Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill Debate
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Lord Deighton
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Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill
Lord Deighton Excerpts(10 years, 11 months ago)
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Lord Deighton
The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Deighton) (Con)
My Lords, this amendment brings forward the timetable of the independent review to be held of ring-fencing. As the House will recall, the Government previously amended the Bill to provide for an independent review of ring-fencing, once the ring-fence has come into force. Following the recommendation of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, our original amendment provided that the review be conducted no later than four years after the ring-fence had come into effect. This was to allow the ring-fence time to bed down before being reviewed.
The Government have, however, listened to arguments from the Opposition that the review should be held sooner. Two years is a long enough period over which to observe the operation of the ring-fence, and assess its effects. The knowledge that ring-fencing will soon be reviewed may also be a further encouragement to banks to comply faithfully with the ring-fence.
This amendment therefore requires that the independent review of the ring-fence be held within two years of the ring-fencing taking effect, rather than four years. This is a sensible change and one that we hope illustrates the Government’s constructive approach to reasonable suggestions from all sides.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, everyone in the House has from time to time expressed the view that this is a great experiment. We are not quite sure how the ring-fence will work and therefore it is appropriate that that it be monitored promptly and on a regular basis. I think this is a very sensible amendment—I would do, since I moved a version of it earlier—and I urge the House to support the Government.
Lord Deighton
“PRA review of proprietary trading
(1) The PRA must carry out a review of proprietary trading engaged in (whether or not as a regulated activity) by relevant authorised persons, for the purpose of considering whether further restrictions on any kind of proprietary trading ought to be imposed.
(2) The review must begin before the end of the 12 months beginning with the first day on which section 142G of FSMA 2000 is fully in force.
(3) On completion of the review, the PRA must make a written report to the Treasury on—
(a) the extent to which relevant authorised persons engage in proprietary trading;(b) whether proprietary trading engaged in by relevant authorised persons gives rise to any risks to their safety and soundness;(c) whether any kinds of proprietary trading are particularly likely to give rise to such risks;(d) anything done by the PRA to minimise risks to the safety and soundness of relevant authorised persons arising from proprietary trading engaged in by them;(e) any difficulties encountered by the PRA in seeking to minimise such risks.(4) The report must include an assessment by the PRA of each of the following—
(a) whether the PRA’s powers under FSMA 2000 are, and might be expected to continue to be, sufficient to enable it to advance its objectives in relation to relevant authorised persons who engage in proprietary trading;(b) the effectiveness of restrictions imposed in countries or territories outside the United Kingdom on proprietary trading by banks (so far as experience in those countries or territories appears to the PRA to be of relevance to the United Kingdom). (5) The report must be made within 9 months of the beginning of the review.
(6) The Treasury must lay a copy of the report before Parliament.
(7) The PRA must publish the report in such manner as it thinks fit.
(8) The functions of the PRA under this section are to be taken for the purposes of FSMA 2000 to be functions under that Act.
(9) This section is to be read with the interpretative provisions in section (Reviews of proprietary trading: interpretation).”
Lord Deighton
My Lords, these amendments require the PRA to review proprietary trading by UK banks and PRA-regulated investment companies and prepare a report to the Treasury. That will be followed by an independent review of the issue. The PRA must consider in its report the extent to which regulated firms engage in proprietary trading. It will then have to assess whether that risks their safety and soundness.
As the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards showed, proprietary trading can take many forms. That is why we are requiring the PRA to look into what particular risks different forms of proprietary trading can pose to the safety of the firm.
To help to give a full picture to the Treasury and to Parliament, the PRA must also report on steps it has taken to deal with risks from proprietary trading and whether it encountered any difficulties when it tried to tackle those risks. Building on that, the PRA must then give an assessment of whether it believes the tools it has to tackle proprietary trading are appropriate, given the risks that may exist at that time and in future. It must also consider whether restrictions imposed on proprietary trading in other countries have been effective. The experience of the United States in relation to the Volcker rule, which banned proprietary trading by banks, will be particularly relevant.
That review will take place within a year of the ring-fence coming into force. The Government have committed to ring-fencing being implemented in 2019, so this will take place in 2020. In Committee, there was some discussion about the appropriate timing of the review. The Government returned to the original PCBS recommendation, which said that the review must include,
“an assessment of the impact of the ring-fencing rules on proprietary trading by banks”.
To do that, the ring-fence must be in place for at least some time to consider such issues. While the ring-fence and proprietary trading are in many ways distinct issues, they will of course interact. Therefore we think it is right to allow the PRA to consider the impact of risks from proprietary trading on ring-fenced banks and whether the safeguards in place are sufficient for the particular requirements for the safety of ring-fenced banks. I know that members of the PCBS have been very concerned about that in the past, and I want to make sure that this review looks at this important area.
