Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Debate between Lord Dodds of Duncairn and Baroness Altmann

Committee stage
Monday 31st October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

My Lords, it is indeed a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, with whom I had the honour of serving alongside for many years in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. I understand that he continues to serve there with great distinction, so it is a pleasure to hear what he has to say.

On the issue of Article 16, I say with the greatest of respect: I well remember that, when this was being discussed and advocated by us and others, there was agreement that some of the articles in the Northern Ireland protocol should be suspended. Article 16 was absolutely opposed tooth and nail by the vast bulk of everybody, not just in Northern Ireland on the nationalist side but both here in this House and in the other place. In the last debate, I quoted statements from leading members of what was then Her Majesty’s Opposition, including the Liberal Democrat Benches—as well as others on the Conservative Benches—who were vociferous and vehement in their opposition to any notion of the implementation of Article 16. The Irish Government went so far as to say that it would completely upend the Belfast agreement, which seems to be the chosen form of words when something is proposed that is not liked. I hear with interest what noble Lords are saying now about Article 16, but that certainly was not what was being said a few months ago. Noble Lords should look back in Hansard to what the situation actually was. The reality is that Article 16—whether or not it was invoked—was not going to solve all the problems.

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords—

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

Other Members have had their say so I am going to proceed in terms of my speech.

The amendment before us from the noble Baronesses, Lady Suttie and Lady Ritchie, has the intent of saying that the Bill’s operative clauses should not proceed unless there is approval from the Northern Ireland Assembly. I note, however, that this is not by cross-community vote. What is fascinating about people who defend and say they are defending the Belfast agreement—as amended by St Andrews, of course—is that they say, “Let’s give a vote to the Northern Ireland Assembly”. Regardless of whether or not it is reserved, the fact is that you are giving a power to the Assembly, and the Assembly in Northern Ireland operates by cross-community vote: there must be a majority of unionists, a majority of nationalists and an overall majority for all major pieces of legislation to pass. If it is subject to a majority vote, it can be turned into a cross-community vote by a petition of concern. Yet, uniquely, the proponents of the Belfast agreement only ever want to give a vote on the protocol issues to the Northern Ireland Assembly without a cross-community vote. So, if we are going to be consistent about defending the Belfast agreement and the institutions thereof, this amendment should include provision for a cross-community vote.

The other big flaw of course is that there is no such requirement for the absolute implementation of the protocol itself. I pointed out that Article 50 of the joint declaration in December 2017, signed by the EU and the United Kingdom Government, said that there could be no regulatory difference between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom unless it was by a cross-community vote of the Assembly and the Executive in Northern Ireland. So that is what should be the priority. As my noble friend Lord Browne said, there needs to be a prior step before we go down this route, which is to ask whether the protocol has the assent of the Northern Ireland Assembly on the basis of the Assembly’s decision-making powers, which are by cross-community vote.

It has also been said that the democratic deficit argument is not valid because there are other countries that have no say in laws that govern them. Norway was cited. Of course, Norway is a member of the European Economic Area but is not a member of the customs union, so it does not have EU customs laws applied to it in the way that Northern Ireland has. That is a significant difference. But the other major difference is this: the whole of Norway is a member of the single market. Northern Ireland is separated out from the rest of the United Kingdom, so one part of the United Kingdom is subject to EU laws while the rest goes its own way, making its own laws and being free to make its own decisions. Given that Northern Ireland does more trade with the rest of the United Kingdom than with the rest of the world, Europe and the Republic of Ireland put together, that makes no sense whatever. So it is entirely wrong to suggest, “Oh, well, there’s no difference between Northern Ireland and places like Norway”—there is a world of difference. I am surprised that that has not been noted.

Then we have the argument that it is the Government who have set out the position as to what needs to be done in relation to the protocol and putting it right. They issued a Command Paper in July 2021 and have now published this Bill. A lot of it is good in terms of restoring democratic control over laws that apply to Northern Ireland; it goes some way to rectifying that, although it does not do everything that we would like. Then we are told that if the DUP do not get on board with this—the Government’s proposals—then somehow the rules for power sharing in Northern Ireland should be cast aside. Again, I ask defenders of the Belfast agreement: where are you when people say, “Let’s just do away with the cross-community mechanisms and go for majority voting”? We have not had majority rule in Northern Ireland for over 50 years.

