Armed Forces

Lord Dannatt Excerpts

Monday 23rd June 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dannatt (CB)]

At the outset I thank the Minister and ask him to pass on my thanks to the Leader of the House and the government Chief Whip for making time available for this important debate this afternoon and evening. During the Question for Short Debate in my name on defence manning on Monday 7 April, many noble Lords who spoke that evening asked for time to be made available to explore defence issues more widely. I am most grateful that that opportunity has been provided today.

What also makes this afternoon’s debate most timely is the general election next May and the quite proper defence and security review that will follow. I certainly welcome the current Government’s commitment to hold such a defence and security review once in every five-year Parliament. This is clearly a step forward and will prevent a repetition of the 12 or 13-year gap between the Labour Government’s SDR of 1997-98 and the coalition Government’s SDSR of 2010. So our eyes now should be on the review to come in 2015. That review will be conducted within the context of the international security environment within which we currently sit—an environment that has changed significantly since 2010.

Although I stress the importance of the strategic context of any defence review, it is inevitable that the allocation of resources by any Government will be a major constraining factor. Indeed, as we know, in the 2010 SDSR it was financial considerations that took a higher priority than strategic considerations, with the result that the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces were constrained to provide for the defence of the realm and the safety of our citizens at home and abroad from a defence budget that was, in effect, 17% less than before.

Why do I say 17% less? I use the figure of 17% because rebalancing the then defence budget and filling in the £35 billion black hole inherited by the coalition Government itself equated to about a 10% reduction in defence spending over 10 years, and the Chancellor, of course, wanted his cut in the headline defence budget of some 7% or 8%. Hence we were in the position where the MoD had to do what it needed to do on behalf of the nation with some 17% or so less resource than previously.

In those circumstances choices had to be made, and they were. The major policy decision was to prioritise spending on defence equipment at the expense of manpower, which translated into 30,000 posts being cut from the regular manpower of the Royal Navy, the Royal Marines, the Army and the Royal Air Force. Such manpower reductions, even if to be mitigated by a planned and, let us hope it happens, increase in Reserve Forces, certainly in the case of the Army, could not be cut by the traditional practice of salami slicing.

The 2010 SDSR outcome required structural change and has produced Force 2020, within which Army 2020 has set out a 10-year migration plan to move from a Regular Army of 102,000 trained strength to 82,000. It is worth reflecting for a moment on the implications of that 10-year migration plan. First, it is a10-year migration plan with a large number of moving parts: withdrawing the Army from Germany; rebasing many units within the United Kingdom, in particular focusing our armoured units increasingly in the Salisbury Plain area; integrating reserve manpower with regular manpower to a greater extent than ever before; and implementing a redundancy programme while endeavouring to manage voluntary outflow in order to keep a sensible manning profile. In my view, the current Chief of the General Staff and his team have done a remarkable job in redesigning the Army in order to maintain a certain level of capability from a deck of cards dealt to them which had many twos and threes and not a sniff of a picture card.

From this, my second and third points on Army 2020 flow. Whereas in 2006 to 2009, when our land forces were heavily committed to major operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously, we were able to deploy as a nation nine Army brigades and the Royal Marine brigade in two five-brigade cycles, providing troops to both operational theatres. However, in future we will have only six Army brigades, some heavily dependent on mobilised reserves. Therefore, in future we could provide forces for only one operation on the scale of Iraq or Afghanistan, not two.

So, therefore, in headline terms, the potential output of our land forces is some 50% less than before, a reduction forced by an apparently modest 7% to the defence budget but one which, as I have already argued, is in reality a 17% cut. However, irrespective of whether you prefer to talk about a 7% or 17% cut, a 50% reduction in land forces capability is a fairly poor deal.

My third point on Army 2020 is that the scale of the structural reorganisation to deliver even this significantly reduced level of land force capability is such that the Army cannot implement the migration to Army 2020 should there be any further cuts to its budget. Any further cuts will inevitably lead to Army 2020 being torn up and a new plan devised, with a loss of credibility in the whole point of trying to plan sensibly for the future, not to mention the loss of morale among those serving and an unhealthy dose of cynicism about the whole government process.

Therefore, notwithstanding the Chancellor’s warning in his recent Budget speech that there will have to be further reductions in overall government spending, there is a widely held view that to remove further funding from defence will seriously call into question the Armed Forces’ ability to continue the migration towards Force 2020 and field even the reduced level of capability provided for by the SDSR.

