Autism
Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Earl Howe(11 years, 6 months ago)
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Earl Howe
My Lords, we will certainly consider the idea of an innovation fund during the course of the review. We have allocated some central funding already to support the implementation of the autism strategy, for example in commissioning a range of training products from expert bodies to support local areas and professionals. I hope the noble Lord will agree that the strategy and the statutory guidance that goes with it mark a great step forward for adults with autism in England. We now need to take an honest look at how it is all working and come up with further ideas and actions as necessary.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I declare an interest as president of Ambitious about Autism. Can my noble friend confirm that the Government’s review of the adult autism strategy will pay close attention to the kind of day support services, such as the NAS’s Horizons service, which the recent Deloitte report, Ending the Other Care Crisis, has demonstrated not only leads to increased quality of life and reduced dependency but has clear economic benefits?
Earl Howe
My noble friend draws attention to a very important strand of support for people with autism. Many people with this condition can benefit from small amounts of advocacy, help and support often through less formal support networks and not necessarily through the local authority. We will certainly be looking at that area.
Health: Cancer Drugs Fund
Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Earl Howe(11 years, 9 months ago)
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Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, as regards the introduction of value-based pricing, can the Minister confirm whether cancer patients will be consulted about the definition of value within that concept? Can he confirm that the impact on quality of life will be included in the assessment of value?
Earl Howe
My Lords, we consulted on our proposals for value-based pricing between December 2010 and March 2011, and as part of that process a number of patient organisations contributed their views, which were reflected in the Government’s response to the consultation, published in July 2011.
Health: Cancer
Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Earl Howe(12 years, 1 month ago)
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Earl Howe
My Lords, I accept that the uncertainty has been unfortunate and, in some cases, damaging. The noble Baroness is right in her broad observations. However, the intent to maintain networks was signalled very early on this summer by the Commissioning Board. The standard operating framework, which will apply to all clinical networks, will be published very shortly. I think that that will provide helpful additional clarity. However, I repeat to the noble Baroness that the aim here is to maintain networks and to ensure that the good work continues and that the expertise which we still have in networks is translated across into the new system.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, the NHS strategy document The Way Forward stresses that, as regards cancer, the new networks will focus very tightly on what is called domain 1 of NHS outcomes, which is reducing mortality. But surely for all those who have experience of cancer, is not enhancing the quality of life absolutely crucial too, and should not the networks be concentrating on that as well?
Earl Howe
Yes, my Lords. While the document to which my noble friend refers does make explicit that the cancer strategic clinical network will be focused around domain 1, which is reducing mortality, nevertheless improvements to patient experience and patient safety underpin all NHS care and those matters will be similarly embedded in the work of all strategic clinical networks.
Health and Social Care Bill
Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Earl Howe(12 years, 9 months ago)
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Earl Howe
My Lords, we are talking about Amendment 178A. I disagree with the noble Baroness’s reading of it. It is quite clear what it says. It is geared towards making the NHS the preferred provider. The noble Baroness shakes her head. If I have misunderstood and that is not her intention, I will obviously retract that.
Yet the amendment would increase the risk of commissioners facing legal challenge under procurement law. As the noble Baroness pointed out in 2010,
“procurement must be transparent and non-discriminatory”.—[Official Report, 9/3/10; col. 137.]
Amendment 178A would be a retrograde step. I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw it, as well as the other amendment in this group.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, is the Minister aware that many of us will welcome the statement he made? It was very comprehensive—indeed, more comprehensive than would be possible in many respects under an amendment to the Bill. He has covered so many different areas, both in terms of the provision-commissioning duties of Monitor and also the duties of co-operation.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, clearly I have the Floor. I thought that I had it after the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, as I was guided. I am very pleased to have the Floor before her.
What my noble friend Lord Howe said was extremely constructive, not only about the state of competition within the health service and some of the patching that had to be done to make up for deficiencies of the 2006 Act, but also to do with competition, the block exemptions available, co-operation and the general duties of Monitor. A law court would probably find it much more useful to have my noble friend’s fuller statement than simply some rather narrow amendment to the Bill. I recognise the deficiencies in my own Amendments 177 and 178. I much prefer the Pepper v Hart solution that has been found and proposed in these circumstances. The dangers of putting matters in the Bill are entirely illustrated by Amendment 178A. The Minister’s criticism of that amendment, which was made to me by expert competition lawyers, of trying to put commissioning in a straitjacket as is proposed—it may give the wrong impression, but it is ineffective in terms of EU procurement law—shows exactly the dangers of trying to put too much into the Bill. The Minister, entirely appropriately, has picked up many of the points made during the course of the Committee and in debate today and put forward a statement that will be used by those looking at provision and commissioning in the NHS in future. On that basis, I wholly welcome it. I may not be able to withdraw my amendment to the amendment, but I shall certainly not be moving my Amendments 177 and 178. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I speak also to Amendments 182 and 183. There is one simple point to Clause 77: it is there to remove the current legal uncertainty and risk of double jeopardy for foundation trusts under the UK’s existing general merger controls. The OFT already has jurisdiction to review foundation trust mergers under the Enterprise Act, but there is legal uncertainty as to when that applies in individual cases. That creates the risk of double jeopardy for foundation trusts under current arrangements, as their mergers are also reviewed by the Co-operation and Competition Panel. Amendments 181 to 183 are minor and technical amendments which make it clear that Clause 77 applies to both completed and anticipated mergers. I will reserve my remarks on the other amendments in the group until I have heard the contributions of the noble Lords who are proposing them. Meanwhile, I beg to move.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 184. In Committee, we debated the role of the OFT in merger policy and looking into mergers between foundation trusts. I tabled an amendment because it seemed to me at the time that the Enterprise Act was a relatively blunt instrument for the OFT to use to look at those mergers, compared to the usual way that it would look at the competitive effect or impact on competition of such a merger. The response of the noble Earl, Lord Howe, was extremely helpful in guiding us through the relevant provisions of the Enterprise Act—in particular, pointing out that the OFT has a duty under the Enterprise Act to look at relevant customer benefits.
The issue is that “customer” is not normally how we describe patients in the NHS and the way that the NHS operates is rather different from considering whether Dixons taking over Comet, for instance, will impact on the customer or the consumer. There is a difference. It seemed to me that the best way to handle the matter would be specifically to provide for Monitor to be inserted into the process so that it would give specific advice to the OFT on those matters. Although the definition is “relevant customer benefits”, its perspective would be on the impact on patients.
I appreciate the earlier amendments which the noble Earl has tabled, but this would add the extra dimension to Clause 77 which will enable the OFT and Monitor to have a really powerful role in the way that they oversee foundation trust mergers and, I think, settle some of the concerns which surround Clause 77 as drafted.
Earl Howe
My Lords, perhaps I may begin by clarifying the role of the Competition Commission as set out in the Bill because I think that there have been a few misconceptions about this. The commission would not enforce the Competition Act in relation to healthcare services, nor would the commission’s role affect the applicability of competition law to the NHS, and the Bill would not give the Competition Commission direct powers over providers of NHS services.