Following the PRA’s report to the Treasury and to Parliament, the Treasury will set up an independent review panel. The first task for that panel will be to consider the evidence that the PRA gathered and come to a view on its findings. It will then have to make recommendations about whether future measures to deal with risks from proprietary trading are necessary. The independent review will be able to make any recommendations in relation to proprietary trading that it considers appropriate. It will not be constrained, and like the PRA review, will be able to consider the experience other countries have had with restrictions on proprietary trading, such as in the US with the Volcker rule. By the time of the review, I imagine that a wealth of information and views will be available to help the independent panel come to its conclusions. The independent review panel must make its recommendations in a report to the Treasury and to Parliament.
As I have said previously, the PCBS heard in evidence that proprietary trading does not currently pose a large risk for the UK financial system, but it can do little harm to keep this area under review, should risks emerge in the future.
As noble Lords have seen when we debated other parts of the Bill, and, indeed, through this Government’s willingness to set up and listen to the ICB in the first place, we are in favour of independent reviews. Therefore we are persuaded that proprietary trading is an area where an independent review in future can add value. These reports will give a future Parliament all the information it needs to assess whether future safeguards are necessary. I beg to move.
Lord Lawson of Blaby
My Lords, once again I would like to thank the Government and, in particular, my noble friend Lord Deighton, for moving this amendment. It is in response to a strong recommendation that was encapsulated in a specific report on this subject among the five reports from the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards.
Just as in the previous amendment, which concerned the review of the ring-fence, initially the Government were prepared to look at it only from the point of view of whether an individual banking institution had been gaming the ring-fence. They have now agreed to look at the system as a whole, and I am grateful for that. Again, initially the Government said, “No way should there by a review of proprietary trading”, but they have now come round to saying, “Yes, the parliamentary commission was right and there should be a review”. I am extremely grateful to my noble friend for that. He said that there is no risk at the moment. That is because proprietary trading has, for the time being, stopped to all intents and purposes. Yet at its peak it was for many banks up to 30% of their total business. One must imagine that that is quite likely to occur again in future. I do not know whether it will but it is clearly possible. But if I might say so to my noble friend, it is not simply a question of risk—although risk is obviously an important factor.
There was an important debate on Thursday last week on the five reports of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. Unfortunately, I was unable to attend but I read the Hansard report. It was introduced by a magisterial speech by the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury and there were a number of good speeches—it read very well. In particular, I was impressed by the speech by my noble friend Lord Deighton, in which he gave us a little autobiographical counter. He spoke a little bit about his own experience as a banker. One thing I noted in particular. He said he was always conscious of the importance in banking of, “putting the customer first”. That is a very important aspect of banking culture. Indeed, banking culture was one of the most important things that the parliamentary commission was set up to look into.
However, in proprietary trading there is of course no question of putting the customer first—because there is no customer. It is the bank trading on its own behalf. That involves a totally different culture and mindset. If you want to preserve in banking—as I think we should—the culture that my noble friend believes in, as he said on Thursday, then you should ban proprietary trading by banks altogether. It is fine for hedge funds. It is an excellent activity for them and they can do it very well. I am not suggesting that it should be made an illegal activity, but banks should not do it. Most of us on the commission—though clearly not all—came to that conclusion. We called for a review because we were unsure about the practicalities. There is some difficulty in defining the sort of proprietary trading that should be banned for banks because there is a need for market-making. The line between market-making and proprietary trading is very clear in the minds of those doing it, but whether it is clear in law is another matter. We thought it useful to look at the American experience.
Finally on this, I say to my noble friend that we should look at the American experience but not too much at the American legislation. The complexity and detail of the American legislation was simply appalling. It is a problem across the legislative system that they have in the United States. My noble friend quite rightly referred to the Volcker rule because Paul Volcker insists that there should be a ban—for cultural reasons, above all. He also told us, when he gave evidence to the commission, that the legislation introduced in Congress was certainly not the sort he had in mind.
Having said that, I wish the Government well in this. It will be an important review, for the reasons that I have outlined. I commend the Government for repenting, if slightly belatedly—but as the right reverend Prelates on the Bishops’ Benches will know, better “the sinner that repenteth”, et cetera. Thank you very much.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury (LD)
My Lords, I ask whether the independent review under Amendment 3 is on the same basis as the review carried out by the PRA under Amendment 2. Amendment 2 specifically refers to the risk factors that proprietary trading embraces, but there is no reference to that in Amendment 3 with regard to the independent review of proprietary trading. Is the second, independent review to be undertaken on a wider basis than the PRA review? Will it be able to look at some of the broader cultural aspects of proprietary trading by banks? I hope that question is not too late in the day for the Minister.