My comments thus far have focused around the reductions to our Armed Forces which were necessitated in 2010 by the overall reduction in government spending, but the proper context for a discussion about defence issues should focus on our strategic goals within the current security environment. This should be the start point for any strategic defence and security review.

It is fair to say that we have little control over the wider security environment: events unfold, strategic shocks happen and we have to deal with the consequences. However, we do have control over our national ambition and therefore the setting of our national strategic goals. Being clear about this must be the start point for any defence and security review. However, is there an appetite to have that discussion? As the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, has already alluded to, the Foreign Secretary is on the record as saying that he senses no appetite for strategic shrinkage, but is he right? If he is right, how is the UK to continue to maintain its position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, as a member of the G8 or G7 and the G20, as a firm ally of the United States, as the leading European military power within NATO and, of course, as the leader of the Commonwealth? We have managed to fulfil these responsibilities in the past by maintaining a good level of defence spending—yes, probably punching above our weight—taking risk where we need to and by recruiting high-quality people to our Armed Forces who see such service as an attractive career prospect.

What are the options for the future? I have already rehearsed the view that any further cuts to defence spending would be highly damaging as the Armed Forces migrate towards Force 2020. I have no sympathy with the view that the results of SDSR 2010 will produce smaller and more capable Armed Forces. As far as I am concerned, they will only produce smaller Armed Forces. Quantum has a quality of its own and smaller means smaller. I have already illustrated the reduction in our land forces’ capability. We are less capable now because we are smaller.

So do we spend more on defence? Looking at Syria, Iraq and Ukraine today, there is certainly a case that can be made for that. So should we spend more on defence if we want to maintain our current position in the world, or do we accept that the UK’s role is indeed diminished and therefore lower our national ambition accordingly, even if there is apparently no appetite for that?

Or perhaps, as we say at home in Norfolk, we should do different. There is an avenue of difference that we could embrace if we want to try to maintain our current level of influence and status on the world stage. I am not about to make the case for so-called soft power as an alternative to hard power, but I will make the case for better integration of our overall defence capability with our diplomatic skills and our determination to fund a high level of international development work. Embraced as a determined government policy, the integration of defence, diplomacy and development, plus an acknowledged role for the private sector, could retain the UK in an influential position. However, this will happen only if such an initiative is endorsed and led at the very top of government; if the strategy is agreed by the National Security Council; and if all the various government departments, at all levels, work closely with each other.

The challenge here is to get better at horizon scanning, to get better at spotting potentially failing states and engaging with them early to prevent them failing and falling prey to extremist or terrorist opportunists. It is a widely accepted truism that prevention is better than cure and our recent experiences of interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan followed by nation building under fire, which have proved so expensive in the expenditure of blood and treasure, should make the case for acting differently on the world stage and seeking to prevent conflict rather than dealing with the consequences of it.

The noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, made reference to the role of women in combat units. Before I draw my points to a conclusion, I shall offer my views on women in combat units. I would like to make it quite clear that within the Army, the Navy and the Air Force women have an enormous role to play and that what they bring to all aspects of our life is without equal. However, there is a question that needs to be addressed, and that is whether it is correct, appropriate or right for women to serve in our front-line combat units. It is important to understand that combat units—in the case of the Army these are the infantry or the armoured corps—are the units that we commit by design to offensive operations. The mission of that unit, that battalion, that company or that platoon is to go forward, under shot and fire, with fixed bayonet and close with extreme violence on an enemy. The question I ask is this: is it an appropriate task for a woman? Is it actually an appropriate task for anyone, but in particular, is it one for a woman?

I expressed these views in either a radio or a television programme a while ago, and received a certain amount of mail, as one might expect. One lady wrote to me and described the sort of the person she thought I was. I did not actually agree with her description. She also said, “Surely we can trust our commanding officers to know when it is appropriate to use their personnel”. I am afraid that that comment completely undermined her other point. That is because the basic fighting unit of an armoured regiment is a four-person tank crew. The basic fighting unit of an infantry battalion is a four-person fire team. How can a commanding officer be expected to say, “This task is appropriate for a fire team or tank crew that includes women, but that task is not”? Frankly, as Chiefs of Staff, former Chiefs of Staff and Members of this Parliament, we have a responsibility to take that decision and say what is appropriate for men and what is appropriate for women. I am afraid that I am implacable in my view that a woman in a four-person fire team or two women in a four-person tank crew is not appropriate. We have absolutely to own this unpopular decision and take it in the best interests of our overall capability.

