(10 years, 7 months ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what is the estimated annual cost of allowing all armed forces widows, who choose to re-marry or co-habit, to retain and not forfeit their existing service widow’s pension in line with the provisions in the Armed Forces Pension Scheme 2015.
My Lords, first, I am sure that the whole House will wish to join me in paying tribute to Captain Richard Holloway of the Royal Engineers, who was killed while on operations in Afghanistan on 23 December, last month. My thoughts are also with the wounded, and I pay tribute to the courage and fortitude with which they face their rehabilitation.
The cost of not suspending pensions on remarriage or cohabitation to spouses who survive members of the 1975 Armed Forces Pension Scheme, whose deaths were not attributable to service, is estimated to be in the region of £250,000 per annum; the cost is estimated to be £70,000 per annum in relation to the War Pensions Scheme. Survivors of those enrolled in the current 2005 pension scheme and the new 2015 scheme, when implemented, will retain pensions for life regardless of personal circumstance.
My Lords, I associate myself with the Minister’s remarks about Captain Holloway. I also declare an interest as a vice-president of the Forces Pension Society and a member of the Armed Forces Pension Scheme 1975.
Is the Minister in favour of justice for widows—those widows who are trapped or locked into a scheme which is unfair and discriminatory compared with later schemes, which allow the survivor pension awards to be retained for life? Is this not totally counter to the Armed Forces covenant, which is so strongly supported by the Prime Minister and all in the Government? Will Her Majesty’s Government move quickly to remove the discrimination in the Armed Forces Pension Scheme 1975 and the War Pensions Scheme, bearing in mind that there would be no significant cost to the taxpayer, given the Minister’s figures and making allowance for the policing, both intrusive and insensitive, and the complex administration of these schemes?
My Lords, there are 10 categories of widow or widower under the Ministry of Defence pension and compensation schemes. I have discussed this very complex issue with the noble and gallant Lord. We both agreed that I should place a letter of explanation in the Library setting this all out, which I have done this afternoon.
Defence Ministers have enormous respect for the Forces Pension Society and for the War Widows Association of Great Britain and will continue to work very closely with both of them. Successive Governments have reviewed pensions for life, but changes cannot be taken in isolation from other public sector schemes, including those for the NHS, teachers, police and the fire service, which have similar rules in place for their older schemes.
(10 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we review the situation every six months. Obviously the level of intimidation, which is relatively low at the moment, is an important factor that would be considered.
My Lords, in considering whether to grant asylum to an Afghan interpreter, does the fact that he has a family or is not married come into the equation?
My Lords, I can assure the noble and gallant Lord that it does not. Eligible staff will be allowed to bring their immediate family: that is their spouse—one only—or partner, their minor dependent children under 18 years-old and that spouse. There is no limit on the size of a single family provided that the criteria are met.
(10 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I do not have much sympathy for GOCO defence procurement. My doubts have been strengthened by the lack of genuine competition and therefore interest from the private sector. The Government are right to pause this approach, but I remain sceptical that the pause and the changed approach announced by Ministers will resolve the fundamental problems affecting advanced platform and weapons systems procurement.
Those of your Lordships who have been involved with defence issues over the past 50 years and more will recall that this is but the latest of numerous attempts to solve difficulties in defence procurement. When the Ministry of Supply was abolished in 1959, defence procurement passed initially to the three single-service ministries until the Ministry of Defence took overall responsibility in 1964. Before that there had been some serious overspends on equipment.
In 1961, the Gibb-Zuckerman report recommended a common, improved process of milestones past which every major project would have to proceed. By the mid-1960s further spectacular cost overruns triggered the establishment of a development cost steering group, chaired by a Mr Downey. The group made further changes but few of these efforts were any more successful. At a time when the Warsaw Pact seemed at its most dangerous, the MoD was inevitably ambitious in its requirements. The three services, the research establishments and industry erroneously felt that technical and integration problems, only revealed during full development, could be resolved—maybe so, but at much increased cost and timescales; and occasionally never, leading to cancellation of a major programme after much time, effort and money had been spent. That is all too similar to experiences 50 years later in 2010, I fear. Cost-plus was much in vogue.
By the early 1980s, exasperated by what he felt was a too-close relationship between the services and their industrial suppliers, the then Defence Secretary, Michael Heseltine, now the noble Lord, Lord Heseltine, decreed that there must be no more fraternisation between the two sides. He also invited Peter Levene, now the noble Lord, Lord Levene, from private industry to fill a new appointment of Chief of Defence Procurement in 1985, as we know. Improvements came: cost-plus was out, competition was in, but initial better outcomes were not sustained after about 1991. More recently, we have seen and forgotten the smart procurement of 1998, which collapsed due to inadequate funding of defence, and was later renamed smart acquisition, but I fear was no better funded.
