Financial Services and Markets Bill

Lord Flight Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 6th February 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, like my noble friend Lord Hunt, I make a point in my amendment about the link between financial fraud—in practice this now broadly means “online scams”—and mental health. I made this point last Wednesday, in dodging between the Committee and the House, when I raised this issue in the context of the Online Safety Bill. The same issue arises under this Bill and should be dealt with.

There is no doubt that people who have problems with their mental health are, for a variety of reasons, more vulnerable to fraud than people generally. According to a recent survey, people with mental health problems are three times more likely to say that they have been the victim of an online scam than people generally. In reverse, scams are a threat to people with normal health that risk their mental health.

I will talk about this in a bit more detail during debate on the next group of amendments, but we must understand that the result of fraud, however perpetrated, is much misery, destroying people’s finances, in many cases their families and, in some cases, tragically, their lives, so the Bill should address the issue and face up to the need to provide adequate protection. Anyone can fall victim to a scam, but people with mental health problems are at particular risk and can suffer more as a result. We must do what we can, therefore, to improve scam protection and ensure that, when people fall victim to scams, they receive adequate support.

I must pay tribute to the great work being done on this area by the Money and Mental Health Policy Institute. It has drawn attention to the fact that although harm can arise in diverse areas—gambling, retail and scams—across them all, including financial services, there are recurring themes. There is the lack of friction in transactions, advertising of investment opportunities, and high-pressure techniques applied which can put people under pressure, particularly in online spaces.

The institute concludes that these concerns have, up to now, gone relatively unchecked and underexamined, with current regulation either lacking or poorly matched to the real environments in which people find themselves. Although the Online Safety Bill has an important role in this area, it needs to work with the regulations in this Bill to address the problems that cause so much misery.

[Lord Flight (Con)]

My Lords, might there be a case for the regulators to play a more active role in addressing fraud?

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I want to make just four points on fraud, which damages the markets so greatly and damages individuals. The amendments reflect the four points. First, we need a strategy. I do not see how we can go forward any longer without one. I have two comments on strategy. First, the bodies to be consulted should include lawyers and accountants, not because there might be a bent lawyer or bent accountant in the fraud but because often it is their failure to see a flaw in the system that has caused the fraud. Therefore, they need to be part of those consulted. Secondly, five years is a long time for a new strategy. We need some form of accountability for the performance of the strategy in the meantime.

My second point is the object, the principle or the duty—however you put it—of the regulators looking into fraud. This seems critical, and there are two primary reasons for this. First, there is the prevention of fraud. I have too often been told after a fraud has come to knowledge and things are being done about it by those in the market, “Oh, the return was too good to be true. Him? We would not have touched him with a bargepole.” Regulators ought to be able to pick that up, and the duty on them ought to emphasise that responsibility.

Secondly, if fraud occurs—and it is bound to—the expertise of the regulators is needed to guide the way in which prosecutions take place. These days, because virtually everything is documented, you cannot move money. In the old days you could take a suitcase of cash somewhere, but you cannot do that any more. You need someone who can interpret what is usually the defence, “Yes, I did this but I wasn’t dishonest”. The skill and expertise of those in the market who can point to and make clear why it was so obviously dishonest are critical.

Thirdly, dealing with fraud is expensive. If you are accused of fraud, you have nothing to lose by spending all you have in defending yourself. If you fail, that was the end anyway, so you might as well have tried to save your money. If you are successful, you generally get most of it back. In a sense, there is an imbalance. Therefore, I warmly support the amendment saying that the Treasury should hand over the cash. There is no conflict of interest there, because the decision on the level of fine is made by the court. That is a good idea.

Fourthly and finally, the idea of criminalisation is essential. It is often nice to be able to pay tribute to the wisdom of His Majesty’s Treasury. One of the most effective tools in its armoury in relation to sanctions has been criminalisation, because that is what frightens people. Therefore, criminalising the failure to act would be a welcome step, and is something that I hope His Majesty’s Treasury, with all its wisdom, will see the force of.