[Noble Lords]

Hear, hear!

[Lord Dannatt]

With that off my chest, I will draw to a conclusion.

The 2010 SDSR, in response to the national financial situation and in recognition of the inherited overdraft in defence, reduced defence spending and reduced our defence capability. It has produced smaller—not smaller and better, just smaller—Armed Forces. The international security situation as we approach the next defence review in 2015 looks considerably more challenging than it did in 2010. Cutting UK defence spending any further would send all the wrong messages to the Kremlin, to al-Qaeda and to those who do not share our British values. A modest increase in defence expenditure would signal that the UK still takes its international responsibilities seriously and would reassure both our NATO partners and our principal ally, the United States.

If no more money for defence can be found and we wish to maintain our historic level of international influence, then the alternative of better integrating our overall defence, diplomacy and development capability offers a different and potentially beneficial path. But we must remember that even if we go down that alternative path, what underpins our overall policy and our overall position in the world, and what guarantees the overall security of the British people, is a strong defence capability. SDSR 2010 weakened the UK and the world is now even more challenging, so SDSR 2015 will be a watershed. The next Government must remember first and last that their primary responsibility is the defence of the realm and the safety of our citizens, and they must not forget their duty to the well-being of the members of our Armed Forces—a relevant thought tonight as we enter Armed Forces week.

Armed Forces (Service Complaints and Financial Assistance) Bill [HL]

Lord Dannatt Excerpts

Monday 23rd June 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dannatt (CB)]

My Lords, in approaching the Bill I have perhaps an unsurprising ambiguity towards it, wishing on the one hand that there was no need for it yet recognising on the other that that wish is not entirely realistic. My hope for the Bill is therefore that its implementation will be done well. Implementation will be the key to the Bill’s success. As the Minister said in introducing the Bill this afternoon, whatever happens must not prejudice the integrity of the chain of command. I am extraordinarily encouraged to hear that the Chiefs of Staff have been consulted closely for their views on this and that this particular, key point is recognised.

However, there is one lurking concern: that the ombudsman process provides an alternative route if the main complaints procedure is not followed. I would hope, first, that this route would be followed rarely and in extremis. Perhaps the existence of that alternative process might be an encouragement to the chain of command to make sure that it deals as properly as it can with complaints as they come up through that chain

Secondly, in terms of implementation, the new arrangements must be properly resourced. The current Service Complaints Commissioner has done an extraordinarily good job over the past six years and I wish to associate myself with the compliments and congratulations that have been offered towards her. However, there is no doubt that her work has been made more difficult by the very small team that she had to support her and the comparative lack of resources made available to her.

The main target for the successful implementation of the Bill is to attack delay. It is well known that in many circumstances justice delayed is justice denied, and in recent years delay has been the focus of much work within the chain of command. Many of the new powers within the Bill will allow delay to be tackled, particularly in dealing with cases at the most appropriate level. It has not been satisfactory in the past that cases could not be dealt with at what would seem to be the logical level and have been taken up higher up the chain of command than need have been.

Delay has been attacked vigorously over the past few years, and in theory has been reduced. It does not appear to be so in all circumstances, though, because the number of cases of complaint has increased. I think that is so for two reasons: first, the fact that awareness of the complaints process and procedure has increased, and therefore more people are aware of the ability to complain about something; and, secondly, the wider litigious environment in which we find ourselves. That said, delay must be tackled; that is the key to the success of the Bill and is the key point as far as implementation is concerned.

I also welcome the fourth clause in the Bill regarding financial assistance. Anything that can be done to improve the integration between the public, private and charitable sectors in the way in which we support our veterans and their families has to be welcome. People often say, “Surely the Government should do more”, to which my reply invariably has been, “The British way in looking after our veterans and their families has been for the public, private and charitable sectors to come together”. This is a recognition that the Government, the public sector, can do more in that triumvirate, that trinity of activity, and I therefore welcome the clause.

Armed Forces

Lord Dannatt Excerpts

Monday 7th April 2014 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Dannatt]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what is their assessment of whether they have sufficient manpower and the right balance of regular and reserve forces within the Armed Forces in order to meet the United Kingdom’s current national and international responsibilities and requirements.