Instead, the Bill would give the Competition Commission two narrow, specific roles in relation to NHS services. First, the commission would be the independent adjudicator where sufficient providers or, in some cases, commissioners objected to Monitor’s proposals for licence modifications or its methodologies to be used to calculate prices or levies for providers to ensure the continuity of essential services.
Secondly, the Bill currently provides that the commission would undertake reviews of the development of competition in the provision of NHS services and the way that Monitor was fulfilling its functions relating to the provision of such services. Where it concluded that something was or could be averse to the public interest, it could make non-binding recommendations to the Secretary of State, Monitor or the NHS Commissioning Board.
I am aware of a concern that this wording could imply that the review should focus the development of competition as an end in itself. That is absolutely not our intention. That is why commissioners will decide when competition and choice will be used, and indeed whether it will be used, as a means of improving services and enabling patients to have control of their care. To make that clear, we have tabled Amendment 185, which provides that the reviews relate to the effectiveness of competition in realising benefits for NHS patients, rather than the development of competition per se. I hope that noble Lords will agree that this wording provides clarity about the purpose of the reviews and is consistent with the principle that competition should not be pursued as an end in itself. I therefore beg to move Amendment 185.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, it would seem convenient, although it alters the groupings, to talk to my Amendments 186, 187 and 188 at this point.
In Committee—and I am very grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Turnberg and Lord Patel, for supporting these amendments—we flagged our general concern about the risks of EU competition law being applied across the board in the health service. One risk that we considered to be high was the involvement to such a great extent in the Bill of the Competition Commission and, in particular, its role in Clauses 78, 79 and 80, as well as its role in reviewing competition within the health service and the development of competition by Monitor.
On these Benches, we, along with Future Forum and following legal advice, believe that it is necessary and consistent to delete Clause 78, which provides for a review of the exercise of Monitor’s functions and, as I said, the development of competition in the NHS. Government Amendment 185 would of course change this to a review of the effectiveness of competition in the NHS in promoting the interests of those who use the NHS. Nevertheless, we have considerable concerns about the involvement of the Competition Commission. The commission occasionally has to apply non-commission principles in its investigations. It may need to consider, for example, whether media plurality would be undermined by a media merger. However, the commission members and staff are steeped in competition law principles and it is difficult to get them to attribute equal weight to non-competition objectives. The experience of those involved with the commission is that it tends to focus far more on the competition analysis and is often reluctant to accept that it might be required to endorse an outcome that may be suboptimal from a competition perspective in order better to promote other objectives.
Judgments about whether competition or co-operation best promote certain objectives, including health sector objectives, are not clear-cut. Which side of the line people come down on will depend on their standpoints and assumptions about the extent to which competition is helpful in general, as well as on their experience. Regular commission members tend to have a strong bias in favour of the benefits of competition, and that strengthens our view on the inappropriateness of the reviews by the Competition Commission. It is not necessary for there to be a review of this kind either of the NHS or of the operation of Monitor. Indeed, I would argue that its very presence in reviewing both the NHS and Monitor increases the risk of competition law applying more widely.
Following the Future Forum’s report, the purpose of Monitor is no longer primarily to promote competition. Clearly there is now explicit recognition of the overriding importance of the benefits to patients. This is the key determinant of which instrument—competition or integration—is appropriate in the operation of the health service.
I have not put down amendments to the more technical areas where there is Competition Commission involvement. It seems that in many cases that may well be relevant in terms of the tariff and so on. However, we on these Benches believe that Clauses 78, 79 and 80 are a throwback to pre-Future Forum days, and we therefore propose leaving them all out.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Howe for putting forward these amendments, particularly Amendment 193, to which I have added my name. In Committee, we were concerned that the powers of Monitor did not reflect the general spirit of the way in which the Future Forum report talked about the mixture of competition and integration. Although the objectives of Monitor at the beginning of Part 3 were changed to reflect the Future Forum report, some of the back end of Part 3 was not changed to reflect that. These significant amendments, particularly Amendment 193, rebalance the Bill and makes sure that it genuinely reflects the intentions of Future Forum. I am very grateful to my noble friend for putting down these amendments.
Earl Howe
My Lords, this has been an interesting debate and I thank in particular the noble Lords, Lord Patel and Lord Warner, and my noble friend Lady Cumberlege for tabling Amendment 191 and for giving me the opportunity to explain the Government’s thinking on the important issue of patient and public involvement in Monitor’s work. We are very clear that patients must lie at the centre of the reformed NHS and that the Bill establishes mechanisms to ensure that that is the case. Health and well-being boards are part of those arrangements and HealthWatch will have a vital role in giving patients and the public a real voice throughout the NHS. I can therefore understand the intent of Amendment 191—and I wish that I could accept it. However, I am sorry to say that in practical terms it is not workable and I will explain why.
The list in Clause 95(8) relates to consultation but this is expected to take place before bodies such as HealthWatch and health and well-being boards are formally established. In other words, Amendment 191 would impose a statutory requirement with which Monitor could not possibly comply. The list at subsection (8) deliberately includes only those bodies that will be in existence at the expected time of the consultation.
I can nevertheless offer the noble Lord and the House firm reassurances on this issue. First, Clause 95(8)(e) gives Monitor powers to include in the consultation “such other persons” as it “considers appropriate”. Clause 61(7) places a general duty on Monitor to secure the involvement of patients and the public in decisions on the exercise of its functions, and we would firmly expect Monitor to use those powers to involve patients and the public fully in the consultation. Secondly, Clause 95(11) would require Monitor to consult with HealthWatch England, with the NHS Commissioning Board and with every clinical commissioning group in the event that the consultation takes place later than currently expected and after these bodies have been established. I hope that I have been able to reassure the House that Amendment 191 is not only unnecessary, but would actually put Monitor in an extremely difficult position, and that the noble Lord, Lord Patel, will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
I turn now to Amendment 196, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. The amendment raises an important issue, that of making sure that patients receive the compensation to which they are entitled in the unfortunate event that they are harmed as a result of clinical negligence. The Government agree that there must be equivalent safeguards in place for patients irrespective of who provides their NHS services. Currently the NHS contract which providers must hold to deliver services requires adequate and sufficient indemnity arrangements to be in place. In addition, to ensure equivalent protection for the future, the Government’s preference is to enable all providers of NHS services access to the clinical negligence scheme for trusts. That would mean that all providers of NHS services would have access to the same level of protection for patients, whether those providers were private, voluntary or public sector. The department has asked the NHS Litigation Authority for advice on the options for modifying the scheme and expects that new arrangements would be in place for the next round of NHS contracts in April 2013.
