European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 5) Bill

Debate between Lord Faulks and Lord Goldsmith

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 8th April 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith]

I give way to whoever would like to speak on the opposite Benches.

[Lord Faulks]

I entirely agree with the noble and learned Lord that it is most important that there should be as much legal certainty as there can be, but also that the Prime Minister should have the proper role and authority to negotiate. However, does he agree that the royal prerogative exists to allow the Prime Minister to negotiate on our behalf in international and foreign relations unless Parliament actually restricts that authority? That of course was the subject of the Gina Miller case and the reason behind that decision. If we say nothing about the restrictions on the Prime Minister, she will be able to rely on the royal prerogative.

[Lord Goldsmith]

The noble Lord is quite right that that is a very important point. It was raised at Second Reading that the Government felt strongly, and I understand why, that the royal prerogative should not be subject to at least inadvertent erosion. Of course it has been eroded in certain respects over the years; we do not need to go into what they are but they include treaty making and waging war.

I take from the noble Lord’s point this observation: one great benefit of the amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is that it makes clear that the royal prerogative is being maintained. I want to avoid seeing that apparently contradicted by other provisions in the Bill.

I have one other observation to make. I said a few moments ago that there were certain things that could happen: the European Council might accept the proposal or it might come up with another one. However, there is a risk that there might be no agreement at all; that needs to be considered. We have had discussions with the Government. I look to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Callanan—I am sorry, the noble Lord. He should be noble and learned as he has had to deal with so much of this Bill already; we will see if we can arrange that. I anticipate that he will give an assurance that, in the event that there is no agreement, the matter will be brought to the other place as soon as possible. Indeed, we expect it to be brought there this week, otherwise it might simply be too late.

When the noble Lord comes to respond on this amendment, I look forward to hearing what he says about that, and I hope he will give us sufficient assurance that if there is in fact a failure to agree at the European Council meeting then the matter will come back to the other place, which will therefore be able to debate what should happen next. It should do so on an amendable Motion so that it can put forward and support its view on what should take place. I do not know whether it would be for the convenience of the House if the noble Lord could tell us now what he will be able to say but, if not, I look forward to hearing what he says when he comes to respond to the debate.

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[Lord Faulks]

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, have helpfully identified a problem with the Bill, in that a counterproposal by the EU could fall between the cracks and result in an accidental no deal, thus frustrating the will of Parliament, in so far as that will is ascertainable.

In the event of a counterproposal, which seems likely, the amendment suggests that the Prime Minister has the power to seek or agree an extension to a date not earlier than 22 May. At col. 337, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, suggested that approval would still have to be sought for that new date.

I wholly understand the thinking behind the amendment, but the apparent need for it underlines the strange constitutional waters in which we are now swimming. My understanding of the Gina Miller case is that the Government argued that Article 50 could be triggered without parliamentary involvement, whereas the opposing argument, advanced by the noble Lord among others, was that Parliament had legislated in such a way that the royal prerogative was enough on its own and that Parliament need not be involved. By a majority this argument prevailed, although there were three dissenting speeches.

The prerogative, however, allows Ministers, and in this case the Prime Minister, to make or unmake treaties unless Parliament has legislated to restrict that power. It rarely does, hence the paucity of useful precedents in the Gina Miller case. It seems to me that the Prime Minister would be allowed to agree a counterproposal as a matter of law. Whether that would be politically sound is a different matter.

The response of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is that it is or might be uncertain, but it seems to me that this amendment in fact fetters the royal prerogative. We have a dualist system of law in this country, which has worked well, and I wonder if it is wise to undermine the royal prerogative in this way. To make a constitutional change of this sort needs prolonged and serious thought. A Private Member’s Bill that went through all its stages in the House of Commons in four hours, that was not given pre-legislative scrutiny and that, for good reasons, is hurrying through this House, is surely not the context in which to make significant constitutional changes.

[Lord Goldsmith]

Could the noble Lord enlighten me, at least, as to which amendment he is referring to?