[Lord Dannatt (CB)]

My Lords, in opening this evening’s short debate, perhaps I may first thank those noble Lords who are taking part, albeit somewhat later than we had anticipated, and other noble Lords who have indicated their interest in this question but who are not able to be in their places. To me this level of participation underlines the importance of the matters we are considering.

I am also aware that this short debate comes hard on the heels of the Defence Reform Bill, which has now passed all its stages in your Lordships’ House, and that the question of manning the Army Reserve was the subject of some discussion. Indeed, I spoke on the subject during the Committee stage and was minded to table an amendment at the Report stage. However, I make no apology for returning to this key topic, and I do so in the context of both regular and reserve manning, not just for the Army but for the Royal Navy, the Royal Marines and the Royal Air Force, too.

I believe that this subject can be properly addressed only if it is done so in its full context. It seems to me that, when the coalition Government took their decisions on the size and shape of the Armed Forces at the time of their strategic defence and security review in 2010, they did so against the background of the way the world looked then and in the midst of the economic crisis; we were in the early days of the current age of austerity. In headline terms, a decision was taken to prioritise defence equipment over manpower—a not altogether unreasonable decision given the long lead times in defence procurement and the need to preserve British jobs in the defence industries. However, in order to balance the books, manpower reductions of 30,000 personnel across the three armed services were required, which inevitably would fall most heavily on the Army, but they also fell with considerable impact on the other services, in particular on our ability to man the fleet both now and in the future, especially when the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers and the new offshore patrol vessels come into service.

As regards the Army, the mitigation of the risks inherent in a 20,000 cut in Regular Army manpower would be the recruitment and training of an Army Reserve of 30,000, giving an overall integrated Army manpower strength of 112,000. Put like that, this looks to be a reasonable outcome, but doubt has remained as to whether the Regular Army component of just 82,000 of that overall total is sufficient for the nation’s needs, and whether the target of 30,000 trained reservists to round out Army 2020 is even achievable.

When this policy was announced, it was originally stated that the major draw-down of regular manpower would not occur until the strength of the reserves had risen to or near their projected target. However, after a reworking of the finances within the MoD, this policy was changed, and in the case of the Army the draw-down to 82,000 regulars has now been very nearly completed with little upward shift in reserve manning. Noble Lords have observed previously in this House that this shift of policy carries an acknowledged level of risk. Is the Minister confident that this risk is being managed and mitigated, both for now and in the foreseeable future?

I raise this question at this time because, with the planned culmination of our operations in Afghanistan—linked to a general feeling of war weariness and war wariness given our recent experiences in both Iraq and Afghanistan—it could be argued that concerns about the size of the Army today are theoretical rather than immediate. However, that view overlooks the current strategic landscape. While there is neither a logic nor an appetite for intervention in Syria, nor a treaty obligation requiring military intervention in Ukraine, both situations stand as stark examples of how the strategic landscape can change. Predicting the future is notoriously hard, and strategic shocks happen: the invasion of the Falkland Islands, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and 9/11 were all unpredicted events that had major consequences for our defence and security policies and capabilities. It is often said about predicting the future that the trick is not to be so far wrong that, when the future reveals itself, you cannot adapt quickly to the new circumstances. Circumstances have changed since 2010, and are changing at the present time. They are plain to see, provided that there is a willingness to look.

I believe that these strategic changes change our previous risk calculations. The Russian takeover of Crimea may not have been to President Putin’s timing, but it certainly suits his agenda and aspirations. Whether his ambition reaches into eastern Ukraine or elsewhere only he knows, but with a Russia resurgent both in confidence and military capability in many observers’ judgment this is a poor moment for the US-led West to be weak in both resolve and muscle. Diplomacy and economic sanctions may for now be the right response to President Putin over Ukraine, but he will look through those things to see from where the real check on his actions might come. Russia has long been the ally of Syria. Mr Putin will have seen the UN and the EU virtually powerless to impose their will on President Assad, and he will be further encouraged. Parallels with earlier periods of history might or might not be useful, but it can be argued that uncomfortable shadows of the 1930s are starting to become visible.

