Defence Reform Bill

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Tuesday 10th December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, I do not have much sympathy for GOCO defence procurement. My doubts have been strengthened by the lack of genuine competition and therefore interest from the private sector. The Government are right to pause this approach, but I remain sceptical that the pause and the changed approach announced by Ministers will resolve the fundamental problems affecting advanced platform and weapons systems procurement.

Those of your Lordships who have been involved with defence issues over the past 50 years and more will recall that this is but the latest of numerous attempts to solve difficulties in defence procurement. When the Ministry of Supply was abolished in 1959, defence procurement passed initially to the three single-service ministries until the Ministry of Defence took overall responsibility in 1964. Before that there had been some serious overspends on equipment.

In 1961, the Gibb-Zuckerman report recommended a common, improved process of milestones past which every major project would have to proceed. By the mid-1960s further spectacular cost overruns triggered the establishment of a development cost steering group, chaired by a Mr Downey. The group made further changes but few of these efforts were any more successful. At a time when the Warsaw Pact seemed at its most dangerous, the MoD was inevitably ambitious in its requirements. The three services, the research establishments and industry erroneously felt that technical and integration problems, only revealed during full development, could be resolved—maybe so, but at much increased cost and timescales; and occasionally never, leading to cancellation of a major programme after much time, effort and money had been spent. That is all too similar to experiences 50 years later in 2010, I fear. Cost-plus was much in vogue.

By the early 1980s, exasperated by what he felt was a too-close relationship between the services and their industrial suppliers, the then Defence Secretary, Michael Heseltine, now the noble Lord, Lord Heseltine, decreed that there must be no more fraternisation between the two sides. He also invited Peter Levene, now the noble Lord, Lord Levene, from private industry to fill a new appointment of Chief of Defence Procurement in 1985, as we know. Improvements came: cost-plus was out, competition was in, but initial better outcomes were not sustained after about 1991. More recently, we have seen and forgotten the smart procurement of 1998, which collapsed due to inadequate funding of defence, and was later renamed smart acquisition, but I fear was no better funded.

Concurrently, overambitious, rushed and disruptive reorganisation of procurement and logistics responsibilities and downsizing caused distortion, much frustration and dismay among staff involved. Mr Bernard Gray’s 2009 study of this generic problem recommended that 10-year rolling defence budgets and 20-year equipment budgets published to Parliament should be adopted—no signs of that. The nearest—and minimalist—has been the Prime Minister’s assurance that the equipment budget would increase by 1% after the next election. This is the basis for the affordable equipment programme announced last year for the period 2015-16 through to 2020-21 but, as the NAO has commented, this does not and will not offer a definitive view of the affordability of the equipment plan, as more time and experience will be required to assess its worth. Moreover, it is far from clear whether this raise for equipment is additional to the whole defence budget or will have to be offset by reductions elsewhere in MoD spending, as the Chancellor proposed only last week. Of course, there is a general election in 18 months so nothing can be definitive.

I have only briefly itemised some of the attempts to do better in procurement over the past 50 years. Much more could be said. Of course, it is right to try to do better, but sometimes the MoD seems to be the whipping boy of Whitehall over poor procurement, and cost and timescale overruns. Other departments with much less challenging requirements seem to suffer major cost and timescale overruns without being subject to such excoriating criticism—for example, the NHS’s repeated nationwide computing failures; the National Offender Management Service’s information system being 400% over budget; the tenfold rise in the cost of the Scottish Parliament; Transport for London modernisation, with billions of pounds underestimated; the numerous PFI schemes that have left the taxpayer billions of pounds worse off than before these wheezes were introduced. The successful Olympics bid, which has already been mentioned, started off at £2.9 billion, only to finish close on £9 billion—and the hard-pressed Armed Forces saved the day for the whole enterprise when G4S messed up. Until—and do not hold your breath—Governments of the day, with opposition support, are prepared to approve the sort of decade-long, rolling budgets recommended by Bernard Gray, and to stick to them, I fear that budget aspiration rather than reality will remain the quicksand basis of government procurement planning and costing.

