Armed Forces

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Monday 5th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Astor of Hever, for arranging this debate. He has been most assiduous in keeping your Lordships’ House aware of defence issues and this is yet another example of that. I also welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Garden of Frognal, to her new responsibilities. She has proved to be an excellent Front-Bench spokesman on other subjects and I am sure that that she will be equally good, or better even, on this subject, of which she has much background knowledge.

In this Remembrance Week, many families and friends of the fallen will be thinking of their loved ones—loved ones who served in the two world wars and in a variety of combat operations since 1945. Along with many others, I shall be honouring their memory next Sunday as I march past the Cenotaph with the Not Forgotten Association contingent, of which I am the senior president. While the majority who served in the two world wars or on national service were called up, causalities in more recent conflicts were volunteers. They joined the Armed Forces as a career choice, accepting that in the course of their service they could be exposed to real danger. Public support for Remembrance Sunday, as in your Lordships’ House, is thankfully large.

The recovery of the Falklands following Argentina’s invasion was ultimately a matter for combat operations and, importantly, enjoyed overwhelming national support. However, I fear that our more recent efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have not enjoyed the same national understanding or backing. Many reasons are suggested for this. The rationale for committing so much treasure, for sacrificing so much in lost lives and limbs, and for continuing over so many years—double the years that it took us to win through in World War I and World War II—is complex, difficult to explain simply and difficult for the public to grasp. But unlike with the world wars or even the Falklands, it is not easy to engender a sense of real tactical successes or even ultimate victory. Media coverage is largely confined to reporting casualties in Afghanistan, and much more needs to be done about that. Minds are now focusing on getting out of Afghanistan, and hopefully enough will have been done by the coalition to enable Afghanistan to look after itself.

However, the so-called war against terror has yet to succeed. There are limits to the contribution that military forces can make in the fight against terrorism. The enemy is not like a state, which is a geographic entity. It can and does threaten from many widely dispersed areas and in numerous different forms. This presents Governments with far more difficult choices for the involvement of their forces in support of other diplomatic and political initiatives.

The current approach is based on two incompatible assumptions. On the one hand there is the size of the financial commitment to defence, not just for day-to-day functioning but also for the future size and shape involving programmes that take many years to realise. For shorthand, let me characterise this as a commitment of 2% of GDP. The other assumption, now shown to be incompatible with the first one, is that the Armed Forces are to be structured to meet a certain level of immediate and ongoing enduring commitments without an honest costing of what that might mean for defence funds.

Most telling now is the number of criticisms of the MoD and Government by coroners dealing with inquests about the lack of life-saving equipment or inappropriate kit for the tasks expected of the casualty. This serves to highlight the mismatch in the public’s mind—their perception of a mismatch between the 2% GDP and what capabilities can be procured and operated on an enduring basis with such funds. Ministers would do well, if the 2% of GDP is not to be increased, to realise the risks of relying on urgent operational requirements and backing from the contingency fund in future engagements. They must never lose sight of the fact that those who will fight for them are volunteers who are prepared to pay the ultimate sacrifice. So service men and women have a right to reasonable expectations that they will get not only political and moral support but the right equipment in the right place at the right time when they are ordered into conflict in a war of choice.

There are two other particular constraints that do not seem to figure as strongly as they should, and attract little or too little attention in the ability of our Armed Forces to take on new operational commitments. The first is that no matter how much current equipment—ships, aircraft or armour—has advanced in hitting power and accuracy, these improvements provide no recompense for meeting geographically widespread commitments.

Noble Lords will recall the endless arguments about frigate/destroyer numbers over the years. My first exposure to this was half a century ago when a force of at least 55 of these ships was deemed to be the absolute minimum. Without going through each of the soon-to-be-breached irreducible minimums in defence reviews in the intervening years, we now expect to stand up a mere 19 of such vessels. Of course, each of the 19 will be more powerful than any of their predecessors, but you cannot cut any of the 19 in two to spread the coverage on worldwide commitments. The Falklands guard ship, the Caribbean drug-busting task force, combating piracy in the Indian Ocean and safeguarding the deterrent are just a few examples of worldwide enduring commitments, as of course are training and ship repair schedules. These could leave too little available for mounting any wars of choice with a maritime contribution. Air power has the flexibility and reach to move rapidly afar, but it, too, can become overcommitted on enduring operations, as we have experienced in the combat air support of Afghanistan—and that was before the most recent cull of front-line fast-jet numbers.

Another factor that has a bearing on numbers is the risk of losses in combat. Since the Falklands, our forces have been fortunate to operate in benign or near-benign air environments. Consequently, losses to opponents have been non-existent or very small. It would be all too facile to assume that future operations would take place in a benign air environment, with no serious loss of ships or aircraft or other major equipment. Experience in the Falklands against an enemy of only limited air power capability cost us dearly, particularly in ships sunk or badly damaged.

Losses in a fight with a better equipped enemy than we have had to face in the past two decades could be infinitely more serious today. Indeed, the very limited cover we might be able to mount for a carrier task force, particularly as we now lack the protection of any maritime patrol capability, could restrict its use to operations facing benign threats and an opposition without any serious strike capability. The Exocet type of threat has not gone away.

A defence budget of only 2% of GDP, which will include the replacement boats for the nuclear deterrent—requiring 25% or more of the equipment budget during the peak stages of that programme—has to be the driver for calculating the variety and mix of short or enduring capabilities that the Armed Forces could mount. This must be constantly reviewed so that Ministers are able to reach judgments on the use of the Armed Forces in the expected threat environment. What this produces must be the yardstick used by Ministers before embarking on any future war of choice.

Surely it should be part of the military covenant that our young men and women are sent on combat operations only when adequately armed and equipped for the task. It should not be acceptable that they have only additional support from the contingency fund but do not have the strength and depth of equipment and back-up for losses in conflict. Such losses cannot be made good overnight, no matter how much money is thrown at them. Unless Ministers are guided in this way, there will be more avoidable casualties in the nation’s thoughts on future Remembrance Sundays.