Meanwhile, with economies still struggling to recover from the epic downturn in 2008, there is a lurking temptation to curb public expenditure further, as trailed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his recent Budget speech. However, to remove further resources from defence would be sending exactly the wrong message at this time. On the contrary, there is a growing argument that the international landscape is more challenging than in 2010 and that we should consider making a statement that greater military capability must underpin our diplomacy and the other instruments of our foreign and security policy. The projected 1% uplift in defence equipment procurement spending from 2015, though welcome, will do nothing to improve regular defence manning levels, which, without a further uplift in spending, will in all probability face further contraction. Such a conclusion is mathematically almost inevitable.

Furthermore, there is genuine concern as to whether we can in fact recruit and train 30,000 members of the Army Reserve. Although we are only some six months into a five-year programme of recruitment, I am not alone in believing that current circumstances bring forward the need to alter the regular reserve balance within our Army and increase the size of the Regular Army, and probably the regular component of the Royal Navy as well. There is an increasingly strong case for increasing the manning of our regular Armed Forces by some 5,000 posts. Not only would that be a useful increase in capability in itself, but it would send a clear signal that the UK Government take their defence responsibilities seriously, not only on behalf of their own citizens but on behalf of our EU partners and NATO allies too.

Noble Lords will have read this morning’s comments by the Secretary-General of NATO calling for an increase in defence spending. Although our Government will argue that the United Kingdom still has the fourth—or is it now the fifth?—largest defence budget, it is proportionately down in terms of GDP from even five years ago, and represents a funding level that provides a lesser degree of defence capability than five years ago. Will the Minister confirm that, whereas in 2008 our land forces were able to deploy 10 combat brigades, going around two five-brigade cycles, conducting difficult operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously, that capability is no longer available and will not be under the plans for Army 2020? If the Minister does confirm this, will he further confirm that this is not because of equipment shortages but due to the lack of manpower, be it regular or reserve?

What is to be done? Much as I would like to see the 5,000 uplift in regular manpower across the three armed services that I am calling for, I am aware of the political calculation that there are no votes in defence, so I do not see this uplift happening before the next general election. However, talking widely with many people—within your Lordships’ House and without—that one meets, I wonder whether that calculation is correct. Are there no votes in defence? Indeed, are there no votes in providing adequately for our national security? I am not so sure.

At the very least, would the Minister use his good offices with the government Chief Whip to programme a full debate on defence and security issues in this House in the next Session of Parliament? Surely such a debate would be a major contribution to the strategic defence and security review that will follow the next election. Surely the people of this country deserve to hear the arguments set out clearly before them. At the end of the day, it is the votes of the people of this country that will determine the next Government, and it is the first duty of that Government to provide fully for the defence of the realm and the safety of our citizens, not forgetting the well-being of the members of the Armed Forces and their families, who provide that defence and our safety. The case for re-examining our previous assumptions on military manning and the levels of risk that we are taking is strong, and, if anything, getting stronger.

Flooding: Military Deployment

Lord Dannatt Excerpts

Monday 24th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

Yes, I can assure my noble friend that that is the case. The average number of reservists employed in mid-February, at the peak of the crisis, was around 80 per day. In most cases reservists were employed on man training days—the payment method used for routine reservist activity—although there were a small number of formal mobilisations, namely of signallers and engineers. I managed to visit some of the reservists who helped with the flood work, both infantry and engineers, who told me that they were very well received by the public for the work that they did.

[Lord Dannatt (CB)]

My Lords, would the Minister like to say a little more about the issue of funding? We are aware that when the military is called out in support of the civil power, if it is to reduce the threat to life there is no charge, but very quickly the charging becomes extremely high. That could well have been the reason why local authorities were concerned about calling the military out. That would seem to be counterproductive when trained bodies of people are available to help in civil situations. Can the Minister say what the Government are thinking of doing about that?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, the noble Lord asks a good question. Certainly the perceived risk of a substantial full-costs bill at the end of an operation can be a concern to local authorities. We would like to do more to support the civil authorities, but we must ensure that the defence budget is not disadvantaged, nor indeed gains any inappropriate benefit, from so doing. The Secretary of State is currently in discussions with the Treasury, exploring the possibility of a full marginal costing recovery scheme, which would make the costing situation much clearer to all parties in advance.

Defence Reform Bill

Lord Dannatt Excerpts

Tuesday 11th February 2014 Grand Committee

We should not proceed with the implementation of the Reserves in the Future Force 2020 plans without any requirement within a short period of time for the Secretary of State to report to Parliament on the key issues of viability and cost-effectiveness—issues to which the Secretary of State normally attaches considerable importance— particularly bearing in mind the greatly enhanced role that our reserves will have in the future under these plans and the extent to which our Regular Forces will be dependent on the reserves for the provision of key support skills.

