Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Etherton Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Wednesday 2nd March 2022 Lords Chamber

The likelihood of the UK Government being able to send back an asylum seeker to any third country that the Government have no agreement with appears unlikely, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has said. The other place may be bored with too many take-out amendments. As an alternative, therefore, Amendment 32, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, to which I have added my name, would ensure that the powers in this clause would be brought into force only once the Government have agreed a formal returns agreement with the third country that the Government claim the asylum seeker has a connection with and to which they intend to send them. Amendment 32 is not as good as taking out the clause but it is better than no change at all, so we will support this amendment in the event of a Division.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, the provisions for an admissible asylum claim, where there is a connection —as defined in new Section 80B, which is to be inserted into the 2002 Act—are quite plainly contrary to the refugee convention and a breach of the UK’s obligations under it. In particular, the conditions in new Section 80C(4), which is where a claim could have been made to a third state—the claimant was present in a state eligible to receive and offer a safe space for him or her—and new Section 80C(5), where the claimant should have made a claim to a safe third state whether or not he or she had ever visited or been associated with it, are both plain breaches of the convention and find no place in its wording.

Condition 4 in new Section 80C is really another way of stating the coming directly from the country of persecution requirement in Clause 11 and Clause 36(1). On Monday this House rejected the Government’s interpretation of Article 31 of the convention in relation to that requirement, by rejecting Clause 11 as part of the Bill. With regard to condition 5 there is nothing whatever in the convention to justify rejecting as inadmissible a claim to asylum by a refugee as defined by the convention in the circumstances specified there. The only explanation, or example, given in the Explanatory Notes, is where the asylum seeker has close family members in the safe third country, whether or not there is another connection of any kind whatever.

Both these conditions are a rewriting of the convention and not a legitimate interpretation of it. The fact that Clause 15 provides, in new Section 80B of the 2002 Act, that a decision that a claim is not admissible because of an asylum seeker’s connection to a safe third state is not subject to a right of appeal, makes Clause 15 an all the more egregious breach of the convention. There is, in effect, no legal redress for the refugee if the Secretary of State has declared the asylum claim inadmissible under the proposed safe third state provisions.

Logically this leads to the conclusion that Clause 15 should be left out of the Bill. I am content, however, to support the alternative approach of the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Paddick, in Amendment 32, which is to fix a start date for the Clause 15 provisions if a formal returns agreement has been reached between the United Kingdom and a third state to which it is said the asylum seeker has a connection.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions. I say at the outset that the Government have been consistent and clear about their belief that people who require international protection should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach, rather than make dangerous and unnecessary journeys to the UK to claim asylum here.

Inadmissibility processes, in particular the first safe country principle, are well established, both in the UK, through long-standing measures in the Immigration Rules, and internationally, including as part of the Common European Asylum System. For example, the procedures directive recognised at recital 22 that

“Member States should not be obliged to assess the substance of an application for international protection where a first country of asylum has granted the applicant refugee status or otherwise sufficient protection and the applicant will be readmitted to that country.”

An overriding objective of these processes is to prevent secondary movements by those who have already reached safety. By definition, that is not about denying safety to those who need it but about having rules which aim to reduce unnecessary travel across borders by those who are already safe.

Amendment 31 seeks to remove third-country inadmissibility powers from primary legislation altogether. It would weaken our ability to deploy inadmissibility processes appropriately and decisively within a strong legal framework, and with that, erode our ability to deter unsafe migration and focus our resources on those most in need of our help.

We are confident that the measures in Clause 15 are fair, appropriate and fully in line with our international obligations. The clause sets out the strict circumstances in which a person’s behaviour or circumstances could lead to inadmissibility action. It requires decision-makers to take account of exceptional mitigating factors that may apply when considering those circumstances. It sets out minimum criteria that must be met by any country before it can be regarded as a safe third country of return, including it being one where a person would not be at risk of persecution, would not experience a breach of Article 3 ECHR rights, and would not be sent to another place where they would be persecuted.

The primary protection afforded refugees under the refugee convention and its protocol is non-refoulement, including no onward refoulement. It is therefore clear that non-refoulement is the primary requirement of “safety”. The same is true for protection afforded under Article 3 of the ECHR. Furthermore, an individual may not meet the definition of refugee under the convention but still require protection. A state may still be safe for them where they will not be refouled, even though they are not a refugee. Therefore, our criteria for determining whether a country is safe, and for subsequently making a claim inadmissible, upholds the UK’s obligations under international law.