Lord Deighton
I thank noble Lords for those questions. In response to my noble friend Lord Higgins, with respect to proprietary trading and international collaboration and co-operation, that is the approach that we shall be espousing. On consolidation, this is structured so as to be integrated into existing legislation, thereby ending up with a consolidated result.
With respect to the question of my noble friend Lord Phillips, I confirm that the independent review of proprietary trading will not be constrained in what it can examine.
Lord Deighton
“Independent review of proprietary trading
(1) The Treasury must, after receiving the report of the PRA under section (PRA review of proprietary trading) but before the end of the initial period, appoint one or more persons (“the review panel”) to carry out a review of proprietary trading engaged in (whether or not as a regulated activity) by relevant authorised persons.
(2) The initial period is the period of 2 years beginning with the first day on which section 142G of FSMA 2000 is fully in force.
(3) The members of the review panel must be persons—
(a) who appear to the Treasury to be independent of the PRA, the FCA, the Bank of England and the Treasury, and (b) who do not appear to the Treasury to have any financial or other interests that could reasonably be regarded as affecting their suitability to serve as members of the review panel.(4) In appointing the members of the review panel, the Treasury must have regard to the need to ensure that the review panel (considered as a whole) has the necessary experience to undertake the review.
(5) Before appointing the members of the review panel, the Treasury must consult the chair of the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons.
(6) The reference in subsection (5) to the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons—
(a) if the name of that Committee is changed, is a reference to that Committee by its new name, and(b) if the functions of that Committee (or substantially corresponding functions) become functions of a different Committee of the House of Commons, is to be treated as a reference to the Committee by which the functions are exercisable;and any question arising under paragraph (a) or (b) is to be determined by the Speaker of the House of Commons.(7) If the review panel consists of two or more members, the Treasury must appoint one of them to be the chair of the panel.
(8) The review panel must, within a reasonable time after the end of the initial period, make a written report to the Treasury—
(a) stating whether the panel agrees with the conclusions reached by the PRA in its report under section (PRA review of proprietary trading),(b) stating whether the panel recommends any further restrictions on any kind of proprietary trading in relation to relevant authorised persons, and(c) making such other recommendations as the panel thinks fit.(9) The Treasury must—
(a) lay a copy of the report before Parliament, and(b) publish the report in such manner as they think fit.(10) Any expenses reasonably incurred in the conduct of the review are to be paid by the Treasury out of money provided by Parliament.
(11) This section is to be read with the interpretative provisions in section (Reviews of proprietary trading: interpretation).”
Lord Deighton
Lord Deighton
“(a) enable the Bank of England, for the purpose of enabling it to exercise in relation to the business of a building society any of the powers exercisable as a result of the amendments made by this Part—(i) to convert the building society into a company, or(ii) to transfer the business of the building society to a company which immediately before the transfer is owned by the Bank or by a person of a description specified in the order;(b) enable the Bank of England, in connection with the exercise of a power conferred by virtue of paragraph (a), to cancel membership rights or shares in the building society;(c) provide for any power exercisable as a result of the amendments made by this Part to be exercisable in relation to the company—(i) into which the building society is converted, or(ii) to which the business of the building society is transferred;(d) enable the Bank of England, in a case where it has transferred the business of a building society by virtue of paragraph (a)(ii), to dissolve the building society at any time after the transfer;(e) confer functions on the Treasury, the Bank of England, the FCA, the PRA or a bail-in administrator;(f) make further amendments of Part 1 of the Banking Act 2009;(g) amend or modify the effect of the Building Societies Act 1986 or”
Lord Deighton
My Lords, the amendments in this group are minor and technical amendments to Clause 14 and Schedule 2 that will help to ensure that the bail-in powers can be used as intended in order to deal effectively with the failure of a financial institution.
First, they clarify the scope of the Treasury’s power to make an order applying the bail-in provisions to building societies. Since introducing this clause, we have had the opportunity to consider further what provisions may be necessary and are therefore in a position to specify this in the Bill.
Moving to Schedule 2, minor amendments are made to new Section 44B. They permit supplemental property transfer instruments to make special bail-in provision. This is consistent with the situation for resolution instruments and will further assist in combining bail-in with the bridge bank stabilisation option. They amend new Section 48R which, without this amendment, applies only to resolution instruments that do not transfer securities. As special bail-in provision may relate to things that are not transferred, it is appropriate that the new Section 48R power applies irrespective of whether securities are transferred. By broadening the Section 48R power in this way, we can then remove the amendment to Section 21, which makes similar provision, as no longer necessary.