[Lord Dannatt (CB)]

My Lords, I generally support the intention behind Amendments 18 and 18C but I draw attention to two underlying concerns that I have with regard to the overall policy that the amendments refer to.

The noble Lord, Lord Astor, in proposing Amendment 18, made reference to the fact that the Reserve Forces of the future will look very different from the Reserve Forces of the past, and that, by design, is absolutely right. However, we have to remember why we have deployed so many members of the Reserve Forces over the past 10 years. Following the defence review of 1997-98 led by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, a certain amount of work was allocated to the Army, Navy and Air Force. In the case of our land forces, we would be involved in one medium-scale ongoing operation and another medium-scale operation of six months’ duration. As we all know perfectly well, from 2003 to the present date, and particularly in that very intense period from about 2006 to 2009, we were committed to two considerable-sized—I do not use the words “large” or “medium” because the definition does not fit either—operations in Iraq and Afghanistan concurrently, well over and above the planning assumptions that were put in place in the defence review of 1997-98. Therefore, it was inevitable that we were going to have to draw heavily on our Reserve Forces in order just to be able to do what we were going to do. It was not by design; it was by consequence.

Now, in the consequences of the 2010 SDSR, we have decided to reduce significantly—and I speak particularly in terms of the land forces—the size of our Regular Army, and we are going to compensate for that loss of capability by having a large reserve training force. I understand that, and in theory I could see it working, but I have two concerns.

First—I have to choose my words carefully because I do not want to appear more critical than I intend—I challenge the transparency and perhaps honesty of some aspects of that policy. What the Ministry of Defence has done in its very constrained cash situation is effectively to move off balance sheet some of the liability of our land forces and put them back in the Treasury. We will deploy large numbers of these Reserve Forces only in a future considerable-sized operation such as that of Iraq or Afghanistan of the past 10 years. It is when we deploy those large numbers of reservists that they have to be paid for. They are not going to be paid for by the Ministry of Defence because they will come from the contingency fund held by the Treasury. So the Ministry of Defence has solved a large chunk of its problem but has not necessarily solved our national problem. I merely raise question marks about whether we are being completely transparent about its shift in policy.

My second concern, which we have already alluded to today, is to do with the provision of mental health support. We know that reservists when demobilised are in a more difficult situation than regulars when they return from operations—the facts prove that—and therefore we are taking measures to alleviate the potential situation that some of the demobilised reservists will find themselves in. I question the fundamental morality of taking a policy decision that we will use more reservists on difficult deployed operations knowing that it will place them in an adverse mental health position. I wonder whether that is right. I raise those two points as underlying concerns, albeit these amendments, at least in part, speak to them.

My third and final point, which has been mentioned already today by the noble Lord, Lord Astor, is that we know we will have a gap between 2015 and 2017-18, the regulars having been reduced and our not being able, according to current plans, to increase the number of reservists. As recently as 2011 it was still government policy that we would not reduce the Regular Forces until we had built up the reservists. We have changed that policy and so we are accepting risk. That risk could be reduced by slowing down the rundown of the Regular Forces at the moment, but I presume that the Government would say that, looking beyond Afghanistan, from the end of this year onwards they cannot see the prospect of another major operation and so it is a risk worth carrying.

Many noble Lords have mentioned the issue of risk in the past and I simply point to this as another risk that we are taking. We have Armed Forces that are less capable than they were and, certainly in terms of our land forces, they are smaller than they were, and we are willingly taking on additional risk. I raise those three points as concerns about the underlying policy, although I agree that Amendment 18C attends, at least in part, to the mental health issue.

[Baroness Garden of Frognal (LD)]

My Lords, we, too, welcome the Minister’s Amendment 18. As he said, there was broad support for this when it was debated in the House of Commons. It is therefore appreciated that the Government have brought forward this amendment and accepted the principle of the new clause to be agreed in this House.

Amendment 18F calls for a report within one year of enactment. Its wording is too restrictive to reflect accurately issues as they may arise around viability and cost-effectiveness and we would not wish to support that proposed clause.

Providing an annual report to the Secretary of State, which must also be laid before Parliament, provides reassurance that the position will be kept under review for all three services. We have quite naturally concentrated more on the Army than the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, partly because of the numbers involved and partly because the Reserves are integrated already, in a different way, with the Royal Air Force. Obviously within the annual report it will be helpful to identify where there are differences between the three services and to identify examples of best practice which might cross-refer between them.