Concurrently, overambitious, rushed and disruptive reorganisation of procurement and logistics responsibilities and downsizing caused distortion, much frustration and dismay among staff involved. Mr Bernard Gray’s 2009 study of this generic problem recommended that 10-year rolling defence budgets and 20-year equipment budgets published to Parliament should be adopted—no signs of that. The nearest—and minimalist—has been the Prime Minister’s assurance that the equipment budget would increase by 1% after the next election. This is the basis for the affordable equipment programme announced last year for the period 2015-16 through to 2020-21 but, as the NAO has commented, this does not and will not offer a definitive view of the affordability of the equipment plan, as more time and experience will be required to assess its worth. Moreover, it is far from clear whether this raise for equipment is additional to the whole defence budget or will have to be offset by reductions elsewhere in MoD spending, as the Chancellor proposed only last week. Of course, there is a general election in 18 months so nothing can be definitive.
I have only briefly itemised some of the attempts to do better in procurement over the past 50 years. Much more could be said. Of course, it is right to try to do better, but sometimes the MoD seems to be the whipping boy of Whitehall over poor procurement, and cost and timescale overruns. Other departments with much less challenging requirements seem to suffer major cost and timescale overruns without being subject to such excoriating criticism—for example, the NHS’s repeated nationwide computing failures; the National Offender Management Service’s information system being 400% over budget; the tenfold rise in the cost of the Scottish Parliament; Transport for London modernisation, with billions of pounds underestimated; the numerous PFI schemes that have left the taxpayer billions of pounds worse off than before these wheezes were introduced. The successful Olympics bid, which has already been mentioned, started off at £2.9 billion, only to finish close on £9 billion—and the hard-pressed Armed Forces saved the day for the whole enterprise when G4S messed up. Until—and do not hold your breath—Governments of the day, with opposition support, are prepared to approve the sort of decade-long, rolling budgets recommended by Bernard Gray, and to stick to them, I fear that budget aspiration rather than reality will remain the quicksand basis of government procurement planning and costing.
A further and often overlooked issue is the political, and sometimes party-political, pressures on Ministers to adjust programmes to sustain industrial capacity or employment. Should such additional costs be totally met from within the defence budget? Some form of Treasury contingency funding might be made available when such adjustments to programmes are not for military or technical reasons. Further costs, which are hard to quantify in advance, will arise within multilateral programmes and be beyond the control of the Ministry of Defence. In over 50 years the right answer has evaded all; no silver bullet has been found. It should be no surprise, unless the Government and Treasury adopt a totally different approach, if it were to remain unresolved in the next 50 years. Meanwhile, I shall watch with interest how the latest scheme matures.
There is much in the Bill about the Single Source Regulations Office, enough to emphasise its importance for obtaining value for money. It is said to be free of government but where does it stand with the Treasury, which also has authority and interest in value for money? Will the SSRO be free from Treasury second-guessing, or will it merely be a further bureaucratic stage when dealing with single-source contractors?
Turning to concerns expressed in your Lordships’ House and elsewhere about the legal erosion of our national fighting power, I fear that this may extend further than the battlefield and into the field of procurement and technical support. When I was flying Vulcan and Victor bombers, only the two pilots had ejection seats. The rear crew members had to rely on parachutes if their aircraft had to be abandoned in flight. Fitting ejection seats for all at the design stage was deemed technically very complex, with unacceptable time delays into service, and costly. At various times, following tragic fatal air accidents of these aircraft on training flights, the possibility of fitting ejection seats for all crew members was re-examined. Once again, cost, complexity and the loss of airframes from the front line while modifications were installed were deemed excessive in any attempt to reduce the relatively low-frequency risk of a similar future air disaster. Indeed, I am not aware that any claims by relatives were made in those days—probably Crown immunity then would have ruled them out—although the additional life insurance premium to cover flying risk was largely met by the ministry.
Today, when coroners and courts are keen to investigate the background to individual service deaths, there is a growing tendency to question why particular modifications or kit which could have been made available and might have averted the individual’s death were not available. Such an approach cannot take full and proper informed account of the complexities of the design or later modification, the downtime to carry out the necessary work and the remaining in-service life of the aircraft fleet or other equipment involved. Additional cost, too, of course arises. Is it better to pay that much to ameliorate one risk of catastrophe over, say, a few years of remaining in-service life, and not be able to afford to do more for other potentially higher and longer-lasting risks?