[Lord Faulks]

I am referring to Amendment 7.

[Lord Goldsmith]

Amendment 7 does not fetter. It actually says the opposite.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Faulks and Lord Goldsmith

Committee: 11th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, this is a piece of political opportunism. The context of the 2011 Act, as those who were in the House well remember, was that there was very strong opposition in your Lordships’ House to there being referendums as the result of relatively minor transfers of powers and competences. That was rejected as being unnecessary and being a sop to the Eurosceptic wing. However, there were, incidentally, quite a few occasions on which it was conceded that all was far from perfect in the European Union, which is not something we have heard much about in the debates during the course of this Committee stage. To say that we should rely on a Bill that was most unpopular with many Liberal Democrats and a good number in the Labour Party in order to hold another referendum is really not what this is about.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, it must be unprecedented to have such a long and well-attended debate on what is almost the final repeal in the last schedule to a Bill. Given that this is the last debate that we will have in the Committee stage, perhaps I may, as the person who happens to be responding from these Benches, pay tribute to the quality of the contributions that have been made by all sides of the Chamber, including from my noble friend Lord Adonis. I have to say that anyone outside who says that we have been spoiling or somehow wrecking the Bill would not be able to maintain that charge in the light of the clarity and detail of the scrutiny that we have given the Bill.

As to the amendment, I admire the ingenuity which brings it forward. It is clear that the purpose behind it ultimately would be to trigger the referendum-requiring provisions set out in the 2011 Act. There are two ways of looking at that. One is to consider the political nature of the 2011 Act and compare that with what is happening at this stage, where one might well say, if I dare, that it was simply a staging post to the position we find ourselves in now. Many of us find the position of exit an unhappy one, but it would be a staging post to that and it has now passed. There is a legal question which is quite different: whether in fact the conditions in the 2011 Act are triggered. From what the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, has said, there are legal proceedings which may challenge that, and I do not think it is right for me to venture an opinion from this Dispatch Box as to whether those are right or not.

However, I will venture a political opinion from my position, which is this. We are well aware that there are some in this House, in particular on the Liberal Democrat Benches—we fully respect their views, even if we may not share them—who would like to see a further referendum, and many in the country would like to see that. If that is going to happen, one might say that the way for it to come about is through a direct vote on whether a referendum should be taking place rather than what might seem to be a side wind. And that is my problem with the proposed amendment, even though it is ingenious. I have reason to believe—indeed, I suspect, from what the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, said—that this House will have an opportunity on Report to express its view directly, full-throatedly and openly about a further referendum. The House will give its view, but I am not convinced about doing it through this route.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Faulks and Lord Goldsmith

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, that short exchange has demonstrated how complicated this area is and how important the general principles of EU law are in it. It is, perhaps, late at night to be discussing this but it is extremely important because of both the principles and the way they operate. If one looks at it in this way, and takes the Government’s intention not to take away rights as a part of this process, one has to recognise that the architecture which provides rights at the moment is quite complicated. As a commentator has said, there is no single, simple answer to restoring the position in the light of what the Government propose to do.

Amendment 41, which stands in my name, follows the principle the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, initiated by saying that the general principles of EU law should continue to be capable of giving rise to rights which can be enforced by our courts. The point has already been made that there is a difference between these general rights existing as a way of interpreting other rights—as an interpretive technique—and giving rise to freestanding rights themselves. Paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 prevents any action being founded in contravention of one of the general principles or rendering any Executive act unlawful or disapplying any legislation, including secondary legislation, on the grounds that it offends these general principles.

The general principles of EU law have been critical to a number of legal decisions relating to people’s rights. One of those often cited is the case of John Walker, who brought a case for equal protection in pension rights for his same-sex partner, a claim upheld by the Supreme Court which recognised that prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation was a key principle of EU law. As I apprehend it, without that the case would not have succeeded.

