Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly from the Back Benches. I agree very much with the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and my noble friend Lord Ponsonby. I was a magistrate many years ago. I do not sit any more, but when I lived in the Midlands I used to sit on the Coventry Bench. Again, like my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, there were times when people came in front of me who had absolutely nothing. In particular, I used to sit in the fines court, to which people were brought back because they had not paid their fines. When you looked at their circumstances, the only way they could pay those fines was to go out and commit more crime; it was impossible otherwise. Now we have an additional charge here. It is important that we take into account people’s circumstances: not to allow the court to have that discretion is a bad move. To have loads of fines when there is no possibility of their ever being paid back is a complete waste of time. It makes a mockery of justice, and we should not do it.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

My Lords, the criminal courts charge scheme has been designed to be clear and transparent, with charge levels that reflect the costs reasonably attributable to a particular type of case, and offenders expected to pay at a rate they can afford. The changes proposed by these amendments make the scheme far more difficult to understand and apply.

Amendments 63AA, 63AD, 63AG, 63AJ to 63AL and 63ABA would provide the court with significant discretion over whether to impose the criminal courts charge. As the court is the main beneficiary of the charge, there is a risk that this would be perceived as providing the ability directly to influence the funding of the criminal courts. The judiciary is an integral part of the courts system, and it has a vested interest in its success. Furthermore, where there is no clear indication as to what the court should base its decision on, other than the broad definition of the imposition being “just and reasonable”, accepting these amendments risks offenders being treated unequally.

If what lies behind these amendments is to protect poorer offenders, this is unnecessary. The offender has the opportunity to provide means information that the court can take into account when setting the rate of repayment for the charge, as it does with court-ordered financial impositions. Offenders can manage their repayments so that they pay the charge at a rate they can afford. For instance, they can apply to pay by instalment, and if necessary request subsequently to vary the rate of repayment. Also, those offenders who make their best efforts to comply with payment terms and do not reoffend will be able to apply to have the charge cancelled after a specified period of time.

Amendment 63AB proposes to limit the charge imposed to no more than 50% of the total cost they have imposed on the courts.

Amendment 63AM enables the court to impose a charge up to the amount specified by the Lord Chancellor. If an offender has committed a crime and imposed a cost on our criminal justice system, the Government believe it is right that they should be liable to pay back up to the full amount of costs reasonably attributable to that particular class of case. I have already outlined the protections in place to avoid placing an offender in hardship as a result of the charge.

Amendments 63AC and 63AF seek to limit the circumstances in which the criminal courts charge would be imposed. Specifying that an order imposing the courts charge should not be made if doing so would, in the opinion of the court, affect a decision on plea is unnecessary. I can assure noble Lords that the courts charge will come into play only once a verdict has been reached—long after the defendant makes a decision about plea.

Amendment 63AF also provides that the courts charge must not be imposed where the enforcement costs are likely to amount to more than the value of the charge. The charge will be enforced in the same way as existing financial impositions, so it is unlikely that the costs would exceed the level of the charge. Furthermore, it would not be possible for the court to anticipate how much enforcement activity will be required in a particular case.

We believe that excluding from the charge any costs associated with part of the hearing for which the defendant was not responsible would be unworkable. Charge levels will be set up to the cost reasonably attributable to that type of case, not based on a costs calculation of each individual case. Attempting to cost each individual case and then determine whether or not the offender was responsible for each element would be extremely time-consuming and totally impracticable.

Amendment 63AF also seeks to prevent the courts charge being imposed in relation to any appeal. The principle behind our courts charging policy is that offenders should bear some of the costs that have been incurred by the criminal courts as a result of their actions. It is appropriate to charge offenders a contribution towards the cost of an unsuccessful appeal. Finally, the amendment inserts a condition that the courts charge cannot be imposed before a written means assessment has been carried out. Amendment 63AE also prevents it from being collected before an assessment of the defendant’s finances has been made. The criminal courts already impose a number of financial impositions and established systems are in place to ensure that the court is provided with an offender’s means information. For these reasons Amendments 63AF and 63AE are unnecessary.

