All 4 Debates between Lord Etherton and Baroness Ludford

Wed 12th Jul 2023
Illegal Migration Bill
Lords Chamber

Consideration of Commons amendments
Mon 12th Jun 2023
Illegal Migration Bill
Lords Chamber

Committee stage: Part 2
Wed 24th May 2023
Illegal Migration Bill
Lords Chamber

Committee stage: Part 2 & Committee stage: Minutes of Proceedings Part 2
Tue 8th Feb 2022

Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Lord Etherton and Baroness Ludford
Lord Etherton Portrait Lord Etherton (CB)
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My Lords, I support the amended version of Clause 1, put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. Whether or not Parliament intends to incorporate international treaties within our own law depends on the wording. The point was made on Report that the noble Baroness’s previous wording had no reference to interpretation. It seems to me quite clear now that the emphasis has been put on having regard to the provisions in these international treaties which bind this country for the purposes of interpreting this Act. I consider that this falls plainly on the right side of the line.

As for my own amendment to Motion S, which the noble Lord, Lord Murray, has addressed, I thank the Minister for his time, patience and reasonableness over the discussions concerning this. I was principally concerned that those who are entitled to the protection of the convention because of a well-founded fear of persecution in the country stated in the removal notice should not have to have an additional test of irreversible harm in order to prevent removal there. The assurances the noble Lord has given have satisfied me over that concern, particularly in relation to the principles in the case to which he drew attention, HJ (Iran) for LGBT refugees. My concerns have been satisfied and for that reason I will not oppose the Motion of the Government on this point.

Baroness Ludford Portrait Baroness Ludford (LD)
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My Lords, briefly, we on these Benches support all the Motions to amend the government Motions. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has well made the point that even if one could have argued that the original Amendment 1 was a backdoor incorporation—an argument I always found unpersuasive—that objection certainly cannot be made of the new text of Motion A1, which is clearly nothing of the sort. The Prime Minister has been at the NATO summit in Vilnius upholding international law against breaches through Russian aggression. Indeed, the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 cited the rule of law at one of the core principles. The Prime Minister was also recently at the Council of Europe summit. Again, the core values in the declaration were the threats to human rights, democracy and the rule of law.

On Report, the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, talked about how this amendment

“is firmly in the Conservative tradition of strengthening, not undermining, the international rule of law”.—[Official Report, 28/6/23; col. 704.]

She reminded noble Lords that

“Conservative Governments were instrumental in creating the first four conventions listed in the amendment”.

Finally, on Amendment 93, we still have concerns, as do doctors, about the proposals in the Bill for as yet unproven medical age assessments. Amendment 93 provides the most basic safety net for those undergoing age assessment: the right to appeal a judgment. Removing that right will not deter any smugglers, or child refugees in need of appropriate safety and protection. We urge support for the amendment Motions.

Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Lord Etherton and Baroness Ludford
Baroness Ludford Portrait Baroness Ludford (LD)
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I warned your Lordships that I would keep popping up this evening, but I am glad to say that the cavalry is coming to my assistance. On the Bench opposite there are all my legal heavyweight friends who are going to row in on this issue. In moving that Clause 37 should not stand part of the Bill, I shall speak similarly with regard to Clauses 38 to 42 and in support of my Amendments 114 and 115 as well as all the other amendments in this group.

At the moment, under existing law, a human rights claim would effectively suspend a claimant’s removal; the suspensive effect of a human rights claim is a crucial safeguard against individuals being removed to face human rights abuses before the validity of their claim has been established. As was referred to in earlier groups, we on these Benches believe that pursuing a claim from another jurisdiction is likely to be very difficult and in some cases impossible. We were talking about trafficking victims earlier, but I contend that it applies to anyone trying to pursue a claim from abroad. The European Court of Human Rights has held that the right to an effective remedy under Article 13, taken together with Articles 2 and 3, guarantees the ability to present an asylum claim effectively. We would say that you cannot do it effectively if you are outside the country.

Clause 4 of the Bill makes it clear that the Clause 2 duty on the Secretary of State to make arrangements for removal will still apply to a person making a claim that removal would violate their human rights. The continuing application of the duty means that, under the Bill, these claims would all be non-suspensive. The Bill provides narrow exceptions to this non-suspensive effect by establishing two categories of suspensive claims that prevent the removal of the claimant while they are ongoing: the serious harms suspensive claim and the factual suspensive claim. These are the only ways in which anyone who satisfies the Clause 2 conditions—whether they are seeking asylum, have been trafficked or have otherwise come without permission—would be able to challenge their removal before it takes place. Even a successful claimant will remain subject to the Secretary of State’s removal duty and prohibition on getting leave to enter or remain under Clause 29, as we have just been discussing, and will thus remain in a state of limbo regarding their immigration status—at least theoretically still awaiting removal—so it does not necessarily solve the problem. Most human rights claims will stay non-suspensive and have to be pursued from outside.