A further and often overlooked issue is the political, and sometimes party-political, pressures on Ministers to adjust programmes to sustain industrial capacity or employment. Should such additional costs be totally met from within the defence budget? Some form of Treasury contingency funding might be made available when such adjustments to programmes are not for military or technical reasons. Further costs, which are hard to quantify in advance, will arise within multilateral programmes and be beyond the control of the Ministry of Defence. In over 50 years the right answer has evaded all; no silver bullet has been found. It should be no surprise, unless the Government and Treasury adopt a totally different approach, if it were to remain unresolved in the next 50 years. Meanwhile, I shall watch with interest how the latest scheme matures.

There is much in the Bill about the Single Source Regulations Office, enough to emphasise its importance for obtaining value for money. It is said to be free of government but where does it stand with the Treasury, which also has authority and interest in value for money? Will the SSRO be free from Treasury second-guessing, or will it merely be a further bureaucratic stage when dealing with single-source contractors?

Turning to concerns expressed in your Lordships’ House and elsewhere about the legal erosion of our national fighting power, I fear that this may extend further than the battlefield and into the field of procurement and technical support. When I was flying Vulcan and Victor bombers, only the two pilots had ejection seats. The rear crew members had to rely on parachutes if their aircraft had to be abandoned in flight. Fitting ejection seats for all at the design stage was deemed technically very complex, with unacceptable time delays into service, and costly. At various times, following tragic fatal air accidents of these aircraft on training flights, the possibility of fitting ejection seats for all crew members was re-examined. Once again, cost, complexity and the loss of airframes from the front line while modifications were installed were deemed excessive in any attempt to reduce the relatively low-frequency risk of a similar future air disaster. Indeed, I am not aware that any claims by relatives were made in those days—probably Crown immunity then would have ruled them out—although the additional life insurance premium to cover flying risk was largely met by the ministry.

Today, when coroners and courts are keen to investigate the background to individual service deaths, there is a growing tendency to question why particular modifications or kit which could have been made available and might have averted the individual’s death were not available. Such an approach cannot take full and proper informed account of the complexities of the design or later modification, the downtime to carry out the necessary work and the remaining in-service life of the aircraft fleet or other equipment involved. Additional cost, too, of course arises. Is it better to pay that much to ameliorate one risk of catastrophe over, say, a few years of remaining in-service life, and not be able to afford to do more for other potentially higher and longer-lasting risks?

My fear is that this legal probing, basking in the certainty of 20:20 hindsight, will extend to questioning why original designs or modifications which subsequently proved unable to match the opposition’s capability were allowed to persist or be deployed or, alternatively, why additional steps had not been approved though the technical capability existed. Such concerns should be borne in mind in any changes to responsibility for defence procurement. Indeed, they should add further stimulus to taking positive action to reinstate immunities in a field of activity where acceptance of risk to life has to be the norm if our forces are not to be gravely neutered by legal hindsight.

I turn to the reserves. There is nothing in the Bill that would expedite the call-out of individual or small cadres of reservists, whose earliest possible availability is essential to the preparation and mounting of an intended operation. With greater reliance on ready Reserve Forces, the current statutory requirement that ministerial approval has to be obtained before the call-out of any reservists needs to be reviewed. Delegated ministerial authority to service chiefs for small and key critical reserve elements would ensure that those individuals who are already at high readiness would be immediately on task when required. What assurance can the Minister give that such delegation is covered by current legislation, and perhaps by Clause 45, or should it be a matter for amendment? With a policy to rely more than ever on the employment of reservists alongside Regular Forces, their early availability is a key requirement and must be assured in all circumstances.

Armed Forces: Legal Challenge

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Thursday 7th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, I very much welcome the opportunity that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has given the House to debate this topic, and I commend strongly his excellent speech.

For all my 40 years of service, service discipline, enforcement and review were the responsibility of the chain of command. Since then, service legal arrangements have changed to accord more closely with human rights legislation and the view that misbehaviour and crimes in the services should largely be judged independently of that chain of command. The services have adapted, but what concerns me more is that the Armed Forces Act and human rights legislation are potentially incompatible.

