Justice: Cautions

Debate between Lord Faulks and Baroness Hamwee

Tuesday 11th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, there is a range of available options. For example, there is a youth conditional caution, where a caution can have conditions attached. These conditions must be rehabilitative, reparative and punitive; punitive conditions can include unpaid work and a financial penalty. However, the most widely used community sentence for those under 18 is a referral order which has a clear basis in restorative justice. A youth rehabilitation order, which can include as many as 18 different requirements, is also an alternative to custody.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that what is important, as well as the aspects he has shared with the House, it that there should be consistency across police forces in the use of cautions?

[Lord Faulks]

I do agree with my noble friend. The Ministry of Justice has hitherto given administrative guidance but, in order to provide transparency and clarity for both the police and public, we are legislating. Clause 14 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill sets out restrictions on the use of cautions and makes quite clear the circumstances in which cautions are appropriate, to encourage the very consistency to which the noble Baroness refers.

Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Faulks and Baroness Hamwee

Monday 3rd February 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions to our short debate on this and for the thorough contributions to the Bill Committee which discussed these important, although relatively obscure to some, provisions.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, referred to the fact that Professor Cooke had not specifically considered the question of the 15% trigger. I can assure him, and the House, that she has now considered it and approves the amendment, which has her blessing as well as that of the Government. The Government think the 15% trigger is high enough to ensure that the level of the statutory legacy is adjusted only where there has been enough of a rise in inflation to warrant it. I, too, remember the days referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

In answer to the question raised by the noble Baroness about the word “available” in new paragraph 3A of the amendment, this refers to the Statistics Board publication of the consumer prices index for a particular month. The index is published on the website of the Office for National Statistics. The monthly publication dates are published a year in advance.

I turn to the query of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. Clause 1 refers to the interest payable on an unpaid statutory legacy. New Schedule 1A refers to the level of the statutory legacy overall. I understand that the different rates apply in different circumstances and are compatible. We will take cognisance of this matter and refer it back at Third Reading if there is any residual doubt on it.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, before the Minister finishes, I will test the patience of the House and say that I understand his common-sense answer, which was what I expected. However, I am not completely convinced that the Bill, incorporating this amendment, actually says that. I will leave that with him, as it is not very sensible for the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, to go to and from the Box to answer a rather technical question. However, we are all such pedants in this Chamber that I know we all want it to be correct.

[Lord Beecham]

I follow the noble Baroness to take a little further our discussion on the impact of Clause 1 and the amendments. If I understand the noble Lord correctly, there are two situations. One will be governed by one rate of interest, as specified in Clause 1, and the other will be covered by these amendments. This raises a further question of why there should not be consistency, in terms of the interest to be calculated, in respect of what appear to be two separate situations. If they are not separate situations, there is a degree of confusion; if they are separate, there needs to be a rationale for having two different rates of interests. I invite the noble Lord to consider that before Third Reading. It may or may not need tidying up. On the face of it, there seems to be something slightly awry with the position we will be in when the amendment is passed.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Faulks and Baroness Hamwee

Monday 18th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

Or even “nuisance or annoyance”?

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords and noble and learned Lords who have taken part in this debate. I am grateful to the Minister for his reassuring noises; he has shown himself, as usual, to be a listening Minister. The expression “nuisance or annoyance” has a pedigree, as I think he said, in the housing context. It is almost a term of art, so widely has it been used over the years in the context of breach of covenant in common law, and it has found its way into statute.

Of course, a particular housing situation is not precisely analogous to anti-social behaviour. Nonetheless, there is a substantial accumulation of case law that the judges will understand and, I suggest, they will interpret it accordingly. I repeat what I said earlier: it seems that in any event the reasonableness is part of the judge’s task in deciding whether or not it is just and convenient to grant an injunction. Reasonableness will be the watchword, as will the obligations that the court has under the Human Rights Act.

Where I suggest it is important to import reasonableness, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said, is at the stage of defining with some degree of objectivity the nuisance and annoyance so that neither the agencies nor the court are in any way diverted by simply having to accept a subjective interpretation of what counts as anti-social behaviour. I hope that the Minister will reflect on that. I appreciate that this does not in any way weaken the power, but it should reassure those who are naturally concerned about the potential for this power to be used oppressively, and that reassurance would be at least provided, I hope, by an appropriate amendment. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Faulks and Baroness Hamwee

Tuesday 12th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I was quite right to wait for others to table the amendment before adding my name, so that they could all go first with the arguments. I tried to canter through them at Second Reading in considerable haste and will try to be quick now. I accept that the new clause is to do with compensation, not the criminal law, otherwise every overturned conviction would lead to a right to compensation and Section 133 makes it clear that that is not the case. However, what has been troubling me is that if you do not have to prove innocence at the original trial and then the matter turns on a new or a newly discovered fact, surely you would not have had to prove that. If the fact had been available at the time of the trial, this would not have changed whether you would have to have proved your innocence, which you did not have to do. I do not see that bringing in a new fact should change that at all. I do not see why that is necessary now.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, has said that this is about who should be entitled to compensation. The Government say that it is about clarity. They do not argue in any effective way that the amounts involved are such as to require a change in the law in order to save the taxpayer. The impact assessment on this clause says:

“The intended effect is to lessen the burden on taxpayers and reduce unnecessary and expensive legal challenges to Government decisions to refuse compensation”.