Nothing in Clause 15 requires extensive delay in processing inadmissibility decisions. It is right that we consider inadmissibility action and, where appropriate, seek the agreement of the relevant third country, or countries, for the person’s admission there. In some cases, particularly where we are reliant on case-by-case requests to partners, this may take some time, but we have not operated, and will not operate, the inadmissibility system in a way that puts someone in indefinite limbo, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, talked about—able to access neither the asylum system in the country of proposed removal nor the UK system. That would be contrary to the object and purpose of the refugee convention. Our existing processes, which Clause 15 strengthens, are clear that where return cannot be arranged within a reasonable period, the person’s claim would be admitted to the UK asylum system for substantive consideration. That ensures compatibility with the refugee convention.

Individuals will have an opportunity to explain their actions and circumstances prior to claiming asylum in the UK, and that explanation will be carefully considered in deciding whether an inadmissibility decision is appropriate. They will also be able to make representations on why any safe third state is not safe in their particular circumstances. Any decision to declare a claim inadmissible and remove an individual will be subject to the standard principles of public law, including rationality. The inadmissibility provisions are therefore compatible with the refugee convention. For these reasons, I do not agree with the amendment seeking to leave out the clause.

Turning to Amendments 32 and 86, as we have stated on previous occasions, the UK-EU joint political declaration made clear the UK’s intention to engage in bilateral discussions with the most concerned member states to discuss suitable practical arrangements on issues around asylum and illegal migration. We continue to do that with EU member states on these issues. We have been clear that formal agreements, though valuable, are not the only way in which an inadmissible asylum seeker may be accepted for removal by a safe third country. I think it is right to seek removals on a case-by-case basis where appropriate and, with the consent of the relevant country, make that removal. This approach has formed part of our inadmissibility process since the changes to the Immigration Rules in December 2020—and, until the Bill’s provisions come into force, we will continue to rely on the Immigration Rules.

The structure of case-by-case removal arrangements will not be uniform for each country of removal. A wide range of factors will still affect the formality and administration around such removals, not least the diverse organisational structures in place in the third country, the levels of centralised and decentralised decision-making, and other circumstances that may be specific to the individual. These arrangements will inevitably vary, but the framework in which cases are considered, within which third countries are assessed for safety and claimants are progressed to removal, will not. We have a clear and consistent approach to these fundamental and important issues, and we stand by our international obligations.

I do not agree that these provisions are unworkable without formal agreements in place. We aim to make the process work as a whole and to return people where appropriate. Where it becomes clear that an individual cannot be removed to a safe country, either because we do not have formal returns agreements in place or because a case-by-case removal cannot be agreed within a reasonable period, the individual’s asylum claim will be considered in the UK. To go back to the assertion made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I say that this will ensure that we do not keep people in limbo, in accordance with our obligations under the refugee convention. I do not think this amendment is required and ask that it be withdrawn.

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I think the noble Lord, Lord Horam, makes the mistake of thinking that this House trusts the Government. Of course, it does not—or rather, by and large, the majority in this House does not, because the Government have broken their word so many times.

I will speak briefly as well, because I am very concerned that we can vote as much as possible but I do not understand why the Government are trying to move people to other countries. This makes no sense, and it is one of the many ways that the Government are trying to avoid their obligations. Instead of trying to deport people while the Government dither about processing their claims, we should provide them with decent accommodation and work so that they can start to retrieve some of their lives. If there was ever a moment when this Government should come out against the far-right ideology within their own ranks, this is it.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I entirely agree with and support what has been said by the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham and the noble Lord, Lord Cashman. Offshoring while an asylum seeker is having their claim assessed is wrong in principle, oppressive in practice and, critically, lacking sufficient safeguards under the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Horam, mentioned Australia’s policy of offshoring as a successful process, as he did on Monday. On the contrary, from a humanitarian perspective, Australia’s offshoring shows all the defects and injustices of such a policy.

In Committee, I mentioned the 2013 Amnesty International report This is Breaking People, highlighting a range of serious human rights concerns at the immigration detention centre on Manus Island, Papua New Guinea. I also mentioned and quoted from Amnesty’s follow-up report, which stated that on 16 and 17 February 2014, violence at the detention centre led to the death of one young man and injuries to more than 62 asylum seekers. Indeed, some reports suggested that up to 147 were injured. I quoted more from this report in Committee, but it is not appropriate or necessary to repeat that now.