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[Baroness Penn (Con)]

I have heard the point and I acknowledge the principle that this amendment seeks to explore in terms of those incentives, but I point to the NCA’s budget and the regulators’ budgets. We seek to ensure that enforcement agencies have the proper money available to them to take enforcement activity. I also point out that, while the funds currently go into general expenditure, that funding is spent on other public services, so it does not go unspent elsewhere.

[Lord Flight (Con)]

This point seems absolutely central to me. Unless police forces have either a strong negative or a strong positive incentive, they are not going to be bothered, if you like, to prosecute serious fraud crime. I do not know what the Government’s preference is, but it has to be one way or the other.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

I have listened very carefully to the debate, and I see the point that noble Lords are making. This operates in other areas of government—there is the Proceeds of Crime Act and how that operates—but I slightly counter leaning too heavily into the fact that the police would have no incentive to investigate serious organised crime unless the costs of the investigation and the prosecution are reimbursed to them. Their fundamental role is to investigate and prosecute crime. I understand that there is a complex landscape when it comes to investigating and prosecuting fraud, and that is something that the Government have tried to tackle with the establishment of the economic crime command at the NCA—but it is ongoing work for us. The challenge before me today is that the funding that comes from these fines currently goes to the consolidated fund and is spent elsewhere on public services, so any change of this nature would have implications that go—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I think the Minister said that the legislation, as it finally went through, gave the FCA the option of either a duty of care or something else. Did that imply that it could be much weaker than a duty of care—and did anybody signing up to it understand that?—or was there a sense that it might be done in a different way but would be equally as strong and effective as a duty of care?

[Lord Flight (Con)]

The other fundamental point is that it is not the law; it is a sort of quasi-law that does not have the same power as law.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

If I may, I will come on to address the noble Baroness’s point and the questions from the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, on why the FCA took the approach it did in selecting the consumer duty approach rather than a duty of care. It is the FCA’s view that it provides not a weaker response but a stronger one; I will set that out in more detail.

The consumer duty sets a higher and clearer standard of care that firms owe their customers than now, and includes a new principle requiring firms to act to deliver good outcomes for customers. It is a package of measures comprising an overarching principle, cross-cutting rules and four “outcome rules”. It is also accompanied by extensive guidance, as noble Lords have noted, to provide clarity for firms on what is expected from them.

The FCA developed the consumer duty following extensive consultation with a wide range of stakeholders, including consumer representatives. Noble Lords may be aware that, in its consumer duty consultations, the FCA specifically sought views on whether the new principle should instead require firms to act in customers’ best interests. On balance, the FCA concluded that requiring firms to act to deliver “good outcomes” was the most appropriate approach. The FCA explained that “good outcomes” best reflects the outcomes-focused nature of the consumer duty and underlines that firms should not focus simply on processes but on the impact of their actions on consumers. The FCA also noted concerns raised by some stakeholders that “best interests” language could be confused with a fiduciary duty or a policy that required the best outcome to be achieved for each consumer, potentially resulting in unintended consequences concerning the availability of products and services to some consumers.

I hope noble Lords are therefore assured that the FCA carefully considered the wording of its consumer duty in the manner proposed by Amendment 76 and concluded that a different approach would deliver better outcomes. As the UK’s independent conduct regulator for financial services, it is responsible for developing its rules independently of the Government.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, asked about the potential for the consumer duty to operate in the context of past problems. She highlighted the mis-selling of PPI and interest rate hedging products. As I said, the consumer duty sets clearer and higher standards for firms to follow, and that means clearer and higher standards for the FCA to supervise and enforce, which will enable the FCA to act more quickly and assertively where it identifies poor practice. However, within this system, even the best regulators doing everything right will not be able to, and cannot be expected to, ensure a zero-failure regime.

In respect of the two specific cases of PPI and interest rate hedging products, the Government have always been clear that mis-selling financial products is unacceptable. That is why we supported unequivocally the FCA’s work on PPI to ensure that consumers who were mis-sold PPI receive appropriate redress, and the review process into the mis-selling of interest rate hedging products, which saw over £2.2 billion of redress being paid out to almost 14,000 businesses.