Those are two quite separate points. The lessening of the burden on taxpayers is very small, but legal challenges to government decisions are another matter. That goes to clarity and it seems to me—I am not nearly as well qualified as everyone else who has spoken—that the chain of cases we have has produced the clarity. The impact assessment says that we need the provisions to be unambiguous and decisions on eligibility to be more transparent. I should have thought that the cases have taken us to that point.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I fear that I do not share the view just expressed by my noble friend Lady Hamwee that the law is clear at the moment. The number of decisions, one following another, with disagreements between judges in the same tribunal indicates the difficulty of the question and, I conclude, the lack of clarity in the test that should be applied. One of the reasons for this provision is in order to provide clarity. That, I believe, it does. The second question is whether it is appropriate and whether it offends the presumption of innocence. I am part of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and originally I took the view that it did offend the presumption of innocence. I have changed my mind, having thought about it. Although I was not often able to persuade the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, of anything, he has contributed to persuading me, on the other hand, of the merits of the arguments he advanced, both at Second Reading and today.

I have also had the opportunity of reading the cases of Allen v the United Kingdom and KF v the United Kingdom and I agree with the noble and learned Lord that they do not in any way require the retention of the law in its current state, or that they offend the presumption of innocence—provided, it seems, that some judge, in declining to award compensation, does not make any comment to the effect that there is any doubt about someone’s innocence.

I also respectfully disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, that the point of these applications for compensation is to hold the state to account. The point of the applications is to obtain compensation, and the difficult question is that of who is entitled to it. It is not an easy question, but in my submission the Government have come to the correct answer. Sadly, a few people who are genuinely innocent will not obtain compensation, which in my view, for the reasons given, is an unsatisfactory element. However, it does not involve people being deprived of their liberty; it is simply a question of compensation.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Debate between Lord Faulks and Baroness Hamwee

Tuesday 15th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Newton of Braintree, warned the Minister that those directly behind him were not unanimously supportive of the Government’s position. I have previously warned the Minister that those at a bit of an angle to him are, similarly, not wholly with him.

I wish I had used the example given by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, when I recently brought some young cousins into the Chamber and attempted to explain the separation of powers. That is exactly what this is about. Recently the Government have sometimes responded to judgments of the courts as though the courts sought to usurp policy-making powers. They are not the first Government to do so. That very response demonstrates the importance of the role of the courts, and the need to demonstrate our integrity as a country for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Condon, has just explained.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I have enormous respect for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, for his experience and the consistency of his approach to this issue. I also acknowledge how delicate the situation is, how important the liberty of the individual is and that any powers of this nature ought to be hedged by a great many safeguards. However, a decision of this nature is one that falls to the Home Secretary to take. So far, the judges who have these powers have exercised the right to scrutinise thoroughly in a way that we cannot feel is short of what might be desired. I respectfully submit that it is a power that should belong to the Home Secretary, who makes these decisions, no doubt with great anxiety and the consciousness that any decision that she makes will be looked at very carefully.

A judge will have an opportunity to look at a particular case on an ad hoc basis. However, we should not underestimate the strategic role of the Home Secretary to see an act or potential act of terrorism, or a terrorist, in the wider scope. Notwithstanding all the powerful speeches that have been made, I respectfully submit that this is a question that belongs to the Home Secretary and her alone.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, consistency has become something and since I opposed this amendment on the last occasion I intend to be consistent in opposing it on this occasion.

Of course, the arguments are extremely beguiling in favour of an annual review. Any provision which threatens the liberty of the subject demands anxious consideration at every level. But there is a difference between what happened in 2005 and what we are confronted with today. I am sure that those who brought in those provisions—those exceptional and extraordinary measures—hoped that they would not be necessary for more than a short period. Unfortunately, that has not proved to be the case. This Bill is the result of a careful and thorough review of counterterrorism and of mature reflection by a number of people that, sadly, powers of this nature need to remain. There have been important modifications to these powers, including the higher threshold for the Secretary of State before deciding that there should be such provisions and the removal of the relocation measures. There has been a degree of sensitivity over how potentially extreme the provisions are, but the legislation has been the result of a mature consideration and has been scrutinised in a thoroughly orthodox way through both Houses of Parliament. It has not been the result of an accelerated procedure.

I respectfully suggest, although entirely appreciating the arguments that such provisions need regular review, this has had a thoroughgoing review. It can be reviewed again after the end of this Parliament, and I respectfully ask the House to consider rejecting the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, expressed a certain weariness when he spoke on this issue in Committee. I do not think that he used the words “ritualistic” or “formulaic” but that may have been what he had in mind when he referred to the way some of the control order debates seemed to be going. I share that concern, but it leads me to say that we should make sure that renewal of this provision is not ritualistic or formulaic. We should take care to avoid that. However, it is not an argument for saying that we should not undertake that renewal.

We will, I am sure, be told by the Minister that we can debate the issue at any time that any of us succeeds in putting down a debate, and that the Government could repeal TPIMs at any time. Neither of those claims is an answer to the points that have been made. I urge the Government, if they lose the Division that is about to come, to turn it into a virtue and explain annually why it is that any renewal is required. The term “trust” was used quite a lot at an earlier stage in this Bill. Trust does need to be renewed, as well as everything else, to take both your Lordships’ and the country with them. The Government should regard this as an opportunity, not something that should be pictured in any way as a defeat.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Debate between Lord Faulks and Baroness Hamwee

Wednesday 19th October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

What I endeavoured to say was that the balance of probabilities would be appropriate were the courts to be taking that initial decision in place of the Secretary of State, which I understand to be the burden of the amendment put forward by the noble and learned Lord, whereas I understand that the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is that the initial stage and the decision to be taken by the Secretary of State should be on the balance of probabilities, and there I suggest that the current test is more suitable.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Does the noble Lord have any comments on the provisions in Clause 26, which provide for the Secretary of State to take a decision based on the balance of probabilities in the position where the more stringent measures might be applied?

[Lord Faulks]

I have no immediate answer to that, but at this juncture I would suggest that the initial decision-making process is far better on that basis because that is the most important stage: whether or not you decide that it is appropriate to impose, or seek to impose, a TPIM—with the approval of the court, it must be said.