Public Order Bill

Lord Etherton Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 30th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, the debate in Committee was extensive and expressed concern that the wording of Clause 9, whether it intended to or not, was setting a dangerous precedent in which free speech and opinion, through giving out leaflets, could be criminalised in state-designated zones around hospitals and clinics. Some of us asked, “Where next?”, and I put down amendments to Clause 9. I am really pleased that the debate led to people changing their minds because concerns were heard, and I commend the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, on listening. Amendment 45 is undoubtedly a different provision from having that Clause 9 and, in my opinion, is much improved from a civil liberties point of view.

We should therefore note that the proponents of Clause 9 now do not support it. Good—that is that out of the way. However, I have several problems with Amendment 45 but will concentrate on one at this time. It is about its proposed new subsection (1)(a), which has the idea that there should be no attempt to influence

“any person’s decision to access … the provision of abortion services”.

Influencing has been discussed here this evening in appropriately legalistic terms, which are important, but I want to bring a different perspective. It is dangerous to suggest that influencing someone to change their mind about a decision made should be against the law, in almost any circumstances. This is not the same as suggesting that the appropriate place to have, as somebody called it, the free speech debate on abortion is outside an abortion clinic. I organise a festival called the “Battle of Ideas”, but we should not be having a battle of ideas outside an abortion clinic when somebody is trying to access healthcare. That is not the basis on which free speech is threatened by these buffer zones going national, which I think it is.

Many women are very firm and clear; they have made a rational decision that they want an abortion. They have given a lot of time to that decision and will not be deterred. I do not think they would even be deterred by anti-abortion vigils going on, because they know what they want to do. It is a bit distressing but they go in, and good luck to them. However, some women may be unsure. If they are toing and froing, they should and must be free to change their mind at any time and in any direction, up until either termination or what have you. It is not coercive if you think again. If a woman is trying to work out, “Should or shouldn’t I have a termination?”, they can go to see a counsellor at BPAS or a Marie Stopes clinic because they are not sure. If somebody tries to influence them—not in one way or another, but by getting them to talk it through and think about it—a woman might then leave that counselling service and say, “I’ve thought about it now. I’ve made my mind up and I’m going to have a termination”. That is a woman’s moral autonomy and we assume she is not coerced in that situation. A woman who may not be sure and is still thinking about it, even as she goes in for a termination, might be given a leaflet and then says in her own defence, “I’ve changed my mind. There may be an option of getting some practical support for pregnancy”.

Whatever the reason is, that is their choice. The point is that I am pro-choice. I do not want us to undermine women’s agency in our enthusiasm to support laws presented as protecting women. We should not legislate on the basis of worrying about women, how they feel, and their being distressed. Influence is something we should protect. I want to influence you now. I might be failing, because you have the capacity to listen and make a decision. Influencing is the basis of democracy. We should be careful about saying that we should not be allowed to influence because a Bill in Parliament said, “Don’t influence in that bit of the country”.

I consider these vigils insensitive and a nuisance. I disagree with the anti-abortionists outside. I think that abortion is a woman’s right to choose and a key right for women. I find the views of the people on these vigils offensive, and their demonstrations are often objectionable and distressing. However, in a democracy we have to tolerate people who sometimes have views we find distressing or offensive.

I want to emphasise that earlier we had lots of debates about proportionate law-making and civil liberties. Everyone on this side of the House has made some fantastic speeches about how we have to be careful about bringing in laws and what the thresholds are. Amendment 1, which I spoke on and supported, suggested a much higher threshold for what we consider “serious disruption”. I do not think these vigils, however obnoxious they are, would merit even the lower threshold the Government had. Basically, what I am saying is that I do not like them, but I do not think we need a law against them. I listened in Committee, as well as the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, and changed my mind. I was trying to amend Clause 9, but instead I do not think we should amend it at all. We should review whether we need nationally mandated buffer zones at all. I do not want to amend the buffer zones; I want to stop, pause and look at the evidence.

Throughout Committee and since, I have talked to lots of people on all sides. I have been inundated by my mates on the pro-choice side and people on the other side. What struck me was the variance in what I was hearing. We have heard from a former police leader that he has gone round and there is a real problem. We heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, that this is escalating. There is American money, and all sorts of things are happening. We have heard that, since Roe v Wade, there are lurid stories of quite aggressive things happening outside abortion clinics. I have also heard on the other side that all anyone is doing is silently praying and it is completely benign.

The truth of the matter is that, if we are going to make such a dramatic change in the law from locally decided PSPOs, where there is a particular problem, to a national decision to carve up some public space and say, “No, you are not allowed to stand there”, when there might not have even been a problem, can we not at least base it on what is really going on? Public space protection orders are local remedies. I do not like that carving up of public space, but it is there and it is used. In 2018 the Home Office asked the same questions we have asked tonight, did an extensive review of vigils around abortion clinics and concluded that introducing national buffer zones would not be a proportionate response considering the experiences of the majority of hospitals and clinics and that the majority of activities are more passive in nature. People who wanted this clause say, “No, that is out of date and completely wrong. The 2018 review does not hold”. Fine; let us have a 2023 review. That is all I am saying, let us find out; I am adamant about that.

