King’s Speech

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Wednesday 15th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, I too warmly welcome the noble Earl to his new appointment and join in the praise and admiration for his predecessor’s work in the Chamber and beyond. She was quite outstanding.

One much-invoked word in speaking about security issues is “strategy”, often coupled with another word, such as “defence”, “diplomatic”, “economic” or “operational”, or even “grand” strategy. A poor relation of this strategy family is the “exit” strategy. Far from being the poor relation, it should be one that is alive and well: never ignored, never allowed to wither on the vine. For clarity, by “exit”, I refer not just to military disengagements, though perhaps these are the most vital, but to a variety of situations where there has been a departure from the norm and the current state is non-sustainable and/or non-desirable.

Too often, the pressure of events, or their surprise occurrence, means that total effort is concentrated on the immediate response. At some later date, thought and planning get to focus on exit or withdrawal and its aftermath. However, early thought, ideally even before any major commitment of effort or force, should be given to that aftermath. Often, such premeditation may not be possible, but when it is, as was the case in the first Gulf War, it can be immensely invaluable. Whether government activity has been based on earlier contingency planning or rapid response to a threatening development, the record of forward thinking on how to end the deployment or involvement and manage its aftermath is sadly lacking. Going back to World War II, did the decision to insist on unconditional surrender really take enough account of the aftermath once hostilities ended? One can appreciate the strength of feelings at the time, but it left considerable burdens which only the victor powers could then support.

Since World War II, we have tended to be tied as an ally to the approach of the United States or to the collective views of NATO. Occasionally, as with Vietnam, the Government decided not to deploy forces, so no exit strategy was called for. If we had deployed, the decision on when to disengage would not have been politically possible until the US itself finally did so. Some would say that was maybe a sensible decision on our part. It underlines one of the most important considerations before getting involved: how much may we be sacrificing our own freedom of choice?

When it came to the first Gulf War, there were months between the first aircraft deployments following Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the start of hostilities in February 1991. In early discussions with my opposite number then, General Colin Powell, it was clear that we were on the same page. Once the military objective was achieved—forcing the Iraqis out of Kuwait and sufficiently weakening the Iraqi Republican Guard and its air force that a re-invasion of Kuwait would not be possible—we should move back home. A military exit strategy was established. This was good for the hosting nation, Saudi Arabia—which was experiencing considerable qualms about hosting so many foreign forces with their different cultures, and of course the expenses that it was meeting—good for other neighbouring states, and especially good for our own forces. Regrettably, the forward planning for the aftermath of military withdrawal fell far short of what was required.

Experiences later in Iraq and then in Afghanistan lacked the clarity that should be the bedrock of exit strategies, wherever it can be achieved. The abrupt and messy departure from Kabul in 2021 was a poor end to many years of bravery and commitment.

In wondering whether Israel will have a heavy ongoing responsibility in Gaza once the shooting stops, I hope it is working too on its strategy after getting what it claims to want: the unconditional surrender by Hamas.