What is absolutely critical—here I take serious issue with the noble Lord, Lord Horam—is that before any such notion of offshoring can be pursued by the Government under this or any other legislation, certain assurances have to be provided in primary legislation, none of which is addressed in the Bill, the Explanatory Notes or any other guidance by the Government. First, how will asylum seekers have access to legal advisers with knowledge of the law and practice relating to UK asylum claims, which is complex and difficult? Is that going to be done four and half thousand miles away on Ascension Island? Secondly, legal aid and advice is available to refugees in the United Kingdom. Is there anything to suggest that it will be available to refugees in offshoring holding centres? If conditions, as in Australia, in the proposed offshore centre are so bad as to cause physical or mental harm to refugees—whether through physical conditions in the centre or, in the case of single women or LGBTQI people, for example, because of discrimination, harassment, bullying and violence from staff or other asylum seekers—will they be able to have recourse or bring proceedings in the UK, or will they be restricted to such remedies as might be available in the foreign countries?

These are fundamental questions. They cannot be left outstanding while individual arrangements with separate countries are being negotiated or considered. They have to form the legal framework within which any such discussions should take place and be seen on the face of any legislation, including this Bill. Although I raised these points in Committee, the Government have not given any answer on any of those issues and, until they have done so, I suggest that these amendments necessarily have to be carried.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I want to briefly restate what I said in Committee. Not only is the Home Office seeking the power to remove an asylum seeker to any country while their claim is being considered but it is seeking to remove them to a country and then tell that country, “If you think they are a refugee, you take them; they’re not our problem any more”.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, has just said, according to Amnesty and Migrant Voice, offshoring by Australia effectively excluded legal, judicial, medical, humanitarian and media scrutiny. It has cost it over half a billion pounds a year, according to the British Red Cross, and failed to stop those seeking asylum, including by boat. Evidence to the Public Bill Committee in the other place from independent academics supports these conclusions. The UNHCR has

“voiced its profound concerns about such practices which have ‘caused extensive, unavoidable suffering for far too long’, left people “languishing in unacceptable circumstances’”

and denied them “common decency”.

I accept what the noble Lord, Lord Horam, says: the Government should be looking at every option, but surely they should be taking into consideration the evidence that I have just cited and considered any counterevidence. Then, having worked out its practicalities and decided whether it is to go ahead, they should bring forward legislation—not bring forward legislation and then decide whether they are going to use it.

Clause 28 and Schedule 3, as drafted, should not be part of the Bill. We support all the amendments in this group that seek to prevent anyone being removed from the UK while their asylum claim is being considered, particularly Amendment 35, to which I have added my name.

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[Lord Cashman (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall be brief and summarise the position I took in Committee. I support all the amendments in this group, particularly those relating to Clauses 31 and 32. I do so because the amendments will protect the most vulnerable, including women and girls who have been subjected to gender-based violence and abuse and the long-term harm those cause. They will also protect other vulnerable groups with protected characteristics, and recognise the immense and deep trauma such individuals have suffered but often deny because of a deep sense of shame. The amendments also restore the principle of a civilised and humane approach to asylum and ensure that we conform with the UN refugee convention and our international legal obligations. Finally, I have been deeply moved by the letters and some postcards I have received, particularly from women and other vulnerable groups, who express that they have much to fear from the clauses and the effects that they will have on their lives.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I have two amendments in this group, but they are quite distinct from what has been debated so far and distinct from each other. One is concerned with Clause 32(5) and the other concerns Clause 36(1). Because the amendment to Clause 32(5) is a manuscript amendment tabled only today, if I may, I shall start with that to Clause 36(1), because your Lordships will be familiar with the background to that.

Clause 36(1) seeks to define, for the purposes of the convention, the meaning of coming “directly” to the United Kingdom from a country of persecution. The same definition was relevant to Clause 11, because that cross-refers to the provisions of Clause 36, so we have in Clause 36 as a matter of proposed domestic legislation and as a matter of interpretation of Article 31 of the convention the same definition of arriving “directly”. Your Lordships will recall that the issue was whether, as the Government contend, if an asylum seeker passes through an intermediate state on the way to the United Kingdom from the place of persecution—through a place considered to be somewhere they ought reasonably to have applied for refugee status—they have not come “directly”. In fact, the only way they could come directly, if they are surrounded by other countries—Ukraine is a good example—would be to fly.