Amendment 63AFA would allow the court to consider the court charge imposed when sentencing or dealing with breach of a community order, community requirement, suspended sentence order or supervision requirement. The scheme is designed so that the charge reflects the cost an offender imposes on the courts system. It is not a punishment that relates to the severity of the offence committed. It should not therefore be taken into account when deciding on the appropriate sentence.

Amendment 63AH would divide the payment of criminal court costs between defendants where two or more defendants are convicted during a single hearing. The Bill currently makes each offender liable to pay the criminal courts charge as prescribed in secondary legislation. We expect that each offender will pay the full amount, although the power will exist to charge multiple defendants less when they are convicted at the same time as others. The amendment creates unnecessary complexity and is likely to result in one offender, who has been tried with one or more co-defendants, paying less then an offender who has been tried on their own, despite the fact that they may have committed identical offences. This raises questions of fairness. Our approach is the fairest approach and should be both simpler to operate and simpler for offenders and the public to understand.

Amendments 63B, 63C, 63D and 63E seek to withdraw the conditions that must be met for the courts charge to be remitted and give the courts a wide discretion about doing so. As previously mentioned, the clause currently allows a court to remit the charge where the offender has taken all reasonable steps to pay and does not reoffend. This provides a powerful incentive for offenders to repay the charge and refrain from reoffending, while also ensuring that those who meet these conditions are not necessarily required to make payments over an excessively long period.

Amendment 63AN specifies that, where the charge can be remitted, it includes the remission of interest. The purpose of the provisions to remit the charge is to relieve the offender of the debt where they have paid accordingly and not reoffended. It is therefore logical that any remission of the charge should include the whole debt—both the principal amount and the interest. The amendment is therefore unnecessary.

Amendment 63EA has the effect that offenders aged 18 to 21 who are sentenced to detention or imprisonment would be eligible to have their charge remitted earlier. The current proposal is that a court may remit the charge after a specified period that begins either when an offender is convicted or, if they have received a custodial sentence, released from detention or imprisonment. In practice it is unrealistic to expect many offenders to pay the charge while they are being detained. By setting the period after which the charge may be remitted to run from conviction rather than release for 18 to 21 year-olds, the amendment would mean that more serious offenders are likely to end up paying less than offenders who are not sentenced to custody. That would not be fair.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

I have a point that is slightly tangential to the group of amendments we have just been debating. When magistrates are fining somebody, for a huge proportion of the time they do not know the existing level of outstanding fines; so they are fining somebody when they do not know what debts to fines they already have. I understand that this is a practical problem and a difficult issue that the court service is reluctant to address. Surely, however, if one is serious about reducing the level of outstanding fines, one should try to address it so that when a court sets fines it knows the level of the outstanding fines when it puts in place the sentence.

[Lord Faulks]

It is certainly the case that the court should know, as far as possible, the level of outstanding fines. I understand the practical difficulties that can be encountered by courts but, with great respect to the noble Lord, we are concerned here with a definite, fixed cost in relation to the particular nature of the offence, which will not depend on fines outstanding. That is not a question—reasonable though it is—that arises on consideration of these amendments.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I am struck by the direct relationship between the speed with which the Minister is racing through his brief and the embarrassment he no doubt feels at the material he is giving to the Committee. I cannot believe that the good and noble Lord is really convinced of the case he has been asked to put. That would not surprise me, because much of what we have heard is simply beyond credence. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, in a very powerful speech, made the essential point that—among other things—the court should have discretion on the amount. None of us is any the wiser about what kind of sums we are talking about. The Minister certainly has given no examples, except to say that it will be related somehow to the cost of the individual case. How is that to be calculated? On what basis will that be apportioned? Are we just talking about the cost of prosecution? That can be covered anyway, under the existing framework. Are we talking about a contribution to the cost of maintaining the court building or the cost of the judicial salaries in a higher court? There is no indication of how this cost is to be calculated and then passed on.

