Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Bill [HL] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Eatwell
Main Page: Lord Eatwell (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Eatwell's debates with the HM Treasury
(13 years, 2 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I express my gratitude to the Minister and his team and to Mr David Hertzell of the Law Commission for their briefing on the Bill, which was very helpful indeed.
In debates on measures brought before Parliament, the claim is often made—and perhaps even sometimes believed—that the consequences will be wide-ranging. In the case of this Bill, it is likely that the claim will indeed be true—and perhaps not only in the United Kingdom. For the Bill proposes a fundamental change in the structure of the insurance contract from a requirement that the purchaser discloses everything that will be material to the insurer’s decision to insure to a requirement in Clause 2(2) that the purchaser,
“take reasonable care not to make a misrepresentation to the insurer”.
In effect, the purchaser must answer carefully the question posed by the insurer. That is a dramatic shift of responsibility. Even though it is claimed that the Bill essentially clarifies what is accepted practice under the FSA’s insurance regulation and the various provisions of the Financial Ombudsman’s scheme, it seems that the Bill goes further than mere clarification.
One of the fundamental principles of insurance is that which is referred to as “uberrimae fidei”, or “utmost good faith”. That principle is fundamental to insurance law throughout common-law jurisdictions. A quick internet search revealed exactly the same principle as cited in the UK also cited in India, Ireland, Australia and the United States. Yet the Bill makes it clear in Clause 2(5)(a) that,
“any rule of law to the effect that a consumer insurance contract is one of utmost good faith is modified to the extent required by the provisions of this Act”.
Given that this legislation makes such a fundamental change to the principle if not to the practice of consumer insurance, it would be helpful if the Minister would clarify a number of points. First, have I interpreted correctly the shift in the onus of good faith? Is it indeed the case that the Bill characterises the information on which an insurance contract is based as deriving from the responsibility of the insurer to ask the questions and from the requirement that the consumer answer the questions with “reasonable care”, as under Clause 3? Also, is it indeed the case that there is no onus on the consumer to provide information that is not asked for—that is, there is no requirement to answer questions that are not asked, however relevant the information may be to the insurer?
As a supplementary point, what is the position if the consumer thinks that unasked-for information might be relevant to the contract but, not being asked, either concludes that the insurer believes the information to be not relevant or believes that it is not his or her responsibility to supply the information? In other words, will Clause 3(1) result in the addition of catch-all questions to insurance contracts, such as, “Is there any other information that might be relevant?”, hence substantially negating the declared intention of this Bill? Would that question be “clear and specific”? Is such a question permissible?
As a further supplementary, what questions are not permissible? As the noble Lord will be aware, the European Union seems likely to rule questions associated with gender as being out of order in motor insurance. Is this likely to become a general rule? Are questions about race permissible when they are relevant, as in the health issues associated with, say, sickle cell anaemia?
Secondly, why is there no responsibility on the insurer not merely to be clear and specific in questioning but also to demonstrate the relevance of questions asked? If questions that are indeed relevant when embodied in the insurer’s statistical analysis do not appear relevant to the consumer and their relevance is not demonstrated, the consumer may be led into treating the exercise more casually than is appropriate. This may be particularly true in medical insurance, in which the relevance of important issues may be very obscure to the consumer.
As I understand it, Clause 4(1)(b) establishes appropriate materiality in legal terms, but to the lay man, and indeed to the consumer, that clause is completely obscure. I imagine that if I asked any non-lawyer in this Room to explain how that clause established materiality, they would be hard pressed to do so. Since this is consumer legislation, should not the wording be clear and specific and not as obscure as Clause 4(1)(b)? I believe that the clause needs to be rewritten.
Thirdly, given that the insurers are now no longer protected by the catch-all requirement that the consumer must provide everything that would be material to the insurer’s decision to insure, it might be expected that the questions asked in proposal forms would become far more wide-ranging and comprehensive than has previously been the case. The very complexity of questions required to cover every eventuality might well create problems in and of itself. Are there to be guidelines to insurance companies defining the character and range of questions to be asked? Will the ABI, for example, provide such guidelines?
Fourthly, it is a familiar problem in credit analysis that a consumer’s credit rating is inappropriate because information has been logged wrongly or analysis has been faulty, or for a number of other reasons. In these circumstances, consumers have access to their credit ratings and a right of appeal. Is a similar facility available to consumers of insurance products and, if it exists, will the availability of this facility and its importance be widely publicised subsequent to the passage of this Bill? Will the facility be available, or is it available on the internet? In this context, are consumers deemed to know to what they have access? I know that this is a common outcome of business law, but it would be entirely inappropriate in consumer law.
Fifthly, how are all these matters to be played out in the process of renewal of an insurance contract referred to in Clause 2(3)? What if the request “to confirm or amend”, based on the original questions asked, does not in fact cover relevant changed circumstances? Is the consumer required to volunteer such information and how, under the terms of the Bill, is he or she to determine what is relevant? Would the insurer be allowed to ask the catch-all question, “Provide all other information that might be relevant at this stage”? If so, once again the Bill is otiose. It is particularly unclear in Clause 2(3), which therefore requires redrafting. It says that an insurance contract renewal is in fact a new contract. Renewal is not a concept known to insurance law. Should not the clause be redrafted to make that clear? What estimate has the Treasury made of the increase in the cost of insurance consequent on this legislation?
