Employment Rights Bill

Lord Faulkner of Worcester Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 16th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)]

I advise the Committee that if this amendment were agreed to, it would not be possible for me to call Amendment 264A for reason of pre-emption.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Coffey for her amendment in this group and for her introduction. I will speak to Amendments 266 and 267 in my name. These amendments are not presented in opposition to the spirit or general objectives of the Bill. Indeed, we fully support the aims of enforcing employment rights and ensuring that bad employers do not undercut fair ones. These amendments respond to a real and serious concern about the breadth of the power that the Bill currently gives to Ministers—a power that, if left unchecked, would allow a future Government to expand the remit of the fair work agency with far-reaching consequences but only the most minimal parliamentary oversight.

Paragraph 35 of Schedule 7 allows the Secretary of State to add to the list of enactments that fall under the enforcement remit of the fair work agency by way of regulations. That list, set out in Part 1 of Schedule 7, includes a range of statutory rights covering pay, working time, sick pay and protections against exploitation. The current drafting allows for the addition of any enactment that relates to employees, workers, employers or trade unions. That is an extraordinarily broad formulation. It would allow the Secretary of State to bring into the fair work agency’s scope virtually any area of employment or labour law, potentially even those governing union recognition, industrial action or collective bargaining, by secondary legislation and with no meaningful boundary in statute.

Amendment 266 seeks to address this by narrowing the scope of this delegated power. It would limit the types of enactments that can be added to those that relate to hours, pay or holidays. These are, after all, the core minimum terms and conditions of the employment relationship. They are well understood, capable of objective enforcement and already subject to statutory minima in other parts of the Bill. They also reflect the matters over which the recognised trade unions typically have statutory bargaining rights. There is, therefore, a clear and principled rationale for limiting the fair work agency’s enforcement jurisdiction to these domains.

We put forward this amendment on the grounds that it is both reasonable and proportionate. It would still allow Ministers to respond to emerging issues in labour markets, such as new forms of pay abuse or evasion of working time rules. It would, however, prevent this power being used to draw the FWA into controversial or contested areas of employment law, or into territory where individual enforcement through tribunals is more appropriate than systemic enforcement by a regulator. It would preserve the coherence of the agency’s function and protect against mission creep over time.

We anticipate that Ministers will argue that this amendment is too prescriptive and does not allow sufficient flexibility to bring in related rights that may not neatly fall into the categories of pay, hours or holidays, but that are none the less important for fair work—for example, information rights, certain protections from detriment or emerging contractual abuses not yet addressed by current law. The Government may say that drawing such hard lines in primary legislation is undesirable and that a degree of discretion is necessary for effective future-proofing.

If the Government do not accept Amendment 266 on the grounds that it is too narrow, it follows that the strength of Amendment 267 becomes even more essential. This amendment would require that any regulations made under paragraph 35 be subject not merely to the affirmative resolution procedure but to the super-affirmative resolution procedure, which I know the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, is fond of, as defined in Section 18 of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006.

The super-affirmative procedure is not some theoretical or obscure mechanism. It exists precisely for circumstances such as this, where Parliament grants the Executive a broad power to amend the application of primary legislation by secondary means. The procedure ensures that Parliament is properly consulted, that draft regulations are subject to scrutiny before they are laid and that there is an opportunity for representations to be made, considered and reflected in the final statutory instrument.

The two amendments offer a choice. If the Government agree with us that the power to amend Schedule 7 should be tightly confined, they can accept Amendment 266. If they prefer to retain flexibility, they must accept that that comes with the responsibility of subjecting that power to a higher standard of parliamentary scrutiny, in which case Amendment 267 is the minimum safeguard necessary. What would be constitutionally unacceptable is for the Government to reject both amendments, leaving in place a broad and undefined power exercisable by ordinary affirmative resolution. That would be to hand the Executive a blank cheque over the shape and scope of labour-market enforcement in this country, without adequate safeguards in place.

To conclude, I urge the Government to consider carefully the implications of paragraph 35 as currently drafted. It is not enough to say that Ministers do not intend to use this power in a wide-ranging or politically contentious way. We are legislating not just for the current Secretary of State but for future ones, too. If the Government want discretion, Parliament must have oversight, and if they want latitude, we must have safeguards. The amendments give the Government the opportunity to make a choice: define the limits of this power clearly or accept the heightened scrutiny that wide powers properly demand.