The House rejected that definition, because it accepted the amendment to remove Clause 11. It expressly rejected that definition of arriving “directly”. Amendment 46 simply takes out the corresponding provision in Clause 36(1), which was incorporated in Clause 11 but would otherwise simply remain at large but, so far as I can see, would have no relevance whatever to anything else in the Bill. If I am wrong on that and there is some purpose in retaining Clause 36(1), although that interpretation of arriving “directly” was rejected by the House when it approved the removal of Clause 11, the House would want to know what it is being retained for: why it is being retained and in relation to what other provisions in the Bill. My amendment would remove Clause 36(1) from the Bill.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

This is another of those occasions when saying “From these Benches, we support” and not much more must not be taken as any lack of support for all the amendments in this group, nor any dilution of the points made.

I just want to register concern about Clause 32(2). The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, spoke to this and I record our support, particularly for the amendment that deals with what is meant by “a particular social group”: that you do not qualify unless the group in question is perceived as being different by surrounding society. As has been pointed out to noble Lords in briefings, a trafficked woman would need to show not only that her status as a trafficked woman is an innate characteristic but that trafficked women as a group are perceived as having a distinct identity in the country of origin. That is very difficult to show. Judged by the perceptions of the society in her country? It would be very challenging to find objective evidence on that, and on that being a distinct group. It is very dangerous to suggest that one can tell those things by looking—or, rather more accurately, perceiving.

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I remind the House that far from being clear what the position is in law, there has been a degree of confusion in this area for many years. One can cherry-pick Upper Tribunal decisions from here, there or anywhere, but I am afraid the fact is that there is a clear mismatch between how the concept of “particular social group” has been defined in current legislation and government policy in different tribunal judgments and how it has been interpreted in some courts. Therefore, we have set out a clear definition in primary legislation, because at the moment there is no universally agreed definition.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I am afraid that I have been caught rather short on procedure, so I hope the House will indulge me. I did not address Clause 32(5), which is the focus of my manuscript Amendment 45A, but the Minister is now dealing with Clause 32. It would not be appropriate in the circumstances to make a speech on this, but I ask the Minister to respond to two questions.

First, in general terms, what are these acts that are referred to in Clause 32(5) that are criminal and, in some way or other, said to bear upon a quite different issue: sexual orientation, which is an identity? At the moment, it seems as though Clause 32(5) is mixing apples and pears—one on identity, to live a life freely and openly and without fear of persecution, which is what orientation is, and then we have some exclusion or cutting down on acts. I assume that we are not going back 100 years and saying that all those people who are LGBTQI have some inclination to paedophilia: I hope that we are not saying that.

Secondly—

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

I am sorry to interrupt the noble and learned Lord, but I think my noble friend is able to answer the questions that he is posing. Moreover, this is Report, so although noble Lords can rise for small points of clarification, it should be no more than that.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I have one more point of clarification. Could the Minister explain what the position will be for refugee asylum seekers who are under 16 and for whom any sexual relations would be a criminal offence?

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I was coming to each of those points in my speech. I am not going to do so just yet, because I was, it is fair to say, on a different point, but I will come to those points in due course when I deal with the manuscript amendment.

Before the noble and learned Lord’s intervention, I was setting out the definition of “particular social group.” I was making the point that there is no universally agreed definition and no authoritative definition of that phrase. There is, as I have said, conflicting tribunal-level case law. For example, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham referred to the Fornah decision of this House in its former judicial capacity. The point there is that it is obiter. That is really important, because that bit is obiter: it is not part of the ratio of the decision. That really underlines my point that we cannot, with great respect, cherry-pick passages of decisions which are obiter, particularly decisions of the Upper Tribunal. Ultimately, it is for the UK, as a member state and signatory, and, for this Parliament—not the Home Office—to interpret the refugee convention. That is what we have sought to do here.

There are two clear conditions, and let me underline the following point: this is not a change in government policy. These conditions do not change the position—they reflect current government policy. The first condition is that members of the group share either an innate characteristic, a common background test that cannot be changed, or a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it.

The second condition is that the group has a distinct identity in the relevant country because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding society. The amendment would mean that a group need meet only one of the characteristics to be considered a particular social group. Obviously, that would significantly widen the scope of people who could qualify as a refugee but, relevantly for this debate, it would erode the concept that people deserve and need protection based on fundamental characteristics that go to the core of who they are, such as their faith or sexuality. It would broaden the definition to cover potentially transient factors such as an individual’s occupation, and that, we say, is incompatible with very purpose of the refugee convention.