Defence Policy (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Friday 30th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Swansea. As everyone would expect, this is a comprehensive and critical commentary on the Government’s published views on defence and security. It was very ably introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay. At times, it does not land its punches quite as trenchantly as it might and as the situation demands.

There is no doubt in the current international climate, with a resentful and maybe unstable Russia and with the Ukraine conflict far from resolved, that UK defence and its Armed Forces are not in a good place. Public perception may be less critical following the brilliant contributions by all three armed services to the recent Coronation parades, or their performance for His Majesty’s official birthday. Indeed, the public might feel reassured. These displays are all the more worthy because they have never been mounted with fewer personnel available. Many other operations and commitments around the world must also be met.

So why are defence and the Armed Forces not in a good place? It has not just happened suddenly, or even because of the more recent threat concerns posed by Russia; it is a long, protracted outcome of budget cuts going back 20, 30 and even more years. It was, and still is, poor performance in defence procurement. It was, and still is, expectations that our essential allies will help shoulder defence capabilities and costs, far more than has ever been achieved. It was, and still is, expectations of efficiency savings helping to square the budget.

Long ago—58 years ago—when I was military assistant to the then Chief of the Defence Staff, the new Government were insisting on a £200 million saving through cuts and efficiencies; £200 million then was a hefty 10% of the annual defence budget. Efficiency savings have been a perennial ask ever since. Expectations of their success have always far exceeded the actualité.

The Government will rightly say that the defence budget has been increased and they aspire to further increases; but, with inflationary pressures, even these increases may not mean that there will be any real-terms growth in the budget. I stress that long-term past performance is the determinant of where national defence capability is now. As night follows day, there is no short-term fix. Even a massive, immediate increase in funds could not be transformed overnight into new equipment, more trained personnel or weapon stocks.

News reports give no sense that replacements of our gifts of weapons and supplies to Ukraine are being pressed as UORs—urgent operational requirements—to speed up the procurement process. Apart from a recently placed order in Germany for 115 millimetre ammunition, almost 18 months on what else has been ordered? If anything has, it has not been well publicised. More importantly, when will it, or other, orders be delivered? Surely these operational requirements need real priority.

I welcome the all-party support for this Government’s commitment to provide massive practical help to Ukraine. I would welcome, too, bipartisan support for the nuclear deterrent force. It would be equally welcome if such cross-party support could be devised to work collaboratively on solving the many problems faced with procurement, for example. Both main parties, while in office, recognised that there were difficulties. They devised and promoted new schemes to overcome them. I have seen at close hand most of them come and go without ever achieving any long-term success; rather, party-inspired criticism prevails. Year after year, too, the National Audit Office or another Treasury watchdog mounts excoriating criticism of failures or of projects that have been much delayed and have grown in overall cost.

There needs to be a long look ahead—maybe more than political realities would normally allow—to address these shortfalls in defence capabilities and the essential weapons spares and stocks. I will single out just a couple of these shortfalls. Front-line numbers of fighting forces in all three services are too low to maintain conventional control in conflict for more than a few days if they suffer even modest rates of attrition. Recent practical experience of the Ukraine conflict has demonstrated, in spades, that weapon stock consumption is high, far higher than industry could be expected quickly to replace one for one. There are also novel threats from cyber, and in space, to grapple with.

The deterrent is often stressed as our greatest safeguard, but it must be credible to be that safeguard. In turn, its credibility rests on an ability to stand one’s ground conventionally and not to be seen by the enemy as a one-trick pony having to contemplate deterrent use or surrender in the opening stages of conflict. Defence capabilities and strength are not as they should be. The climate of threat is real, and in spite of this week’s upheavals in Russia, will not diminish. Defence needs long-term attention, real growth and greater cross-party support. What we now have is tissue-paper thin.