Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 63B to 63E, tabled in my name. The effect of these amendments would be to remove the requirement to delay remitting the criminal courts charges; in other words, magistrates could remit in the same breath as imposing the charge, although only if they were satisfied that that was in the interests of justice. It is a different method of achieving the same aims as those of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and my noble friend Lord Beecham. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has said very clearly, what is the point of imposing court charges on people when it is plainly obvious that they will not be able to pay, and the court in any event has the power to remit the charges in the future?

I want to say a little more about the general principle of criminal courts charges. Magistrates’ courts, particularly those in London, very often deal with people who are poor and who have mental health problems and/or drug and alcohol problems. It is not that unusual to find defendants in front of one who have no national insurance number, no money, no benefits and no legal status within Britain. They come before the court for whatever reason has brought them there, and they are living off the kindness of friends with no recognisable status. It really is ridiculous for a court to be required to put a charge on these people in addition to the victim surcharge and other possible charges when there is absolutely no chance of them paying. It is already the case that one ranks the payments that are to be made. It is compensation which is discretionary so far as the courts are concerned. Compensation would be paid first, to be followed by prosecution costs, which are discretionary. Third in the rank would be the victim surcharge, which is non-discretionary, and then after that will come the courts charge, which is also non-discretionary. If defendants are made aware of the non-discretionary nature of the victim surcharge and the courts charge, poorer people could be more likely to plead guilty so that there are less extensive court charges, rather than going into a lengthy trial where there is an unpredictable but mandatory level of courts charge if they are found guilty.

I understand that there will be a three-year review period; I presume that one purpose of that review period is to look at whether there is any statistical basis for poor people being more likely to plead guilty. That is a very profound question, because it would be a consideration of some of the poorest people that we see in our courts today.

I will check one point with the noble Lord. I hope that I know the answer to it, but I wanted to check that it is open to the courts to deem the criminal courts charge served by time spent in custody—one day deemed served—in a similar way that that discretion exists regarding the victim surcharge. Therefore in that very specific way, with someone drunk and disorderly who has spent some time in the cells, you can deem both the victim surcharge and the criminal courts charge as served. I am not in favour of that in principle. My group of amendments try to restore finding a particular way to restore discretion to judges and magistrates so that they can deal with the reality of the situation they come across every day.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly from the Back Benches. I agree very much with the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and my noble friend Lord Ponsonby. I was a magistrate many years ago. I do not sit any more, but when I lived in the Midlands I used to sit on the Coventry Bench. Again, like my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, there were times when people came in front of me who had absolutely nothing. In particular, I used to sit in the fines court, to which people were brought back because they had not paid their fines. When you looked at their circumstances, the only way they could pay those fines was to go out and commit more crime; it was impossible otherwise. Now we have an additional charge here. It is important that we take into account people’s circumstances: not to allow the court to have that discretion is a bad move. To have loads of fines when there is no possibility of their ever being paid back is a complete waste of time. It makes a mockery of justice, and we should not do it.

--- Later in debate ---

Preventing the use of the powers that these provisions contain would mean that offenders would have to face the consequences of defaulting on payment, which might include the use of bailiffs or a return to court to seek a variation, including additional costs for the court. We suggest that, notwithstanding the difficulties that are presented by those who do not have substantial means, as the noble Lords, Lord Kennedy, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Beecham, and my noble friend Lord Marks, mentioned, they are met by the various provisions that I have outlined to mitigate the harshness, and that the transparency and consistency of this provision is an advantage and should result in financial benefit accruing to the whole criminal justice system. I therefore ask the noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

I have a point that is slightly tangential to the group of amendments we have just been debating. When magistrates are fining somebody, for a huge proportion of the time they do not know the existing level of outstanding fines; so they are fining somebody when they do not know what debts to fines they already have. I understand that this is a practical problem and a difficult issue that the court service is reluctant to address. Surely, however, if one is serious about reducing the level of outstanding fines, one should try to address it so that when a court sets fines it knows the level of the outstanding fines when it puts in place the sentence.

[Lord Faulks]

It is certainly the case that the court should know, as far as possible, the level of outstanding fines. I understand the practical difficulties that can be encountered by courts but, with great respect to the noble Lord, we are concerned here with a definite, fixed cost in relation to the particular nature of the offence, which will not depend on fines outstanding. That is not a question—reasonable though it is—that arises on consideration of these amendments.