I hope, therefore, that the noble Baroness will appreciate that I strongly agree with the spirit of her amendment. Nevertheless, I must set out my concerns around its potential effect, if she is thinking of pressing it. First, the amendment could be implemented by employing organisations requiring indemnity from their own staff. Employees would then have to obtain their own personal indemnity. However, I do not believe it would be right to transfer this burden to staff or that employees would support it. Further, I do not believe it would be cost-effective. My second concern is about potential unintended consequences. Currently the Limitation Act 1990 limits the time available that personal injury claimants have to bring their claim. The overwhelming majority of claimants have three years to make their claim under the terms of that Act. Requiring all providers to hold indemnity for the lifetime of all patients, potentially much longer than a patient’s legal entitlement to make a claim, would be disproportionate and incur significant costs. Overall, the effect of such a wide-reaching clause would be to divert resource unnecessarily away from patient care. I am sure that that is not what the noble Baroness would ever seek to do and I do not believe that it is in the interests of patients or the NHS. I hope that on reflection and in the light of my assurances about what we are planning, the noble Baroness will feel able not to press her amendment.
The noble Baroness also referred to her Amendment 192, which I think we debated in a previous group. The Government have listened to concerns on education and training raised by her and other noble Lords and we have brought forward amendments to require the board and CCGs to have regard to the need to promote education and training when exercising their functions. Further, the Bill requires Monitor in Clause 64(j) to have regard to,
“the need for high standards in the education and training of health care professionals”,
when exercising its functions. I suggest to the noble Baroness that Amendment 192 is not required.
At this juncture, it might be worth quickly reminding the House that all providers of NHS services will be licensed by Monitor. The Royal College of Physicians has sought reassurances on how patient choice of any qualified provider would work. Even though the choice of any qualified provider is not in the Bill, I am happy to confirm that providers would always be required to comply with national quality standards. Under our reforms, providers above a minimum size would be expected to take part in the provision of education and training, and to work within agreed local care pathways to ensure safe and joined-up care. I hope that that is a reassurance not only to the Royal College of Physicians but to other noble Lords.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I shall speak also to government Amendments 197A, 197B, 197C, 198A, 198B, 199A, 199B, 200A, 300ZA and 300ZB.
Monitor will continue as the regulator of NHS foundation trusts, as I have said. We had always intended this to be the case and I welcome the opportunity to clarify our position. Monitor will regulate foundation trusts through a new licensing regime, which it will administer jointly with the Care Quality Commission. This will help to strengthen collaboration between the two regulators. It will license foundation trusts to provide NHS services, as it would license anyone else who wished to do so, to ensure that NHS services are protected as financially sustainable and of high clinical quality.
Part 3 anticipates that Monitor will set differential licence conditions for foundation trusts to reflect their unique status and governance structures. Monitor would have power to intervene and direct foundation trusts to take action to ensure compliance with licence conditions. This would include the power to enforce requirements on foundation trusts to maintain continuity of NHS services and protect essential NHS assets, consistent with its principal purpose, as defined in statute. Those powers are set out in Clause 105. I emphasise that these enforcement powers would not be transitional.
However, I recognise that this was not as clear in the Bill as it could have been. I am grateful to noble Lords, particularly my noble friends Lord Clement-Jones, Lord Marks, Lady Barker and Lady Tyler, for their work in highlighting this issue. I have tabled four amendments to Clause 111—Amendments 196C, 197A, 197B and 197C—which clarify the position. These enduring powers would enable Monitor to require a foundation trust to remove directors or governors in exceptional circumstances as a form of remedial action, where it considered this necessary. This would be appropriate only in the case of a very serious breach of licence conditions.
In addition, for a transitional period until at least 2016, Monitor would retain express powers to fire or suspend foundation trust directors and governors directly. As now, this power could be used only where a foundation trust had failed to comply with a notice from Monitor to remove or suspend individuals itself. These powers are for use when a foundation trust is at risk of breaching its licence conditions to provide NHS services because of a failure of governance. This is more likely in the early years of a trust’s existence, when its governors are all new to the role and are building up their capability to hold its directors to account. That is why the powers consist of those to fire or suspend directors and governors.
I understand the concerns of noble Lords to ensure that this additional power remains available for as long as Parliament considers necessary, while we work with Monitor, the Foundation Trust Network and others to support governors to develop their capability in holding their boards to account. Therefore, I have tabled five amendments—Amendments 198A, 198B, 199A, 199B and 200A—which provide for Monitor to retain this power unless and until the Secretary of State makes an order to withdraw it, either for all foundation trusts or individual trusts. I beg to move.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I want to speak to my amendments, to express my thanks to the Minister for the amendments that he has tabled, and to give a little rationale for why we were concerned but are now satisfied by the Minister’s amendments. On these Benches we were very concerned about the deregulation of foundation trusts in 2016. We believed that putting foundation trusts on the same footing as all other provider licensees was not only dangerous because of the risk of wider application of competition principles, but undesirable since district general hospitals—essentially foundation trusts—are the core of public provision in the health service. They are public assets, funded either conventionally by the Government or by PFI. Sadly, many of us argued at the time that PFI would be an expensive and inflexible method of financing healthcare infrastructure. Nevertheless, district general hospitals are an essential part of the NHS.
Therefore, we proposed amendments that removed Clauses 111 to 114 and retained Monitor’s special powers over foundation trusts unless terminated by the Secretary of State with the authority of an affirmative resolution of both Houses of Parliament. We were not saying “never” but the Secretary of State, after some years of the new structure, clearly needs to satisfy Parliament as to why particular foundation trusts no longer need to be subject to regulation by Monitor in this way. It may be possible to make the case for the deregulation of foundation trusts in the future, but currently the assumption should be that foundation trusts will be treated differently from other providers in regulation—not just in the transition period but in the medium term—so that Monitor will have the right to appoint and dismiss directors and governors in that period.
To that end, we very much welcome the amendments tabled by the Minister to meet our concerns. Our amendments talk of an order passed by the affirmative process and the Government’s by the negative process but I do not want that to stand between us. The Minister has gone a very long way to meet our concerns, for which I am extremely grateful, as are all my colleagues on these Benches.
Health and Social Care Bill
Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Earl Howe(13 years ago)
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Earl Howe
My Lords, the amendment relates to an important issue: the concerns among pharmacists about the risk of prosecution where they normally follow good professional practice but make an inadvertent dispensing error. I am very grateful to my noble friend for raising this issue. I warmly welcome the opportunity to discuss it and have been listening carefully to the points made.
We are on the record as saying that we intend to take legislative action to address the issue. We want to see a learning culture that encourages the reporting of dispensing errors so that any helpful lessons can be learnt. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, was quite right about that. However, we need to make any changes in ways that continue to protect patients under the law. The noble Baroness, Lady Pitkeathley, drew our attention to that aspect.
Section 64 of the Medicines Act 1968 provides that,
“No person shall, to the prejudice of the purchaser, sell any medicinal product which is not of the nature or quality demanded by the purchaser”.
This is a strict liability offence, and contrary to what my noble friend stated it does not relate only to pharmacists. Various other healthcare professionals could be affected, as well as other parties who are not subject to professional regulation. Guidance issued to government prosecutors in 2010 has been helpful, but we recognise that it does not remove the underlying problem.