Only service men and women effectively contract with the state to make the ultimate sacrifice if required, backed by the Armed Forces Act to enforce discipline and obedience. No other public servant is placed in this position. To disobey a lawful command, even one that for operational reasons may place an individual at serious risk of injury or even death, is a criminal offence under Armed Forces law. But today or in the future will the commander be at risk of a charge under human rights legislation? I acknowledge that this has not yet happened and that today’s commanders have been given assurances that the MoD would give them full support if ever it did. As has been mentioned, the Minister sought to reassure me, in answer to my topical Question following the Supreme Court judgment last June. He said:

“I do not expect it to be open to a soldier facing a charge of failing to follow orders to argue that his human rights trumped those orders”.—[Official Report, 25/6/13; col. 657.]

However, could it not go the other way, when protracted legal hindsight is brought to bear on the heat and urgency of operational decisions?

In 1998, in concert with Lord Campbell of Alloway, I tabled amendments on Report and at Third Reading to exclude the Armed Forces from the Human Rights Bill. While acknowledging that the Armed Forces were a public body as defined in the Bill—now the Human Rights Act 1998—we argued that special considerations applied to Armed Forces personnel, who may be, and often are, treated differently by legislation. As I said:

“There are offences of conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline, of disobeying a lawful command, and so on, which have no direct parallel in civilian life. These are enacted because they underpin and are vital to the operational effectiveness and discipline of the Armed Forces. Without further elaboration, the conclusion is self evident. The Armed Forces may be, and often are, treated differently by legislation”.—[Official Report, 19/1/98; col. 1354.]

The fashion of the time—remember we were not then engaged in major expeditionary operations overseas and the services were almost sidelined in the public mind—was to believe that civilian-style management rather than military-style leadership was what the services should adopt, particularly in peacetime. At Third Reading of the Human Rights Bill, the Lord Chancellor sought to assure the House. He said that,

“the Secretary of State for Defence takes the view that the Bill raises no issues which are special to the Armed Forces”.

Later in his speech he said:

“I urge your Lordships to be of the view that the convention is a flexible instrument. It poses no threat to the effectiveness of the Armed Forces”.—[Official Report, 5/2/98; col. 768.]

Since then numerous cases against the MoD have been brought under that Human Rights Act. The Lord Chancellor’s reassurances have been frittered away, most spectacularly by the way that the Supreme Court findings last June were publicised. The court’s view—albeit a minority one—that such cases were not suitable for resolution by a court seemed to be a ray of hope that could help inch the problem back to greater realism. The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, quoted the wording of the minority view, and it is worth repeating. It stated that,

“the approach taken by the majority will in my view make extensive litigation almost inevitable after, as well as quite possibly during and even before, any active service operations undertaken by the British army … ‘war cannot be controlled or conducted by judicial tribunals’”.

Should that realism be translated into new legislation? There is a proper reluctance in some quarters not to try to make changes because of the variety of cases that are sub judice and because today’s service men and women might be encouraged to believe that their rights were being eroded. Nevertheless, I remain concerned that there is a need to be proactive, not to await events only to find that the problem has become far more difficult and disruptive to the effective command and control of forces and personnel in operational situations.

The changes since the Human Rights Act 1998 and the assurances given then and the recent Supreme Court ruling show that this issue still has legs and will run and run unless remedies are devised and provided. This said, what proactive approach might be taken? The Policy Exchange think tank, which has been mentioned several times, argued in its study entitled The Fog of Law that such legal mission creep could paralyse the effectiveness of the military. It came up with seven options for tackling this problem. I floated two, Crown immunity and combat immunity, in my topical Question last month:

“Will Her Majesty’s Government consider new legislation to define combat immunity? ... Could this be incorporated in the Defence Reform Bill now in passage through Parliament?”.—[Official Report, 23/10/2013; col. 1003.]

Following further discussion, I now accept that this is not the right moment for primary or secondary legislation, although we should not ignore the public’s present strong support for the Armed Forces. After withdrawal from Afghanistan, and in the absence of other major overseas adventures, that support will surely fade.

The quinquennial Armed Forces Bill, due in 2016, would, however, provide a vehicle for further legislation, giving time for preparation and avoiding prejudice to current sub judice cases. A proactive game plan must be the Government’s approach. There needs to be a well resourced team charged with instigating study in academia and elsewhere to prepare the way. Waiting until something worse turns up before moving would be wrong and a deplorable failure of political and military leadership. I hope that the Minister will be robustly proactive tonight.

Armed Forces: Human Rights Legislation

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd October 2013 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Craig of Radley]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to review and clarify the application of human rights legislation to members of the Armed Forces when they are based or engaged in operations overseas.