Paragraph 15 of Schedule 2 is amended to address situations where a resolution instrument does not transfer securities, such as shares. Paragraph 15 amends the power to make continuity provision conferred by Section 18 of the Banking Act. This change will allow, for example, supplemental resolution instruments which do not transfer securities to make ancillary provision relating to an earlier transfer of securities. There are also some minor amendments to the compensation provisions.
Where bail-in is combined with the bridge bank stabilisation option, the Treasury needs to make a resolution fund order. Some minor amendments are made to Section 52 and new Section 60A to ensure that the compensation arrangements for special bail-in provision will work with full effect in this context. Minor amendments are also made to Section 53 to ensure that the Treasury may make compensation orders under Section 53 whenever any form of supplemental order or instrument is made to effect a stabilisation option. Finally, we have brought the compensation provisions for bail-in further into line with the other stabilisation options by making it optional for the Treasury to make a further compensation order following a supplemental resolution instrument. I commend these amendments to the House.
Lord Deighton
““bail-in administrator” is to be read in accordance with section 12B of the Banking Act 2009 (as inserted by paragraph 2 of Schedule 2);”
Lord Deighton
“Determination of applications for approval
In section 61 of FSMA 2000 (determination of applications), in subsection (2)—(a) omit the “or” at the end of paragraph (b), and(b) after paragraph (c) insert “or(d) has the personal characteristics,”.”
Lord Deighton
“64B Rules of conduct: responsibilities of relevant authorised persons
(1) This section applies where a regulator makes rules under section 64A (“conduct rules”).
(2) Every relevant authorised person must—
(a) notify all relevant persons of the conduct rules that apply in relation to them, and(b) take all reasonable steps to secure that those persons understand how those rules apply in relation to them.(3) The steps which a relevant authorised person must take to comply with subsection (2)(b) include, in particular, the provision of suitable training.
(4) In this section “relevant person”, in relation to an authorised person, means—
(a) any person in relation to whom an approval is given under section 59 on the application of the authorised person, and(b) any employee of the authorised person.(5) If a relevant authorised person knows or suspects that a relevant person has failed to comply with any conduct rules, the authorised person must notify the regulator of that fact.
(6) In this section “employee”, in relation to an authorised person, has the same meaning as in section 64A.
(7) For the meaning of “relevant authorised person”, see section 71A.””
Lord Deighton
Lord Deighton
“(3A) The Treasury may by order provide that authorised persons falling within any of the following descriptions are “relevant authorised persons” for the purposes of this Part—
(a) non-UK institutions (or non-UK institutions of a specified description) that are credit institutions;(b) non-UK institutions that are investment firms of a specified description.“Specified” means specified in the order.(3B) If the Treasury propose to make an order under subsection (3A) they must consult—
(a) the FCA,(b) the PRA, (c) any organisations that appear to them to be representative of interests substantially affected by the proposals, and(d) any other persons that they consider appropriate.”
Lord Flight
My Lords, perhaps I may make the point that I made last time this matter came up for debate—a point that is staring at us. The problem is with parts of the world where corruption, drugs and political corruption are rife. Much more demanding anti-money-laundering requirements are needed when accounts are opened for individuals or organisations from such parts of the world.
We already have a factfile that grades different countries around the world according to the extent of their corruption—so there is, if you like, a textbook. If those standards were required, it would, apart from anything else, discourage banks from potentially getting involved. Also, rather than imposing greater demands on everybody—I do not think anyone is suggesting that the average Mr and Mrs Brown from Dorking is engaged in money-laundering—much more demanding standards would be applied when dealing with organisations and individuals from parts of the world where there are the real money-laundering problems.
Lord Deighton
My Lords, I think that I can safely say that every Member of this House will agree with the noble Lords, Lord Brennan, Lord Watson of Invergowrie and Lord McFall of Alcluith, about the importance of the fight against money-laundering and other financial crime and about the importance of ensuring that the banks discharge their responsibilities in this area properly—absolutely no question. I hope therefore that the statement that I am making now will reassure them, more than my letters have done, that anti-money-laundering compliance in banks will be fully covered in the new senior managers regime. I can assure noble Lords that anti-money-laundering compliance in a bank will always ultimately fall within the responsibilities of a senior manager in that bank. The FCA will also have extensive powers to ensure that banks are clear about where these responsibilities lie.