Before ending, I shall turn to the questions raised by paragraph (a) of Clause l, which seeks to define “consumer”, and by Clause 6, which is on warranties and representations. It may be—I have been unable to find out—that the concept of the consumer is defined in other relevant legislation, but as drafted in this Bill the definition is unreasonably vague. For example, taking out insurance against debilitating illness is typically motivated by the economic well-being of the sufferer and could not be said to be unrelated to the individual’s trade, business or profession. That would be especially the case if the physical or mental capacity that is insured is a necessary component of the performance of the profession. For example, for a ballet dancer, the body is the tool of his or her profession; it is the instrument of his or her art. Would any general health insurance taken out by a ballet dancer be insurance contracted by a consumer or not? Another, less exotic, example of the ambiguity of this definition of a consumer comes to mind. If I insure my BlackBerry, am I a consumer or not? The expression “wholly or mainly” is far too vague for me to know and, by the way, is unknown to insurance law.
On a related point, why was the legislation not extended to cover small businesses or even the micro-businesses to which the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, referred, which at present suffer the same disadvantage as consumers? Indeed, the boundary between a consumer and a small business is often very vague—take my BlackBerry example. The clause requires further attention. It is not satisfactory as it stands.
On the question of insurance warrants, Clause 6(2) makes a valuable amendment to the law on misrepresentation, but this does not eliminate the generally destructive power of a warrant related to a condition of insurance. Given the drafting of Clause 3, which refers to “reasonable care”, and the remedies outlined in Schedule 1, would it not be appropriate to eliminate the role of warrants entirely from consumer insurance?
This is an important Bill, which is designed to pursue a worthy purpose. It is entirely supported by this side. However, it is not clear that the present drafting is sufficient to bear the weight of the major philosophical and practical change that is embedded within it. We will have the opportunity to pursue these matters at a later stage. In the mean time, answers to the questions that I have posed will greatly facilitate preparation of any necessary amendments.
I nearly forgot: as far as the Committee stage is concerned, I understand that under the rules governing Law Commission Bills it is possible to take evidence in Committee. Given that and given the defects in the drafting of the Bill as presently tabled, are the Government intending to call expert witnesses in Committee?
My Lords, I start my response to what has been a helpful discussion by thanking the noble Lords who have taken the trouble to contribute this afternoon. The points have been wide-ranging and constructive. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, for his faith that I can respond so quickly to the huge number of very detailed points that he raised in his constructive intervention. He may forgive me in advance if I do not manage to cover all the details. Of course, I will write to the noble Lord and copy that to others who have taken part in the debate this afternoon.
My Lords, I entirely understand the noble Lord’s position and am quite happy to receive written answers to my questions.
I am grateful for that, because some of this has been a touch technical and some rather fundamental. I will talk about the process in a moment, as my noble friend Lord Higgins asked about the procedure for Law Commission Bills. The fact that it is a Law Commission Bill and has, as my noble friend pointed out, been the subject of a big report subsequently consulted on by the commission means that we can be fairly confident that all the fundamentals of the law have been considered in great detail. Otherwise, this Bill would not be going through this procedure. This is the first Bill to go through the Law Commission procedure since the procedure was made permanent last year. I am pleased that, as my noble friend Lord Higgins recognised, this innovation has allowed for parliamentary time to be found for this legislation, which would clearly otherwise have been difficult.
On what happens next, the important thing is that this is not in any sense a fast-track procedure, because the Bill will follow the usual parliamentary process but for two exceptions. First, the substantive Second Reading debate is held in Committee—that is what we are doing this afternoon—rather than on the Floor of the House. Secondly, the Committee stage will be, as the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, said, taken by a Special Public Bill Committee, which is indeed empowered to take evidence from witnesses as well as to conduct the usual clause-by-clause examination of the Bill. I have no present intention to suggest from the Government’s side that we should call witnesses, but that is allowed for in the procedures. For the benefit of my noble friend, I draw the Committee’s attention to paragraph 8.44 of the Companion to Standing Orders, which says:
“The House agreed in 2008, on a trial basis, that second reading debates on certain Law Commission bills should be held in the Moses Room … The Committee debates the bill, and reports to the House that it has considered the bill. The second reading motion is then normally taken without debate in the House, though it remains possible, in the event of opposition, for amendments to be tabled or a vote to take place on the motion. Law Commission bills are normally committed to a special public bill committee”.
I hope that that is as clear as it can be. I do not know whether that allows for speakers lists, gaps and things this afternoon, but I am grateful that my noble friend got to his feet and contributed to the discussions in his usual lively way.