The principle of effectiveness of remedies has also been relied upon. When the Supreme Court struck down employment tribunal fees that disproportionately affected disadvantaged women and low-paid workers, the principle of effectiveness of remedies was relied upon. Cases concerning caps on compensation and equal pay cases have depended upon the general principle that we find in the EU principles. The amendment standing in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, seeks to enable those general principles to continue to have that effect in our law. It is important that they do for a couple of other reasons. Take, for example, something that was raised in the other place. What if there is a principle of EU retained law which is deficient, defective, does not operate properly or is disproportionate? Without being able to rely upon the general principles of EU law, it may be that all the court could do if faced with that would be to say that either that principle or that particular Act or that particular piece of law, though deficient or defective, has to continue to operate because there is no principle by which it can be struck down, and that would be a loss.

The other reason goes back, I am afraid, to the debate that we had last week on the charter and the Government’s assertion that the charter is not necessary because all the rights are otherwise protected under our law. Of course, at the time the charter was drawn up we were still a member and, in many people’s minds at least, were expected to continue to remain a member of the European Union with all that that implied, including the continued application of general principles. But if one looks—

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords—

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[Lord Faulks]

When we were having the debate about the charter, I specifically asked the noble and learned Lord whether principles which were referred to in the charter were actionable or not, and he said that in his contention, they were not actionable. I am not simply trying to make some forensic point, but I seek clarity from him as to why in that context he said that the principles were not actionable—I can well understand his answer, because principles are rather difficult to identify as regards a clear breach, for example—but he now says that the Bill is wrong and that principles should somehow be actionable.

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am grateful for the question, because it enables me to clarify that point. There are two sorts of principles. I was talking in answer to the noble Lord’s question last week about the principles which are contained in the charter itself. The charter says that it is a charter of rights and principles, and the principles there—it is not that easy to identify which are principles and which are not—are not actionable in themselves. They may become actionable, because as they are aspirational tools, they are then implemented into law and are actionable at that stage. The principles we are talking about here are different. These are the general principles of EU law, which are, for example, the principle of legal certainty, the principle of proportionality, and the principle of non-discrimination. These are different in that sense; they are general rather than specific principles, and they are actionable at the moment. That is why the Walker case I mentioned gives rise to a remedy, as did the other cases where the Supreme Court struck down tribunal fees as being disproportionately high for particular categories of workers.

That is why we believe it is important to keep this. It is one element of the architecture to retain rights. I remind noble Lords that the Prime Minister made it clear that the intention was that rights would continue the same the day after exit as the day before. To remove general principles in this way, and the ability to rely upon them, will fail to keep that promise. This amendment also—it has been referred to already—specifically proposes that the general principles of EU law should include those which are contained in Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Those are environmental principles of huge importance: the precautionary principle, the principle of polluter pays and the principle for preventive action. Those principles and the others I referred to need to continue to operate to keep in place the rights that people enjoy at the moment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Faulks and Lord Goldsmith

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith]

I apologise to both noble Lords. The proposition is that the charter does no more than codify existing rights and principles, so it is not necessary to bring it in. It has been said, for example, by the very distinguished and independent Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law that that proposition is demonstrably not correct. It sets that out in a detailed report that I commend to noble Lords. An opinion of Queen’s Counsel obtained by the Equalities and Human Rights Commission concludes that in fact this would lead to a significant weakening of human rights protection in the United Kingdom. Against those independent statements, it is no wonder that many NGOs and many members of civil society are deeply troubled about the exclusion of the charter. It is not just civil society that is concerned about that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, noted in the last debate, but industries such as the tech industry.

One can find examples of rights that are not protected in the report, which I also commend to noble Lords, by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. In its right-by-right analysis it identifies which rights are already included in our law and which are not. For example, on the very first item in the charter—Article 1 on the protection of human dignity, which many people would regard as the most fundamental human right and the basis of all others—the Government’s right-by-right analysis gives two reasons for saying that that would be continued: first, an unincorporated treaty, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which does not have enforceable effect in this country at all; and, secondly, as a general principle of EU law—but, as noble Lords will know, this Bill seeks to prevent general principles of EU law being given effect or creating any enforceable rights. That is an aspect that we will have to come back to later in the debates on the Bill.

