saying that IFRS had a fundamental role in relation to the financial crisis. There is not significant evidence of that although, as I have had it rather neatly described, you could perhaps describe accounting standards as an accomplice after the fact rather than as being responsible. There are issues that very much need to be looked at. The review that the IASB is doing, very much with the encouragement of the G20, of the financial instruments standard known as IFRS 9, the work that the Financial Reporting Council is doing, which I have referred to, the inquiries coming out of your Lordships’ committee and the most recent hearing last week will all contribute to an important ongoing debate.

Independent Commission on Banking

Lord Flight Excerpts

Monday 12th September 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sassoon]

I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Kramer for bringing us back to one of the constituencies most affected by the state of our banking system. That is why I welcome the discussion in the report about issues concerning the ability of individuals to switch accounts. There are important recommendations about the Lloyds Bank disposals, which make the point that this is not just a numbers game, of counting the branches that must be disposed of, but about creating another competitor out there. Therefore the report addresses critical aspects of the challenges that she poses, but in addition—whether it is looking at mutual models, credit unions or all the other aspects of a rich and varied banking system—there are significant other channels which the Government continue to address.

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, I draw attention to my entry in the register indicating that I am a director of Metro Bank, one of the new banks.

I would like to make three points while generally welcoming the recommendations. First, I remember over 10 years ago, following what I believed then to be the mistaken collapse of Barings, talking to the then Governor of the Bank of England about changes to the lender-of-last-resort doctrine, which had stood this country’s banking system in very good order for nearly 100 years. It changed by it being said that it was available only to larger banks, walking straight into the moral hazard problem whereby very large banks were of the belief that they could not be allowed to fail, which was the case, and smaller banks were not able—if there were a banking run—to get lender-of-last-resort support. That is why a whole lot of them wound up. It is very important in achieving competition that, broadly, the lender-of-last-resort doctrine is restored to what it was.

Secondly, I am slightly worried that increasing banks’ capital may be brought forward too quickly. I draw noble Lords’ attention to the very convincing writings of Professor Tim Congdon to the effect that if we increase capital requirements very speedily, we will end up shrinking the money supply, which is the last thing we want to do when the country is trying to struggle its way out of recession.

Finally, one banking system, Lebanon’s, escaped all the problems because the governor of the central bank of Lebanon had the wisdom to spot what was coming, to warn the banks and to keep them out of it. There is nothing more important than having a really good central bank governor who actually knows what is going on and blows the whistle in good time.

[Lord Sassoon]

All I can say is that my noble friend Lord Flight makes three important and interesting observations which we need to dwell on as we take all this work forward.

Global Economy

Lord Flight Excerpts

Thursday 11th August 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, perhaps I may suggest to the Minister that what is really damaging confidence and what has knocked stock markets is, in fact, the euro crisis. It is the perception that the economies of southern Europe and Ireland cannot recover without substantial devaluation. It is a situation analogous to that of the UK back in 1992. Broadly speaking, markets, because they cannot go for the currency, go for the bond markets. It may or may not be correct that the only solution is pan-European bonds, but the second issue is, if there is to be a pan-eurozone, it will obviously require massive ongoing transfer payments by Germany. Markets do not believe that Germany will be willing to accept such liabilities. That is the big factor damaging confidence and growth. It is the potential further banking and government debt crisis that that represents; it is people understandably moving their deposits out of banks in southern Europe because they fear they may end up with a lira or a peseta. Money supply is falling dramatically, with a 10 per cent reduction in Italy in just the past few months. That is the crisis which is having the knock-on problems for this economy—much more, I suggest to the Minister, than for the US.

[Lord Lea of Crondall]

My Lords, perhaps I may make two comments and ask two questions. First, it has already been remarked on that the Faustian pact between China and the United States over the past 10 years has been an ultimate, if not the principal, reason for slow world growth. Secondly, although the Minister dismisses so perfunctorily what my noble friend Lord Eatwell said, I suggest that he reads Hansard tomorrow, because my noble friend made a very carefully considered analysis of the world and European situation. I suspect that in terms of economic analysis my noble friend would probably get a higher mark than the Minister on the current situation.

Six months ago, I and many of us were on record as saying that all this would lead to a double dip. It is a quite different scenario from the Thatcher period when there was a reasonably good international position. The prediction of the IFS and others was that if you are going to cut £200 million-worth of output through the crash, the deficit would actually rise from 3.5 per cent in 2008 to something like 11 per cent now. That was without adding to it through austerity measures. We are talking as if austerity measures apply to all circumstances.

My first question is: will the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, consider inviting Chancellor Merkel over here to give her a personal tour of Britain to show her how a modern economy can best succeed—an economy where manufacturing all around works at the rate of Siemens and BMW?

Greece: Default Contingency

Lord Flight Excerpts

Monday 20th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sassoon]

I am happy to confirm that Greece is a relatively small part of the euro area but, as we have already identified this afternoon, Greece is interconnected, as are all the European and global financial markets. Therefore, one should not in any way trivialise the Greek situation and the capacity for difficulties in the markets.

That said, it is also important to be clear about the lines around whether the UK should or should not be involved in these matters. We are not a member of the eurozone; we are not going into the eurozone; and we are not going to make any preparations to enter the eurozone in the lifetime of this Government, this Parliament. We must make sure that, on the one hand, we are not part of any ongoing and permanent support mechanism for the eurozone; at the same time, we have to play a full part to ensure that the eurozone economic governance is fit for purpose.

[Lord Flight]

Does my noble friend agree that if relatively less or more successful countries or economic areas are to share a currency, there is a requirement for substantial ongoing transfer payments, as is the case within the US and even within the UK? Secondly, does he by any chance know roughly what proportion of Britain's exports to the eurozone are to what I would call hard northern Europe, compared to softer southern Europe?

[Lord Sassoon]

I am not able off the top of my head to break down the analysis of our exports, and I am not quite sure where my noble friend would draw the line between hard and soft. The critical point here is that more than 40 per cent of our exports go into the eurozone. Of course, they are generally distributed in relation to the size of economies, with Ireland, as we discussed in relation to the Irish package, having for historical reasons a disproportionately large share. My noble friend makes the point that it is absolutely in the UK's interest to ensure that the eurozone economies are successful, because that is where the largest part of our exports go.