As I said in opening, we believe that this Bill is necessary in order for the law to catch up with best practice. It will also ensure that the legal duty of consumers is reasonable and clear. In answer to the questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, in this area, I am not sure whether it is right to look on it in the context of shifting the onus of good faith. It is clear that it is up to the insurer to ask the questions and to the consumer to answer them, with the potential consequences of misrepresentation in the way that I outlined in opening. The effect of this is to shift the burden between the insurer and the consumer in the consumer’s favour as against the law as it stands in the 1906 Act. That is entirely appropriate.
It is worth reiterating in this context—I think that this is the point on which my noble friend Lady Kramer asked for confirmation—that any information that the consumer misrepresented or failed to disclose must be proven to have been relevant to the content and/or the price of a policy before the insurer is entitled to a remedy. There is a shift in the legal position, but it is a shift towards a position that is in line with industry best practice and the standards that are currently imposed by the Financial Ombudsman Service.
I am particularly grateful to my noble friend Lady Kramer for drawing attention to a shocking but classic case of the sort that this Bill is intended to obviate and to ensure does not happen in future. The case that she put forward was interesting because it was a question not of unreasonable loss to the consumer—as I understand it, after a two-and-a-half-year struggle, the FOS found in favour of the insurer—but, as was explained to us, of the very real distress and the time and effort that had to go into getting to the right answer. That should be eliminated in similar situations as a result of this legislation.
As I said in opening, the industry will benefit, as we anticipate a reduction in the costs of handing complaints internally and with the ombudsman. In that context, I can confirm to my noble friend Lady Noakes that we will be mindful of the burdens of implementation on the industry. She rightly and helpfully pointed out the various other initiatives that will bite on training, information and standards of scripts, whether in relation to the retail distribution review or simplified advice. Her points are well taken.
My noble friend Lord Higgins referred to paragraph 10.30 of the Law Commission’s report, which discusses the pros and cons of giving legal effect to industry guidance. My noble friend quoted from paragraph 10.30, but the report discusses the issue at some length in paragraphs 10.32 to 10.43. The Law Commission decided not to include such a provision for the reasons set out in paragraph 10.38, principally because the role of guidance is different from that of legislation. I think that the discussion is extensive in the Law Commission’s report.
Good. I, too, am grateful that we have nailed that one.
On the other questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, there is first this difficult issue about permissible questions and specifically questions of gender and race. They are made particularly difficult by the recent judgment of the court in relation to motor insurance. This issue is dealt with elsewhere and not in the Bill, which is solely focused on the transmission of information in the context of underwriting risk. It is not part of the scope of the Bill to discuss questions of discrimination or equalities legislation—nor should it be.
On the definition of consumers and micro-businesses, we discussed informally last week what would happen with respect to the insurance of the foot of a ballet dancer or a footballer. Maybe we could call this the “David Beckham’s foot” question. The Explanatory Notes on Clause 1 define a consumer as,
“an ‘individual’ who is acting wholly or mainly for non-business purposes. Thus the consumer must be a natural person, rather than a legal person (such as a company or corporation). The definition expressly provides for mixed use contracts”—
for example, the insurance for a personal car that is sometimes used for business travel to be defined as a consumer insurance contract. It means that the Bill will not apply to individuals purchasing insurance that is mainly for purposes related to their trade, business or profession, which would clearly be the case in some of the examples that have been discussed.
Lastly, on the cost of insurance, HM Treasury has not made an estimate of the impact of the Bill on insurance premiums. However, we have estimated that the net impact will be savings for the industry—that is, when we take account of the initial training costs and the savings as a result of fewer FOS complaints among other factors. On the basis that the industry should have net savings from this Bill being enacted, there is absolutely no reason to believe that there should be any additional cost passed on to consumers. In relation to the overall cost of insurance, these are relatively small marginal costs but ones that would impact favourably—that is, downwards—on insurance costs.
I should perhaps explain the point about cost. Given that the catch-all clause from the Marine Insurance Act 1906 is removed, necessarily the range of risks to which the insurance company is exposed will be greater. Given that, it is likely that the premium charge will be greater. That was the point that I was making.
My Lords, I do not believe that the range of risk will be any greater. Under this Bill, the range of risk to which the insurers are exposed will be brought in line with the current industry best practice and the standards to which insurers are held under FSA rules and by the FOS. There is no extension of the range of liabilities; there is merely—this is an important “merely”—an alignment, a clarification and an important legal codification of where the duties lie at the point at which the insurance contract is taken out. There is also clarification of the remedies—the remedies that are already applied by the FOS—should a misrepresentation occur. So, yes, the position under the law will change from that of the 1906 Act, but in substance the Bill will put insurers in a position that they are already in under current practice. Therefore, I would not accept that there is a greater range of liabilities and costs to which the insurer is liable; if anything, as I have said, there will be a modest saving because of the clarity that the new architecture will bring.
I have gone on at some length in response to the important questions that have been raised. I will sweep up anything else that I have not had the chance to cover and get back to noble Lords in good time ahead of the Special Public Bill Committee. I hope that I have, nevertheless, responded to as many points as I can this afternoon. I look forward to further discussion in the Special Public Bill Committee in due course.