One of the things I have been completely won over on is that the victims of these vigils are often not women trying to access a termination but the staff day after day. When you are going in for the termination, they might annoy you once. I cannot imagine anything more irritating than having to walk past this if you are trying to do your job providing women’s reproductive healthcare.

Let the review look at whether we can have a particular way of dealing with that. When I was talking about PSPOs, I heard, “PSPOs don’t work, you know; they’re useless at this”. In that case, we need a review. Come back in less than a year, so we can have decent legislation that fits the facts, not the virtue signalling. For the sake of women’s rights, it seems important to me that we take this seriously and not just do it as a political act.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I shall support Amendment 45, subject to one important qualification. My experience in relation to this derives from presiding in the Court of Appeal over the very first buffer zone case, Dulgheriu & Anor v the London Borough of Ealing. Ealing set up what is now called a buffer zone around the Marie Stopes clinic, and I will refer to a couple of matters that have arisen in the course of this debate which informed the judgment in that case. We dismissed the application for a public spaces protection order, which was made by a Christian group called the Good Counsel Network. It protested daily, and its protests comprised a variety of different actions, including presenting people who were going into the clinic with posters of foetuses at various stages of development, distributing prayer beads and putting up tents. Overall, the object was to prevent an abortion taking place. There was also evidence that they called out “Mum” to the women going in, that they presented puppet babies and that they held both verbal and non-verbal vigils. The evidence was that that was extremely distressing to vulnerable women, who were going into the clinic for advice or treatment, and it was equally clear that the staff were also extremely upset by what was happening.

I am afraid that I disagree with those who say we need a review to see whether the legislation is necessary. It is clear that the 2014 Act under which the public spaces protection orders are made is not designed to protect individuals in this way; it is designed for the benefit of a community when there is an action or activity that is harmful to the community. So there is no legislation that can provide this sort of protection, so far as I am aware and Ealing was aware, and which is designed specifically for this type of attack, in effect, on very vulnerable people seeking medical advice.

I agree with my noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe in this respect: this is not like the protests we have discussed so far today; these are actions directed to particular people who are particularly vulnerable. There is no other legislation, so the only question is: do we have this on a national or a local scale? Under the 2014 Act, a number of consultations have to be conducted. They can take a great deal of time—not just weeks or months but sometimes years; the Ealing consultation took a very long time to complete—so, from my perspective, legislation of this kind is needed for the protection of vulnerable individuals. Amendment 45 covers the ground perfectly, subject to one thing: I do not believe that it is consistent or appropriate for the maximum penalty for this type of offence to be limited to level 5 on the standard level.

For tunnelling, the penalties range from fines to imprisonment. Many of these religious groups are very well-backed; I do not anticipate at all that, if there was a fine, that would be the end of the matter. I think there would be repeat offences. Consistently with the earlier provisions in relation to tunnelling, for example, on indictment there should be provision on repeat offences for there to be the ability to pass a sentence of imprisonment.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Etherton Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Wednesday 2nd March 2022 Lords Chamber

The likelihood of the UK Government being able to send back an asylum seeker to any third country that the Government have no agreement with appears unlikely, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has said. The other place may be bored with too many take-out amendments. As an alternative, therefore, Amendment 32, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, to which I have added my name, would ensure that the powers in this clause would be brought into force only once the Government have agreed a formal returns agreement with the third country that the Government claim the asylum seeker has a connection with and to which they intend to send them. Amendment 32 is not as good as taking out the clause but it is better than no change at all, so we will support this amendment in the event of a Division.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, the provisions for an admissible asylum claim, where there is a connection —as defined in new Section 80B, which is to be inserted into the 2002 Act—are quite plainly contrary to the refugee convention and a breach of the UK’s obligations under it. In particular, the conditions in new Section 80C(4), which is where a claim could have been made to a third state—the claimant was present in a state eligible to receive and offer a safe space for him or her—and new Section 80C(5), where the claimant should have made a claim to a safe third state whether or not he or she had ever visited or been associated with it, are both plain breaches of the convention and find no place in its wording.

Condition 4 in new Section 80C is really another way of stating the coming directly from the country of persecution requirement in Clause 11 and Clause 36(1). On Monday this House rejected the Government’s interpretation of Article 31 of the convention in relation to that requirement, by rejecting Clause 11 as part of the Bill. With regard to condition 5 there is nothing whatever in the convention to justify rejecting as inadmissible a claim to asylum by a refugee as defined by the convention in the circumstances specified there. The only explanation, or example, given in the Explanatory Notes, is where the asylum seeker has close family members in the safe third country, whether or not there is another connection of any kind whatever.

Both these conditions are a rewriting of the convention and not a legitimate interpretation of it. The fact that Clause 15 provides, in new Section 80B of the 2002 Act, that a decision that a claim is not admissible because of an asylum seeker’s connection to a safe third state is not subject to a right of appeal, makes Clause 15 an all the more egregious breach of the convention. There is, in effect, no legal redress for the refugee if the Secretary of State has declared the asylum claim inadmissible under the proposed safe third state provisions.

Logically this leads to the conclusion that Clause 15 should be left out of the Bill. I am content, however, to support the alternative approach of the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Paddick, in Amendment 32, which is to fix a start date for the Clause 15 provisions if a formal returns agreement has been reached between the United Kingdom and a third state to which it is said the asylum seeker has a connection.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions. I say at the outset that the Government have been consistent and clear about their belief that people who require international protection should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach, rather than make dangerous and unnecessary journeys to the UK to claim asylum here.

