Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Empey and Lord Norton of Louth

Monday 21st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, Amendment 27 seeks to leave out subsection (1) of Clause 2. My purpose is to tease out the reasons for this provision.

Although this is termed the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, it is not a measure providing for fixed-term Parliaments. It stipulates a fixed term unless certain conditions are met. There may be deviations from the set term of five years under Clause 1(5) and Clause 2(1) and (2). The Bill thus seeks to move from a flexible to a semi-flexible or, if one prefers, a semi-fixed Parliament in terms of its duration within a maximum life of five years.

The Bill proposes two safety valve mechanisms enabling a parliamentary election to be held prematurely. One is the Dissolution Motion introduced by Clause 2(1) and the other is the vote of confidence covered in Clause 2(2). In evidence to the Constitution Committee, Professor Robert Hazell, director of the Constitution Unit at University College London, said that he was,

“slightly puzzled why the Government sees the need for a dual threshold”.

Although the committee concluded that it was appropriate to include two different safety mechanisms, I wish to probe why we need this particular mechanism.

I know the argument that this provision ensures that the House, in the event of some unbreakable deadlock, does not have to engineer a vote of no confidence in order to ensure an early election. However, the problem with this provision is that it sets the bar at a high level and, as a result, the Bill fails to deal with the situation where there has been a breakdown within the Government but the Opposition are not prepared to support a Dissolution Motion. The Opposition may not be able to muster enough votes to pass a Motion of no confidence, but they may find it politically advantageous not to vote for a Dissolution. If the Government resign without either a no confidence Motion or a Dissolution Motion having been passed, then the 14-day trigger is not engaged. We could have a period of instability, with no Government but with no election in prospect either. I appreciate the situation is unlikely but, as long as it is not impossible, we need to consider it.

I am not clear why there needs to be the two-thirds hurdle in the context of the Bill. I am familiar with the fact that some legislatures have a two-thirds provision, but to what extent does this exist in the context of a dual as opposed to a single safety valve? Is it not the case that the two-thirds provision in other legislatures applies more often than not in respect of a confidence Motion? Perhaps my noble and learned friend can tell us which other national legislatures utilise an extraordinary majority for the passage of a Dissolution Motion.

[Lord Empey]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. If my memory serves me correctly, the Northern Ireland Assembly needs 70 per cent of its Members to vote to bring the life of the Assembly to a conclusion, albeit subject to the assent of the Secretary of State.