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

The noble and learned Lord identifies the fact that certain rights are no longer protected adequately because the charter contains rights that are not there in the European convention or, presumably, otherwise provided for by law. Could he tell the House why the Human Rights Act was not expanded to take into account the protection of these laws? At no time from 1998 to the time when the Labour Government lost power was there any attempt to include these rights that he now says are a central part of our law.

[Lord Goldsmith]

They were, because the charter provided for them. The Human Rights Act incorporated one set of provisions only, the European Convention on Human Rights, which goes back to just after the Second World War and which provides the classic political and civil rights. The other rights that we find in the charter, which is a much longer document and refers to socioeconomic rights, were not included in the Human Rights Act because they were not included in the European Convention on Human Rights.

The right-by-right analysis demonstrates which of these rights are not included. Given that the Government’s objective, as stated by the Prime Minister, is to ensure that the protections for people in this country are the same the day after exit as the day before, I respectfully suggest that it is not for me to identify why that is not right; it is for the Government to demonstrate why it is. When we have substantial independent bodies such as the Bingham Centre and independent opinions from QCs demonstrating that actually it is not the case that the protections remain the same, the Government need to explain. I shall come on to that further.

Obviously there are examples of rights in the charter that reflect precisely other rights that we have within our law. In particular, there are a number of rights in the charter that are explicitly based on the European Convention on Human Rights; they are the same. Indeed, during the negotiations I went to some pains to try to ensure that they were phrased in the same way so as to prevent lawyers from saying, “It’s written differently so it must mean something different”. However, those are not the only rights that are there. As I noted at Second Reading, the charter is based not just on the European Convention on Human Rights but on principles of EU law and on principles that are commonly accepted by the member states, and those are in a different position from the ECHR rights.

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[Lord Faulks]

Is the noble and learned Lord telling the House that these principles are going to be actionable on their own?

[Lord Goldsmith]

The noble Lord knows that that is not the position in relation to the principles: they are guidance and aspirational. I am not spending a lot of time on them, although some of the NGOs have. I will give one example. There was a case in which the EU’s proposed legislation in relation to plain packaging of tobacco products was challenged in the courts on the grounds that it contravened freedom of expression. One of the things that the court looking at that noted was that the charter provided for a high degree of public protection in terms of health. I hope that all noble Lords agree with that sentiment, whether or not they agree with the result of the case. That is an example of where the principles come into effect.

British Bill of Rights

Debate between Lord Faulks and Lord Goldsmith

Thursday 10th December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, the legislation passed by the Russian Duma does not actually mean that Russia is leaving the ECHR. It was a response to a decision of the ECHR about the unfettered right to tap phone calls and Article 8. This Government remain absolutely committed to the protection of human rights, both here and abroad, on this international Human Rights Day. We are party to no fewer than, I think, seven explicit treaties protecting human rights, as well as many others which bear on them. We will remain within the convention and the obligations under Article 46. Any future plans will involve the protection of all those rights contained within the convention.

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, does that mean that the Government accept the proposition put by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that they will not try to rule out the obligation of this country to comply with decisions of the European Court of Human Rights? Does the Minister agree that, given the proud history that this country has had leading other countries in Europe, if we were to take a different view it could mean the dismantling of the fairer and more just Europe which we in this country, including his party, have tried to maintain and to build?

[Lord Faulks]

As the noble and learned Lord knows, Article 46 requires all members of the Council of Europe to adhere to the convention, and the implementation of decisions is subject to the supervision of the Committee of Ministers. We have an extremely good record in complying with recommendations of the Committee of Ministers. There is one outstanding matter, of which the House is well aware, where there is a tension between a decision clearly made by Parliament and a decision made by the Committee of Ministers. My ministerial colleague attended the day before yesterday; we have yet to hear the outcome.