Inadmissibility processes, in particular the first safe country principle, are well established, both in the UK, through long-standing measures in the Immigration Rules, and internationally, including as part of the Common European Asylum System. For example, the procedures directive recognised at recital 22 that

“Member States should not be obliged to assess the substance of an application for international protection where a first country of asylum has granted the applicant refugee status or otherwise sufficient protection and the applicant will be readmitted to that country.”

An overriding objective of these processes is to prevent secondary movements by those who have already reached safety. By definition, that is not about denying safety to those who need it but about having rules which aim to reduce unnecessary travel across borders by those who are already safe.

Amendment 31 seeks to remove third-country inadmissibility powers from primary legislation altogether. It would weaken our ability to deploy inadmissibility processes appropriately and decisively within a strong legal framework, and with that, erode our ability to deter unsafe migration and focus our resources on those most in need of our help.

We are confident that the measures in Clause 15 are fair, appropriate and fully in line with our international obligations. The clause sets out the strict circumstances in which a person’s behaviour or circumstances could lead to inadmissibility action. It requires decision-makers to take account of exceptional mitigating factors that may apply when considering those circumstances. It sets out minimum criteria that must be met by any country before it can be regarded as a safe third country of return, including it being one where a person would not be at risk of persecution, would not experience a breach of Article 3 ECHR rights, and would not be sent to another place where they would be persecuted.

The primary protection afforded refugees under the refugee convention and its protocol is non-refoulement, including no onward refoulement. It is therefore clear that non-refoulement is the primary requirement of “safety”. The same is true for protection afforded under Article 3 of the ECHR. Furthermore, an individual may not meet the definition of refugee under the convention but still require protection. A state may still be safe for them where they will not be refouled, even though they are not a refugee. Therefore, our criteria for determining whether a country is safe, and for subsequently making a claim inadmissible, upholds the UK’s obligations under international law.

Nothing in Clause 15 requires extensive delay in processing inadmissibility decisions. It is right that we consider inadmissibility action and, where appropriate, seek the agreement of the relevant third country, or countries, for the person’s admission there. In some cases, particularly where we are reliant on case-by-case requests to partners, this may take some time, but we have not operated, and will not operate, the inadmissibility system in a way that puts someone in indefinite limbo, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, talked about—able to access neither the asylum system in the country of proposed removal nor the UK system. That would be contrary to the object and purpose of the refugee convention. Our existing processes, which Clause 15 strengthens, are clear that where return cannot be arranged within a reasonable period, the person’s claim would be admitted to the UK asylum system for substantive consideration. That ensures compatibility with the refugee convention.

Individuals will have an opportunity to explain their actions and circumstances prior to claiming asylum in the UK, and that explanation will be carefully considered in deciding whether an inadmissibility decision is appropriate. They will also be able to make representations on why any safe third state is not safe in their particular circumstances. Any decision to declare a claim inadmissible and remove an individual will be subject to the standard principles of public law, including rationality. The inadmissibility provisions are therefore compatible with the refugee convention. For these reasons, I do not agree with the amendment seeking to leave out the clause.

Turning to Amendments 32 and 86, as we have stated on previous occasions, the UK-EU joint political declaration made clear the UK’s intention to engage in bilateral discussions with the most concerned member states to discuss suitable practical arrangements on issues around asylum and illegal migration. We continue to do that with EU member states on these issues. We have been clear that formal agreements, though valuable, are not the only way in which an inadmissible asylum seeker may be accepted for removal by a safe third country. I think it is right to seek removals on a case-by-case basis where appropriate and, with the consent of the relevant country, make that removal. This approach has formed part of our inadmissibility process since the changes to the Immigration Rules in December 2020—and, until the Bill’s provisions come into force, we will continue to rely on the Immigration Rules.

The structure of case-by-case removal arrangements will not be uniform for each country of removal. A wide range of factors will still affect the formality and administration around such removals, not least the diverse organisational structures in place in the third country, the levels of centralised and decentralised decision-making, and other circumstances that may be specific to the individual. These arrangements will inevitably vary, but the framework in which cases are considered, within which third countries are assessed for safety and claimants are progressed to removal, will not. We have a clear and consistent approach to these fundamental and important issues, and we stand by our international obligations.

I do not agree that these provisions are unworkable without formal agreements in place. We aim to make the process work as a whole and to return people where appropriate. Where it becomes clear that an individual cannot be removed to a safe country, either because we do not have formal returns agreements in place or because a case-by-case removal cannot be agreed within a reasonable period, the individual’s asylum claim will be considered in the UK. To go back to the assertion made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I say that this will ensure that we do not keep people in limbo, in accordance with our obligations under the refugee convention. I do not think this amendment is required and ask that it be withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I think the noble Lord, Lord Horam, makes the mistake of thinking that this House trusts the Government. Of course, it does not—or rather, by and large, the majority in this House does not, because the Government have broken their word so many times.