My fear is that this legal probing, basking in the certainty of 20:20 hindsight, will extend to questioning why original designs or modifications which subsequently proved unable to match the opposition’s capability were allowed to persist or be deployed or, alternatively, why additional steps had not been approved though the technical capability existed. Such concerns should be borne in mind in any changes to responsibility for defence procurement. Indeed, they should add further stimulus to taking positive action to reinstate immunities in a field of activity where acceptance of risk to life has to be the norm if our forces are not to be gravely neutered by legal hindsight.
I turn to the reserves. There is nothing in the Bill that would expedite the call-out of individual or small cadres of reservists, whose earliest possible availability is essential to the preparation and mounting of an intended operation. With greater reliance on ready Reserve Forces, the current statutory requirement that ministerial approval has to be obtained before the call-out of any reservists needs to be reviewed. Delegated ministerial authority to service chiefs for small and key critical reserve elements would ensure that those individuals who are already at high readiness would be immediately on task when required. What assurance can the Minister give that such delegation is covered by current legislation, and perhaps by Clause 45, or should it be a matter for amendment? With a policy to rely more than ever on the employment of reservists alongside Regular Forces, their early availability is a key requirement and must be assured in all circumstances.
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I very much welcome the opportunity that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has given the House to debate this topic, and I commend strongly his excellent speech.
For all my 40 years of service, service discipline, enforcement and review were the responsibility of the chain of command. Since then, service legal arrangements have changed to accord more closely with human rights legislation and the view that misbehaviour and crimes in the services should largely be judged independently of that chain of command. The services have adapted, but what concerns me more is that the Armed Forces Act and human rights legislation are potentially incompatible.
Only service men and women effectively contract with the state to make the ultimate sacrifice if required, backed by the Armed Forces Act to enforce discipline and obedience. No other public servant is placed in this position. To disobey a lawful command, even one that for operational reasons may place an individual at serious risk of injury or even death, is a criminal offence under Armed Forces law. But today or in the future will the commander be at risk of a charge under human rights legislation? I acknowledge that this has not yet happened and that today’s commanders have been given assurances that the MoD would give them full support if ever it did. As has been mentioned, the Minister sought to reassure me, in answer to my topical Question following the Supreme Court judgment last June. He said:
“I do not expect it to be open to a soldier facing a charge of failing to follow orders to argue that his human rights trumped those orders”.—[Official Report, 25/6/13; col. 657.]
However, could it not go the other way, when protracted legal hindsight is brought to bear on the heat and urgency of operational decisions?
In 1998, in concert with Lord Campbell of Alloway, I tabled amendments on Report and at Third Reading to exclude the Armed Forces from the Human Rights Bill. While acknowledging that the Armed Forces were a public body as defined in the Bill—now the Human Rights Act 1998—we argued that special considerations applied to Armed Forces personnel, who may be, and often are, treated differently by legislation. As I said:
“There are offences of conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline, of disobeying a lawful command, and so on, which have no direct parallel in civilian life. These are enacted because they underpin and are vital to the operational effectiveness and discipline of the Armed Forces. Without further elaboration, the conclusion is self evident. The Armed Forces may be, and often are, treated differently by legislation”.—[Official Report, 19/1/98; col. 1354.]
The fashion of the time—remember we were not then engaged in major expeditionary operations overseas and the services were almost sidelined in the public mind—was to believe that civilian-style management rather than military-style leadership was what the services should adopt, particularly in peacetime. At Third Reading of the Human Rights Bill, the Lord Chancellor sought to assure the House. He said that,
“the Secretary of State for Defence takes the view that the Bill raises no issues which are special to the Armed Forces”.
Later in his speech he said:
“I urge your Lordships to be of the view that the convention is a flexible instrument. It poses no threat to the effectiveness of the Armed Forces”.—[Official Report, 5/2/98; col. 768.]
Since then numerous cases against the MoD have been brought under that Human Rights Act. The Lord Chancellor’s reassurances have been frittered away, most spectacularly by the way that the Supreme Court findings last June were publicised. The court’s view—albeit a minority one—that such cases were not suitable for resolution by a court seemed to be a ray of hope that could help inch the problem back to greater realism. The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, quoted the wording of the minority view, and it is worth repeating. It stated that,
“the approach taken by the majority will in my view make extensive litigation almost inevitable after, as well as quite possibly during and even before, any active service operations undertaken by the British army … ‘war cannot be controlled or conducted by judicial tribunals’”.