Human Rights: UK Application

Debate between Lord Faulks and Lord Goldsmith

Wednesday 18th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith]

It is good to hear from the noble Lord the commitments to human rights and also, particularly, what he said in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Lexden. There is a more basic problem, as the noble Lord will know, even more so than that of same-sex marriages, which is the criminalisation of homosexuality in certain parts of the world. What can the Minister say about the British Government’s persuasion of other countries, particularly Commonwealth countries, to get rid of the criminalisation of homosexuality and treat people decently in that respect?

[Lord Faulks]

The Government maintain their firm resolve to do all they can to protect human rights, both here and abroad. It is a tradition which precedes this Government; it was part of the coalition Government’s policies and, indeed, those of the previous Labour Government. Nothing about any changes we might wish to make to the domestic arrangements has in any way diminished our enthusiasm or determination in that area.

Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill

Debate between Lord Faulks and Lord Goldsmith

Monday 15th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

The Bill is described in its preamble as being to make,

“provision as to matters to which a court must have regard in determining a claim in negligence or breach of statutory duty”.

I do not see any reference to breach of contract there. But the noble Lord is right in the sense that Clause 3 refers to,

“a generally responsible approach towards protecting the safety or other interests of others”.

That would open the door to the possibility of other interests being considered. Having regard to the general structure of the Bill, I would not wish to add anything to what was said in the House of Commons. I imagine that it is going to be focused primarily on conventional personal injury cases.

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am sorry, but I wonder how the noble Lord can make that observation. If a claim comes before the courts, where there is an allegation of breach of statutory duty or negligence, which as he would readily concede could be negligence arising from a contract, how is that clause to be avoided? For example, the accountant says, looking at the wording of Clause 3, “The activity that I carry out is doing people’s tax returns and advising them on that; I have done it for the last 10 years and I am now going to tell the court about my record”. How do the words in the clause prevent that from being done?

[Lord Faulks]

Let me deal with the hypothetically negligent accountant. As I said in answer to previous questions, the Bill is concerned with the activity in question, so it would be the particular tax return or the particular piece of advice, because that is what the Bill says.

[Lord Goldsmith]

It would not be this tax return, surely, but the activity of advising on tax returns generally.

[Lord Faulks]

I respectfully disagree with that interpretation because it is concerned with the activity in question,

“in the course of which the alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty occurred”.

It would not, therefore, deal with the 99 years of accurate tax returns but would focus on the particular tax return that is the subject of the claim in negligence. That is the correct interpretation of the particular clause.

I will answer the question that I hear from a sedentary position: how do we deal with the question of “generally”? My answer to that is that the “generally responsible” approach is directed at the activity in question. It is difficult to see, frankly, that it would have much of an application on the hypothetically negligent accountant—

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Faulks and Lord Goldsmith

Wednesday 30th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

The answer, I think, to the noble and learned Lord’s question is that Clause 65(1)(b) states that the information will be specified in the rules of court. The anxieties expressed in the Committee and by those who have provided briefings and written articles are clearly matters that will be taken into consideration, and we do not want to stifle proper judicial reviews or make people feel anxious about small contributions. These matters will be taken into account. However, for the reasons that have also been outlined in argument, we cannot specify in this statute every single, precise situation.

I hope that I have gone some way to reassure those who have sought—

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I was taken by a remark he made a few moments ago. I was listening attentively to everything that he and noble Lords have said. He seemed to suggest that these changes were here simply because the senior judiciary had asked for them. Is that what he was saying, because I am surprised if that is the position?

[Lord Faulks]

No, I do not think that the noble and learned Lord was here at the beginning of the debate, but I have not, in fact, suggested that the provisions were there only for that reason. I see the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, is nodding. I said that they are there because the Government think that they should be included. However, I did say that the senior judiciary welcomed a degree of transparency. I am not suggesting that that they also endorsed the precise form of the statute, if that helps the Committee or the noble and learned Lord.