But when people talk about the Assembly not functioning for a large bulk of the period since the Belfast agreement, remember that between 2003 and 2007 it was down because of the actions of Sinn Féin and its military wing, the IRA, in robbing the Northern Bank. The Government rightly insisted that it would have to give up its weaponry before it could be considered fit to have a place in the Government of Northern Ireland. For four years—and between 2017 and 2020, again Sinn Féin kept the Assembly down and boycotted the Executive—would not agree to re-form it—on the issue of language and culture. But, as soon as there is any suggestion that the DUP insists on the democratic rights of people in Northern Ireland to be treated in the same way as other citizens of the United Kingdom, to have their say and vote on laws that affect them, we have the defenders, it appears, of the Belfast agreement saying, “No, let’s jettison all that, let’s change the rules”. Well, I am afraid that really is a recipe for disaster.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Debate between Lord Dodds of Duncairn and Baroness Altmann

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, with all due respect to the noble Lord, Lord Bew, and in due deference to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I will now inject the perspective of an economist and businessperson.

I support Amendments 3 and 67 and will try to inject a different perspective here. The arguments about protecting the Good Friday agreement are of course important and real. However, it seems that, despite arguing that the UK has contributed to the problem—which is essentially part of the reason why the doctrine of necessity seems unable to be applied here—there are options open to the United Kingdom to respect the Good Friday agreement, including maintaining regulatory alignment. Were regulatory alignment to be maintained, the east-west problem would not necessarily arise—because the EU could be reassured that there is less of a threat to its single market—and the north-south element would also not arise. If the UK wanted to diverge regulatorily, it has the option to negotiate that. So there are practical resolutions within our power to protect the Good Friday agreement and the protocol.

If we cast our minds back to the awful Brexit and post-Brexit periods, an assurance was given to noble Lords, including myself, that there would be technical arrangements—alternative arrangements—that would permit the flow of goods across the border that could be tracked, with trusted traders and technology being introduced, that would mean that we would not have these problems of customs procedures. If those arrangements were to be in place, the problem would not arise. So again, the UK Government have the option of saying, “We will maintain regulatory alignment until we have introduced those arrangements”. That would allow us to be in a position where we would not be breaking international law.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Bew, when he said that, if there is a problem, we should try to find a compromise, but that again means negotiation and using the facilities we have signed up to ourselves rather than threatening to blow up the whole agreement. I urge my noble friends on the Front Bench to try to get away from the magical thinking that we can somehow square this circle by threats or by breaking international law—or even by threatening to break international law—and instead to get around the table and negotiate a reasonable way forward that gets away from this kind of argument.

[Lord Dodds of Duncairn (DUP)]

My Lords, this debate illustrates one of the issues deeply affecting Northern Ireland politics: trust and agreements. Noble Lords have talked about agreements entered into and then broken. One of the problems that exists for unionists at the moment in Northern Ireland is that so many promises and pledges have been made but have not been fulfilled. I referred in the earlier debate to the provisions of Article 50 and the joint report published on 8 December 2017, a commitment entered into by both the European Union and the UK Government. The noble Lord, Lord Caine, was present for some of the discussions we had with Theresa May in Downing Street when this matter was discussed. Provisions were inserted, and this was agreed by the European Union and the UK Government: no regulatory difference would exist unless by the express agreement of the Assembly and the Executive. That was ditched.

This has led to a situation—and this is just one example—where unionists now feel that their voice is not listened to and that commitments entered into are not accepted or followed through. This has led to a hardening of views across unionism generally, resulting in people now saying, “We need to see the colour of people’s money and actual delivery, not promises”. I listened with great interest to Steve Baker the other day, who said, “You know, unionists should choke down their concerns; they can count on us”. I have the greatest respect for Steve Baker and others in the Government, but quite frankly the days of counting on others and taking people’s word for it—even when international agreements are set aside during negotiations —have unfortunately gone.