Future Capability of the Armed Forces

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Thursday 16th July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, much has been said in recent months about the possibility of a Russian conflict with NATO. Such a war will be deterred if we and our allies react to strengthen our weak arms posture now. NATO’s potential military, economic and technical strength far exceeds that of any potential adversary. The challenge is to ensure that this strength is credible, visible and ready to deter any prospect of open conflict. Such determination must be led from the top of Governments. For the UK, a clear graph of intended progress to 3% then 3.5% is required, not ring-fenced with any “if fiscal conditions allow” type caveats of uncertainty.

As it takes two to tango, the assessment by the potential aggressor of their own warlike capabilities and chances of strategic success matter. If Russia were that opponent, what is there to learn from its fight with Ukraine? Far from being what was expected, namely, a quick conquest of Ukraine and a change to a Russian-subservient Government in Kyiv, the Ukrainians, after great difficulty and challenge, are now able, with much NATO help, to hold Russian advances and operate far into Russia itself, to Moscow and St Petersburg as well as into Crimea and elsewhere. Maybe Putin sacked some senior commanders for bringing him only bad news. Maybe their successors rely on holding their posts by reporting only good news from the front. Maybe Putin even feels that all adverse results reported reflect western propaganda and so cannot possibly be true, but what he feels and believes is what will drive him on.

While much of Putin’s available forces are fighting in Ukraine, there is much more uncommitted, with advanced capabilities in missile and maritime offence. Sub-conflict measures are already occurring and increasing in dangerous ways. But faced by a strong NATO alliance, would Russia believe it could wage and win a war of conquest, not just with arms but to achieve political mastery? One judgment might be that without the latter, the incentive to go further than sub-conflict measures may exist only if the NATO alliance appears to be weakening or even breaking apart.

While there are differences between last century’s Soviet belief in the worldwide spread of communism and today’s Russia, we learned from our spy Oleg Gordievsky of the Kremlin’s abiding view that NATO is an aggressor from its perspective. Since 1949, NATO has moved from the original 12-country transatlantic alliance to one of 32 that has grown and reached eastwards to the very borders of Russia, from its far north all the way down to Turkey—far too close to Mother Russia for its own sense of security. Now, NATO’s strong support of Ukraine and the US assault on Iran, with the expectation of NATO help, must only further alarm the Kremlin’s paranoia about NATO, so real and abiding tensions exist. It may not be possible to ease such confrontation in the military domain, but more might be done with arts, culture and sporting events to ease the existing tensions, and Putin is not immortal.