I will speak briefly as well, because I am very concerned that we can vote as much as possible but I do not understand why the Government are trying to move people to other countries. This makes no sense, and it is one of the many ways that the Government are trying to avoid their obligations. Instead of trying to deport people while the Government dither about processing their claims, we should provide them with decent accommodation and work so that they can start to retrieve some of their lives. If there was ever a moment when this Government should come out against the far-right ideology within their own ranks, this is it.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I entirely agree with and support what has been said by the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham and the noble Lord, Lord Cashman. Offshoring while an asylum seeker is having their claim assessed is wrong in principle, oppressive in practice and, critically, lacking sufficient safeguards under the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Horam, mentioned Australia’s policy of offshoring as a successful process, as he did on Monday. On the contrary, from a humanitarian perspective, Australia’s offshoring shows all the defects and injustices of such a policy.

In Committee, I mentioned the 2013 Amnesty International report This is Breaking People, highlighting a range of serious human rights concerns at the immigration detention centre on Manus Island, Papua New Guinea. I also mentioned and quoted from Amnesty’s follow-up report, which stated that on 16 and 17 February 2014, violence at the detention centre led to the death of one young man and injuries to more than 62 asylum seekers. Indeed, some reports suggested that up to 147 were injured. I quoted more from this report in Committee, but it is not appropriate or necessary to repeat that now.

What is absolutely critical—here I take serious issue with the noble Lord, Lord Horam—is that before any such notion of offshoring can be pursued by the Government under this or any other legislation, certain assurances have to be provided in primary legislation, none of which is addressed in the Bill, the Explanatory Notes or any other guidance by the Government. First, how will asylum seekers have access to legal advisers with knowledge of the law and practice relating to UK asylum claims, which is complex and difficult? Is that going to be done four and half thousand miles away on Ascension Island? Secondly, legal aid and advice is available to refugees in the United Kingdom. Is there anything to suggest that it will be available to refugees in offshoring holding centres? If conditions, as in Australia, in the proposed offshore centre are so bad as to cause physical or mental harm to refugees—whether through physical conditions in the centre or, in the case of single women or LGBTQI people, for example, because of discrimination, harassment, bullying and violence from staff or other asylum seekers—will they be able to have recourse or bring proceedings in the UK, or will they be restricted to such remedies as might be available in the foreign countries?

These are fundamental questions. They cannot be left outstanding while individual arrangements with separate countries are being negotiated or considered. They have to form the legal framework within which any such discussions should take place and be seen on the face of any legislation, including this Bill. Although I raised these points in Committee, the Government have not given any answer on any of those issues and, until they have done so, I suggest that these amendments necessarily have to be carried.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I want to briefly restate what I said in Committee. Not only is the Home Office seeking the power to remove an asylum seeker to any country while their claim is being considered but it is seeking to remove them to a country and then tell that country, “If you think they are a refugee, you take them; they’re not our problem any more”.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, has just said, according to Amnesty and Migrant Voice, offshoring by Australia effectively excluded legal, judicial, medical, humanitarian and media scrutiny. It has cost it over half a billion pounds a year, according to the British Red Cross, and failed to stop those seeking asylum, including by boat. Evidence to the Public Bill Committee in the other place from independent academics supports these conclusions. The UNHCR has

“voiced its profound concerns about such practices which have ‘caused extensive, unavoidable suffering for far too long’, left people “languishing in unacceptable circumstances’”

and denied them “common decency”.

I accept what the noble Lord, Lord Horam, says: the Government should be looking at every option, but surely they should be taking into consideration the evidence that I have just cited and considered any counterevidence. Then, having worked out its practicalities and decided whether it is to go ahead, they should bring forward legislation—not bring forward legislation and then decide whether they are going to use it.

Clause 28 and Schedule 3, as drafted, should not be part of the Bill. We support all the amendments in this group that seek to prevent anyone being removed from the UK while their asylum claim is being considered, particularly Amendment 35, to which I have added my name.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Cashman (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall be brief and summarise the position I took in Committee. I support all the amendments in this group, particularly those relating to Clauses 31 and 32. I do so because the amendments will protect the most vulnerable, including women and girls who have been subjected to gender-based violence and abuse and the long-term harm those cause. They will also protect other vulnerable groups with protected characteristics, and recognise the immense and deep trauma such individuals have suffered but often deny because of a deep sense of shame. The amendments also restore the principle of a civilised and humane approach to asylum and ensure that we conform with the UN refugee convention and our international legal obligations. Finally, I have been deeply moved by the letters and some postcards I have received, particularly from women and other vulnerable groups, who express that they have much to fear from the clauses and the effects that they will have on their lives.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I have two amendments in this group, but they are quite distinct from what has been debated so far and distinct from each other. One is concerned with Clause 32(5) and the other concerns Clause 36(1). Because the amendment to Clause 32(5) is a manuscript amendment tabled only today, if I may, I shall start with that to Clause 36(1), because your Lordships will be familiar with the background to that.

Clause 36(1) seeks to define, for the purposes of the convention, the meaning of coming “directly” to the United Kingdom from a country of persecution. The same definition was relevant to Clause 11, because that cross-refers to the provisions of Clause 36, so we have in Clause 36 as a matter of proposed domestic legislation and as a matter of interpretation of Article 31 of the convention the same definition of arriving “directly”. Your Lordships will recall that the issue was whether, as the Government contend, if an asylum seeker passes through an intermediate state on the way to the United Kingdom from the place of persecution—through a place considered to be somewhere they ought reasonably to have applied for refugee status—they have not come “directly”. In fact, the only way they could come directly, if they are surrounded by other countries—Ukraine is a good example—would be to fly.