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns (Con)]

My Lords, the clock has stopped. I say to colleagues who are trying to leave the Chamber that, on this occasion, we shall maintain dignity by remaining in our seats while the Minister responsible for defence makes an announcement about our armed services.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever) (Con)]

My Lords, I am sure that the whole House will wish to join me in offering sincere condolences to the family and friends of Lance Corporal James Brynin, Intelligence Corps, of 14 Signal Regiment (Electronic Warfare), who was killed on operations in Afghanistan recently. My thoughts are also with the wounded, and I pay tribute to the courage and fortitude with which they face their rehabilitation.

Turning to the Question, although the Government have already expressed their disappointment with recent judgments in this area, both in the domestic courts and at Strasbourg, many aspects of the relevant law continue to be uncertain. In view of the importance of the principles at stake, the Government will defend their position vigorously in the key cases still before the courts.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, why wait? Is there not now sufficient experience of the impact of legal hindsight when passing judgment on the activities of personnel engaged in operations or based overseas? Should not the Secretary of State revive, by order, Crown immunity, as the Crown Proceedings (Armed Forces) Act 1987 allows, to cover warlike operations in any part of the world outside the United Kingdom? Alternatively, will Her Majesty’s Government consider new legislation to define combat immunity, in order to clarify the current position? Could this be incorporated in the Defence Reform Bill now in passage through Parliament?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I share the noble and gallant Lord’s concerns. He is absolutely right to emphasise the relevance of the 1987 Act. Our Armed Forces should not have to put ECHR considerations ahead of vital operational decisions in the national interest. That is why we are not ruling out any options. An amendment to the Defence Reform Bill would probably be regarded as outside its scope, but we hope that the Court will provide clarification of combat immunity. For that reason we shall defend this litigation with vigour.

Reserve Forces

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, in answer to the first part of the noble Lord’s question, medical reservists develop additional valuable specialist skills when they are deployed, which they then bring back to the National Health Service. The Defence Medical Services is uniquely placed to share the development of operationally specific medical science and clinical excellence with the NHS. The National Institute for Health Research centre has brought together military and civilian trauma surgeons and scientists to share innovation in medical research, to advance clinical practice on the battlefield and to benefit all trauma patients in the National Health Service at an early stage of injury.

On the benefits to an employer who recruits an employee who is a reservist, I would say that reserve service will benefit different employers in different ways. For some, the improved skills, experience and training of the individual reservist will be beneficial. For others, where the reservist’s military role is close to their civilian one, there will be more benefit from transferable skills. For some companies and sectors, reserve service suits and supports their business models. For many, reserve service may support corporate social responsibility objectives and may be part of their social action plans, alongside wider volunteering policies. We encourage employers to publicise their support for the Reserve Forces to customers, suppliers and their local communities. The second part of my answer was in response to my noble friend’s third question.

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, the Government say in the White Paper that they will introduce new legislation to enable mobilisation for the full range of tasks that our Armed Forces may be asked to undertake. Current mobilisation arrangements are something of a historical anachronism. Invariably they require ministerial authority. They date from a time when protection for employers was nothing like as good as it will be in future. Will there be arrangements to allow mobilisation of individuals for very small units to be carried out without having to seek ministerial authority?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I cannot from the Dispatch Box answer the noble and gallant Lord’s question. That point is not in my briefing, but I will write to him.

Armed Forces: Human Rights

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Tuesday 25th June 2013 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Craig of Radley]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what advice and directions are being given to Armed Forces personnel following the Supreme Court judgment on 19 June that human rights legislation, and in particular the right to life, may apply to Armed Forces personnel engaged in operations abroad.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever)]

My Lords, urgent cross-government discussions are taking place to consider our options. We will provide advice to members of the Armed Forces as soon as possible. The Government are concerned that the ruling creates uncertainty and will continue to defend their position against ill-founded legal claims, while continuing to provide our forces with the equipment they need, and ensuring that, where casualties occur, generous provision is made for troops and their families through the Armed Forces compensation scheme.