My noble friend is to be commended for raising this issue, but the terms of the proposed amendment present a number of problems that we would need to work through before an appropriate drafting solution could be found. It does not cover other healthcare professionals affected by the current legislation, and in relation to pharmacy it covers only a proportion of pharmacy activity—retail pharmacy—and only where a pharmacist is responding to a prescription. The amendment does not address the different arrangements for the professional regulation of pharmacists that apply in Northern Ireland. There is also some ambiguity as to how it would be determined in practice: that is, whether a pharmacist would be subject to the revised provisions in this amendment. The amendment extends beyond Section 64 and would also change Section 58, on prescription-only medicines, and Section 85, on the labelling of packages and containers of medicinal products, of the Medicines Act 1968.
The legislative ramifications of the issue are therefore quite complex, and I am sure my noble friend will appreciate that we need to get this right. However, let me assure him that we have listened very carefully to the debate and the representations made to us, and that we will continue to work with all relevant parties to find a solution. I also wish to reiterate our commitment to bring forward a suitable legislative change at the earliest possible opportunity. I hope that with those assurances my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. I also thank all noble Lords and noble Baronesses who have spoken in the debate. I should at the outset have declared an interest as chairman of the council of the School of Pharmacy. My noble friend the Minister has pointed out, quite rightly, that the amendment as drafted only covers the pharmacy profession. He has also pointed out a point picked up by almost all the speakers in the debate, namely that the essence of the provision is the ability to admit and correct error, which is vital in these circumstances.
I welcome very much the forensic way in which the Minister responded to the amendment. I did not think that it was the kind of amendment that would cause Ministers to throw their hands up in the air and say, “Wonderful! We will put this in the Bill”. It needs refining. One of the key issues is that it currently only relates to retail pharmacy. Obviously, it should cover hospital pharmacy as well. There are also issues about Sections 58 and 85 in Northern Ireland.
The Minister has assured us that he has listened very carefully and that he intends to legislate at the earliest possible opportunity. That phrase was very carefully chosen, I am sure, as my noble friend always chooses his words extremely carefully. If the Minister would indicate that, if humanly possible, this will be inserted either on Report or at Third Reading—as the Bill provides a very good opportunity to include reform—I think that the pharmacy profession and others which, as he said, are subject to this kind of disproportionate criminal liability will be extremely happy. I am sure that they would be very grateful to the noble Lord if he could make sure that that was the case. The Minister is not indicating that he is going to say anything further—but maybe he will.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, the Minister chooses an even more felicitous phrase. I thank him, and I look forward to further progress during the course of this Bill. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Health and Social Care Bill
Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Earl Howe(13 years ago)
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Earl Howe
My Lords, if the noble Baroness is calling for evidence beyond the testimony of numerous NHS trusts, I am not sure what more I can offer her. I can write to her on this but there is very considerable evidence—almost a priori evidence—that if you restrict a trust’s ability to earn income which would otherwise go to improve facilities for NHS patients, you are damaging the interests of those NHS patients. That is an argument that we have consistently put forward ever since the 2003 legislation. However, it is also an argument that I recall Ministers in the previous Administration making when we last debated this subject at any length.
I was going to point out too that NHS trusts as distinct from foundation trusts do not have a private income cap. A number of them earn private incomes well in excess of many foundation trusts. There is absolutely no evidence that these providers are ignoring NHS patients as their prime responsibility—no evidence at all. A number of noble Lords, not least my noble friend Lady Williams, have tabled amendments in this area to ensure that foundation trusts must protect the interests of NHS patients above all and that public money should not subsidise private care. I wholeheartedly agree with that. I would like reassure noble Lords of the safeguards that the Bill already contains to this end. Some of these safeguards are prospective in nature and some are retrospective.
First, foundation trusts will continue to be bound by their principal legal purpose, which is to provide goods and services for the NHS in England. I am going to move Amendment 299ZA today to state explicitly that “principal purpose” means that the majority of every foundation trust’s income must come from NHS service provision. That amendment will make it certain that the trusts are NHS providers first and foremost. I admit to my noble friend Lady Noakes that this is something of a belt and braces amendment, but I believe that it directly addresses the main concerns voiced by my noble friend Lady Williams.
The second safeguard is that the Bill would make foundation trusts more accountable and transparent to their public and NHS staff. My second amendment in this group, Amendment 299AZA, would support that by requiring every foundation trust to explain in its annual report how its non-NHS income had benefited NHS services. The Bill gives governors, who represent the public and NHS staff, greater powers to hold directors to account and this amendment would help them do so. My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones sought to place additional duties on directors. The Bill would also place an explicit duty on them to promote the success of their foundation trust with a view to maximising benefits for its members and the public. If, for example, directors were to pursue private patient activity against the interests of members and the public, the governors would be able to, and they should, use their new powers to challenge directors or they could use their existing power to remove the chair and non-executive directors.
Lord Clement-Jones
I understand the safeguard aspect there, but what will the members of the trust or the general public know about how a foundation trust plans to use its assets in terms of private patient income?
Earl Howe
My Lords, it will be open to governors to seek information from the boards of directors on the plans that they have for the trust. They will have access to key papers. There should be no difficulty about knowing what the board has in mind for the trust in that strategic sense.
Thirdly, the NHS Commissioning Board and NHS commissioners would be responsible for securing timely care for NHS patients. They would be under a duty to exercise their functions with a view to securing continuous improvements in the quality of NHS services. That is an important provision too.
Finally, to achieve a fairer playing field, Monitor’s licensing regime would allow it to step in to prevent NHS money cross-subsidising private care. Foundation trusts would also be required separately to report to Monitor their NHS and private-funded income. My noble friend Lady Williams said that in her view it would be useful to have in the Bill that the majority of foundation trust patients have to be NHS patients. While I agree with the intent behind that thought, I cannot agree with her two arguments that support the need for an amendment. First, we do not agree that legislation should be used symbolically in this way. Foundation trusts’ principal purpose already covers the point that she raised. Secondly, even if we had such an amendment, it would not make any difference to how the courts interpret and apply EU competition law. It is the nature of the activities that they are undertaking that matter, not how many patients they treat or how much income they earn.
Perhaps I may make a specific point about my noble friend’s Amendments 297 and 299. They would duplicate unnecessarily the legal description of the NHS, which since 1946 has been described as “health service”. Use of the word “national” would be inconsistent with references to the NHS throughout existing legislation.
Just to elaborate on EU competition law, the Bill, as we discussed the other day, does not change the position on EU competition law or the applicability of the law. It remains the case that there is uncertainty on the status of NHS providers as undertakings for the purposes of competition law because no direct case law exists. In so far as foundation trusts already provide private healthcare services, they may be engaged in economic activity. Therefore competition law, both the prohibitions on anti-competitive behaviour and the prohibitions on state aid, may apply to their activities in these markets. Although the Bill would offer more flexibility to participate in these markets if the cap were lifted, it does not mean that foundation trusts are more or less likely to be considered undertakings in their provision of NHS services.