I turn to the test for these suspensive claims, which I think is where some of the amendments come in. The test established in the Strasbourg court is where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question would face a real risk. However, this appears to mean that individuals who can establish a real risk of treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 but cannot establish that it is imminent would still be removed under this Bill and left to pursue their claims from overseas. The JCHR says, and we on these Benches agree, that this would likely breach the Government’s obligations under the ECHR—the convention to which the Government are newly converted.

Another problem is that a serious harm suspensive claim would have to contain compelling evidence that the serious harm condition is met. This appears to be a new evidential standard created by this Bill. Freedom from Torture told the JCHR that this amounts to

“an extremely high evidential threshold which may, in fact, be higher than ‘real risk’ or even ‘the balance of probabilities’. How an individual who has just fled persecution could provide evidence to this threshold is unclear”.

The next problem is that the Bill retains a power for the Secretary of State to make provision about the meaning of “serious and irreversible harm” in regulations. Our Constitution Committee considers that

“the implications of this definition are so significant that it should be amended only by primary legislation unless any delegated power to do so is limited to prevent fundamental risks of harm being removed from the definition”.

The committee supports my proposition that Clause 39 should be removed from the Bill or heavily circumscribed.

This is also the subject of criticism by the JCHR. Not only does the committee

“urge the Government to reconsider its decision to make human rights claims non-suspensive, and the extremely high threshold imposed to establish serious harm suspensive claims”

but it believes:

“The meaning of ‘serious and irreversible harm’ should not be open to amendment by regulations”


and:

“Clause 39 should be removed from the Bill”.


Lastly, timeframes are the subject of my Amendments 114 and 115. In the Bill, the Government are imposing very tight timescales: the lodging of a claim within seven days following receipt of the notice, a decision within three days and appeal to the Upper Tribunal within six days. My amendments aim to increase both the claim and the decision deadlines to 30 days. All in all, my amendments in this group, with the support of other noble Lords, are designed to restore better fairness to the possibility of people appealing against removal. I beg to move.

Lord Etherton Portrait Lord Etherton (CB)
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My Lords, I will speak to a number of amendments in my name in this group: Amendments 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 111 and 112, all of which are supported by my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew, who is a co-signatory. I am grateful to him and to the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, who has also supported one of them. I am also grateful to the Minister for a remote meeting with me to discuss my amendments, which I appreciated.

We are here dealing with the situation where a person claiming refugee status has been given a third country removal notice. That notice will be for removal to a country specified in Schedule 1, and the refugee claimant has a well-founded fear of persecution if they are removed to that country. Under the Bill, the removal notice can be challenged only by a serious harm suspensive claim. The serious harm condition is defined in Clause 38(3): the person claiming refugee status must, within a specified period called “the relevant period”,

“face a real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm if removed … to the country or territory specified in the third country removal notice”.

The majority of my amendments in this group focus on the inappropriateness of the requirement to show an imminent risk of “irreversible” harm within a specified period.

The first point to note is that, by way of general observation, whereas the serious harm suspensive claim focuses on the situation of an individual claiming refugee status, the well-established approach both internationally and under our own jurisprudence is to ask, in the case of a “particular social group” within Article 1A(2) of the refugee convention, whether the members of that group have a well-founded fear of persecution by virtue of being a member of that group.

Secondly, that change in approach is explained by the appearance, for the first time, of a requirement for an individual claiming refugee status to be able to resist removal to an otherwise unsafe country only if they can additionally show that they would personally suffer serious and irreversible harm. There is no such requirement in the refugee convention or in any jurisprudence of our own courts or, so far as I am aware, those of any other country.

Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Lord Etherton and Baroness Ludford
Baroness Ludford Portrait Baroness Ludford (LD)
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My Lords, I will quickly speak on Amendment 12, otherwise I fear there will not be a second voice in support of the very important issue of the potential impact of the Bill in respect of Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission has pointed out that the human rights memorandum does not include an assessment of compliance of the Bill with Article 2 of the Windsor Framework, so my first question to the Minister is: will that memorandum be amended to include such an assessment?

The Bill raises significant concerns about compliance with the Belfast/Good Friday agreement and with the Windsor Framework, because the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into Northern Ireland law was an explicit commitment of the Good Friday agreement and was achieved through the Human Rights Act. The Bill would constitute a breach of two core elements of this commitment: the guarantee of direct access to the courts and the obligation to provide remedies for breach of the convention, under the relevant chapter of the agreement. That chapter extends to everyone in the community, which includes asylum seekers and refugees.