Equally, although the noble Lord rightly pointed out the provision in the Bill that the Lord Chancellor will prescribe the class of case to which the charge will apply, he has given no indication tonight—and I do not think that it was done in the other place either—of what kind of cases are envisaged. Why do we not know which cases are likely to be included? What will be the process, if any, for parliamentary approval of the classes as prescribed by the Lord Chancellor? Will Parliament be permitted any consideration in this, or will it simply be a matter of the Lord Chancellor’s fiat?

The Minister’s suggestion that it would be improper for the court to determine the amount because that would somehow reflect a vested interest on its part is simply risible. It is an absurd suggestion. The notion that magistrates or High Court judges will be influenced to make rather larger requirements of prisoners because that will somehow affect them, or the court system, is an insult to both the judiciary and the magistracy. It cannot be something that the noble Lord seriously believes. His scriptwriters need to go back to wherever they were taught their craft.

In addition, and worryingly, the Minister suggested that there is no deterrent effect because the charge will be imposed only long after a plea was entered. That is absurd. The fact that the court is in a position to impose a charge is known to the defendant before he appears there; it certainly ought to be. Of course, it may influence a defendant as to the nature of a plea, particularly in the case of an appeal.

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Moved by

[Lord Faulks]

63F: Schedule 8, page 106, line 18, at end insert—
“Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (c. 29)10A In section 13(3)(a) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (effect of order on court’s other powers), after “other than” insert “an order under section 21A of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (criminal courts charge) or”.”

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[Lord Faulks]

Is the noble Lord suggesting that in order to bring in a provision saying that one cannot recover damages if one is fundamentally dishonest, that is simply serving the interests of the insurance industry?

[Lord Beecham]

Of course it is not simply serving the interests of the insurance industry, but it is serving its interests and there is no reason why the insurance industry should not lobby to that effect. But let us not be unrealistic. I repeat that it is perfectly proper for the noble Lord to make his case, and I have no criticism of him whatever. My criticism is of the Government. In any event, there are a number of questions about the situation, as created by the Bill.

First, why single out personal injury claims? There are many damages claims to which such a provision might apply. There are claims, for example, of breach of contract over the supply of goods or services, damages to property or professional negligence. Indeed, paradoxically or ironically, the driver of a car might be caught by this provision in respect of a personal injury claim arising out of an accident but not if he claims only for damages to the vehicle. Where is the logic in that? In fairness to the noble Lord, he quoted an example of a potential for a claim other than a personal injury claim. But that is not what the Bill says; it concentrates purely on the aspect of personal injuries.

The second question is why, particularly given the drastic consequences, should the balance of probabilities test apply only to something that after all amounts to fraud, and is capable, as pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, of being prosecuted? In that event, it should be prosecuted if it is committed, but a different standard of proof would apply to the treatment of the conduct, deplorable as it is, in a civil claim as opposed to a criminal claim. As we have also heard, claimants, in addition to the possibility of prosecution, which would be amply justified, could face contempt of court proceedings in which again the applicant for the contempt case must prove fraud beyond reasonable doubt. I do not think that different standards of proof should apply to the same conduct in this context.

The third question is on why the entire claim should be struck out instead of judicial discretion being exercised to reduce damages or penalise the claimant in costs. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, has dealt very effectively with an example in which that situation might occur. The fourth question is whether the Government have considered the impact on third parties, notably the National Health Service, which in personal injury claims can recover treatment costs from the person causing the injury. Again, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, was ahead of me, not for the first time, and was quite right to say that if the defendant escapes scot-free because of some misconduct on the part of the claimant in relation to part of his claim, it is the health service—and the taxpayer generally—that will suffer.

The fifth question is: what is meant by fundamental dishonesty? The CPR, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, pointed out, coined the phrase in relation to qualified one-way cost shifting when a party loses the protection of QOCS if he has been found to have behaved in this way. However, as far as I am aware, there has been only one unreported case. It may be the case to which the noble Lord referred; it rings a bell. I think it was the case of Cotton. That is the only one that has so far come to light since the provision came in. I assume that the Minister will confirm that the Bill’s provisions have the same meaning, as far as that is ascertainable, as the Civil Procedure Rules.