It was suggested by my noble friend Lady Williams that there might be a sort of case-by-case approach to lifting the cap. I recall that that approach was strongly rejected by the previous Government, and for very good reasons. We agree with those reasons. The disadvantages of that approach would be that it would be very difficult to set up a clear system and it would be likely to be difficult to administer and to increase bureaucracy. It would potentially lead to greater variation between foundation trusts and to claims of unfairness between different trusts, which could possibly be a source of litigation. It would maintain the problematic definitional issues around the cap itself. We are not drawn to that approach.
The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, asked whether we could consider including in guidance to foundation trusts the need to avoid double-paying staff. I think she makes a very interesting point and I can confirm that we will give that some active consideration.
While the principles of some of the amendments tabled by noble Lords are ones that we could all agree with, we believe that the amendments are unnecessary and could be damaging. For example, a requirement for non-NHS income to support only NHS services could mean that foundation trusts would find it impossible to invest in their non-NHS activities and therefore make greater profits to support core NHS work. We want to avoid safeguards, no matter how well intentioned they may be, having a perverse legal consequence on foundation trusts’ ability to innovate.
I hope I have said enough to persuade the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment because I am completely convinced that the necessary safeguards are there and that what we are proposing are the right things to do.
Baroness Williams of Crosby
I am happy to withdraw the amendment, but I would like the Minister to consider very carefully the words of my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones because my impression is rather the same as his, although on a much weaker basis of expertise. On the one or two occasions when I visited the Commission to discuss this matter, I had a strong sense that social purpose is one of the main criteria that they look at in deciding whether something counts in the area that captures competition law in the EU. I cannot speak about the Competition Commission in England because I do not have enough expertise to do so, but I hope that the Minister will consider what my noble friend has said because I believe that it is a crucial factor for the EU Competition Commissioner.
Lord Clement-Jones
I want to add one further point about “prospectivity”, if there is such a word, and governors and/or directors looking at the activities of the trust. It is important that one considers that point from the social purpose point of view. One can then look at the pattern of activity of the trust and see what investments are going to be devoted to private and NHS patients. That is an important part of looking at the risk factors associated with a purpose not being a social purpose.
Health and Social Care Bill
Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Earl Howe(13 years ago)
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Earl Howe
My Lords, I apologise to the noble Baroness if I skirted over the considerable number of questions she asked, and if it would be helpful to her I will write her a letter on all of them. Perhaps I may cover two at this point. As regards her Amendment 282ZC, our expectation is that Monitor’s licensing criteria will be light-touch and broadly drawn, to encompass a wide range of providers. The amendment she has tabled does not lend itself to that approach. Much as I understand the importance of this particular issue, requiring any and every licence applicant to meet a definition of,
“commitment to education, training and research”,
that Monitor has developed does not fit with the principles of proportionate and targeted regulation. But I will write to her with further reasoning on that.
As regards the noble Baroness’s Amendment 282ZB, which is about indemnity, if she will forgive me, again I think that I will have to write to her.
Lord Clement-Jones
I have another amendment on which the Minister might find a lacuna—Amendment 287A, which deals with the Nolan principles.
Lord Clement-Jones
The Minister said that he thought that the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Williams—Amendment 274AB, et cetera—would undermine the role of the Secretary of State and his ability to call Monitor to account. That seems a very far-fetched way to describe an attitude to conflict-resolution. The Secretary of State, particularly under Amendment 274E, is asked to resolve conflict. This is an addition. There is no other way, as far as I can see, of resolving conflict. A key issue, which has also been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, in this debate, has been the multiplicity of roles of Monitor. Therefore, there is a strong need to resolve such conflicts.
I ask the Minister to consider further whether that is really detracting from the Secretary of State's ability to monitor Monitor—in the words of the noble Baroness. We need a mechanism to resolve conflict. Faute de mieux, this seems to be the best one.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I hear what my noble friend says, but the fact is that the amendments he refers to would reduce Monitor’s independence from political interference. We are clear that we do not want political interference in Monitor’s activities. The intent of the amendment is clearly to give the Secretary of State increased accountability for the decisions around Monitor's functions. We believe that Monitor will be an effective regulator and able to deal with conflicts of interest. Clause 63 requires Monitor to resolve conflicts between its functions. If a failure to resolve conflicts between functions was significant, then the Secretary of State already has the power to intervene under Clause 67. Therefore, there is an intervention mechanism but we suggest that it should be triggered only in the circumstances to which I have referred.
Earl Howe
I refer the noble Lord to the remarks I made earlier. The provisions are partly transitional and partly not. It depends on which functions we are looking at.
I come back to the point I was making on the amendment tabled in the name of my noble friend. This provision says that in preventing anti-competitive behaviour that is against patients’ interests or in setting prices, Monitor must ignore the transitional functions it has as the regulator of foundation trusts. If the subsection were left out as the amendment proposes—although I know that it is only a probing amendment—when undertaking its anti-competitive behaviour or pricing functions, Monitor could also consider its transitional intervention powers. That could result in Monitor treating struggling foundation trusts preferentially by, for example, not subjecting them to its anti-competitive powers. I hope that that is helpful to my noble friend.
My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones spoke about the designation of specialist centres and expressed his view that that should not conflict with the prohibitions on anti-competitive behaviour and that, in essence, patients’ interests have to be paramount. I am with him on this and I would like to reassure him that patients’ interests would be the paramount consideration for Monitor in resolving conflicts that arise in the exercise of its functions in this way. Monitor need not take issue with decisions to designate specialist centres where this would improve quality and protect patient safety, even if it reduced competition.
I hope that those remarks are helpful and that my noble friend will feel content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that reply, which I have found very helpful. It was robust in one sense and has set out a robust framework in another. Although I was also interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Davies, had to say, in that it would tie us all in knots, I think that the Minister’s exposition was clear in that it has set out a suitable conflict framework. Although I cannot speak for my noble friend Lady Williams, I thought that the Minister explained the necessity for Clause 63(3) very well. His reassurance on the aspect of patients’ interests was extremely helpful as well, although of course it does not mean that the spectre of EU competition law does not still haunt us somewhat and that it will continue to be the subject of discussion, perhaps outside this Chamber. After all, that could override everything else if we are not careful.
I took considerable comfort from the Minister’s undertaking to review Clause 62 as well, because that is quite a shopping list. If it could be clarified, that would be helpful. His general undertaking to the Committee on the conflict area was also very helpful. In the circumstances, I am happy to withdraw my amendment.
Health and Social Care Bill
Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Earl Howe(13 years ago)
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Earl Howe
What the noble Baroness says it quite right. It would be open to a future Secretary of State to extend the period under which Monitor retained that role. My purpose at the moment is to set out the Government’s position. I am sure we can come on to debate these things, if the noble Baroness will allow, but it is important for the Committee to have the Government’s prospectus in their minds.