Should that realism be translated into new legislation? There is a proper reluctance in some quarters not to try to make changes because of the variety of cases that are sub judice and because today’s service men and women might be encouraged to believe that their rights were being eroded. Nevertheless, I remain concerned that there is a need to be proactive, not to await events only to find that the problem has become far more difficult and disruptive to the effective command and control of forces and personnel in operational situations.
The changes since the Human Rights Act 1998 and the assurances given then and the recent Supreme Court ruling show that this issue still has legs and will run and run unless remedies are devised and provided. This said, what proactive approach might be taken? The Policy Exchange think tank, which has been mentioned several times, argued in its study entitled The Fog of Law that such legal mission creep could paralyse the effectiveness of the military. It came up with seven options for tackling this problem. I floated two, Crown immunity and combat immunity, in my topical Question last month:
“Will Her Majesty’s Government consider new legislation to define combat immunity? ... Could this be incorporated in the Defence Reform Bill now in passage through Parliament?”.—[Official Report, 23/10/2013; col. 1003.]
Following further discussion, I now accept that this is not the right moment for primary or secondary legislation, although we should not ignore the public’s present strong support for the Armed Forces. After withdrawal from Afghanistan, and in the absence of other major overseas adventures, that support will surely fade.
The quinquennial Armed Forces Bill, due in 2016, would, however, provide a vehicle for further legislation, giving time for preparation and avoiding prejudice to current sub judice cases. A proactive game plan must be the Government’s approach. There needs to be a well resourced team charged with instigating study in academia and elsewhere to prepare the way. Waiting until something worse turns up before moving would be wrong and a deplorable failure of political and military leadership. I hope that the Minister will be robustly proactive tonight.
(10 years, 10 months ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to review and clarify the application of human rights legislation to members of the Armed Forces when they are based or engaged in operations overseas.
My Lords, the clock has stopped. I say to colleagues who are trying to leave the Chamber that, on this occasion, we shall maintain dignity by remaining in our seats while the Minister responsible for defence makes an announcement about our armed services.
My Lords, I am sure that the whole House will wish to join me in offering sincere condolences to the family and friends of Lance Corporal James Brynin, Intelligence Corps, of 14 Signal Regiment (Electronic Warfare), who was killed on operations in Afghanistan recently. My thoughts are also with the wounded, and I pay tribute to the courage and fortitude with which they face their rehabilitation.
Turning to the Question, although the Government have already expressed their disappointment with recent judgments in this area, both in the domestic courts and at Strasbourg, many aspects of the relevant law continue to be uncertain. In view of the importance of the principles at stake, the Government will defend their position vigorously in the key cases still before the courts.
My Lords, why wait? Is there not now sufficient experience of the impact of legal hindsight when passing judgment on the activities of personnel engaged in operations or based overseas? Should not the Secretary of State revive, by order, Crown immunity, as the Crown Proceedings (Armed Forces) Act 1987 allows, to cover warlike operations in any part of the world outside the United Kingdom? Alternatively, will Her Majesty’s Government consider new legislation to define combat immunity, in order to clarify the current position? Could this be incorporated in the Defence Reform Bill now in passage through Parliament?
My Lords, I share the noble and gallant Lord’s concerns. He is absolutely right to emphasise the relevance of the 1987 Act. Our Armed Forces should not have to put ECHR considerations ahead of vital operational decisions in the national interest. That is why we are not ruling out any options. An amendment to the Defence Reform Bill would probably be regarded as outside its scope, but we hope that the Court will provide clarification of combat immunity. For that reason we shall defend this litigation with vigour.
(11 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in answer to the first part of the noble Lord’s question, medical reservists develop additional valuable specialist skills when they are deployed, which they then bring back to the National Health Service. The Defence Medical Services is uniquely placed to share the development of operationally specific medical science and clinical excellence with the NHS. The National Institute for Health Research centre has brought together military and civilian trauma surgeons and scientists to share innovation in medical research, to advance clinical practice on the battlefield and to benefit all trauma patients in the National Health Service at an early stage of injury.
On the benefits to an employer who recruits an employee who is a reservist, I would say that reserve service will benefit different employers in different ways. For some, the improved skills, experience and training of the individual reservist will be beneficial. For others, where the reservist’s military role is close to their civilian one, there will be more benefit from transferable skills. For some companies and sectors, reserve service suits and supports their business models. For many, reserve service may support corporate social responsibility objectives and may be part of their social action plans, alongside wider volunteering policies. We encourage employers to publicise their support for the Reserve Forces to customers, suppliers and their local communities. The second part of my answer was in response to my noble friend’s third question.