As the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, said in his remarks about mental health, there is a general agreement that this is an important issue. We agree with the Minister that this is covered within Amendment 18 and we do not see the need for additional medical detail, particularly in the Bill. There may well be a case for having guidance which sets this out more clearly, but not in the Bill.

It is timely that today sees the publication of the Veterans’ Transition Review of the noble Lord, Lord Ashcroft. Almost certainly within that there will be recommendations which will help to influence the response to or implementation of what is happening to the reserves under this Bill. Will there be a government response to that review? It would be helpful to have a debate on it in the light of the recommendations of the noble Lord, Lord Ashcroft.

In summary, we support Amendment 18, and while seeing value in the proposed two new clauses of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, we do not see them as essential to the Bill.

Defence Reform Bill

Lord Dannatt Excerpts

Wednesday 5th February 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Stirrup]

First, one has to decide upon the reliability of the intelligence, because intelligence is not knowledge—there is no certainty about it. What degree of assuredness can we attach to the intelligence? What sort of cross-referencing is there? Then, everything else about the target—its structure, the things around it, the possibilities of collateral damage and all the issues properly raised under the law of armed conflict; that is, the military utility of attacking the target versus the possible risks of doing so—is gone into at great length. Certainly as far as the United Kingdom—and, in my experience, the United States—is concerned, it is done with a lawyer looking over one’s shoulder the whole time. When I was responsible for these sorts of targeting decisions in the five months after 9/11 when I was at United States Central Command, my lawyer and I were essentially joined at the hip. It had to be so and I welcomed it.

[Lord Dannatt (CB)]

My Lords, I identify with the comments of my noble and gallant friend. He made many of the points I would otherwise have made. I share his scepticism here. I understand the purpose behind these amendments but I have some concern about seeing them included in a Bill such as this at the present time. On the other hand, I very much welcome the debate on the wider subject.

I just amplify one of the points made by my noble and gallant friend. In the popular mind, so-called “drones”, or “unmanned aerial systems” or “unmanned aerial vehicles”—the name professionally and technically which we have used for many years—are large and operate over great distances. However, within the same overall category come small battlefield UAVs. Some are small enough to be able to look over a hill into a valley beyond and report back to a ground tactical commander. There are reconnaissance and weapons-deploying issues here, and issues of large and small size. Because of that complexity, the issue definitely merits further investigation and debate, with the formation of a wide-ranging piece of legislation dealing with definitions and bringing the whole into a proper regulatory format. For that reason alone, while I recognise the intent behind the amendments, this should be taken forward in a somewhat different way.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I will be very brief indeed. Obviously, views have been expressed about keeping the law and its enforcement up to date with developments in the nature and conduct of warfare. Also, at the back of what has been said there is a desire to know what is going on in our name and what the outcomes have been in relation to the use of some of the unmanned systems to which reference has been made. Certainly I await with interest the Minister’s response.

There seems to have been a general acceptance that this is an issue which should be debated and discussed, although obviously doubts have been raised as to whether, as far as the amendment is concerned, how relevant it is to this Bill. The only comment I would make before concluding and leaving it to the Minister to give the Government’s response is that, of course, as far as concerns the provision of any additional information that there may be, or any developments in the law, whatever is done must be consistent with the national interest and national security.

Ministry of Defence: IT Systems

Lord Dannatt Excerpts

Tuesday 14th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, my noble friend makes a very good point. When the previous Administration took office in 1997, the Territorial Army was more than 50,000 strong; by the time it left office in 2010, that figure had halved. That pattern of decline has now been arrested and the strength has been stabilised.

[Lord Dannatt (CB)]

My Lords, the regular Army is losing 20% of its strength, which means 20,000 trained soldiers over the next few years over and above the normal annual outflow of trained soldiers. The initiative to increase the strength of the Territorial Army, as it was previously called, is—to be generous about it—struggling. Can the Minister assure the House that the IT system that is in place is good enough to track the regular Reserve—that is, the soldiers who have served and have been recently discharged—and that, in extremis, there is the IT capability there to recall them to the colours as ex-trained regular soldiers?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

The noble Lord makes a very good point about officers and soldiers who have left whom we might need at some point in the future. The best of my understanding is that we can track them. If that is not the case I will write to the noble Lord.