The remit of Monitor would be expanded to cover all NHS-funded healthcare providers. This approach ensures that Monitor and everything that it does is governed by a single, coherent legal framework and that all its functions are bound together by a single, overarching statutory duty—the one that I read out. For that reason, I would counsel noble Lords to resist amendments that may seek to achieve similar aims, but do so by retaining a separate legal framework for regulation of foundation trusts.
Many people have sought to portray the new role for Monitor as some sort of mighty club-wielding behemoth, dictating to commissioners how NHS resources should be spent. This is not the case. Monitor’s role, as set out in Part 3, is intended to support and complement the role of commissioners, as set out in Part 2. Our aim is to empower those commissioners—GPs and other clinicians—to take the lead, arranging access to services to meet their patients’ needs and stimulating innovation and improvement. Commissioners will have various tools at their disposal to do this. They will need to decide how to use co-operation, integration and competition to improve quality or efficiency or reduce inequalities.
In that context, the appropriate role for Monitor would be to support commissioners by enabling integration and where competition is used, ensuring that this operates effectively. Monitor’s role is not—I repeat, not—to impose competition from above. Competition is not now and will not be an end in itself.
Our strategy for improving the provision of NHS services is firmly based on the principle of autonomy and accountability for providers. Building on this, we have proposed functions for Monitor that aim to strengthen incentives for providers to improve, rather than simply relying on the ability for Monitor to set and enforce rules. Promoting competition is part of this, but again the context of promoting is quite different from the idea of driving competition through top-down controls. It will not do that, and it would not be effective even if it did.
What has struck me, looking at these amendments, is that, while there are clear differences between some noble Lords and the Government, I also feel that there is a significant consensus emerging. I want to reiterate that the Government are always willing to listen to how the Bill could be improved. I have listened to the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, but I have also studied very closely the amendments tabled by other noble Lords, particularly my noble friends Lady Jolly, Lord Clement-Jones, Lady Williams and Lord Marks, as well as the noble Lord, Lord Whitty and the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy.
I am sympathetic to a number of the concerns raised by noble Lords, which we shall hear about. I would like to highlight four at this point. The first is the Secretary of State’s ability to specify matters that Monitor must take into account. I am sympathetic to noble Lords’ concerns that we should clarify the mechanisms by which this can happen. The second is the conflicts between Monitor’s functions. It has always been our intention that Monitor should take responsibility for making appropriate arrangements within its organisation to avoid potential conflicts. However, I will explore this further with Monitor in time to provide greater clarity and reassurance before Report stage. The third area is failures to co-operate. Again, I am sympathetic to noble Lords’ concerns that Monitor should have the ability to address abuses and protect patients’ interests. We believe that the safeguards in the Bill already achieve this aim, but we will look to ensure that Monitor is properly equipped to enforce this. The final issue is reviews by the Competition Commission, where I sympathise with noble Lords’ concerns that the provisions as drafted may not yet fully reflect the revisions to Monitor’s role that were introduced in response to the NHS Future Forum.
That is all that I propose to say for now. I hope that it has been helpful for me to speak early in this debate to give some additional clarity to the Government’s intentions in this vital area of the Bill.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I very much appreciate the opening speeches from both sides on this group of amendments. I particularly recognise that the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, has put a great deal of care and consideration into the amendments that she has tabled and they represent a huge amount of work, particularly without the benefit of a Bill team. It is also clear from both speeches that now is the moment to start the debate about the application of EU and domestic competition law to the NHS.
The Bill contains a number of measures that could increase competition within the NHS at the expense of collaboration and integration and which, in my view and that of many of my noble friends, increase the risk that UK competition law will apply as if healthcare were a utility like gas or telecoms. Amendment 288G is the first of a number of amendments tabled by me and my noble friends seeking to minimise that risk.
I am not against competition in the NHS—I suspect that very few of us are—but it must be where it is appropriate. It is not appropriate in all circumstances. Public and patient benefit can often be secured in other ways. We have discussed integration of services throughout the Committee as an alternative and as a complement to competition. Having a balance and choosing the appropriate mechanism that is best for patients is what the debate about Monitor’s powers has focused on to date.
I accept that EU competition law has had some application within the health service for some years now. However, along with many others, I do not want to see EU competition law apply universally across the health service so that our commissioners and providers are required to operate a market-based NHS, red in tooth and claw, without being able to choose where it should apply and where it should not. In my view and that of my noble friends, the risk, for reasons that I shall explain, of a number of elements of the Bill being taken together increases the likelihood of NHS services being found by English and EU courts to fall within the scope of UK and EU competition law. These include, first, potential deregulation of FTs from 1 April 2016, in terms of Monitor no longer having the power to set special conditions under Clause 109 for foundation trusts. That is what Amendment 288G is designed to address. The stand part debates for Clauses 110 to 112, which I support, are also relevant.
Secondly, there are so many new areas where the Competition Commission is deployed. There is the role where Monitor has given notice to include a special condition in a licence in determining whether the matters subject to the proposed condition are potentially contrary to the public interest and whether the special condition provides a remedy. That is Clause 99. There is also its role in reviewing the development of competition in the NHS in the provision of healthcare and the exercise by Monitor of its functions in relation to the provision of healthcare services. That is Clause 76. Its role where there are objections in setting the method of setting prices for the national tariff by Monitor is in Clauses 118 onwards. Finally, there is oversight of foundation trust mergers as a result of the application Part 3 of the Enterprise Act.
Thirdly, after the potential deregulation of foundation trusts and the role of the Competition Commission, there is the lifting of the private patient income cap for foundation hospitals, in Clauses 161 and 162, which opens the way for some foundation trusts to derive the majority of their income from private patients. In that context, I am very pleased to see Amendment 299ZA, tabled by the noble Earl.
If EU competition law were to apply in an unrestrained manner across the NHS, private sector companies that bid unsuccessfully for NHS contracts could make a European competition complaint and challenge commissioning decisions in the courts, and/or the status of foundation hospitals, undermining the mainstream of the NHS in the delivery of services such as intensive care units, A&E, emergency cover, teaching, training and research. The number of such complaints across the EU has increased over recent years.
It was, of course, to minimise the risk of the unrestrained application of EU competition rules that the rules of co-operation and competition and the Co-operation and Competition Panel were devised in 2008. But this Bill, on the face of it, goes much further in encouraging competition. There is a view that the incorporation of those rules in statute is yet another reason to believe that the NHS is at risk in this way.
The applicability of domestic and European competition law to an NHS body, whether commissioner or provider, essentially turns on whether it is an undertaking for the purposes of competition law. Only a grievance between undertakings and abuses committed by dominant undertakings are within the scope of the Competition Act 1998 and Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. There is, in fact, no definition of the term, “undertaking”, in domestic or European legislation, so the scope of the term has been developed and considered through case law of the domestic and European courts.