The House rejected that definition, because it accepted the amendment to remove Clause 11. It expressly rejected that definition of arriving “directly”. Amendment 46 simply takes out the corresponding provision in Clause 36(1), which was incorporated in Clause 11 but would otherwise simply remain at large but, so far as I can see, would have no relevance whatever to anything else in the Bill. If I am wrong on that and there is some purpose in retaining Clause 36(1), although that interpretation of arriving “directly” was rejected by the House when it approved the removal of Clause 11, the House would want to know what it is being retained for: why it is being retained and in relation to what other provisions in the Bill. My amendment would remove Clause 36(1) from the Bill.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

This is another of those occasions when saying “From these Benches, we support” and not much more must not be taken as any lack of support for all the amendments in this group, nor any dilution of the points made.

I just want to register concern about Clause 32(2). The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, spoke to this and I record our support, particularly for the amendment that deals with what is meant by “a particular social group”: that you do not qualify unless the group in question is perceived as being different by surrounding society. As has been pointed out to noble Lords in briefings, a trafficked woman would need to show not only that her status as a trafficked woman is an innate characteristic but that trafficked women as a group are perceived as having a distinct identity in the country of origin. That is very difficult to show. Judged by the perceptions of the society in her country? It would be very challenging to find objective evidence on that, and on that being a distinct group. It is very dangerous to suggest that one can tell those things by looking—or, rather more accurately, perceiving.

--- Later in debate ---

I remind the House that far from being clear what the position is in law, there has been a degree of confusion in this area for many years. One can cherry-pick Upper Tribunal decisions from here, there or anywhere, but I am afraid the fact is that there is a clear mismatch between how the concept of “particular social group” has been defined in current legislation and government policy in different tribunal judgments and how it has been interpreted in some courts. Therefore, we have set out a clear definition in primary legislation, because at the moment there is no universally agreed definition.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I am afraid that I have been caught rather short on procedure, so I hope the House will indulge me. I did not address Clause 32(5), which is the focus of my manuscript Amendment 45A, but the Minister is now dealing with Clause 32. It would not be appropriate in the circumstances to make a speech on this, but I ask the Minister to respond to two questions.

First, in general terms, what are these acts that are referred to in Clause 32(5) that are criminal and, in some way or other, said to bear upon a quite different issue: sexual orientation, which is an identity? At the moment, it seems as though Clause 32(5) is mixing apples and pears—one on identity, to live a life freely and openly and without fear of persecution, which is what orientation is, and then we have some exclusion or cutting down on acts. I assume that we are not going back 100 years and saying that all those people who are LGBTQI have some inclination to paedophilia: I hope that we are not saying that.

Secondly—

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

I am sorry to interrupt the noble and learned Lord, but I think my noble friend is able to answer the questions that he is posing. Moreover, this is Report, so although noble Lords can rise for small points of clarification, it should be no more than that.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I have one more point of clarification. Could the Minister explain what the position will be for refugee asylum seekers who are under 16 and for whom any sexual relations would be a criminal offence?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I was coming to each of those points in my speech. I am not going to do so just yet, because I was, it is fair to say, on a different point, but I will come to those points in due course when I deal with the manuscript amendment.

Before the noble and learned Lord’s intervention, I was setting out the definition of “particular social group.” I was making the point that there is no universally agreed definition and no authoritative definition of that phrase. There is, as I have said, conflicting tribunal-level case law. For example, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham referred to the Fornah decision of this House in its former judicial capacity. The point there is that it is obiter. That is really important, because that bit is obiter: it is not part of the ratio of the decision. That really underlines my point that we cannot, with great respect, cherry-pick passages of decisions which are obiter, particularly decisions of the Upper Tribunal. Ultimately, it is for the UK, as a member state and signatory, and, for this Parliament—not the Home Office—to interpret the refugee convention. That is what we have sought to do here.

There are two clear conditions, and let me underline the following point: this is not a change in government policy. These conditions do not change the position—they reflect current government policy. The first condition is that members of the group share either an innate characteristic, a common background test that cannot be changed, or a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it.

The second condition is that the group has a distinct identity in the relevant country because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding society. The amendment would mean that a group need meet only one of the characteristics to be considered a particular social group. Obviously, that would significantly widen the scope of people who could qualify as a refugee but, relevantly for this debate, it would erode the concept that people deserve and need protection based on fundamental characteristics that go to the core of who they are, such as their faith or sexuality. It would broaden the definition to cover potentially transient factors such as an individual’s occupation, and that, we say, is incompatible with very purpose of the refugee convention.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Etherton Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Monday 28th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)]

My Lords, may I just ask my noble friend a question, based on listening to this debate and looking at Clause 11 as it stands? Subsections (5) and (6) say that the Secretary of State “may” treat group 1 and 2 refugees differently. My interpretation is that this clause is introducing an element of discretion to the Home Secretary to deal with a situation in a way that allows some difference of treatment, should she see fit—not a requirement that she must do so.