I believe the Bill is also inconsistent with obligations under Article 2 of the Windsor Framework, which details various equality and non-discrimination EU directives with which Northern Ireland must keep pace. This includes the victims’ directive and the trafficking directive. The potential for the Bill to lead to failures in identifying and supporting trafficking victims, as well as the provisions on detention and removal, would place Northern Ireland in direct contravention of those directives. I believe that the Government’s explainer document on the Windsor Framework, Article 2, acknowledges that its protections apply to everyone who is subject to the law in Northern Ireland. Asylum seekers are part of the community and therefore protected by the Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity chapter of the Good Friday agreement. I understand that in ongoing court proceedings—I prefer “continuing” court proceedings—the Home Office has not disputed the argument that the protections of the relevant chapter of the Good Friday agreement extend to asylum seekers and refugees.

The Bill instructs the Secretary of State to declare inadmissible any claim that removal of an individual would breach their convention rights, if that individual met the extremely broad criteria covered by the duty to remove. It says that this inadmissibility cannot be appealed, so if those provisions were applied to someone arriving in Northern Ireland, it would be a direct breach of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement because it makes convention rights inaccessible and restricts that individual’s direct access to the courts and remedies for breach of the convention. Also, the application of the Bill to land border crossings could constitute a breach of Article 2 of the Windsor Framework and indeed of its very objectives.

To try to compress all that down, it is a matter of considerable concern that there is a failure to address compliance with Article 2 of the Windsor Framework, and more broadly with the Good Friday agreement, in the human rights memorandum to the Bill. I will end where I started, which is to ask the Minister whether such an assessment is going to materialise.

Lord Etherton Portrait Lord Etherton (CB)
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My Lords, I have co-signed the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile or Berriew, and that in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Cashman. I will make some very brief comments on both.

The principle against retrospection in statutory provisions is very long-standing and well-established because it upsets settled status and settled rights. It follows that it can, save in exceptional circumstances, operate both unfairly and so as to create legal uncertainty in the way that people conduct their affairs.

The best example of where retrospection would be appropriate is in relation to a finance Bill and Act giving effect to a Budget, with the time lapse between the two enabling people to enter into tax avoidance arrangements. But here it would be utterly impossible—certainly without any credibility—to suggest that those who are either crossing the channel or promoting that crossing unlawfully or illegally have organised their affairs, or were ever likely to organise them, on the basis of the complex provisions of this statute. I have never heard anybody suggest to the contrary. For my part, I can see absolutely no sound reason why the normal rule—which is one of fairness and certainty, as I said—should be upset in this case.

I support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, because extending the definition of the third condition to include gender identity and sexual orientation brings to the forefront something which has plainly been ignored in the drafting of the Bill. There is absolutely nothing in Schedule 1 which excludes from the places to which people can be removed those LGBT people who would undoubtedly face extreme persecution, varying from sentence of imprisonment to death and assault. Raising this issue here will, I hope, direct the Government and the Bill team to a serious lacuna in the legislation.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Lord Etherton and Baroness Ludford
Baroness Ludford Portrait Baroness Ludford (LD)
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My Lords, in moving Amendment 106 in the name of, and at the invitation of, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, I will speak also to Amendments 109 and 110.

If Clause 36 is not amended or deleted, it will contradict Article 31 of the refugee convention. It seeks to punish or penalise a refugee for arriving in the UK to make an asylum claim by a route that took them through other countries. The requirement in the refugee convention to come directly was intended only to prevent a person who had acquired refugee status and protection in one country deciding to switch to another. Excluding a person from asylum in the UK simply because they stopped in France, Germany or Belgium, perhaps for a night’s rest, is completely unreasonable. The UK courts have confirmed that any merely short-term stopover en route to an intended sanctuary cannot forfeit the protection of Article 31 of the convention.

Any other interpretation, as the Government seek to impose in Clause 36, means, as in so much of this Bill, a shirking of the sharing of international responsibilities, such that looking after refugees falls overwhelmingly on countries neighbouring the countries of conflict from which the person is seeking to escape. Therefore, Amendment 106 would at least amend the clause, which, however, we might find later, needs to be deleted. I beg to move.

Lord Etherton Portrait Lord Etherton (CB)
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My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 107 in my name, which relates to Clause 36 and provides that a refugee will have come directly to the United Kingdom for the purposes of Clause 11, notwithstanding that

“they have passed through the intermediate country on the refugee’s way to the United Kingdom by way of short-term stopover”.

Those words in the amendment reflect the reasoning and decision of the Administrative Court in Adimi, where my noble and learned friend Lord Brown presided. They also reflect the approval of Adimi by the Appellate Committee of this House in a case called Asfaw.

In this respect, Clause 36 is an important part of the Government’s policy. The reason for that is that it provides a definition of “directly” for the purposes of Clause 11 that makes a distinction between group 1 and group 2 refugees. Under the provisions of Clause 11, if the refugee does not come directly from the place of persecution, they inevitably cannot be in group 1.