[Lord Craig of Radley]

I thank the noble Lord for that not very reassuring Answer. Can he advise on this situation? A commanding officer orders a soldier to take part in operations overseas against an armed enemy, so clearly there is a risk of injury or loss of life. Is that officer’s order lawful? If the soldier disobeys the order, is he liable to a charge and court martial under Section 12, possibly, of the Armed Forces Act because he did not go into the operation? Is the officer liable to be charged or found disciplined under the human rights legislation because the soldier followed his instructions but was killed in battle?

Armed Forces: Redundancies

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Thursday 20th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, no Government likes making these kinds of redundancies. While reduced recruiting and fewer extensions of service will account for some reductions, a redundancy programme is needed to ensure that the right balance of skills is maintained.

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, is it not the case that more than 80% of those who are on the redundancy programme this time are volunteers? If so, what does that say about morale in the Armed Forces, particularly in the Army?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, the number of applications for redundancy is not a good indicator of the state of morale because the Army has deliberately set out to maximise applications. Additionally, it should be noted that only 30% of those who were eligible applied for redundancy.

Royal Navy: Escort Vessels

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Monday 17th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, I cannot comment on what the noble Lord says about BAE. However, I compliment him on his resolute lobbying for the Royal Navy to attend the Royal Australian Navy’s 100th anniversary. The noble Lord has had a word with me two or three times about it. I can now assure him that the Royal Navy has responded to his request and will attend the 100th anniversary. HMS “Daring”, a Type 45 destroyer, will also be out there.

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, bearing in mind the reduction in the number of surface vessels over the past few years, what commitments have Her Majesty’s Government had to give up as a result?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, the Naval Service, which includes the Royal Navy, the Royal Marines and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary which supports them, is able to fulfil commitments around the globe and maintain a maritime presence in priority regions, such as the South Atlantic, the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The Naval Service also safeguards the security of home waters, meets our defence commitments in the North Atlantic and the Caribbean, patrols the Antarctic waters and undertakes periodic deployments to other areas, such as the Far East and the Pacific.

Armed Forces: Pay

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Wednesday 20th March 2013 Lords Chamber

Asked By

[Lord Craig of Radley]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government why they did not approve the 0.5 per cent increase in the X-factor supplement recommended by the Armed Forces Pay Review Body in its 2013 report (Cm 8571).

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Astor of Hever)]

My Lords, earlier today my right honourable friend the Chancellor announced in the other place that we would fund an increase in X-factor, so this recommendation will now also be accepted. This will be welcome news for service personnel and their families who should receive the increase with their May pay. This positive response to the Armed Forces Pay Review Body recommendation also emphasises the importance and the respect that the Government accord to the views of the review body.

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, that is of course very welcome news, although I think it would be a shade fanciful to think that a topical Question could so rapidly change the Government’s mind. Nevertheless, because there has been a delay, can the Minister assure the House that the pay uplift will be made available on time in April, or will it be delayed and have to be backdated? I hope that the Government will do everything they can to ensure that it does not have to be backdated. Will this additional pay be available to full-time mobilised reservists as well as to service personnel?

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords, service personnel will receive the increase from 1 May onwards. I understand that it is the general policy of all Governments not to backdate, to avoid adding complexity and risk to normal administrative operations. The noble and gallant Lord asked if the uplift in X-factor will be paid to mobilised reservists. X-factor is paid at the full level—currently 14%—to all ranks up to and including lieutenant-colonel or equivalent in the Regular Forces, full-time reserve service personnel on full commitment and mobilised reservists.

Armed Forces

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Monday 5th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Astor of Hever, for arranging this debate. He has been most assiduous in keeping your Lordships’ House aware of defence issues and this is yet another example of that. I also welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Garden of Frognal, to her new responsibilities. She has proved to be an excellent Front-Bench spokesman on other subjects and I am sure that that she will be equally good, or better even, on this subject, of which she has much background knowledge.

In this Remembrance Week, many families and friends of the fallen will be thinking of their loved ones—loved ones who served in the two world wars and in a variety of combat operations since 1945. Along with many others, I shall be honouring their memory next Sunday as I march past the Cenotaph with the Not Forgotten Association contingent, of which I am the senior president. While the majority who served in the two world wars or on national service were called up, causalities in more recent conflicts were volunteers. They joined the Armed Forces as a career choice, accepting that in the course of their service they could be exposed to real danger. Public support for Remembrance Sunday, as in your Lordships’ House, is thankfully large.