On the point the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, just made in response to my noble friend Lord Horam, I say that the Government are not seeking not to comply with the refugee convention, but seeking to allow for some flexibility and discretion to deal with some of the changing situations in this context, which are very different now from when the convention was introduced 50 or so years ago.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I entirely endorse and support what the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, has said. I do not want to develop this as a lawyer, because the issues can be very well understood by anybody with any degree of common sense. The starting point is that the English courts have reached a view about the meaning of “directly” in the convention, and the contrary view that has been rejected by the courts is the one found in Clause 36; and Clause 11 is to be read with Clause 36. I take issue with the proposition that the introduction of “may” in some way or other alleviates this problem. It does not. The Government have adopted a view about the meaning of the convention, and the meaning of “directly” that is critical to the division between groups 1 and 2, which has been rejected. Perhaps more importantly even than the fact that it was rejected expressly by the English courts is that it has not been adopted by the UNCHR either, which has followed the English jurisdiction since the expert round-table conference in Geneva in November 2001, set up specifically to discuss and agree Article 31.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Etherton Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Thursday 3rd February 2022 Lords Chamber

I recommend a very interesting long essay published in the Guardian earlier this week. It contained a description of what happened during the Second World War, when we ended up creating camps for Jews who had fled from Nazi Germany, again in mortal danger. They were put into camps because the tabloid press had developed a flurry, suggesting that there was a fifth column of people who might be spies in our midst—and they ended up in camps. What came out of the descriptions that they gave was the horrible thing of being questioned about your loyalty and why you were there, which affected people’s mental health. So, when the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, speaks from a particular experience in her family about the effects of this kind of thing, please let us take it to our hearts. We should have learned from the past. I strongly support these amendments.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 61 in my name. Unlike the previous amendments that have been discussed so eloquently, this is not based on specificities in relation to the nature of the accommodation and particular people; it is a compendious description of the standard of accommodation that should be provided to a refugee, in the light of and against the background of the unsatisfactory accommodation provided to date, which, as I said, has been so eloquently elaborated upon by previous speakers.

The compendious description is in three parts, which are as follows. The accommodation

“must be provided in the United Kingdom”,

which ties in with Clause 28—I will deal with that more fully under that heading. It

“must be consistent with the European Convention on Human Rights”—

there can be no objection to that, for obvious reasons. It must also

“be such as is appropriate for the safety and welfare of that refugee having particular regard to any protected characteristic asserted by the refugee, within the meaning of Chapter 1 of Part 2 of the Equality Act 2010, which is innate or immutable.”

I will say a little bit about that last particular part of this compendious description of the appropriate accommodation that should be provided. An asylum seeker who has “innate or immutable” protected characteristics may have particular vulnerabilities—we have heard quite a bit about that—which need to be taken into account in determining what would be appropriate while their particular claim is being assessed, and even if it has been rejected. In the case of LGBTQI+ and single women refugees, for example, it has been clearly established that they may well encounter bullying, sexual harassment and physical violence from other refugees coming from the same or similar countries, such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Uganda, Nigeria, Iran, Iraq and Syria—or, indeed, in the case of LGBTQI+ refugees, any of the more than 70 countries where sex between two people of the same sex is illegal. There have been comprehensive analyses and accounts of this type of abuse in detention centres, and one can find them in Stonewall’s 2016 report No Safe Refuge: Experiences of LGBT Asylum Seekers in Detention, Stephen Shaw’s 2016 report to the Home Office on his Review into the Welfare in Detention of Vulnerable Persons and the 2020 recommendations of the University of Sussex’s School of Law, Politics and Sociology on people seeking asylum in the UK on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.

In relation to the suggestion in the Bill that there could be offshore centres, I will describe in more detail criticisms of the state of accommodation and examples of the sort of violent and oppressive treatment that I have described—particularly the appalling events that have taken place in some of the Australian offshore centres in Papua New Guinea.

[Lord Cashman (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to speak to these amendments and congratulate my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett on so eloquently moving the amendment. I also congratulate the other speakers who have spoken in favour.

I particularly welcome Amendment 61 of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, because, as he said, he introduces into it elements—human rights and the regard to the special provisions within the Equality Act —of which we should be proud and on which we should lead internationally. I give my wholehearted support to that because, as noble Lords have heard me say before—I make no apologies for saying it again and again—in each of these situations, I imagine what I would want as an asylum seeker or refugee. I must imagine myself in that situation. Some who read our newspapers would believe that it is a picnic and a party; it is certainly not at the moment in the United Kingdom. I believe that the signal that we are sending out with the Bill and with these amendments is that asylum seekers and those seeking refuge are not welcome.

To reiterate the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, I remember that, when I was a Member of the European Parliament many years ago, I was approached by a person whose partner was a gay man from Belarus who was seeking asylum here. His asylum process was going through and, suddenly, in the very early hours of the morning, he was arrested and detained at a detention centre. Let us make no bones about it: Clause 12(9) introduces detention centres—they are called “accommodation” centres, but asylum seekers are detained and cannot leave them at will. This is why the minimum conditions that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham outlined are a basic and bare necessity to which we should adhere. This young gay man was placed in a detention centre for a number of weeks and had to sleep in shared accommodation; we managed to get him out because his partner could afford a rather brilliant lawyer to plead the case. While he was there, he contemplated suicide on an hourly basis. This young man is now in a senior job in the United Kingdom, paying his taxes, his dues and his national insurance and abiding by the same rules and laws as everyone else. But he still lives with that scar every single day, and I do not want any other person to experience that.