Secondly, it is important because, as I pointed out in a previous debate on this Bill, the provisions for describing coming to the United Kingdom directly, as defined in Clause 36, also reflect the provision in the admissibility provision in Clause 15. Your Lordships will recall that, in Clause 15, if there is a connection with another state, the refugee’s claim is inadmissible; in fact, it is not recognised as a claim at all and there is no right of appeal. Clause 15 provides that, if you fall within one of the five conditions inserted in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 by the clause, you have a connection. One of those conditions, condition 4, is that

“the claimant was previously present in, and eligible to make a relevant claim to, the safe third State … it would have been reasonable to expect them to make such a claim, and … they failed to do so.”

So there are two essential elements of the policy behind the Government’s provisions for asylum, where the question of the meaning of coming “directly” is extremely important. I pointed out to the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, that there was a muddle here. If condition 4 in Clause 15, as I have described it, is satisfied, you never get to a distinction between group 1 and group 2 because your claim is inadmissible. The noble Baroness was going to look at that and let me know the position from the Government’s perspective, but I have not yet heard from her.

Before I address what coming “directly” means—as I said, my amendment reflects the reasoning and conclusion in Adimi, and the adoption of the decision in Adimi by the Appellate Committee of this House in Asfaw—I want to say a couple of things about what appears to be the approach of the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, to interpretation. I do not think you need to be a lawyer to appreciate that if, under the aegis of the United Nations, you agree with other states in the world that you will conduct yourself in a particular way and that an agency of the United Nations has a responsibility for overseeing both the implementation of that agreement and that disputes between member states in relation to the meaning and the application of the agreement—here, the refugee convention—will be referred to an international court, there must be a point in time when one has to identify core values. If there are no core values, there is nothing to adjudicate.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, referred to Article 35, which requires member states to co-operate with the United Nations body responsible for oversight in relation to the implementation of the refugee convention. So what one has to do here is decide whether what the Government are doing in putting forward these proposals goes beyond the core principles in the refugee convention, which must be applicable generally to member states—otherwise, all the clauses I have referred to, Article 35, co-operation and adjudication by a court are totally meaningless and impracticable.

So I take issue with the broad statement of principle, as I understand it, put forward by the Minister. He said that it was perfectly acceptable for every member state signed up to the refugee convention to decide, from its perspective, what the convention meant. If that were correct and he was saying that it was for Parliament to decide what it meant for the United Kingdom, it would mean that changes could be made by each successive new Government as to what they felt would be appropriate to support their policy. Well, that is obviously nonsense, if I may respectfully say so.

What the courts have done—and this would be the approach of the all the courts of the countries signed up to the convention—is try to understand what the refugee convention was intended, by those who made it, to mean. The starting point is always the travaux préparatoires leading up to the convention—what was said and what was done—and then trying to understand whether there has been a deviation and, if so, why. That has been exactly the approach put forward and implemented in both Adimi and Asfaw.

The starting point, inevitably, for the interpretation of this particular convention is, as I think the Minister said, the Vienna convention on the interpretation of treaties. I do not think it has yet been said that we are entitled to change, and that we have changed, that treaty according to what we think it ought to say. It provides in Article 31.1:

“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”


That phrase, as has been noted by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, I think, was applied by the UK’s highest court, the Supreme Court, in a case called ST (Eritrea) in 2012 as meaning that there is a duty to give the refugee convention

“a generous and purposive interpretation, bearing in mind its humanitarian objects and the broad aims reflected in its preamble”.

I have to say as a starting point that I have seen nothing so far in this part of the Bill which is a “generous and purposive interpretation”, having regard to humanitarian objects and the broad aims reflected in the preamble of the 1951 convention. Every provision that people have addressed appears to be, as it has been put, a mean-spirited approach to refugee applications.

It is against that background that I now turn to the meaning of “directly”. I have already referred to the clear decision in Adimi on this point about stopping at intermediate countries by way of short-term stopover. Just to give this a bit of flesh, what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, said then was:

“I am persuaded by the applicants’ contrary submission, drawing as it does on the travaux préparatoires, various Conclusions adopted by UNHCR’s executive committee … and the writings of well respected academics and commentators … that some element of choice is indeed open to refugees as to where they may properly claim asylum. I conclude that any merely short term stopover en route to such intended sanctuary cannot forfeit the protection of the Article, and that the main touchstones by which exclusion from protection should be judged are the length of stay in the intermediate country, the reasons for delaying there (even a substantial delay in an unsafe third country would be reasonable were the time spent trying to acquire the means of travelling on), and whether or not the refugee sought or found there protection de jure or de facto from the persecution they were fleeing.”