First, under the new senior managers regime, the regulator will specify senior management functions in its rules. These will cover such roles as the chief executive and the finance director and may extend to any function that involves an individual managing aspects of a firm’s business that could have serious consequences for the firm or the wider economy. The total number of individuals covered by the new regime is likely to be smaller than those currently performing functions of significant influence in banks. In line with the recommendations of the PCBS, all the senior decision-takers—the most senior people in banks who take important decisions—will be covered by the senior managers regime.
Secondly, under the senior managers regime provisions that are now in the Bill, there will have to be statements of responsibility in respect of each senior manager. The banks will have to supply a statement with each application to the regulator for approval of the appointment of a new senior manager. The bank will have to update a statement whenever there is a significant change in a senior manager’s responsibilities. The regulators will also have the power to set out the form that the statements should take. They will also be able to require banks to verify the information in the statements in a way that they direct. As a result, the regulators will be able to tell who is responsible for anti-money-laundering compliance in a bank. They will also be able to detect any gaps in the responsibilities by comparing the statements of the senior managers in a bank. Senior management is always ultimately responsible for ensuring that the bank complies with all applicable legal requirements, including anti-money-laundering law. It is inconceivable that a senior manager will not be responsible in this area. Beneath senior management level there will, of course, be other staff involved in anti-money-laundering compliance work and these will include money-laundering reporting officers. In addition, the Government have deliberately retained the power for the regulator to pre-approve individuals performing key roles below senior management level, such as money-laundering reporting officers, even if those roles are not senior management functions. I am sure your Lordships would agree that this is a sensible measure.
We are also introducing, in line with the recommendations of the parliamentary commission, a certification and banking standards regime, applying to all employees of banks. As a result of those changes, the FCA will be able to set standards of conduct for all bank employees who may come into contact with money-laundering or other financial crime. Banks will have to certify annually that people performing particular functions are fit and proper to do them. These are roles in which an individual could do significant harm to the bank or its customers, such as trading or compliance roles or, of course, roles that involve preventing financial crime. The Government’s measures will ensure that senior managers in banks can be held to account for discharging their responsibilities in relation to anti-money-laundering compliance. The regulators will know who has those responsibilities and what those responsibilities are.
No one doubts the importance of the fight against money-laundering and financial crime. The Government’s reforms will ensure that banks and their senior managers will take their responsibilities in this area seriously and will start to discharge them properly. I hope therefore that, in the light of the assurances that I have given, the noble Lord, Lord Watson, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Watson of Invergowrie
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that clearly considered response and I note what he says. Certainly there is great value in having clearly on the record in Hansard that it will be very senior people who are required to be responsible. That is all to the good and I welcome that, but I am still disappointed that the Minister has not gone a bit further. He talked about the regulator having powers. That is fine, but the regulator may or may not choose to exercise those powers in a particular way. As my noble friend Lord Brennan said, if the word “must” can be used in other amendments to the Bill, why cannot it be used in this one?
Lord Deighton
“Duty to meet auditors of certain institutions
(1) Part 22 of FSMA 2000 (auditors and actuaries) is amended as follows.
(2) After section 339A insert—
“339B Duty to meet auditors of certain institutions
(1) The FCA must make arrangements for meetings to take place at least once a year between—
(a) the FCA, and(b) the auditor of any PRA-authorised person to which section 339C applies.(2) The PRA must make arrangements for meetings to take place at least once a year between—
(a) the PRA, and(b) the auditor of any PRA-authorised person to which section 339C applies.(3) The annual report of each regulator must include the number of meetings that have taken place during the period to which the report relates between the regulator and auditors of PRA-authorised persons to which section 339C applies.
(4) In subsection (3) “the annual report” means—
(a) in relation to the FCA, every report which it is required by paragraph 11 of Schedule 1ZA to make to the Treasury, and(b) in relation to the PRA, every report which it is required by paragraph 19 of Schedule 1ZB to make to the Treasury.(5) In this section “auditor” means an auditor appointed under or as a result of a statutory provision.
339C PRA-authorised persons to which this section applies
(1) This section applies to a PRA-authorised person which—
(a) is a UK institution,(b) meets condition A or B,(c) is not an insurer or a credit union, and(d) is, in the opinion of the PRA, important to the stability of the UK financial system.(2) Condition A is that the person has permission under Part 4A to carry on the regulated activity of accepting deposits.