The sixth question is: yet again, why are the Government seeking to fetter judicial discretion? This is one of the most fundamental points. In Fairclough Homes Ltd v Summers in 2012, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Clarke, said:

“It is for the court, not parliament to protect the court’s process. The power to strike out is not a power to punish but to protect the court’s process”

The Supreme Court said that its already existing power to strike out,

“should be exercised where it is just and proportionate to do so which is likely to be only in very exceptional circumstances”.

The court referred to other ways of punishing fraudulent claimants in costs, criminal or contempt proceedings.

Let me be clear: the Opposition are not in favour of tolerating, let alone encouraging, fraudulent claims whether or not the fundamental dishonesty applies to the whole claim or any part of it. To that extent, all of us who have spoken tonight—the noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Marks, myself and no doubt the Minister are absolutely agreed. But the Opposition are content to allow the courts to deal with any abuse, both in determining the issues of damages and costs and in pursuing criminal proceedings when they are appropriate, and would regard that as applicable to all kinds of claims, not just personal injury claims. That would be illogical, in my submission. The Minister may wish to take that back as a matter to consider. I do not see why personal injury claims should be singled out for this particular treatment.

There is certainly a need to deal with people who abuse the system, but in my submission what is proposed here goes too far and leaves too little discretion to the courts, which are really capable of dealing with it. I beg to move.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions of all noble Lords to this useful discussion of Clause 45. Until the conclusion of the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, I was beginning to wonder whether he thought that there should be any problem with people grossly exaggerating or being fundamentally dishonest in pursuing their personal injury claims. However, by the end I realised that the party opposite is not in favour of that, although he asked why we singled out personal injury claims.

The answer to the noble Lord’s question was provided very elegantly by my noble friend Lord Hunt. There has been—and the Government seek to address this by this clause—an epidemic of people claiming in circumstances that most right-thinking people would find deeply unattractive. The Supreme Court recently in the case of Fairclough had to deal with this particular issue, which the Government seek to address in Clause 45. So it is a particular problem that is troubling most people in society generally, with the so-called compensation culture, but also with a specific problem that has come before the courts. We suggest that it is entirely appropriate for the Government to endeavour to address this difficult problem; indeed, the Supreme Court found it difficult to find a satisfactory answer.

I am grateful for some of the constructive suggestions that have been made about how the clause ought best to have been drafted. At the moment, it requires the court to dismiss in its entirety any personal injury claim when it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the claimant has been fundamentally dishonest, unless it would cause substantial injustice to the claimant to do so. That is of particular relevance when the claimant has grossly exaggerated his claim, and in cases where the claimant has colluded with another person in a fraudulent claim relating to the same incident—also, sadly, a far too common feature of the whole claims industry at the moment.

This is part of a series of measures taken by the Government to discourage fraudulent and exaggerated claims, which arise often in motor accident cases and so-called “trips and slips” claims. Such claims cause substantial harm to society as a whole, not least in increasing the insurance premiums that motorists have to pay. I notice that the noble Lord criticised the Government; I think that the inference was that they were in some way in league with the insurance industry. We are talking here about insurance premiums paid by members of the public. These cases also eat up valuable resources of local and public authorities and employers, which could otherwise be used for the benefit of business and in providing services to the public.

Under the current law, the courts have discretion to dismiss a claim in cases of dishonesty, but will do so only in very exceptional circumstances, and will generally still award the claimant compensation in relation to the “genuine” element of the claim. The Government simply do not believe that people who behave in a fundamentally dishonest way—and I will come to address the adverb in a moment—by grossly exaggerating their own claim or colluding should be allowed to benefit by getting compensation in spite of their deceit. Clause 45 seeks to strengthen the law so that dismissal of the entire claim should become the norm in such cases. However, at the same time, it recognises that the dismissal of the claim will not always be appropriate and gives the court the discretion not to do so where it would cause substantial injustice to the claimant. To that extent, some of the remarks of my noble friend Lord Marks were entirely apposite. The clause gives the court some flexibility to ensure that the provision is applied fairly and proportionately.

The amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Marks and others would considerably weaken the effect of the clause by simply giving the court a wide discretion were it satisfied that the claimant had been fundamentally dishonest, which would enable it to either dismiss the claim, reduce the amount of damages or to do neither. That would make it much less likely that those provisions would be used, even in cases where the claimant has clearly been fundamentally dishonest. I do not believe that that would be appropriate. We do not believe that people who behave in a fundamentally dishonest way should be able to benefit by getting compensation regardless.

I assure the Committee that the way that the clause is drafted should not result in the courts using the measures lightly. Civil courts do not make findings of dishonesty lightly in any event; clear evidence is required. The sanction imposed by the clause—the denial of compensation to which the claimant would otherwise be entitled—is a serious one and will be imposed only where the dishonesty is fundamental; that is, where it goes to the heart of the claim. That was very much what my noble friend said about what it was aimed at.

Of course, “fundamental” has an echo in the Civil Procedure Rules and the qualified, one-way costs shifting. An adverb to qualify a concept such as dishonesty is not linguistically attractive, but if we ask a jury to decide a question such as dishonesty, or ask a judge to decide whether someone has been fundamentally dishonest, it is well within the capacity of any judge. They will know exactly what the clause is aimed at—not the minor inaccuracy about bus fares or the like, but something that goes to the heart. I do not suggest that it wins many prizes for elegance, but it sends the right message to the judge.

The amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Hunt, who has enormous experience in this area, reflect the fact that in his view, any degree of dishonesty, unless the court is satisfied that dismissal would cause substantial injustice to the claimant, would be sufficient. It is a difficult balancing act, but we do not believe that that would be proportionate or practical. The sanction imposed by the clause is a serious one—denial of compensation to which prima facie somebody is entitled—and we believe that it should be imposed only where it goes to the heart of a claim. It would be disproportionate to require a claim to be dismissed in its entirety. It would also not be practical as it would be likely to lead to a large number of disputes between the parties over whether the claimant had or had not dishonestly exaggerated the claim. There is potential for it to impede settlements, leading to an increase in contested litigation.

My noble friend is quite right; the Government hope it will act significantly to deter people from bringing claims or exaggerating in any way at all. The fact that there may not be many reported cases about fundamental dishonesty and the QOCS scenario may be an indication that the concept does not engender great difficulties for judges applying it in practice, and therefore, there is no need for reported cases.

It should not be forgotten that the courts still have powers available—for example, the awards of costs to penalise claimants whose behaviour falls short of financial dishonesty—if it considers the sanction is merited. We consider that the courts will be able to apply the test. In addition, supplementary provisions are included to ensure that the sanctions imposed on the claimant are proportionate. Subsections (6) and (7) ensure that in the event of subsequent proceedings against the claimant for contempt or criminal prosecution, the court has a full picture of the consequences of the dishonest conduct for the claimant when deciding what punishment to impose.

Subsection (5) ensures that when a court dismisses a claim under this clause, it can award costs against the claimant only to the extent that these exceed the damages that would otherwise have been awarded. I thought that I understood what that meant, but I hear what my noble friend says about it, and what my noble friend Lord Marks says about it, and if it is not as clear as it might be I will take that back to consider the drafting before Report. The intention is to limit the extent. We think that that is what it says, but I will definitely take that back and consider it.

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[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I have clearly upset the noble Lord. It certainly was not my intention to do so. We have a very long association, going back to the time when we were involved in the inner city partnership in Newcastle. We have always got on very well. I intended no imputation whatever upon the noble Lord. I do think that the insurance industry, as an industry, has been overpersuasive with the present Administration, in particular with the Conservative Party.

However, that is no reflection on the noble Lord. I made it clear that he has behaved with complete propriety, as he always has. I am sorry if I have upset him; I can say no more than that. I apologise if that has been the effect—it was certainly not intended. I look forward to engaging in civilised conflict with him from time to time over this and other measures in the spirit that we have enjoyed hitherto. I certainly would not like him to leave the Chamber tonight feeling that I have cast any slur or imputation upon him. He is widely recognised as extremely able and a man who has devoted a great part of his life to public service. I would not wish in any way to detract from his record or his sincerity.