I do not propose to give your Lordships a legal lecture—I do not believe I would be able to—but briefly, there are two cases in particular that are of some importance. The question of whether an NHS trust is an undertaking for the purposes competition law was considered by the Competition Appeals Tribunal in the case of BetterCare Group Ltd in 2002. BetterCare was a UK provider of residential and nursing home care, which complained to the OFT that the North and West Belfast Health and Social Services Trust, acting as a purchaser of nursing and residential care home services, was abusing its dominant market position in Belfast. The OFT rejected the complaint on the basis that the trust was not an undertaking for the purposes of competition law. On appeal of the OFT’s decision by BetterCare, the Competition Appeals Tribunal determined that the trust was acting as an undertaking both in the purchasing of services from BetterCare and in the direct provision of elderly care by its own statutory home. This was for various reasons, but of particular importance in the current context, is that in providing care through its own homes, the trust was also a participant in a market for residential care, alongside independent providers, and the trust was in a position to generate the effects that the competition rules seek to prevent.
In FENIN, a case brought by an association of companies involved in the marketing of medical goods used in Spanish hospitals, the European Court of First Instance in 2003 upheld a decision by the European Commission rejecting a complaint alleging abuse of a dominant position by 26 bodies or organisations, including three Ministries of the Spanish Government, which run the Spanish national health system. The Commission had rejected the complaint on the grounds that these bodies were not acting as undertakings in their dealings with suppliers. The Court of First Instance considered that where an organisation purchased goods not for the purpose of offering goods and services as part of an economic activity but in order to use them in the context of a different activity, such as one of a purely social nature, it does not act as an undertaking simply because it is a purchaser of those goods.
Earl Howe
Monitor would ask itself: is the arrangement we are looking at for, let us say, an A&E department that had no competition for miles around, anti-competitive? The answer might well be no, it is not. As I said earlier, the very fact that there is no competition to a service does not mean that it is anti-competitive. Monitor will make a judgment on whether the service is operating in the interests of patients. However, I think that we are getting into an area where it would be beneficial to have a letter from me setting out exactly how the law is applied and by whom.
Lord Clement-Jones
I apologise for interrupting the noble Earl. However, to guide the letter, I want to point out that one of the key things is economic activity by the foundation trust concerned. Whether it is engaging in economic activity will, to some degree, be predicated by the behaviour of the decision of the NHS Commissioning Board and the CCGs on whether it is appropriate that there should be a market in particular services from the provider. That gets another actor, or actors, into the equation. This is one of the matters that concerns many of us, because it means that it will be possible in the future, even where no competition currently exists, for competition to be introduced and therefore for Monitor effectively, legally, to have to treat foundation trusts as undertakings.
Earl Howe
My noble friend speaks with great expertise. It would be helpful if I could cover that point when I write, as he suggests.
The noble Baroness has indicated that it would be better to retain the Co-operation and Competition Panel as a separate body. I am very clear that the noble Lord, Lord Carter, and his team have done an excellent job within the Co-operation and Competition Panel since it began its work in 2009. The panel has published important reports on NHS consultants and patient choice; their specific investigations have resulted in direct benefits to patients, such as improved access to primary care in the Kingston-upon-Thames area—that is one that I know of. However, I would not advocate retaining the Co-operation and Competition Panel as a separate organisation, because that would result, in my view, in unnecessary fragmentation and, indeed, duplication. The arrangement we have at the moment has resulted in undue delays and duplication of resources, as the decision-makers have inevitably sought to review the panel’s investigations before taking any action. My noble friend Lord Newton highlighted that issue once again. I have examples in my brief which replicate his experience. Those delays caused unnecessary uncertainty for the NHS organisations involved and their patients. I emphasise again that our proposals would address this by integrating the advisory role of the Co-operation and Competition Panel as a distinct identity within Monitor.
The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, spoke of the searing experience of Mid Staffs. Of course, we all recognise that the problems of Mid Staffs must be looked into carefully. That is going on at the moment and I am not able to say too much for obvious reasons. But the problems at Mid Staffs, as she will be aware, predated its becoming a foundation trust. After authorisation, its governors were new and fairly inexperienced. Learning from what happened, I am confident in saying that quality now plays a critical role in the authorisation process for new foundation trusts. The governance of foundation trusts in which they are accountable to representatives of the public and staff should help organisations to listen and act on feedback. The events at Mid Staffs demonstrated the importance of having strong, transparent and accountable governance arrangements for the safe and effective operation of the trust. The changes we are making should provide greater accountability to the public and staff and increased transparency so that they can better challenge and scrutinise the delivery of local healthcare provision.
My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones asked what would stop Ministers creating new markets. I hope noble Lords will agree that it must surely be right for doctors and health professionals to want to do the best for their patients. Under this Bill, it would be for commissioners to decide if, when and how to use competition as a means to an end in improving services for patients. The Secretary of State would not have the power to direct commissioners on these matters and the Bill expressly prohibits the Secretary of State exercising his powers to make regulations on commissioning or in setting a mandate to increase market shares for private providers. My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones cited the BetterCare and FENIN cases as an example of how NHS commissioners might act as undertakings. As we have previously made clear, the Government’s view is that the NHS Commissioning Board and CCGs will not be undertakings. Unlike in the BetterCare case, neither the board nor the CCGs will be able to provide services. They will only be responsible for commissioning services for the NHS, which will not be an economic activity for the purposes of competition law.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I apologise. I expressly said that the concerns were not surrounding commissioning but around provision.
Earl Howe
That is helpful. My noble friend and I are clearly in agreement. I apologise if I imputed any different views to him.
The noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, indicated that she felt that the oversight powers for foundation trusts should be retained. As the regulator of all providers of NHS-funded services, Monitor will continue regulating foundation trusts under this Bill. These would be enduring functions, not transitional. I hope the noble Baroness is reassured by that. What would be transitional, however, is Monitor’s power to remove foundation trust boards and board members. That is what Clauses 109 to 112 provide for until 2016, although the Secretary of State would be able to extend the transition period by order, as I indicated earlier, if he or she considered it necessary.
My noble friend Lord Ribeiro sought assurances that all providers will work on a level playing field. I am happy to assure him that all providers will indeed be required to meet the same quality standards for the same procedures. Before being qualified, providers will be required to demonstrate that they can meet those quality standards and Monitor will set fair prices for all providers. Competition, as I have said on previous occasions, will be on quality and not on price. If my noble friend will allow, I shall write to him in some detail with answers to his specific questions, which of course were extremely pertinent. I will copy the letter to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate.
The noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, also said that the Secretary of State should not raid the budgets of successful foundation trusts. I can assure her that this Bill would not enable the Secretary of State to direct individual foundation trusts or to raid foundation trust budgets, which she has rightly cautioned against. She said that there was a need to ensure that the new system should allow care to be shifted out of hospital. I share her view on that. It is essential that the new system enables more care to be shifted out of hospital into people’s homes and communities. This will require strong commissioning, and that is a key point made by the King’s Fund.