(3) Condition B is that—
(a) the person is an investment firm that has permission under Part 4A to carry on the regulated activity of dealing in investments as principal, and (b) when carried on by the person, that activity is a PRA-regulated activity.(4) In this section—
(a) “UK institution” means an institution which is incorporated in, or formed under the law of any part of, the United Kingdom;(b) “insurer” means an institution which is authorised under this Act to carry on the regulated activity of effecting or carrying out contracts of insurance as principal;(c) “credit union” means a credit union as defined by section 31 of the Credit Unions Act 1979 or a credit union as defined by Article 2(2) of the Credit Unions (Northern Ireland) Order 1985.(5) Subsections (2), (3) and (4)(b) are to be read in accordance with Schedule 2, taken together with any order under section 22.”
(3) The italic cross-heading before section 339A becomes “General duties of regulator”.”
Lord Deighton
We now turn to the proposal to put in the Bill new requirements on regulators to meet the auditors of banks. This issue has been subject to extensive debate. The Government have been clear throughout that the regulators should carry the full responsibility for managing an effective relationship with the auditors of banks they supervise, and be held to account for how well they deliver it.
The reasons for this are strong. Before the crisis, regulators neglected their engagement with auditors while the auditors themselves signed off on the accounts of banks which we now know were, in some cases, in dire straits. The Government took action. There is now a requirement in the Financial Services and Markets Act for the PRA to lay its code of practice on auditor engagement before Parliament, meaning that the regulators will be held accountable for how well they deliver on the requirement to engage with the auditors of banks.
However, it has become clear how strongly the PCBS valued the opportunity to go further and specify the number of meetings in statute, to ensure auditors’ insights are used. For those reasons the PCBS is clear that, over time, this dialogue between auditors and regulators must not be allowed to lapse. The proposed amendment therefore includes two provisions to ensure that this crucial dialogue is preserved.
First, the regulators must disclose in their annual report the number of meetings they have held with the auditors. This allows Parliament to hold the regulators to account for the frequency of meetings. Secondly, the regulators must meet at least once per year with the auditors of firms that the PRA, the leading prudential regulator, considers to be important to the stability of the United Kingdom economy. This is a minimum requirement. The Government believe that it is right to place the duty on the regulator to determine how many more meetings are required with the auditors of firms of particular types, consistent with its risk-based, judgment-led approach. This allows the regulators to focus their resources where the risks are highest.
Some noble Lords may argue that the minimum requirement should be higher. The Government do not agree. The Government have said that the regulators must meet with any firm that may be important to the financial system at least once per year, but within this group, there will be firms of major and firms of minor significance.
For firms of major significance, once may be too little; for firms of minor significance, once may be sufficient. For example, under the PRA’s current code, for banks that could have the most significant impact on financial stability, the PRA code mandates at least three meetings a year. For other firms whose failure could still materially impact the UK financial system, the PRA code mandates at least one bilateral a year. The FCA meets at least twice per year with the auditors of the most significant banks and at least once per year with those in the next largest category.
The Government believe that it is right that Parliament does not seek to specify this level of detail in legislation. To do so would risk misaligning the PRA’s resources with the risks the financial system faces. The Government therefore believe that this amendment arrives at a suitable compromise between the desire to specify in the Bill a minimum number of meetings, to prevent meetings between auditors and regulators from lapsing entirely, and an approach that requires regulators to take responsibility for pursuing proportionate and high-quality engagement, and enhanced mechanisms for accountability. I commend these amendments to the House.
Lord Lawson of Blaby
My Lords, once again, I am extremely grateful to my noble friend Lord Deighton and his colleagues in the Treasury for agreeing to bring forward this amendment. As he pointed out, it is in response to a recommendation of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. Hitherto the Treasury has been reluctant to accept this, but it has now done so and it is in the Bill. Incidentally, this was also a recommendation of your Lordships’ Economic Affairs Committee, in its report on the auditors a little while back. This provision is needed in the Bill because we have been here before. The Banking Act 1987—I introduced the Bill that led to that—enabled these meetings to take place, and for a number of years they did. However, in the run-up to the great banking crisis and meltdown they had ceased. That is why we on the commission felt that this time it was necessary to have this provision in the Bill, and I am grateful to my noble friend for that.
I know that the hour is getting late but I should mention another matter that relates to a recommendation of the commission. There was lamentable failure of these meetings to take place and the fact that the auditors were in front of the crisis—the dog that never barked—was partly because of the lack of meetings and was largely the fault of the regulators at the time. It was their responsibility above all to seek such meetings. However, there was also the lamentable inadequacy of the accounting system at the time, IFRS. It is probably an inadequate system in general but it is particularly flawed when it comes to the auditing of banks. That is increasingly recognised within the accountancy profession. It is too late for me to go into the details, and I have explained the specific failings in previous debates and I will not go over the ground again.