The recovery of the Falklands following Argentina’s invasion was ultimately a matter for combat operations and, importantly, enjoyed overwhelming national support. However, I fear that our more recent efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have not enjoyed the same national understanding or backing. Many reasons are suggested for this. The rationale for committing so much treasure, for sacrificing so much in lost lives and limbs, and for continuing over so many years—double the years that it took us to win through in World War I and World War II—is complex, difficult to explain simply and difficult for the public to grasp. But unlike with the world wars or even the Falklands, it is not easy to engender a sense of real tactical successes or even ultimate victory. Media coverage is largely confined to reporting casualties in Afghanistan, and much more needs to be done about that. Minds are now focusing on getting out of Afghanistan, and hopefully enough will have been done by the coalition to enable Afghanistan to look after itself.

However, the so-called war against terror has yet to succeed. There are limits to the contribution that military forces can make in the fight against terrorism. The enemy is not like a state, which is a geographic entity. It can and does threaten from many widely dispersed areas and in numerous different forms. This presents Governments with far more difficult choices for the involvement of their forces in support of other diplomatic and political initiatives.

The current approach is based on two incompatible assumptions. On the one hand there is the size of the financial commitment to defence, not just for day-to-day functioning but also for the future size and shape involving programmes that take many years to realise. For shorthand, let me characterise this as a commitment of 2% of GDP. The other assumption, now shown to be incompatible with the first one, is that the Armed Forces are to be structured to meet a certain level of immediate and ongoing enduring commitments without an honest costing of what that might mean for defence funds.

Most telling now is the number of criticisms of the MoD and Government by coroners dealing with inquests about the lack of life-saving equipment or inappropriate kit for the tasks expected of the casualty. This serves to highlight the mismatch in the public’s mind—their perception of a mismatch between the 2% GDP and what capabilities can be procured and operated on an enduring basis with such funds. Ministers would do well, if the 2% of GDP is not to be increased, to realise the risks of relying on urgent operational requirements and backing from the contingency fund in future engagements. They must never lose sight of the fact that those who will fight for them are volunteers who are prepared to pay the ultimate sacrifice. So service men and women have a right to reasonable expectations that they will get not only political and moral support but the right equipment in the right place at the right time when they are ordered into conflict in a war of choice.

There are two other particular constraints that do not seem to figure as strongly as they should, and attract little or too little attention in the ability of our Armed Forces to take on new operational commitments. The first is that no matter how much current equipment—ships, aircraft or armour—has advanced in hitting power and accuracy, these improvements provide no recompense for meeting geographically widespread commitments.

Noble Lords will recall the endless arguments about frigate/destroyer numbers over the years. My first exposure to this was half a century ago when a force of at least 55 of these ships was deemed to be the absolute minimum. Without going through each of the soon-to-be-breached irreducible minimums in defence reviews in the intervening years, we now expect to stand up a mere 19 of such vessels. Of course, each of the 19 will be more powerful than any of their predecessors, but you cannot cut any of the 19 in two to spread the coverage on worldwide commitments. The Falklands guard ship, the Caribbean drug-busting task force, combating piracy in the Indian Ocean and safeguarding the deterrent are just a few examples of worldwide enduring commitments, as of course are training and ship repair schedules. These could leave too little available for mounting any wars of choice with a maritime contribution. Air power has the flexibility and reach to move rapidly afar, but it, too, can become overcommitted on enduring operations, as we have experienced in the combat air support of Afghanistan—and that was before the most recent cull of front-line fast-jet numbers.

Another factor that has a bearing on numbers is the risk of losses in combat. Since the Falklands, our forces have been fortunate to operate in benign or near-benign air environments. Consequently, losses to opponents have been non-existent or very small. It would be all too facile to assume that future operations would take place in a benign air environment, with no serious loss of ships or aircraft or other major equipment. Experience in the Falklands against an enemy of only limited air power capability cost us dearly, particularly in ships sunk or badly damaged.

Losses in a fight with a better equipped enemy than we have had to face in the past two decades could be infinitely more serious today. Indeed, the very limited cover we might be able to mount for a carrier task force, particularly as we now lack the protection of any maritime patrol capability, could restrict its use to operations facing benign threats and an opposition without any serious strike capability. The Exocet type of threat has not gone away.