Earl Howe
Once again, the word “micromanagement” springs to mind. We want to get away from the Secretary of State micromanaging the health service. On the other hand, we think it is perfectly right and proper for the Secretary of State, on behalf of voters, patients and Parliament, to set broad objectives for the NHS, such as the NHS outcomes framework. That document has been very well thought out by clinicians led by Sir Bruce Keogh in the department and has, I believe, commanded universal approval. Surely this is the territory that the Secretary of State should be on: to drive up the quality of care and the performance of the NHS, but not to micromanage.
I recognise that there are fundamental fears that this Bill would increase the role of competition in the NHS and take us down the road to privatisation. I need to be clear that it is not the intention of this Bill, and I do not believe that it is the effect of this Bill, to privatise the NHS. The Bill reaffirms that the NHS will always be there for everyone who needs it, funded from general taxation and free at the point of use. Extending choice and increasing competition is not about privatisation. We want patients to be able to choose to receive their care from the highest-quality providers. Competition in services, where it is introduced, should only be introduced when commissioners genuinely and for good reasons believe that it will benefit patients and the quality of their care. Should we allow this to happen without any check that it is happening legally and properly? Our answer is no; it needs to be overseen fairly and apolitically by a sector-specific regulator with the interests of patients as its core duty.
As with other parts of the Bill, I am more than willing to enter into discussion with noble Lords on Part 3, and I have already indicated that I am sympathetic to some of the key concerns which these amendments raise. With that in mind, I hope that we can move on and debate different issues arising from this part of the Bill and that noble Lords will feel content for the time being not to press the amendments.
Lord Clement-Jones
The noble Earl said himself that we are clearly in slightly—very—uncharted territory here, and referred of course to the OFT guidance. It is largely a re-run of the 2004 OFT guidance. It is slightly clearer because the case law is slightly more developed, but not a great deal more. We are in the area of assessing risk in terms of the application of EU competition law, domestic competition law and so on. Therefore, in these circumstances, we need the best advice. As I said earlier in my remarks, it is not so much a matter of the department asserting that such-and-such is the case but of having the benefit of some outside, independent legal advice—not that I am promoting the barrister’s profession, being a solicitor. Somebody well versed in competition law should be asked to advise on the risks that I set out at some length earlier today, otherwise we will struggle on with assertion and counter-assertion.
Health: Cancer Drugs Fund
Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Earl Howe(13 years, 1 month ago)
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Earl Howe
My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness for her work in this area. She asked what would happen when strategic health authorities are abolished. Arrangements from 1 April 2013, which is the planned abolition date, and beyond will be the subject of discussions between my department and the NHS Commissioning Board Authority. So I cannot give her definite news yet on that front.
I know that the regional clinical panels are using their own judgment to come to decisions, and it is entirely right that they should. At the same time, they are alive to apparent variations in the drugs that are being made available through the fund in different regions, and I understand that the SHA clinical panels are working collectively now to better understand the reasons for those differences.
Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I welcome the fact that thousands of cancer patients have benefited from the cancer drugs fund, but can the Minister give an assurance that those cancer treatments currently available through the fund will continue to be available when value-based pricing is introduced in 2014?
Earl Howe
One of our aims for value-based pricing is to give patients better access to innovative and clinically effective drugs, which, unfortunately, has not always been the case until now, hence the need for the cancer drugs fund. That is certainly one of our ambitions for value-based pricing.
Medicines Act 1968 (Pharmacy) Order 2011
Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Earl Howe(13 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Clement-Jones
My Lords, I declare an interest as chairman of the council of the School of Pharmacy of the University of London. I thank the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for a crystal clear explanation. I suppose, perforce, it had to be crystal clear to clear up some confusion arising from the Explanatory Memorandum. This is precisely the kind of uncontroversial deregulation that is important in the context. From both professional and consumer perspectives one could say that it is a perfectly formed small regulation. It affects a limited number of people who could not be responsible pharmacists in certain circumstances, but will now be able to be so where there are no significant safety implications from deregulating in the way that this order does.
I want to raise the issue of reciprocity. The noble Earl mentioned that the reason for deregulation is that circumstances have changed. The noble Lord, Lord Collins, also referred to that. I am sure that in broad terms that is the case, but I should be extremely grateful to hear what the noble Earl believes the level of that deregulation would be. I remember doing a study of several EU countries, looking into what was permissible in pharmacy ownership and the level of regulation. That was about five years ago, when the level of regulation was extremely high—not just pharmacy regulation but the kind of licensing required to run a retail outlet, and so on. We have some extremely well run chains in this country, which would like to expand their offer in the EU more broadly. They have been largely frustrated from doing so by some of the regulation that applies. Therefore, reciprocity in these circumstances is extremely important. I am interested to hear just what the Minister believes to be the level of significant deregulation that has taken place.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords for their support for the order. The noble Lord, Lord Collins, asked me three questions. The first was about whether there are any plans to introduce a standardised competency test to make sure that pharmacists from the various countries mentioned have all the required skills to do their job. Under directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications, which I mentioned, a pharmacist who holds a recognised qualification issued by one member state is entitled to recognition of that qualification in another member state, and would therefore be entitled to registration with a competent authority, such as the General Pharmaceutical Council.
However, employers of pharmacists should ensure that anybody they employ has the skills required to undertake the specific post. The General Pharmaceutical Council’s standards of conduct, ethics and performance, among other things, require the pharmacist to recognise the limits of their professional competence and practise in only those areas in which they are competent. Their continued registration is subject to adherence to the council’s requirement for continuing professional development—CPD—and standards of conduct, ethics and performance.
Secondly, the noble Lord asked whether there are plans to make sure that those in charge of a pharmacy have a high enough standard of English. The UK Government’s response to the European Commission’s consultation on the review of the directive on the recognition of professional qualifications clearly sets out the view that in the healthcare professions the ability to communicate with patients and service users is vital.
NHS: Cost-effectiveness
Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Earl Howe(13 years, 3 months ago)
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Earl Howe
My Lords, I must point out one thing about this report: it does not make any claims for how cost-effective our health system was at any given point in time. What it does is measure the improvement in mortality over a period and then assess the cost-effectiveness of that improvement, which is a very different thing. Yes, the NHS has made great strides in improving mortality rates, but that is the only metric that the report deals with. It completely ignores other measures of quality. It is also completely silent about anything that happened after 2005, so recent years are not covered.
Lord Clement-Jones
Is not the really difficult and vital context in which we find ourselves at the moment the fact that we need significantly to improve productivity in the NHS in line with the so-called Nicholson challenge, which was endorsed by both this Government and the previous one? Can the Minister remind us of the record under the previous Government and tell us what he expects to be the outcome of the current health reforms?
Earl Howe
I am grateful to my noble friend. A Written Answer was published in Hansard recently that tracked the changes in productivity of the NHS between 1996 and 2008. He will know if he read it that there was a decrease in productivity over that period of around 3.1 per cent. The pressures on the NHS are increasing. In order for it to respond to the needs of the future, including an ageing population and the cost of new technologies, it needs to adapt to new ways of working that reduce cost pressures while delivering improved outcomes. The measures that are before Parliament seek to do just that.