When the commission addressed this issue it said that since we cannot change IFRS because the “I” represents an international agreement—although it is, in fact, a European agreement because the Americans have made it clear that they do not want to have any part of it—the PRA must require the major systemic banks to produce a second set of accounts that satisfies the needs of prudential regulation and supervision. That involves a small extra cost to achieve a considerable objective.
When this matter was discussed in Committee, my noble friend Lord Deighton said that there was no need to put such a provision in the Bill because the PRA had the power to do so—and I very much hope that it will do so. It is up to the Treasury Committee in another place to keep the PRA up to the mark. I hope that the present chairman of that committee will do that. Andrew Tyrie, the Member of Parliament for Chichester, outstandingly chaired the work of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards and he secured its important and unanimous report. However, I was slightly alarmed in Committee when the Minister said that the regulators already have power,
“to make rules requiring banks to prepare additional accounts, to the extent that this is permissible under EU law”.—[Official Report, 23/10/13; col. 1022.]
While I thank him for the amendment, I must ask him: if the PRA wishes a systemically important bank to present a set of accounts in a way that it feels is necessary for proper prudential supervision, what will it be prevented from doing under EU law? The House needs to know that.
Lord McFall of Alcluith
My Lords, I will be very brief in supporting the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Lawson. I have been interested in the relationship between the auditors and the regulator ever since Northern Rock went down in 2007. The question that the regulator should be keeping in mind in discussions with auditors on a yearly basis is, what is the point of an audit? The auditors tell us that it is to have a backward look at what has happened in a company, but there is a need to have a forward look at the risks that are happening, to issues like low risk and low probability, low risk and high probability, high risk and low probability, or high risk and high probability. These scenarios need to be included, because the auditors came to all the committees, the Treasury Committee in the past and the Treasury Committee now, and said that it was their business to look at the audit at that particular time. That is insufficient and there needs to be a greater engagement between the regulator and the auditors.
I reminded the Minister that previously the regulator did not look at the business models of companies. They had nothing to do with them. Thankfully, the new chief executive, Martin Wheatley, has said that the business models are very appropriate for regulators to look at because the business models that were ignored let the PPI mis-selling scandal go for 18 years. There is a lot of work to do between the auditor and the regulator—and the question that I repeat again is for the regulator to say, what is the point of an audit? Auditors can come up to the mark and not just have a backward look or even a present look at the business model of a company but can ensure that there is also a forward look.
Lord Deighton
With respect to the question asked by my noble friend Lord Lawson about what constraints the EU law would put on the PRA getting the information in the form that it requests, this is merely tying it into what comes out of the capital requirement directive IV, just to make sure that it is consistent. I am not aware of a particular constraint, but I am aware that there will be additional disclosure responsibilities that come along with that. We really just want to integrate it, but I do not believe that it is a constraint; it should actually help with disclosure.
Lord Lawson of Blaby
I am most grateful, but will my noble friend agree to look further into this and, if there is a constraint, to write to me?
Lord Deighton
Of course, I would happy with that undertaking. I fully accept the observation from the noble Lord, Lord McFall, that an audit needs to have the context of the business model behind it to have a proper understanding of where the business is going. We will certainly encourage the regulator to ensure that the dialogue with the auditor takes into account what is really happening in the business and does not just look at the numbers in isolation.
Lord Deighton
(a) after “55C,” insert “71A(3A),”, and(b) ”
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I am delighted to support Amendment 26, which stands in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Deighton, and of my noble friend Lady Hayter of Kentish Town. She is very sorry she cannot be in her place this evening to say this herself, but she is very grateful to the Government not only for accepting the essence of her amendment, moved at Report, but also for turning in some far better drafting than she could have done. This was done under some tight time pressures, for which we are grateful to both of the Ministers concerned and to their staff. My noble friend cannot be here to thank the Government herself because she is at a Labour Party fundraising event to help fund the campaign to expel the Government from office, but in the mean time she does sincerely want her appreciation for the help to be recorded.
The impact of the amendment is that, in future, consumers with complaints against claims management companies will be able to take these to the Legal Services Ombudsman to be resolved. They will therefore get redress when there is judgment in their favour. This will also help to drive up standards. By reporting repeat offenders to the regulator, it will help to get some of the CMC sharks out of the business. So congratulations to both to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and to the Government for accepting the essence of her amendment.
Lord Deighton
My Lords, I know it is getting late, but as this group of amendments draws to a close, I hope you will permit me to spend a few moments reflecting on the changes that this Bill has undergone since it first arrived in this House, and to thank all those who have contributed to it in that time. On Second Reading in July, my noble friend Lord Newby remarked that the great strength of this legislation was due in no small part to the intense degree of scrutiny that it had undergone on its journey to this House, and the constructive spirit in which those of all political colours had contributed to it. This is surely even more true of the Bill that leaves this House today.