Placing vulnerable people back into these situations, as outlined by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, only increases stress and the damage to mental health. If LGBTQI people are put back into the communities from which they have fled, they face further oppression within places that should be safe, and it makes it much more difficult for them to prove their LGBTQI status to others.

Someone once said to me, “Oh, being trans is just a feeling, isn’t it?” Well, I cannot prove to anyone that I am a gay man; it is a feeling and one that I have when I look at another human being—although not every single man, interestingly enough. Therefore, we have to deal with these particular issues, not only of LGBTQI people but all of these vulnerable asylum seekers.

I will finish with this. In roughly 1600, Shakespeare co-wrote a play; it was the only play that he co-wrote and it is “Sir Thomas More”. Sir Thomas More is called to London because the citizens of London are rebelling—they had probably read the tabloids of the day—because “the strangers” had made their way from Calais via Dover to London. In a parenthesis to a speech, Thomas More comes out, and with one hand silences the crowd. In that silence, a voice shouts, “Remove them!” Thomas More replies: “You bid that they be removed, the stranger, with their children upon their back, their families at their side, their belongings at their feet. Imagine you are the stranger, with your children upon your back, your family at your side, your belongings at your feet. Imagine you are the stranger and bid that they be removed and show your mountanish inhumanity.” It is a great privilege and pleasure to support these amendments.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Etherton Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Tuesday 1st February 2022 Lords Chamber

In conclusion, I agree with the right reverend Prelate; I am on his team and those who spoke with him. The way forward is family reunion, humanitarian visas and improving the first-tier administration in the Home Office. I once worked there, and the first-tier decision-making is appalling. By the way, seeking to avoid wars over there is quite a good idea if you are worried about the obligation under the international rule of law to give refuge over here. Noble Lords should think about the consequences. If every country—particularly every developed country—around the world adopted the approach in this Bill, would there even be a refugee convention left?

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Lea of Crondall (Non-Afl)]

My Lords—

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble and learned Lord has an amendment and he wishes to speak to it.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I would like to speak to my Amendment 41. It is a very specific amendment relating to Clause 11 as it currently stands. Before I turn to that, however, I will take up the words of my noble and learned friend Lord Brown in relation to providing a legal structure for our discussion here. The first thing, which has been emphasised by a number of noble Lords, though not all, is that Article 31 is central to the discussion. This is because it is obvious that the Government, in relation to Clause 11 and the following clauses, are seeking to interpret and apply their view of Article 31.

It has been suggested that we can ignore the convention because we must have regard to what people think today, but I am afraid that we cannot do that. We are a party to this convention: if we do not like it, the Government will have to recuse themselves from it and try to get other countries to change it. At the moment, however, the convention applies.

Article 31 says that no penalty shall be imposed on account of illegal entry or presence on a refugee who satisfies three requirements. These are the three requirements set out in Clause 11. The first is that the refugee comes directly from the territory of persecution. The second is that the refugee presents themselves without delay to the authorities. The third is that the refugee shows good cause for their illegal entry or presence. That is what Clause 11 is about. However, you cannot read Clause 11 on its own because the subsequent clauses all have some impact on it. In particular, Clause 36 is critical because it seeks to give a definition of coming directly from the territory of persecution.

Noble Lords will see from what I have just described that, although Article 31 says what the Government cannot do—that is, they cannot impose a penalty if those three requirements are satisfied—it does not go on to say that, if they are not satisfied, you can have a differentiation such as that in Clause 11. That is a matter of policy, and I can certainly see the force of the argument for saying that this division that has taken place in Clause 11 is sufficiently inconsistent with the definition of a refugee to make it improper.

There is a more fundamental point: Clause 36, referred to by my noble and learned friend, in seeking to define “coming directly from another country,” says that the requirement is not to be taken as satisfied if the refugee stopped in another country outside the UK, unless they can show that they could not have reasonably been expected to have sought protection under the convention in that country. There is no such qualification in Article 31, and it appears that the Government believe they can, through legislation, elaborate on the meaning of Article 31 in whatever way would best suit the current asylum policy of the day. This, I am afraid, is entirely misguided as a matter of law.

As an international treaty, the convention has the same meaning for each and every member state that signed up to it. It cannot bear different meanings for each member state, according to the policy of the Government of the state for the time being. In England and Wales, the court has, pursuant to its constitutional role of interpreting legislation and written law, held that a refugee may still come directly to a member state, within the meaning of Article 31, even if the refugee passes through one or more intermediate countries, if the final destination of the refugee has always been the state in which the asylum is finally claimed and the halts in the intermediate country or countries are no more than short-term stopovers. My noble and learned friend Lord Brown referred to his judgment in the Adimi case, which decided that very point.