Armed Forces: Territorial Army

Lord Dannatt Excerpts

Monday 18th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I reassure the noble Baroness that we welcome Commonwealth reservists. As announced on 11 July, to fulfil their reserves commitments they are required to have indefinite leave to remain in the UK prior to joining. However, I will look into the point that the noble Baroness raised.

[Lord Dannatt (CB)]

My Lords, does the Minister agree with me that the Chief of the General Staff is doing a very good job in trying to manage the process of reducing the Regular Army by 20% while building up the strength of the reserves against a very difficult financial background? We are only three or four months into a five-year programme. On the question asked by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, on small and medium-sized enterprises, has consideration been given to waiving national insurance charges for those enterprises as an incentive to employers to take on members of the reserves?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord that the Chief of the General Staff is doing a very good job. I have considerable briefing on the question that the noble and gallant Lord and the noble Lord raised on SMEs and national insurance. It will take me some time to find it—but I will write to the noble Lord. We have always expected there to be a dip in the level of the reserves before they increase as we are changing the fitness requirements and deployability of the force. To reassure the noble Lord, a target of 30,000 trained Army reservists is well within historical norms. We had 72,000 trained reservists as recently as 1990.

Defence: Aircraft Carriers and UK Shipbuilding

Lord Dannatt Excerpts

Wednesday 6th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I welcome my noble friend’s support for the fleet and for Vanguard’s successor. As regards manpower, the Royal Navy attaches a great deal of importance to this, in particular to get the right people with the right skills. The Navy will need an extra 2,000 people for its expanding fleet over the next five to 10 years. We are very grateful to the United States Navy and the US Marine Corps, which have been especially helpful in training our people preparing for the carriers; whether they are training pilots, deck crew, or on air direction or engineering, they have been very helpful. Finally, my noble friend asked about Appledore, on which I will write to him.

[Lord Dannatt (CB)]

My Lords, the last question was on the increase in the size of the fleet in manpower terms that would be required if both carriers come into service and the three OPVs are fully manned. I welcome that and I do not want to get into that argument at all. However, the previous Government and the present Government took major decisions which affected equipment and manpower in the Armed Forces, and priority in big handful terms has been given to equipment. Therefore where savings have had to be found they have had to be found in manpower. Most of those savings have been found within our land forces—noble Lords will recognise that I would say that, wouldn’t I?

I know that the Minister cannot give a guarantee or even half a guarantee in answering this question, but will he ensure that if there is to be an increase in the fleet in manpower terms, which I welcome, it will not be at the cost of further reductions in our land forces, given that our Army is striving very hard to meet the 20% reduction in its regular size by 2020? Will he also ensure that in future discussions with the Treasury, argument is made most fiercely for an uplift in the defence budget in order to pay for the extra people, and that it is not another opportunity cost of one service against another? We cannot do that and remain credible on the world stage.

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, the noble Lord makes a very good point; the increase in numbers goes right the way across the Royal Navy—submarines, aircraft carriers and all the other ships—but we will not reduce the size of the Army just to provide extra personnel for the Royal Navy.

Armed Forces: Reserve Forces

Lord Dannatt Excerpts

Monday 11th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I remember well when my noble friend was a very distinguished Minister standing at this Dispatch Box, and I believe I lobbed the odd question at him. My noble friend mentioned the figure of 83,000. That is why we are very optimistic that we can get up to a figure of 30,000 by 2018.

[Lord Dannatt]

My Lords, when the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, was announcing the things he has just referred to, I was a mere Lieutenant Colonel working as a military assistant to the Minister of State for the Armed Forces. Therefore, we are all aware of the aspirations for our Reserve Forces and the way it has worked out. We are all committed to making this policy work in the interests of the security of the realm, the safety of our citizens, and the well-being of the Armed Forces. However, as this Government think about the next defence review, are they also thinking of an alternative if we are not able to recruit Reserve Forces of the size that we currently need? Might we think about increasing the size of our regular Army in particular?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, we are thinking optimistically. I quote General Monro, who is head of the Territorial Army, and who is very focused on its success. He said:

“There is a mission, and we have to achieve the mission. I am confident that we will get there.”

We intend to maintain appropriate force level to meet our planning assumptions. If necessary, mitigation strategies are in place to ensure that we can take early action to maintain an appropriate force level.