[Lord Faulks]

I want to ask the noble Lord about that comment. He redirected his fire at the Government and said they had been improperly influenced by the insurance industry. Perhaps he can assist the Committee as to the basis of that allegation and how it is relevant to the amendment that the Committee has before it tonight.

[Lord Beecham]

I was trying to say that the Government have frequently changed the law in relation to claims, not just with regard to tonight’s amendment but on a range of issues in a way that adversely affects claimants and generally favours insurers. Whenever the Labour Party makes a proposition that affects working people and trade unions, it is accused of being in the pockets of trade union leaders, dancing to Len McCluskey’s tune. If that is a legitimate comment for the Conservative Party to make about the Labour Party, it is quite legitimate for us to point to some of those industries—not just the insurance industry; there are others—that seem to be willing to fund the Conservative Party, whether or not that involve tennis matches with the Prime Minister.

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Moved by

[Lord Faulks]

64: After Clause 45, insert the following new Clause—
“Rules against inducements to make personal injury claims
(1) A regulated person is in breach of this section if—
(a) the regulated person offers another person a benefit,(b) the offer of the benefit is an inducement to make a claim in civil proceedings for—(i) damages for personal injury or death, or(ii) damages arising out of circumstances involving personal injury or death, and(c) the benefit is not related to the provision of legal services in connection with the claim.(2) An offer of a benefit by a regulated person to another person is an inducement to make a claim if the offer of the benefit—
(a) is intended to encourage the person to make a claim or to seek advice from a regulated person with a view to making a claim, or (b) is likely to have the effect of encouraging the person to do so.(3) A benefit offered by a regulated person may be an inducement to make a claim regardless of—
(a) when or by what means the offer is made,(b) whether the receipt of the benefit pursuant to the offer is subject to conditions,(c) when the benefit may be received pursuant to the offer, or(d) whether the benefit may be received by the person to whom the offer is made or by a third party.(4) The Lord Chancellor may by regulations make provision as to the circumstances in which a benefit offered by a regulated person is related to the provision of legal services in connection with a claim, including provision about benefits relating to—
(a) fees to be charged in respect of the legal services,(b) expenses which are or would be necessarily incurred in connection with the claim, or(c) insurance to cover legal costs and expenses in connection with the claim.”

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, this measure complements significant reforms that the Government have already introduced to control the costs of civil litigation. In particular, it is part of our focus on discouraging fraudulent and grossly exaggerated personal injury claims, as is Clause 45 on fundamentally dishonest claims. In all this work, our intention has been to allow appropriate personal injury claims to proceed at proportionate cost. However, we are determined to root out the disproportionately high costs and frankly unacceptable behaviour that has tainted the personal injury world in recent years.

These clauses address the practice of offering inducements to bring personal injury claims. There are many examples of lawyers offering potential clients money or items such as tablet computers for pursuing a personal injury claim. One recent advertisement read:

“If you bring a successful claim”—

to X Solicitors—

“you will be eligible for a free iPad. We believe in thanking those who entrust us with their claim, and as well as providing clients with a professional legal service, we hope a complimentary iPad can make things easier for you after your accident”.

Another stated:

“On acceptance of your case we will pay you £250 as an upfront ‘welcome’ payment. This payment is on top of your eventual compensation payment”.

Such incentives contribute to the so-called compensation culture by offering rewards for bringing a claim, regardless of its merits. Expenditure on these inducements might also have a detrimental effect on the quality of service provided to the client. Furthermore, in a significant number of cases, the client is then denied the money or benefit initially offered because of terms and conditions. This practice has no doubt developed because of the excessive legal costs in personal injury cases which have already been addressed by our reforms in Part 2 of the LASPO Act 2012, but it is a practice that we need to stop to protect consumers and, indeed, the reputation of the legal profession more widely. We are grateful for the cross-industry support for introducing a ban on the offer of such inducements; reputable lawyers recognise the harm that this does to their profession. The House of Commons Transport Committee has also recently endorsed a ban.