A defence budget of only 2% of GDP, which will include the replacement boats for the nuclear deterrent—requiring 25% or more of the equipment budget during the peak stages of that programme—has to be the driver for calculating the variety and mix of short or enduring capabilities that the Armed Forces could mount. This must be constantly reviewed so that Ministers are able to reach judgments on the use of the Armed Forces in the expected threat environment. What this produces must be the yardstick used by Ministers before embarking on any future war of choice.

Surely it should be part of the military covenant that our young men and women are sent on combat operations only when adequately armed and equipped for the task. It should not be acceptable that they have only additional support from the contingency fund but do not have the strength and depth of equipment and back-up for losses in conflict. Such losses cannot be made good overnight, no matter how much money is thrown at them. Unless Ministers are guided in this way, there will be more avoidable casualties in the nation’s thoughts on future Remembrance Sundays.

Armed Forces: Reserve Forces

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Thursday 1st November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, it is my great privilege and pleasure to congratulate the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, on his maiden speech. He has entertained us well and, I think, rather modestly left out some other judicial appointments in his magnificent career. He was of course Master of the Rolls and Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales in between the times he served here, first as a Law Lord and then as the Senior Law Lord, before moving on to the Supreme Court. He obviously learnt from his time in the Royal Navy. Whether it was all good or all bad, I think we can judge that he enjoyed it, and I am certain that we are going to enjoy his contributions to this House. We welcome him and thank him for speaking today.

I congratulate, too, the noble Lord, Lord Freeman, on his choice of topic. He is right to focus our thoughts on the future of the reserves. Much thought has been given and effort put into this as part of the major restructuring of the Armed Forces following the strategic defence and security review. I am myself a firm supporter of the value of Armed Forces reserves that have real operational worth and are not seen by those outside or within the reserves as weekend chancers playing at being soldiers or, indeed, sailors and airmen. Happily, thanks to the important changes that were introduced for the reserves over the past decade, and the large number of reservists who have been on active operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is far greater public understanding of the key value of reservists, some of whom have made the ultimate sacrifice.

To concentrate on the future, I hope that the Minister will give the House a better understanding of the Government’s expectations of reaching the numbers and mix of reserves that they are now pursuing, and the risks if they are not achieved. As it is well understood, a variety of factors will influence this outcome. First, of course, there are the individuals who have to be attracted, motivated and committed to volunteering and remaining within the reserves structure so as to become worthy and effective members of their units. If trained from scratch, it is essential that the individual is prepared to serve for a number of years in order to “amortise”, as it were, his or her training costs.

Then, as has already been mentioned, there are the employers. While the country is involved in operations overseas, the profile of the Armed Forces is much enhanced in the public mind. Employers react to this by wishing to be as accommodating as possible in releasing employees for reserve activity and retaining them on the payroll after service. But as we move, we hope, beyond the past decade or two of wars of choice—that is, choice by the Government of the day to commit forces into sustained expeditionary operations—will the reduced prominence of the Armed Forces still be a good recruiting sergeant for the reserves, and will they be as readily accepted by employers as they are today? I am not clear what proposals or suggestions the Government will pursue to encourage and, indeed, to reward employers who agree to have and release reservists when they are required for training or for operations. More will need to be done in this regard.

I am also concerned that the Government’s expectations in terms of achieving their recruitment and retention targets are overambitious. Even for the Royal Air Force, which has a good blend of reserve units and is standing up further elements in other geographic areas, such as Liverpool and Northern Ireland, to expand areas for recruitment and provide or sustain an RAF regional footprint, forecasts have not lived up to expectations. I recall mentioning in 2008 in a debate on the reserves the serious dip in recruitment that had been experienced by the RAF Auxiliaries earlier that decade and that it was estimated that full strength could not be reached before 2013-14. A quick look at the figures shows that the trained strength is now forecast not to be reached before 2016. In other words, expectations have not been fulfilled.

Why are the Government so confident that this time around, with far greater ambitions for reserve numbers, the targets can be reached? What evidence do they adduce from past figures? What will have changed so dramatically in the next five to six years that trained strength targets will be reached and sustained? I hope that the Minister can reassure the House on this critical point. Or will he be frank and say that while their aspirations are to get to 100%, 75%, say, may be more realistic?