My Lords, the Government say in the White Paper that they will introduce new legislation to enable mobilisation for the full range of tasks that our Armed Forces may be asked to undertake. Current mobilisation arrangements are something of a historical anachronism. Invariably they require ministerial authority. They date from a time when protection for employers was nothing like as good as it will be in future. Will there be arrangements to allow mobilisation of individuals for very small units to be carried out without having to seek ministerial authority?
My Lords, I cannot from the Dispatch Box answer the noble and gallant Lord’s question. That point is not in my briefing, but I will write to him.
(11 years, 2 months ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what advice and directions are being given to Armed Forces personnel following the Supreme Court judgment on 19 June that human rights legislation, and in particular the right to life, may apply to Armed Forces personnel engaged in operations abroad.
My Lords, urgent cross-government discussions are taking place to consider our options. We will provide advice to members of the Armed Forces as soon as possible. The Government are concerned that the ruling creates uncertainty and will continue to defend their position against ill-founded legal claims, while continuing to provide our forces with the equipment they need, and ensuring that, where casualties occur, generous provision is made for troops and their families through the Armed Forces compensation scheme.
I thank the noble Lord for that not very reassuring Answer. Can he advise on this situation? A commanding officer orders a soldier to take part in operations overseas against an armed enemy, so clearly there is a risk of injury or loss of life. Is that officer’s order lawful? If the soldier disobeys the order, is he liable to a charge and court martial under Section 12, possibly, of the Armed Forces Act because he did not go into the operation? Is the officer liable to be charged or found disciplined under the human rights legislation because the soldier followed his instructions but was killed in battle?
(11 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, no Government likes making these kinds of redundancies. While reduced recruiting and fewer extensions of service will account for some reductions, a redundancy programme is needed to ensure that the right balance of skills is maintained.
My Lords, is it not the case that more than 80% of those who are on the redundancy programme this time are volunteers? If so, what does that say about morale in the Armed Forces, particularly in the Army?
My Lords, the number of applications for redundancy is not a good indicator of the state of morale because the Army has deliberately set out to maximise applications. Additionally, it should be noted that only 30% of those who were eligible applied for redundancy.
(11 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I cannot comment on what the noble Lord says about BAE. However, I compliment him on his resolute lobbying for the Royal Navy to attend the Royal Australian Navy’s 100th anniversary. The noble Lord has had a word with me two or three times about it. I can now assure him that the Royal Navy has responded to his request and will attend the 100th anniversary. HMS “Daring”, a Type 45 destroyer, will also be out there.
My Lords, bearing in mind the reduction in the number of surface vessels over the past few years, what commitments have Her Majesty’s Government had to give up as a result?
My Lords, the Naval Service, which includes the Royal Navy, the Royal Marines and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary which supports them, is able to fulfil commitments around the globe and maintain a maritime presence in priority regions, such as the South Atlantic, the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The Naval Service also safeguards the security of home waters, meets our defence commitments in the North Atlantic and the Caribbean, patrols the Antarctic waters and undertakes periodic deployments to other areas, such as the Far East and the Pacific.
(11 years, 5 months ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government why they did not approve the 0.5 per cent increase in the X-factor supplement recommended by the Armed Forces Pay Review Body in its 2013 report (Cm 8571).
My Lords, earlier today my right honourable friend the Chancellor announced in the other place that we would fund an increase in X-factor, so this recommendation will now also be accepted. This will be welcome news for service personnel and their families who should receive the increase with their May pay. This positive response to the Armed Forces Pay Review Body recommendation also emphasises the importance and the respect that the Government accord to the views of the review body.
My Lords, that is of course very welcome news, although I think it would be a shade fanciful to think that a topical Question could so rapidly change the Government’s mind. Nevertheless, because there has been a delay, can the Minister assure the House that the pay uplift will be made available on time in April, or will it be delayed and have to be backdated? I hope that the Government will do everything they can to ensure that it does not have to be backdated. Will this additional pay be available to full-time mobilised reservists as well as to service personnel?
My Lords, service personnel will receive the increase from 1 May onwards. I understand that it is the general policy of all Governments not to backdate, to avoid adding complexity and risk to normal administrative operations. The noble and gallant Lord asked if the uplift in X-factor will be paid to mobilised reservists. X-factor is paid at the full level—currently 14%—to all ranks up to and including lieutenant-colonel or equivalent in the Regular Forces, full-time reserve service personnel on full commitment and mobilised reservists.