My first thanks must go to the members of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, represented in this House by the noble Lords, Lord Turnbull, Lord McFall and Lord Lawson, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury. The central role that they have played in shaping this legislation is one of the things that has made this Bill so unique; indeed, the great majority of the amendments that it has undergone in this House directly implement the recommendations of the Commission’s final report on professional standards and culture in the banking industry. These measures are not only the crowning achievements of this piece of legislation, but the final piece in this Government’s ambitious four-stage programme of reform for the banking sector.
Many of the noble Lords in this Chamber today will have contributed to the first stage of that reform, the Financial Services Act 2012, which recast the regulatory architecture for financial services. This Bill, as it was introduced in another place, made provision for the second stage of that reform, the implementation of Sir John Vickers’s recommendations on structural reform of the banking sector, and the Bill that leaves this House today puts in place the two final pillars of that legislative programme, overhauling the culture of the banking industry, and driving out competition to improve outcomes for consumers. Of course, the Government’s commitment to implement the recommendations of the Commission’s final report through this Bill has meant that the task of scrutinising these incredibly important measures has fallen largely to this House.
I shall respond to the noble Lord, Lord Brennan. As I understand it the explanatory notes have already been written for the amendments, and they will be published tomorrow. As always, my officials are a little bit ahead of the game, but we absolutely take on board the need to communicate this effectively, both to the other place and more broadly to the City.
All these changes are a challenge to which this House has ably risen, but I must thank all noble Lords for their patience in giving such careful consideration to this wide-ranging and important set of provisions, particularly with the number of amendments that have been introduced, the speed with which drafts have been turned around, and the speed with which noble Lords have been asked to absorb so much information. In particular I must thank the opposition Front Bench, led by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, for its thoughtful and constructive contributions to the debate. I thank my noble friend Lord Newby for his support, without which it would not have been possible to provide the House with the level of response that it deserves, and my officials for their consistent hard work. Special thanks must go to parliamentary counsel for their heroic efforts in drafting amendments with such speed and precision.
The Bill that leaves this House today is completely transformed from the one that arrived here five months ago, and it is hard to imagine how it could have reached its present state without the contribution of those that I have but briefly mentioned. It is a vital addition to the statute book, whose importance is hard to overstate. I beg to move.
Lord Deighton
Lord Deighton
Lord Deighton
Lord Deighton
“This is subject to subsection (2).
(2) The amendments made by the following sections have the same extent as the enactments amended—
(a) section 10 (preferential debts: Great Britain),(b) section 129 (power to impose penalties on persons providing claims management services), and(c) section (Recovery of expenditure incurred by Office for Legal Complaints) (recovery of expenditure incurred by Office for Legal Complaints).”
Lord Deighton
section (Duty of FCA to make rules restricting charges for high-cost short-term credit), and”
Lord Deighton
Lord Deighton
Lord Lawson of Blaby
My Lords, it is incumbent on us to respond to the very kind words of my noble friend Lord Deighton. As he said, the Bill has been completely transformed. I have been a Member of this House for a very long time now but I cannot recall a Bill—let alone a Bill as important as this one—to have been so totally transformed for the better. It is not only a great deal bigger but also a great deal better as a result of its passage through your Lordships’ House. I am extremely grateful and the nation will be extremely grateful.
There has been a lot of nonsense talked about the excessive size of the banking sector in this country. Some people have been even as foolish as to talk about a monocrop economy. The fact of the matter is that banking accounts for a little over 5% of this country’s GDP; it is nothing like a monocrop economy. However, it is a supremely important sector and one in which we are world class.
There is a size problem—I have not got time to go into it now and it would not be proper to do so—with individual institutions. As the former Governor of the Bank of England said, if an institution is too big to fail, it is too big. The size of the sector is a great strength of this country. As the present governor, Mr Carney, said recently, it is a great strength of the United Kingdom that we are prominent and world class in this growing and supremely important industry. We want it to grow further, which I hope it will. It is our great strength. It is what economists call the law of comparative advantage—you should do what you are best at—and this is a sector in which we are very good. However, if it is going to get bigger and bigger, which I think it will and should, it has to be both clean and robust. The purpose of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards was to try to ensure that it would be both clean and robust. That is what the Bill is about.
I say again how grateful I am to the Government, and particularly to my noble friend Lord Deighton, for having implemented so many of the recommendations of the parliamentary commission to ensure that the Bill leaves this House in an infinitely better state than when it arrived here.