On the global picture, to cut matters short—before I turn to the particular amendment—I am against the division, the separation, between group 1 and group 2 in Clause 11 because it depends on a requirement, or the failure to meet a requirement, which is directly contrary to the convention. Therefore, I certainly object to the division between group 1 and group 2 so long as Clause 36 stays in its present form, with its present definition of coming “directly”, on both logical and legal grounds—quite apart from the matter of general principle, which other noble Lords have mentioned, about the demeaning nature of distinguishing between two different categories.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way, and I agree with his analysis entirely. I just wanted to ask him this question, which the Committee might want to know the answer to: if his view, and the view of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, is right, what would be the consequences of some of these cases—were the Bill to become enacted as it is—if they reached the courts?

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

Strictly speaking, the legal position is that there is no basis for individuals to enforce the convention, but it is enforceable by other member states, which can complain that this country is not complying with its obligations. I would expect that that may well happen. So far as coming here illegally is concerned, my noble and learned friend Lord Brown referred to the Adimi case, which was about whether there was an illegal entry. He held that there was not, because although these refugees passed through intermediate states, they did in fact come directly. So, the individual is placed in a not very satisfactory situation, but the state can certainly be held accountable in the International Court of Justice, and that may well happen.

If I may now descend from the wider view to the narrower, I want to deal with a point I have raised in relation to Clause 11(3) and other similar clauses which impose a requirement on a refugee. The requirement, as it were, or even a breach of it can be overcome if

“they can show good cause for their unlawful entry or presence”,

and there are other provisions saying that this can happen where there is a “reasonable” expectation of something happening or where something is “reasonably practicable”. In all those cases, I have sought to table an amendment which says that, in deciding what is good cause, practicable or reasonable, the immigration officer should take into account any protected characteristic of the refugee within the meaning of the Equality Act which is innate or immutable. I do not want to get too involved in the legality of those terms; basically, that is relevant under decisions in our law to people who claim to be a member of a particular social group. Being a member of particular social group that is being persecuted is one of the categories of refugee in Article 1 of the convention, so I do not want to spend too much time on that. There are nine protected characteristics in the Equality Act, but only some of those will be innate or immutable.

That expression, “innate”, is used in the Bill itself in describing the meaning of a particular social group. Your Lordships will find it in Clause 32, which also expressly states that a

“social group may include a group based on a common characteristic of sexual orientation”.

I want to take up that point to explain why I suggest it is necessary that wherever there is a reference to reasonable cause, reasonable expectation or what is practicable—as I have said—there is an express statement in the Bill that the fact that the refugee has a protected characteristic which is innate or immutable should be taken into account.

I want to take the case of LGBTQI+ people to illustrate the reasons why. First, experience has shown that, all too often, difficulties arising from a characteristic such as that have not been taken sufficiently into account. The approach to LGBTQI+ refugees has often been woefully inadequate and misguided. It was not until the 2010 decision of the Appellate Committee of the Supreme Court in HJ (Iran) that it was established that the Home Office could not refuse an asylum claim from a gay man or lesbian simply on the basis that if they could reasonably be expected to act discreetly in their home country, rather than live openly with their sexuality, they would not suffer persecution. Therefore, it was only some 12 years ago that the Home Office, which fought HJ (Iran) right up to the highest court in the land, was obliged to accept that its approach to LGBTQI+ refugees, in the words of then Supreme Court Justice Sir John Dyson—later Lord Dyson and Master of the Rolls—frustrated

“the humanitarian objective of the Convention and”

denied LGBTQI+ people

“the enjoyment of their fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination.”

Secondly, it is well known that LGBTQI+ refugees face a large number of practical difficulties in claiming asylum. I will address these in due course, when we come to the relevant clauses in the Bill, to show why there has been a failure to satisfy a particular requirement. In the case of Clause 11(2)(b), the issue is whether they presented themselves without delay to the authorities and can show good cause for their unlawful entry. This is the question of clandestine exit. As I have said, it applies also to abused women in abusive relationships coming from a conservative religious community. They cannot go and buy a plane ticket. They cannot indicate in any way in these countries what the reason for their seeking asylum is. The result could be honour killings, stoning or being thrown off a wall, so they keep their characteristics as far as possible to themselves. It is not surprising that they are slow to report themselves or that their routes here are clandestine.

Finally, on this point, the Home Office’s own statistics show the extent to which claims by LGBTQ+ asylum seekers have been wrongly rejected by immigration officers. Experimental statistics published by the Government in August 2019 on lesbian, gay and bisexual asylum claims show there was an initial decision grant rate of 29% in 2018. However, 38% of appeals relating to LGBT asylum applications were allowed in respect of applications made in 2015-18. These published statistics are qualified in some respects but, in broad terms, they reflect the reality of a substantial proportion of successful appeals. That is why, in my suggestion, wherever we see in this Bill as currently framed any reference to good cause, those with protected characteristics that are innate or immutable must be protected by an express reference on the face of the Bill.

[Lord Lea of Crondall (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I think the House would be grateful if somebody, in one sentence, expressed appreciation for the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Clarke of Nottingham. No one doubts that, over the past 50 years or so, he has been a beacon of liberalism within his party. The point he made in this connection is that there is a great dilemma facing us all. Apart from climate change, the dilemma is that, for governance systems in parts of the world—Africa is the continent that springs to mind—we will have to have a new arrangement for crossing the Mediterranean whereby we do not get into all these problems, which are getting worse. That speech is not easy to make, but I just want to say that the honesty and the examination of the dilemmas we all face has been a credit to this House.