Consequently, these clauses prohibit legal services providers from offering monetary and non-monetary benefits to potential clients as an incentive to make a personal injury claim. They define what is considered to be an inducement and require regulators to monitor and enforce the ban, as breaches of the ban will not be considered as a criminal offence.

Amendment 87 amends the extent provisions in the Bill to make clear that those provisions apply only to England and Wales.

As to Amendment 64A, I thank my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral for bringing this issue to my attention. I know that he has a long-standing constructive interest in making sure that the Government get the drafting right on this kind of issue. I am extremely grateful for that. I will ask officials to consider the matter carefully during the Recess with a view to returning to it at a later stage.

Subject to that point, we believe that the new government clauses are a proportionate response to what has been a thoroughly bad practice. I beg to move.

Amendment 64A (to Amendment 64)

Tabled by

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Moved by

[Lord Faulks]

65: After Clause 45, insert the following new Clause—
“Effect of rules against inducements
(1) The relevant regulator must ensure that it has appropriate arrangements for monitoring and enforcing the restriction imposed on regulated persons by section (Rules against inducements to make personal injury claims).
(2) A regulator may make rules for the purposes of subsection (1).
(3) The rules may in particular provide that, in relation to anything done in breach of that section, the relevant regulator may exercise any powers that the regulator would have in relation to anything done by the regulated person in breach of another restriction (subject to subsection (4)).
(4) A breach of section (Rules against inducements to make personal injury claims)—
(a) does not make a person guilty of an offence, and (b) does not give rise to a right of action for breach of statutory duty.(5) Subsection (6) applies in a case where—
(a) a regulated person has offered a benefit to a person, and(b) it appears to the regulator that the offer of the benefit is an inducement to make a claim as mentioned in section (Rules against inducements to make personal injury claims)(1)(b).(6) Rules under subsection (2) may provide for the offer of the benefit to the person to be treated as an inducement to make a claim as mentioned in section (Rules against inducements to make personal injury claims)(1)(b) unless the regulated person shows—
(a) that the benefit was offered for a reason other than encouraging the person to make a claim or to seek advice from a regulated person with a view to making a claim, or(b) that the benefit is related to the provision of legal services in connection with the claim (see regulations under section (Rules against inducements to make personal injury claims)(4)).”

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[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I am very happy to support the noble and learned Lord’s amendment and I take it that the Government will accede to it. It is a very sensible change.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, Amendment 68 would have the effect of allowing the President of the United Kingdom Supreme Court to make written representations to Parliament about the Supreme Court and its jurisdiction in the same way as the Lord Chief Justice of any part of the United Kingdom is able to do under Section 5 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. The Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales has used the provision under Section 5 of the 2005 Act to lay before Parliament his annual report, which highlights his accountability for oversight of the judiciary in England and Wales.

Amendment 69 would have the effect of allowing the United Kingdom Supreme Court the flexibility to appoint judges to the supplementary panel within two years of their retirement, providing they are under the age of 75.

First, I should very much like to thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for all his work on these issues and for being so patient in waiting for this amendment to be reached at such a late stage. Given his background, he is of course well placed to speak with authority on these matters. I know that he has been working closely with the judiciary on these amendments and he has also recently written to me regarding them.

The Government understand the rationale behind the amendments. However, before we can agree to make such changes, we will need to consider the matter and the impacts of the proposed changes further and discuss them in more detail with the President of the Supreme Court, the Lord Chief Justice, the Lord President of the Court of Session and the Lord Chief Justice for Northern Ireland. I will also be happy to have further discussions with the noble and learned Lord about the amendments and will respond fully to his letter shortly. On that basis, I hope that he will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his very helpful reply. It is indeed the reply that I expected. It is sensible to take time to consider the matter a little more fully. In view of the undertakings that he has given, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, perhaps I may be quite clear about where the Minister stands on Amendment 69. I do not think that he indicated where he stood on it. It is a very simple matter. Perhaps he could come back to it on Report, but I should be grateful if he would say where he stands. I beg to move.

[Lord Faulks]

It is also a matter where we would like to consider the full implications of the changes. The reply that I gave was supposed to embrace both amendments.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am most grateful. In view of that indication, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.